


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Ch. Darwin

CHARLES DARWIN

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A HISTORY OF FREETHOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

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PART III

THE SCIENTIFIC ADVANCE

CHAPTER XII

THE DOCTRINE OF EVOLUTION

§ 1. *Before Darwin*

1. OF all the ideas which undid the hold of traditionary creed on the general intelligence of the modern world, the most widely potent, probably, was the concept of Evolution. Welcomed in its *à priori* forms, it had partly conditioned the most original philosophic thinking in Germany in the first three decades of the century. It does not appear that the speculation of Von Baer (1828) on the development of all animal life, as studied in the embryo, made any general impression. Hegel recognized evolution only in "Spirit": not in Nature. But behind Hegel's evolutionary philosophy lay the doctrine of Herder (1770)—which remained vital though finally recanted by its bewildered author—that speech was a thing of gradual emergence in primeval man, an animal thus gaining on other animals; and the same concept helped to prepare theologians for an evolutionary view of the Sacred Books. It was, broadly speaking, the lack of such general ideas in England in the reactionary period that made the path of Biblical criticism there so much the harder. The vogue of generalities about "the progress of the species" and "the march of intellect" seemed to avail little for acceptance of any notion of "progress" in the cosmos.

It was not that generalizing ideas were wholly lacking. In a curious treatise published in 1831, 'An Essay on the Origin and Prospects of Man' (3 vols.), by Thomas Hope, celebrated in his day as a wealthy virtuoso and as the author of the romance 'Anastasius,'¹ there is a somewhat remarkable body of speculation as to the processes by which inorganic and organic bodies are evolved by forces of attraction and repulsion. The ideas may have been derived in a general way from Cousin or Schelling, who both employed them; but Hope seems to have

¹ Published anonymously in 1819 and at first attributed to Byron. Byron is recorded to have said to the Countess Blessington that on reading it he wept bitterly for two reasons, first that he had not written it, and, second, that Hope had. (Art. in *D. N. B.* on Hope.)

speculated freely on his own lines. And the process is substantially quite atheological.

He begins his treatise with the declaration: "I have, in common with every other human being who has thought, wished my life here to be prolonged to a happier existence hereafter. Revelation has in me to mere hope added faith." Yet there is no question whatever, throughout the book, of any Christian doctrine; no sign of any religious feeling; and the later avowed conception of immortality is wholly non-Christian—a notion of another world as necessary to develop the possibilities of the human mind. Hope quite definitely posits the scientific doctrine that all religion had begun in fear of evil spirits, the Good God being a late evolution. By reason, however, of the colourless abstractness of the writing and the thought, he seems to have made no traceable impression whatever, either on scientific or religious readers. It needed a concrete treatment of scientific fact, with some direct reference to religious opinion, to set up a sense of the actuality of the problem.

But for the great advances in geology and palæontology, the Darwinian doctrines of the 'Origin of Species' (1859) and the 'Descent of Man' (1871) could not even have been stated. They were the relative consummation of those sciences; and it was their cumulative impact that so quickened the whole process of naturalistic thought as to turn the balance of educated opinion away from Semitic dogma to a comprehensive rationalism. It is not to be forgotten, however, that even in England the "development hypothesis," as it was commonly called in the 'fifties,¹ had a considerable number of adherents, and some powerful advocates, before Charles Darwin was known save as a writer of solid monographs and of the charming 'Naturalist's Voyage.'

2. Darwin's own grandfather had in his *Zoonomia* (1794) anticipated some of the positions of the French Lamarck, who in 1801 began developing the views he fully elaborated in 1815, as to the descendance of all existing species from earlier forms.² As early as 1795 Étienne Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire had begun to suspect that all species are variants on a primordial form of life;³ and at the same time (1794-5) Goethe in Germany had reached similar convictions.⁴ That views thus reached

¹ As Spencer avowed later, in his reply to Martineau, the term "Evolution" is etymologically a more awkward one.

² See Charles Darwin's *Historical Sketch* prefixed to the *Origin of Species*.

³ F. C. Dreyfus, *L'Évolution des Mondes et des Sociétés*, 1888, pp. 10-12. "I take care," wrote Saint-Hilaire in his *Philosophie Zoologique* [1830], "not to ascribe to God any intention" (p. 10, cited by Whewell, *Hist. of the Inductive Sciences*, 3rd ed. 1857, iii, 381).

⁴ Meding, as cited by Darwin, 6th ed. i, p. xv. Goethe seems to have had his general impulse from Kiemeier, who also taught Cuvier. Virchow, *Goethe als Naturforscher*, 1861, Beilage x. As to the question between Goethe and Oken, of priority in the discovery of the homology of skull and vertebræ, see above, p. 128. As to the mistake of ascribing to Goethe an anticipation of Darwinism, see Oscar Schmidt's *Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, Eng. tr. pp. 106-21.

almost simultaneously in Germany, England, and France, at the time of the French Revolution, should have to wait for two generations before even meeting the full stress of battle, must be put down as one of the results of the general reaction. Saint-Hilaire, publishing his views in 1828, was officially overborne by the Cuvier school in France.¹ In England, indeed, so late as 1855, we find Sir David Brewster denouncing the Nebular Hypothesis: "that dull and dangerous heresy of the age..... An omnipotent arm was required to give the planets their position and motion in space, and a presiding intelligence to assign to them the different functions they had to perform."² Sir Richard Owen, as Darwin notes, had reached critical views on "creation" between 1849 and 1858; but remained hesitant. And Murchison the geologist was vehement against Darwinism, which he rejected till his dying day (1871).

3. Other anticipations of Darwin's doctrine in England and elsewhere came practically to nothing,³ as regarded the general opinion, until Robert Chambers in 1840⁴ published anonymously his 'Vestiges of the Natural History of Creation,' a work which found a wide audience, incurring bitter hostility not only from the clergy but, on the score of its scientific errors, from some specialists who, like Huxley, were later to take the evolutionist view on Darwin's persuasion. Chambers it was that brought the issue within general knowledge; and he improved his position in successive editions, especially in the tenth (1853). It remains, nevertheless, a distinctly naïve performance, from the point of view of later thought. "The book, so far as I am aware," writes Chambers in his 'Note Conclusory,' "is the first attempt to connect the natural sciences into a history of creation." As such, it was of course premature. Among other rash tentatives, it proceeded on the "Macleay System of Animated Nature," which, says the Dictionary of National Biography, had soon become "a by-word among naturalists."

For thinking men in general, on the other hand, it must have been as perplexing as it was suggestive, in respect of its theology, which belongs to the theistic school of Combe. Far from being "subversive" on that side, Chambers undertakes to aid the theologians in their standing task of exculpating Omnipotence; and duly takes up the favourite position that we have "the most substantial grounds for regarding all moral emotions and doings as divine in their nature and as a means of rising to and communing with God."⁵ In conclusion, he benevolently suggests that, even when we adopt his view of the emergence of the

¹ Dreyfus, p. 15.

² *Memoirs of Newton*, i, 131. Cp. *More Worlds than One*, 1854, pp. vi, 226.

³ See Darwin's *Sketch*, as cited.

⁴ The date is usually—and in *Chambers's Biographical Dictionary*—given as 1844. But De Morgan in his *Budget of Paradoxes* (1872, p. 210) declares that he has before him an 1840 edition in 12mo.

⁵ Ed. 1887, p. 280.

Cosmos and of Man, we may hold to the current sacrosanctities, "not one tittle of which may ultimately be found necessary to alter."

Yet he was fiercely denounced. A hostile clerical reader, Whewell, admitted of him, in a letter to a less hostile member of his profession, that "as to the degree of resemblance between the author and the French physiological atheists, he uses reverent phrases: theirs would not be tolerated in England"; adding: "You would be surprised to hear the contempt and abhorrence with which Owen and Sedgwick speak of the *Vestiges*."¹ "Contempt and abhorrence" had in fact at all times constituted the common Christian temper towards every form of critical dissent from the body of received opinion; and only since the contempt, doubled with criticism, began to be in a large degree retorted on the bigots by instructed men has a better spirit prevailed. Hugh Miller, himself accused of "infidelity" for his measure of inductive candour, held a similar tone towards men of greater intellectual rectitude, calling the liberalizing religionists of his day "vermin" and "reptiles,"² and classifying as "degraded and lost"³ all who should accept the new doctrine of evolution, which, as put by Chambers, was then coming forward to evict his own delusions from the field of science. The young Max Müller, with the certitude born of an entire ignorance of physical science, declared in 1856 that the doctrine of a human evolution from lower types "can never be maintained again," and pronounced it an "unhallowed imputation."⁴ And Darwin himself testifies, in the *Origin*: "I formerly spoke to many naturalists on the subject of evolution, and *never once met with any sympathetic appreciation*."⁵

§ 2. Herbert Spencer

1. But already a powerful mind, inspired rather by a thought than by special scientific knowledge, was propounding in England a doctrine of evolution that embraced not only life but the process of human history. It was in 1851 that Herbert Spencer met with Von Baer's formula (dating from 1828) that "the development of every organism is a change from homogeneity to heterogeneity." He had previously known that there were such changes; but the explicit generalization came to him as a new principle; and on that foundation-stone was gradually reared the cosmogony entitled "The Synthetic Philosophy."⁶ Ideas have their fates. Von Baer lived to oppose, in his old age, the doctrine of the

¹ Letter of March 16, 1845, in *Life of Whewell*, by Mrs. Stair Douglas, 2nd ed. 1882, pp. 318-19. If this statement be true as to Owen, he shuffled badly in his correspondence with the author of the *Vestiges*. See the *Life of Sir Richard Owen*, 1894, i, 251.

² Mackenzie, *Hugh Miller*, p. 185.

³ *Foot-Prints of the Creator*, end.

⁴ *Oxford Essays*, 1856, p. 5. In 1862 Darwin notes "covert sneers" at him in Müller's *Lectures* (*Life*, ii, 390). In 1873 Müller has become friendly (*More Letters*, ii, 45) though still dissenting. See references in that place to Müller's battle with Professor Whitney.

⁵ Sixth ed. ii, 297.

⁶ *Autobiography*, ii, 8-13.

Descent of Man built up by Darwin;¹ yet his early generalization served to inspire a doctrine of Evolution which finally enfolds Darwinism.

In point of fact, the thesis set forth by Spencer in his early article on 'The Development Hypothesis' (1852), that "not only had bodily organization been naturally evolved, but mental organization too," was already present, long before, in Herder's theory of the origin of language; and, just before Spencer took his cue from Von Baer, Steinthal had written, hyperbolically enough, that "As language arises, mind *originates*."² But Spencer knew nothing of Herder or Steinthal; and he has avowed in notable words: "If any one says that had Von Baer never written I should not be doing that which I now [1864] am, I have nothing to say to the contrary—I should reply it is highly probable"³—one of his few explicit acknowledgments of important debt.

2. Once convinced, Spencer became an evolutionist in nearly all his views; and his little essay on 'The Development Hypothesis' is what the modern press calls a slogan, of a very rousing kind. Two staggering thrusts are given to traditionism in the first two crisp paragraphs:—

Those who cavalierly reject the Theory of Evolution, as not adequately supported by facts, seem quite to forget that their own theory is supported by no facts at all. Like the majority of men who are born to a given belief, they demand the most rigorous proof of any adverse belief, but assume that their own needs none.

There are, he reminds the Bibliolaters, considerably over two millions of vegetable and animal species now existing, and the total number of past and present species may be safely put at not less than ten millions:—

Well, which is the most rational theory about these ten millions of species? Is it most likely that there have been ten millions of special creations? or is it most likely that by continual modifications, due to change of circumstances, ten millions of varieties have been produced, as varieties are being produced still?.....This is one of the many cases in which men do not really believe, but rather *believe they believe*.....If they have formed a definite conception of the process, let them tell us how a new species is constructed, and how it makes its appearance. Is it thrown down from the clouds? or must we hold to the notion that it struggles up out of the ground?.....

By such an attack, startling the orthodox into the horrid suspicion that the plain nonsense was on their own side of the argument and not on the other, a new preparation was made for the advent of the massive argument of Darwin, though in those years Spencer was working up rather to his own general conception of 'Progress,' as set out in the essay of 1857, than to Darwinism proper.

Latterly, it has been said, Evolution is perhaps more often thought of in terms of Spencerism than of Darwinism; but for the world of

¹ Oscar Schmidt, *The Doctrine of Descent and Darwinism*, 1875, pp. 48, 191, 201, 293.

² *Id.* p. 305.

³ Letter to Lewes, in App. to *Autobiography*, ii, 486. Cp. pp. 488, 489.

practical science as well as for that of the theologians the stress of the battle raged round the 'Origin of Species,' till it culminated over 'The Descent of Man.' There were many more men prepared to discuss zoology than were fitted or inclined to consider either a new cosmology or Spencer's 'Principles of Psychology' (1855 ; 2nd ed. 1870-2). Darwin himself confessedly knew nothing of Spencer's general theory when he published the *Origin*, not having seen the *Principles of Psychology*.¹ His concrete doctrine won by far the readier hearing. Yet it is important to remember that Darwin's reconstruction of zoology² grew, as did the contemporaneous theorem of Dr. Alfred Russel Wallace, out of a recognition of the Law of Population, first propounded by laymen in a sociological inquiry, and first reduced to decisive scientific form by the Tory clergyman Malthus, in his 'Essay on the Principle of Population.'

§ 3. *Darwin and Darwinism*

1. It was after the above-noted preparation, popular and academic, and other incidental utterances cited by Darwin, and after the theory of transmutation of species had been definitely pronounced erroneous by the omniscient Whewell,³ that Darwin produced (1859) his irresistible arsenal of arguments and facts, expounding systematically the principle of Natural Selection, suggested to him by the economic philosophy of Malthus, and independently and contemporaneously arrived at by Dr. Alfred Russel Wallace. The outcry was enormous ; and a section of the Church, as always, arrayed itself violently against the new truth. Bishop Wilberforce, moved to extra vehemence by the acceptance given to Darwin by Professor Baden Powell, pointed out in the *Quarterly Review* that "the principle of natural selection is absolutely incompatible with the word of God,"⁴ which was perfectly true ; and at a famous meeting of the British Association in 1860 he so travestied the doctrine as to goad Huxley into a stinging declaration that he would rather be a descendant of an ape than of a man who (like the Bishop) plunged into questions with which he had no real acquaintance, only to obscure them and distract his hearers by appeals to religious prejudice.⁵ Pusey entered the field, with the effect of eliciting Darwin's statement that he wrote the *Origin*

¹ *Life*, ed. 1888, ii, 265. Darwin "laughed merrily," later, at his own early remarks as to mental evolution, made in ignorance of Spencer's treatise (Fiske, *Life of E. L. Youmans*, 1894, p. 105). While speaking of Spencer with the highest admiration (*Life*, iii, 56, 120), he found him hard to understand (p. 193).

² "It is to this [Darwin's] influence that modern zoology owes its most essential pretensions to be regarded as of equal estimation with the other sciences" (Karl Semper, *Animal Life*, Eng. tr. 2nd ed. 1881, p. 1).

³ *Hist. of the Inductive Sciences*, 3rd ed. iii, 479-83 ; *Life*, as above cited. Whewell refused to allow a copy of the *Origin of Species* to be placed in the Trinity College Library. Darwin's *Life and Letters*, ed. 1888, ii, 261 n. ; White, *History of the Warfare of Science with Theology*, i, 84.

⁴ White, i, 70 sq.

⁵ Edward Clodd, *Thomas Henry Huxley*, 1902, pp. 19-20.

with no thought of theology ; though when he was collecting his facts his "belief in what is called a personal God was as firm as that of Dr. Pusey himself."¹ Many of the clergy² kept up the warfare of ignorance ; but the battle was practically won within twenty years. In France, Germany, and the United States leading theologians had made the same suicidal declarations, entitling all men to say that, if evolution proved to be true, Christianity was false. Professor Luthardt, of Leipzig, took up the same position as Bishop Wilberforce, declaring that "the whole superstructure of personal religion is built upon the doctrine of creation"³ ; leading American theologians pronounced the new doctrine atheistic ; and everywhere gross vituperation eked out the theological argument.⁴

2. In France, orthodoxy at once found some more astute champions. François Lenormant, the brilliant archæologist and orientalist, a devout Catholic, and joint editor of the journal *L'Ami de Religion*, resorted to a method of defence as old as the age of Galileo, and declared that the scientific proofs of the antiquity of man, which he accepted, made no difference to his faith in the Holy Scriptures, because these in themselves offered no chronology, and the Church was not responsible for the chronology constructed by the commentators. He accordingly believed both in geology and in the Bible ; and quoted in his support the earlier declaration of the orthodox scholar Silvestre de Lacy (1758-1838), one of the leading orientlists of his time, that "there is no Biblical chronology."⁵ Soon that compromise failed to satisfy ; and the readiness of some leading Catholic clerics to avow a "pre-Adamite" existence of man failed to avert the fresh sunderance of French intellect from revelationism. Some French clerics, notably the Abbé Bourgeois, a highly religious geologist, did much to advance the new conception of mundane evolution.⁶

3. That was to be the later position of educated churchmen, oblivious of the credit of the bishops of the past ; while, on the other hand, a strong minority of professed men of science in every country for a time set themselves against the naturalistic doctrine of evolution, though rejecting their Biblical basis to the extent of accepting geology against Genesis. They had, in a way, a lead from Darwin himself to a theistic formulation of the evolution process. He, as we know, though the son and grandson of freethinkers, was brought up in ordinary orthodoxy by

¹ *Life*, iii, 236. ² As to the fair-mindedness of others, see Darwin's *Life*, ii, 323.

³ Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths of Christianity*, Eng. tr. 1865, p. 74.

⁴ See the many examples cited by White. As late as 1885 the Scottish clergyman Dr. Lee is quoted as calling the Darwinians "gospellers of the gutter," and charging on their doctrine "utter blasphemy against the divine and human character of our incarnate Lord" (White, i, 83). Carlyle is quoted as calling Darwin "an apostle of dirt-worship." His admirers appear to regard him as having made amends by admitting that Darwin was personally charming.

⁵ Lenormant, *L'Égypte*, cited by N. Joly, *Man before Metals*, Eng. trans. 1883, p. 185. Cp. p. 3.

⁶ Joly, as cited, p. 186.

his mother, and "gave up common religious belief almost independently from his own reflections."¹ That is to say, he had no philosophic preparation, strictly so called, for an opinion on the cosmological problem.

Thus he could conclude his 'Origin of Species' with the remark that "There is grandeur in this view of life, with its several powers, having been originally breathed [by the Creator] into a few forms or into one; and that, whilst this planet has gone cycling on according to the fixed law of gravity, from so simple a beginning endless forms most beautiful and most wonderful have been and are being evolved." On that sentence Oscar Schmidt bluntly pronounced² that "in this concession Darwin has certainly been untrue to himself," and that it satisfies neither believers in a continuous creation by a personal God nor the partisans of natural evolution.³ And that was not an isolated position in Darwin. After the question: "Have we any right to assume that the Creator works by intellectual powers like those of man?"⁴ we have from him not only allusion to "the works of the Creator," but propositions as to the swim-bladder in fishes being "an organ originally *constructed* for one *purpose*" and "converted into one for a widely different purpose"⁵—all going to justify the claim of Whewell that the naturalist could not help using the term.

But these are rather avowals of abstention from philosophic adjustment of his problem than declarations, such as Wallace made, of a theistic faith; and at the close of the 'Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication' (1868)⁶ Darwin calmly confronts the theists with the insoluble dilemma imposed on them by their presupposition. Other evolutionists had been rather less prompt to face the issues. As we have seen, Spencer was explicitly deistic in 1860; and the whole body of naturalists and physicists prepared for themselves future trouble with the theists by adopting the terms "mechanism" and "mechanical"—both logically connoting "purpose" and "control"—in speaking of the cosmic process. That, being *sui generis*, is no more fitly to be discussed in terms of human constructions than is the hypothetical domination of cosmic energy to be figured as exercised by a Great Male Person.

4. In spite of these dialectic confusions, however, the doctrine of Evolution may be said to have supplanted, for instructed men, the doctrine of cataclysmal creation of species within twenty years of its promulgation by Darwin. From the first he had the weighty support of two eminent men of science, Hooker and Huxley, the latter the most powerful scientific controversialist of his time. Slow as he had been to accept the argument for evolution, whether from Darwin or from Spencer, up to 1859, Huxley

¹ *Life and Letters*, iii, 179.

² *Doctrine of Descent*, as cited, p. 162.

³ See the criticism of Zöllner, cited by Schmidt. In the first ed. the words "by the Creator" were lacking.

⁴ *Origin*, 6th ed. i, 228.

⁵ *Id.* p. 230. In the first issue we have "wholly" for "widely."

⁶ A continuation of the *Origin*, the production of which was delayed by ill health.

became immediately one of its most efficient protagonists ; and in 1863, by his lectures on 'Man's Place in Nature,' he gave a decisive lead to the acceptance of all the biological implications.

Darwin at his outset had definitely decided to leave the "descent of man" alone ; and the one passage in the *Origin* in which he had guardedly remarked that "light will be thrown" on the human problem by the study of the emergence of animal species was actually deleted from the first German translation by Bronn.¹ Huxley brought to the problem his special zoological knowledge and the architectonic faculty which was one of his chief gifts. His *Man's Place in Nature* was the most courageous and the most important act of his life ; and it was produced in disregard of the warnings of Lawrence.² As one biographer has observed, he forced Darwin's hand.³ It was on his lead that Haeckel, who acknowledges his special service, built up the case more fully, if rather less circumspectly. The result in England was that the shock of Darwin's 'Descent of Man' in 1871 was in a way minimized,⁴ and the effect of Darwin's new evidence was the greater as coming upon minds already in part prepared for his crowning thesis.

5. The transmutation of opinion had been continuous. Already in 1863 we find Charles Kingsley writing to F. D. Maurice⁵ that "Darwin is conquering everywhere, and rushing in like a flood, by the mere force of truth and fact"—this at a time when Lyell was deeply disappointing Darwin⁶ by treating the variation of species as still unproved and doubtful, in his 'Antiquity of Man.' Kingsley of course turns the evolution doctrine into "Natural Theology" and devout unreason, with his doctrine of a "soul which secretes body," as thus :—

If you won't believe [he tells Huxley⁷] my great new doctrine (which, by the way, is as old as the Greeks) that souls secrete their bodies, as snails do shells, you will remain in outer darkness.....I know an ape's brain and throat are almost exactly like a man's—and what does that prove? That the ape is a fool and a muff, who has tools very nearly as good as a man's, and yet can't use them, while the man can do the most wonderful things with tools very little better than an ape's.

Thus was Omnipotence once more stultified at the hands of its champion, to save the doctrine of the entozoic soul. But Kingsley duly proclaims that the theologians "find that now they have got rid of an interfering God—a master-magician as I call it—they have to choose between the absolute empire of accident and a living, immanent, ever-working God"—ever-working, that is, in the fool-muff ape, as in man.

¹ Haeckel, *Last Words on Evolution*, Eng. tr. by J. McCabe, R. P. A. ed. 1910, p. 53.

² *Life*, iii, 278-9. ³ E. Clodd, *Memoirs*, 3rd ed. p. 16.

⁴ Cp. Tyndall, *Fragments of Science*, 5th ed. 1876, p. 467.

⁵ *Charles Kingsley: Letters and Memoir*, 1877, ii, 171.

⁶ Darwin's *Life and Letters*, ii, 8, 9.

⁷ Kingsley's reference to Huxley, in his letter to Maurice, is replaced by asterisks in the *Life* of 1877.

Kingsley deserves commemoration as the Anglican cleric who in his time, following in the steps of Baden Powell, most energetically urged his fellow-Christians to recognize the importance of science and accept its established conclusions. His widow writes (*Life*, ii, 387) that the success of his appeal for a public cultivation of Health Science was "perhaps *the* highest earthly reward ever granted to him." In his lecture on 'The Theology of the Future' (1871) he claimed that "the clergy of the Church of England, since the foundation of the Royal Society, have done more for sound physical science than the clergy of any other denomination," and argues that if orthodox thinkers had followed steadily in their steps "we should not now be deploring the wide and, as some think, widening gulf between science and Christianity" (*Life*, ii, 348). His Dean, at Chester, remarked that "Kingsley's bent was, in his own opinion, more towards Science than Literature" (*id.* p. 414. Cp. p. 409, where "physical science" is declared to be his "favourite kind of literature").

The more remarkable is the warping effect on his mind of his religious training, which left him propounding moral countersense in his "Natural Theology," and enabled him to regard the Teutonic race as pre-eminently "the hosts of God." Dutifully following Maurice, he declares shortly before his death: "My rule has been to preach the Athanasian Creed from the pulpit in season and out of season" (p. 394). Yet he could proclaim that "God's orthodoxy is truth; if Darwin speaks the truth, he is orthodox" (p. 414). Thus he took up sixty years ago a position which to-day is regarded as courageous on the part of bishops.

We have a glimpse of him in a freethinking mood in 1860, at the house of Carlyle. With reference to sermons, "I hate the sound of my own voice," said K., "especially if I have to speak beyond a quarter of an hour. 'Tis a torture to me.....Judge of my feelings when I am obliged to listen to somebody else's sermon for thirty-five minutes. Think of 15,000 clergymen having to stand up Sunday after Sunday with nothing to say. Ah! the Reformation has much to answer for." [Turning to Carlyle] "You and your Puritans have much to answer for. Those men first started the notion that the way to heaven was by infinite jaw; and see what infinite jaw has brought us to." (*The Journals of Walter White*, 1898, pp. 134-5.)

How Kingsley reacted in 1871 to the 'Descent of Man' we do not learn either from his biography or from that of Darwin; but the general principle of the descent of man from lower forms was so far established for scientific and other thinking men that its general acceptance, even by theologians, was a foregone conclusion. Still, despite the plain implications of the *Origin*, the doctrine of the *Descent* came on many as a shock

of painful surprise and evoked a new fury of protest. Only slowly did the roar die down.

§ 4. *The Religious Adjustment*

1. In *this* intellectual evolution, of course, the acceptance of Darwinism meant new readjustments of religious doctrine, as had previously happened on the acceptance of Copernicanism and geology; with the same obdurate pretence of salving the Biblical doctrines of miracle, revelation, salvation, and immortality. Latterly, we have bishops in the pulpit insisting on miracle and Incarnation while assenting to Evolution, which is the negation of all miracle in the theological sense.

Immediately on the recognition of the force of Darwinism by the more competent theizers, the term "creation" was by them deflected from its normal theological meaning to one identical with the concept of evolution *plus* divine immanence. Chambers in his tentative and confused fashion had given them the clue explicitly enough, as had Owen's phrase, cited by Darwin, about "the continuous operation of creative power." All transformation of species through the ages, and by implication all transmutation of the inorganic cosmos, was now presented as "*the* creative process." Primitive animism had seen polytheistic immanence in all natural forces; Hebrew sacerdotal animism had substituted one craftsman-designer, with a corps of angels; Christian animism, long schooled by pagan pantheism, now grafted *that* concept on its motley tradition.

2. It has already become clear that the resistance to new truth in science is not merely a matter of professionally religious hostility. Mental habits prevail for error among scientific as among other men; and though in the case of a clerical scientist such as the Rev. A. Sedgwick, Professor of Geology, conservatism expresses itself with that special theological virulence of which pious men seem never to grow ashamed, Darwin had to contend against a great inertia in the scientific world. At bottom it was probably, in most cases, of religious origin, men of science holding to Deism as other men did. But it is on record that the first man outside the circle of Darwin's intimates to accept the theory was Canon Tristram, a distinguished ornithologist; and the hostile critic in the *Edinburgh Review*, who so revolted Darwin by malice and dishonesty, was Sir Richard Owen.¹ Malice apart, however, obtuseness was common. The cleverest of us, as George Eliot observes, are well padded with stupidity.

Lyell, who is so much praised for the "courage" of his ultimate surrender to Evolution,² greatly disappointed Darwin by his prolonged

¹ In the *Life and Letters* (1887) Owen's name is left blank in the references to him in the letters on the subject, he being then alive.

² In the tenth ed. of his *Principles*, after non-surrender in the previous ed. of *The Antiquity of Man*.

resistance.¹ Yet Lyell had been one of the greatest forces in establishing the equivalent concept in geology. Agassiz was a type of many gifted specialists who could not see the new light; and even Huxley had held out till 1858. And if Owen played a discreditable part, at times hinting priority² without avowal while anonymously hostile, that in turn is an aspect of the normal chicanery with which critics so commonly meet new doctrine, ignoring the innovator's best arguments and multiplying plausible cavils.

3. There was in fact only a gradual collective enlightenment, with only progressive approximation to unanimity. Wallace, who ultimately reverted to the Spiritualism which Darwin found so fraudulent and absurd, and even to the strange thesis that our planet is the "centre" of our universe, had met Darwin's views on man with dissent, and held that, as man has evolved the dray-horse by selection, so, in the case of man himself, "a higher intelligence has guided the same laws for nobler ends." The nobility of character of both men was such that they maintained, with all their differences, a perfect friendship, each acclaiming the other, while Darwin said, "I fear we shall never quite understand each other."³ Even Huxley made Darwin "groan" by his inability to see the argument about rudimentary organs;⁴ while Fleeming Jenkin, Professor of Engineering, impressed him much by producing "the most valuable criticism ever made on his views."⁵ On the other hand, Sir W. Thomson and other physicists zealously darkened the problem by dogmatizing idly on the possible age of the earth. Most forms of error were active on the scientific plane.

4. The great difference, on retrospect, is the relative rapidity with which, in the scientific debate, reason dissolves dissents, as compared with the age-long quarrels of theology, with their immeasurable rancours. Here, evidently, we have to look for a law or laws of causation; and, recognizing in the world of ideas as in that of animal life a "struggle for existence," we seem to find the clues, on one hand, in the dominion of subjectivism, of the intuitional and the emotional, in all matters of religion, to the stultification of the rational; and, on the other hand, in the "dynamic" operation of institutions, of the pecuniary interest, of the total "economic factor," in all affairs of popular credence. Scientific doctrines,⁶ happily, are not "endowed" as are creeds; and, having no salaried defenders, are open to speedy modification—the more speedy as theistic presupposition recedes.

¹ *Life*, iii, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 20.

² *Id.* p. 109. The case of Owen is judicially stated in *D. N. B.* Youmans writes in 1862 that Owen and Huxley "hate and despise each other" (*Life*, by John Fiske, p. 139). Huxley, however, magnanimously contributed a chapter to the *Life* of Owen. See Huxley's *Life*, iii, 273-5.

³ *Life*, iii, 125.

⁴ *Id.* p. 119.

⁵ *Id.* p. 109.

⁶ With the one anomalous exception of the practice of vaccination, the opprobrium of contemporary medicine.

5. On the other side also, however, there was no concerted theological policy, at least in England and America. In the past, official clerical publicists had openly denied, in the interests of Bibliolatry, that the Design Argument in itself had a logical basis. Only Revelation could serve—though scientific and other laymen were always using the Design Argument for religion. Now that Revelation was being utterly discredited as regarded the creation story, the Design Argument must be reinstated as a philosophic, nay, a scientific inference from Nature. But Whewell, the accredited representative of theologically accepted science, had explicitly declared for the presence of design only in organic Nature,¹ implicitly excluding it from the inorganic. It was now growing more and more clear, however, that inorganic Nature is a vital element in the evolution of the organic; and Whewell, in his 'History of Scientific Ideas' (1858),² in one of his hesitating and hedging chapters on 'Palætiology,' avows an unbroken series of *causes* throughout organic and inorganic Nature without saying anything in that connection of design.³

6. Others saw, with Kingsley, the need of going much further if Theism was to be saved; and in 1863 we find the Unitarian J. J. Tayler, the colleague of Martineau, though still "startled" by the Darwinian theory, quite ready to define creation as "a progressive and continuous work of God."⁴ This was to be, of necessity, the position of philosophic Theism in the future, in face of all the desperate difficulties of the association of benevolent purpose and control with all the physical and moral evil of the universe. It was systematically expounded in France by Paul Janet in his *Causes Finales* (1877; Eng. tr. 1878). But Janet (whose philosophic positions will be dealt with hereinafter) merely saddled Theism with the difficulties which he charged on the non-theistic view of Evolution. Without Final Causes, = the Purposes of an Infinite Moral Being, he declared, he found Evolution inexplicable. The answer was that evolutionary science does not pretend to "explain" the Infinite, but merely to trace sequences; and that his Infinite Moral Being, perpetually working evil, was only a new formulation of an old chimera. Prudent theists were careful to say that they did not proffer moral "explanations," but merely a cosmic formula.

The new position, as we have seen, had previously been taken up by men of science. Immediately on the issue of the *Origin*, further, we find Babbage "quite convinced that the development theory is the true one; that an intermeddling series of creations are not the work of an all-powerful, but that an endless succession of incidents and events planned to grow out of one primordial form *is* the work of an All-

¹ *History of the Inductive Sciences*, 3rd ed. iii, 382, 387.

² Recast of part of the *Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences*, 1840, 1847.

³ Work cited, 3rd ed. ii, 276.

⁴ *Letters of John James Tayler*, ed. 1873, ii, 223. We have seen the position taken by Miss Hennell in 1857.

Powerful."¹ He had previously convinced three theists (two of them clergymen, one the son of Malthus) of the scientific force of such a theory by sketching a development of his calculating machine—apparently on the lines indicated in his 'Ninth Bridgewater Treatise,' where he stands for miracles, which Darwinism dismisses. The reporter (himself a religious man) adds that Babbage "thinks he will write another Bridgewater treatise and speak plainly what he thinks on these questions, regardless of consequences. Of revelation he says that man's reason is his revelation, and asks 'What evidence would convince any individual that he himself had received a revelation? How could he satisfy his own mind?'"

Such a theorem of perpetual creation might be termed, as aforesaid, a partially new species of pantheism, acceptable as such to Emerson and his school. But the issue was not really new even for modern theology, though the Victorian theologians did not seem to be aware of it. To say nothing of the fact that the battle had been fought two centuries before in France, over Malebranche, it was an old issue in England. About the time of Malebranche, Dr. Ralph Cudworth, in his great treatise against atheism, 'The Intellectual System of the Universe' (1678), had avowed that the notion of Deity perpetually controlling Nature in every detail was not "decorous," as it "would render divine Providence operose, solicitous, and distractious." He turned, accordingly, to pagan philosophy with, it may be, an eye on Descartes, for the doctrine of a "plastic Nature," a non-personal power implanted by Deity in Nature, which could run the machine without divine interference, and could thus incidentally commit "errors and bumbles" that Omnipotence would of course not have permitted had it been immediately at work.

Cudworth, naturally, incurred the charge of atheism² by thus positing a licensed impersonal Nature, prayer to which would be an absurdity, and the theory of which conceded to the atheists that the cosmic mechanism *could* go on without divine intervention. Post-Darwinian theism, mindful neither of Mansel nor of Cudworth, and oblivious of Malebranche, posited divine Immanence in the cosmic process without reflecting that either effective prayer was once more negated or the Deity was presented as having no "laws," but as carrying on the cosmic process in a fashion truly "operose, solicitous, and distractious"—the fashion, in short, of the God of Israel. Mansel's Absolute was thus once more tacitly disavowed, and theistic philosophy planted afresh on the plane of dogma.

7. The situation was made clear when Spencer replied to Martineau's criticism of the doctrine of Evolution (1872). To that powerful rebuttal³ Martineau never replied, though he privately claimed, idly enough, that

¹ *The Journals of Walter White*, 1898, p. 126.

² References and citations in *The Dynamics of Religion*, pp. 82-6,

³ 'Mr. Martineau on Evolution,' in *Essays*, vol. iii,

Spencer had missed his "intended" argument.¹ His supporters, in turn, being *a priori* theists, could not see that his general argument is not only a body of self-contradiction, culminating in its ethic, but that the alleged psychological necessity of the theistic intuition exists only as an acquired psychic habit, and has no existence for minds of another habit. The Martineau theorem was thus, for the latter, on a par with Catholicism. Meanwhile, all forms of science were conducted with an increasing disregard of religious pretences, though surviving theistic scientists continued to proffer anti-evolutionary teaching.²

§ 5. *European Acceptance*

1. In Germany, ostensibly prepared by so much pre-Darwinian evolutionary thought, there was speedy support, but widespread debate.³ It is to be remembered that in Germany, where the thesis of "Entwicklung" had emerged in the eighteenth century in the mistaken idea of an "unfolding" of all animal organisms from an ovum which contained all their parts (an error exposed by C. F. Wolff in 1759), "evolution" in the fifties still meant just embryology.⁴ Darwin had therefore to meet there as much scientific resistance as anywhere else. Fritz Müller, the embryologist, was an early convert, and came out in 1864 with a treatise '*Für Darwin*'; but Berlin was conspicuously hostile, though in 1867 Darwin received the Prussian Order 'Pour le mérite.' Ernst Haeckel, researching in Italy in 1859, first heard of the new doctrine as being set forth in "a remarkable work by a crazy Englishman"; and when he quickly assimilated it he found all the eminent German authorities contemptuously hostile. When he first openly advocated Darwin's theory at a scientific congress at Stettin in 1863 he was "almost alone, and was blamed by the great majority for taking up seriously so fantastic a doctrine, 'the dream of an after-dinner nap,' as the Göttingen zoologist Keferstein called it."⁵

Strangely enough, the one whole-hearted Darwinian in Berlin Uni-

¹ *Life and Letters*, ii, 7.

² E.g. *The Story of the Earth and Man*, by Sir J. W. Dawson, LL.D., F.R.S., F.G.S., McGill College, Montreal, 1873, of which the tenth edition appeared in 1890. This author distinguished himself by denouncing "the bald metaphysical speculation so rife in our time" and "that materialistic infidelity which, by robbing nature of the spiritual element, and of its presiding Divinity, makes science dry, barren, and repulsive, diminishes its educational value, and even renders it less efficient for purposes of practical research" (work cited, pref.). Unfortunately his own repute as a geologist is bad. What he insisted on describing as an Eozoon, "the oldest known animal" (work cited, 10th ed. p. 24) and as "an organism with the structure of a foraminifer," is "now regarded as a mineral structure"; and his dating of the appearance of man on the planet was long ago dismissed. Yet he was President of the British Association in 1886.

³ Schmidt, p. 6.

⁴ Haeckel, *Last Words on Evolution*, Eng. tr. by J. McCabe, R. P. A. ed. 1910, pp. 18, 23, 24.

⁵ *Last Words on Evolution*, as cited, p. 29.

versity¹ for many years was a pious Christian botanist, Alexander Braun, a strong Conservative in politics, who had no academic influence. Adolf Bastian, the anthropologist, was persistently hostile; and the distinguished pathologist Rudolf Virchow, first favourable, then sceptical, and finally hostile, delivered (1877) an anti-evolutionary address which was followed by a press campaign against Darwinism, as the real inspirer of the policy of assassination among the nihilistic Social Democrats of the time.² Virchow had definitely demanded that Darwinism should be excluded from the schools as dangerous to the State, thus giving a "scientific" lead to the American Fundamentalism of fifty years later.

The attack was powerfully met by Haeckel, who had been among the first experimental exponents of the new doctrine, out-Darwining Darwin in a fashion which disturbed *him* and brought on Haeckel much scientific obloquy, not wholly undeserved. He was now the fiery champion of Darwinism, after having been the admiring pupil and assistant of Virchow. Following Huxley's definite lead of 1863, he had insisted from the first that Man comes into the natural process; and it was at this angle of the problem that Virchow had been driven, apparently rather from socio-political than from scientific considerations, to renounce his earlier support of Darwinism in general.

Being specially attacked, Haeckel was driven to a defensive which became an offensive, embodying a rejoinder to the earlier (1872) reactionary address of Du Bois-Reymond, with its celebrated pronouncement, "Ignoramus, Ignorabimus," in regard to the relations of mind and matter. Virchow and Du Bois-Reymond, both reactionary to their earlier evolutionism, had the shocking experience of being told by their junior that they were ignorant of the modern advances in morphology, Berlin University having been at a standstill in that department since the death of Julius Müller. For himself, Haeckel confessed to having committed "youthful extravagances" in his 'General Morphology' (1866) and 'History of Creation' (1868), which he sincerely lamented, but which had done no serious harm.

2. In due course Berlin University, thus chastened by "little Jena," returned largely to the path of progress. Inevitably German men of

¹ See Haeckel's *Freedom in Science and Teaching*, Eng. trans. 1879, as to Braun, pp. 115-6. The book is a searching criticism of Virchow and Du Bois-Reymond, the outstanding reactionary German scientists of 1877, and is thus a historical document in regard to the German claim to exceptional openness of mind in regard to innovating doctrine. "In no other city of Germany," writes Haeckel (p. 115), "has evolution in general, as well as Darwinism in particular, been so little valued, so utterly misunderstood, and treated with such sovereign disdain, as in Berlin. Nay, Adolf Bastian, the most zealous of all the Berlin opponents of our doctrines, has insisted on these facts with peculiar satisfaction." The new German imperialism of the 'seventies seems to have been one of the factors.

² Darwin's *Life and Letters*, iii, 236.



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science in the end accepted the essentials of Darwinism as men of science did elsewhere. As Huxley observed,¹ there was in the German case the special difficulty that many were evolutionists à priori, and were rather disgusted "at being offered an inductive and experimental foundation for a conviction which they had reached by a shorter cut." But though there was apriorism even in Haeckel, his adoption of evolution was none the less an acceptance of inductive method; and his contribution to the establishment of Darwinism has been one of the most powerful. As Krause testified, the vehemence of Haeckel in fighting the battle of Darwinism in the 'sixties brought it about that "in a surprisingly short time it became the fashion in Germany that Haeckel alone should be abused, while Darwin was held up as the ideal of forethought and moderation."²

3. In France, the acceptance was still slower. There the influence of the authority of Cuvier, obliterating Lamarckism,³ is seen to be instructively prevalent long after his time—another illustration of the normality of certain psychic processes in the world of ideas as in the world of action. In 1868 Darwin writes that "All the great authorities of the Institute [Gaudry being "almost the one exception"] seem firmly resolved to believe in the immutability of species, and this has always astonished me";⁴ while "a week hardly passes without my hearing of some naturalist in Germany who supports my views, and often puts exaggerated value on my works."⁵ Charles-Victor Naudin, whom Darwin had cited in his 'Historical Sketch' as one of his forerunners, albeit with implications which Darwin cannot accept, came out against him as still an evolutionist but an opponent of the maxim of gradual transformation. He argued, on the contrary, that changes of species were sudden—a view still maintained by some naturalists.⁶ But in France too the balance gradually swung to Darwin's side after the downfall of the Empire had let fresh air into the mental world.⁷ National disaster brought in its train a resolute resort to exact thinking in every field of study; and perhaps in no country, latterly, has traditionism been less potent to sway opinion at intellectual levels.

4. Throughout Europe the upshot has been the same. Wherever science is cultivated at all, even by ecclesiastics, ancient dogma has been disregarded in the direct study of all problems of causation; and the trend is even more strongly marked on the scientific side of the renaissance of modern Japan. However long religions may divide men, there is but one

¹ Chapter "On the Reception of *The Origin of Species*" in *Life of Darwin*, ii, 186.

² Cited in Darwin's *Life*, i, 68. Cp. W. Bölsche, *Haeckel*, Eng. tr. 1906, p. 243.

³ Dreyfus, p. 15.

⁴ *Life*, iii, 105.

⁵ *Id.* p. 118.

⁶ Cp. Janet, *La philos. française contemp.*, 1879, p. 25 sq.; *Life and Letters of Darwin*, ii, 247.

⁷ In 1888, F. C. Dreyfus takes Darwinism as proved, but is careful to pay tribute to Lamarck, and very particularly to Haeckel, understating Darwin's range of doctrine.

creed of science, as there is but one arithmetic. The imposition of creed on science is another matter, being a phenomenon of socio-political life.

That proposition in no way conflicts with the fact of the perpetual reconsideration of scientific doctrine. It is no part of the purpose of this survey to trace and check the proposed revisions of Darwin's main theorem—the arguments of Neo-Lamarckism ; the search for the factors of variation ; the debates on the transmission of acquired characters and on Pangenesis ; the thesis of De Vries as to sudden and wide variation ; the philosophic question as to “total” *versus* “infinite” evolution ; and the many other discussions generated by Darwinism.¹ These are problems of science, for scientific discussion ; but in all alike it is common ground that neither “intuition” nor “revelation” counts for anything in the argument, whatever may be the metaphysical leanings of any combatant.

The “creed of science” is and remains the conviction of invariable sequence without “supernatural” interludes. The *knowledge* of the process is a matter of perpetual patient reconsideration, in which myriads of men play their part, modestly or otherwise, as so many insects, building a coral reef. And the definite establishment of this creed for all thoughtful minds as against the older religious creed of “Providence” is the total achievement of Freethought in the nineteenth century.

§ 6. *American Acceptance*

1. Though the United States do not latterly figure as saturated with evolutionary thought, the doctrine did actually spread there in the last century almost more rapidly than anywhere else. But this was largely the result of the special activity of one man, Edward Livingston Youmans, who devoted an active life to the propagation of science, and of the evolutionary science of Herbert Spencer in particular. The facts are particularly worth attention as matter of culture history. It was due mainly to one man's devotion and energy that the continuation and publication of Spencer's works was not suspended in the early 'sixties, when their author, already (1861) “with health broken and nerves shattered,”² found himself unable to face further the losses he had so far sustained from his large adventure, which had been made possible at all only by the method of subscriptions. Youmans, taking up and carrying on the cause in America in the very unpropitious period of the Civil War, changed monetary failure into success, and made possible the completion of the great scheme.

¹ Consult Romanes, *Darwin and After Darwin*, 1892-7 ; F. W. Hutton, *Darwinism and Lamarckism, Old and New*, 1899 ; B. Petronievics, *L'Évolution Universelle*, 1921—the last a very helpful conspectus of the history of the idea ; and Professor V. L. Kellogg's *Darwinism To-day*, 1907—a notably impartial survey of the scientific debate.

² John Fiske, *Edward Livingston Youmans*, 1894, p. 124.

2. The most remarkable feature of the episode is the fact that Youmans was, and always remained, a devoutly unreasoning theist, though not a church-going Christian. "He was early made familiar with the stock criticisms directed against organized Christianity, yet his essentially religious nature forbade his ever joining in an attack on institutions which, however faulty, he held to contain a core supremely true."¹ He had, in fact, that variety of the scientific mind which recognizes that accuracy and truth are of the essence of science, and that science ought to be accurately and universally taught, but does not make or recognize any such demand in regard to either historical or dogmatic religion. Though Youmans could claim that, as we have seen, Spencer had given him his "core supremely true," the attitude in question appears to be specially common in the United States, where, to the present time, despite the intervening activity of Ingersoll, there is less of popular or other criticism of Christian doctrine than in Europe.

As we saw at an earlier stage, the phenomenon appears to be a concomitant of the complete separation of Church and State, in a society in which democracy finds a sufficient field for polemic in highly organized party politics. Money is there forthcoming for almost any species of Church or cult, but not for criticism of the general creed. At the period before the Civil War, public opinion was too much occupied with the ever-worsening slavery problem to be much concerned with remoter issues. Fiske quotes a country clergyman in Connecticut as saying to him in 1857: "There is a great intellectual movement going on in Europe of which scarcely anything is known or even suspected in this country." The minister had read German books, and had been impressed by "the ludicrous ignorance of biblical criticism displayed in American theological magazines and journals." At that period, in Fiske's opinion, hardly anybody in his town had heard even of "uniformitarianism" in geology: "it was only a very bold spirit that ventured to allude to the earth as more than six thousand years old."²

Further, while social needs and the cost of labour had made Americans inventive and familiar with machinery, the physical sciences "were studied in fragments," and Harvard students "were set to learn physics and chemistry by reading in books about magnets and alkalis."³ "An indolent reverence contented itself with a theological cosmogony little modified by the results of observation and experiment."⁴ The eastern States, in fact, apart from the "transcendental" movements associated with Emerson and Parker, were largely at the standpoint of latter-day Tennessee, which has preserved the *status quo ante*. That state of things Youmans, early in life, when he had recovered from his early affliction of blindness, set himself to change by means of educational propaganda; and when there came to him in the years 1856-60 a knowledge of the

¹ Fiske, as cited, p. 18.

² *Life of Youmans*, p. 2.

³ *Id. ib.*

⁴ *Id.* p. 74.

must have been a "mere man," he seeks as it were instinctively to make the Divine figure function for his daily needs as before. The Unitarian, who had already made that adaptation on *a priori* grounds, must do the same for his God-idea. The Bible, seen to be a human fabrication, must be newly vindicated as a "heritage" of moral wisdom. Revelation being dismissed, God must be retained on another footing—the footing shaped by the deist, but with a difference, to justify the cult-practices of prayer and ritual. Evolution means *progressive* adaptation to the new element in experience ; because the new Idea, as such, must compete for existence with the old.

2. And the man of science is mentally conditioned like the rest. The biologist adjusts himself only *qua* biologist. He may or may not cease to go to church ; if he does, that is apt to be the limit of his transformation. It is not his business to think out the problem of the priest, save in so far as Darwin may think out the evolutionary aspect of morals. And, what is most instructive of all, he is unlikely, for a while, to see any new guidance for social life in the doctrine he has compassed. Nay, there is but a chance that he can truly see in the light of his evolutionary doctrine propositions of social conduct which he had previously rejected in terms of training and habit, as the priest and pietist had repelled the criticism of the freethinker.

3. Naturalists thus paid little heed to the fact that Darwin found his key to the variation of species in the Law of Population as formulated by Malthus.¹ Being for the most part devoted specialists, single-mindedly pursuing one path of inquiry, they concern themselves little with the sociology from which the chief generalization of their own sciences has emerged. There have even been denials of any "debt to Malthus" on Darwin's part ; explicit claims that "the whole credit really belongs to Darwin."² Such propositions tell of the unreadiness of many good "scientific men" to be scientific in their psychology and sociology. No one makes light of Darwin because he built a great evolutionary demonstration in the light of a prior generalization that was not overtly evolutionary. Malthus himself did but build his demonstration on a general view which had been reached before him. The historic fact is nonetheless to be kept in view.³

Mr. F. W. Hutton writes : "It is generally thought that Darwin owed the idea of natural selection to Malthus. Indeed he seems to

¹ Haeckel, I think, never mentions Malthus in connection with Darwinism.

² F. W. Hutton, *Darwinism and Lamarckism*, 1899, pp. 40-1.

³ In this connection let us remember Darwin's own avowal in the Autobiography (*Life*, i, 61) : "The voyage of the *Beagle* has been by far the most important event in my life, and has determined my whole career ; yet it happened on so small a circumstance as my uncle offering to drive me thirty miles to Shrewsbury, which few uncles would have done, and on such a trifle as the shape of my nose"—Captain Fitz-Roy having been in two minds about rejecting him because he thought Darwin's nose unpromising, according to Lavater !

have thought so himself"—alluding to some letter of Darwin to Haeckel, without giving date or reference. The usually cited authorities are Darwin's *Autobiography* (*Life*, i, 83) and his letter to Wallace of April 6, 1859 (*More Letters*, 1903, i, 118), both of which are tolerably explicit. But Mr. Hutton claims that Darwin "forgot for the moment" that, long before, he had in the *Naturalist's Voyage* [citing a passage which appears in ed. 1890 on p. 166—end of ch. viii] "stated the Malthusian doctrine more correctly than Malthus himself." Now, in the passage cited Darwin states the Malthusian doctrine *incorrectly* when he writes that "the supply of food on an average *remains constant*," which is in some ways a more serious error than Malthus's admittedly symbolical use of the terms "arithmetical and geometrical ratios." But the vitally serious thing is that the passage cited by Mr. Hutton *does not appear in the original edition at all*, but belongs to the revised and partly recast edition of 1845.

Mr. Hutton "forgot for the moment" that in the *Autobiography* Darwin gives 1838 as the date of his reading of Malthus; and we learn from the *Life* by his son (ii, p. 1) that the last proofs of the printed book were passed in 1837. Even at that stage, the "Journal" was *written-up* from the Notes (*Life*, i, pp. 67, 68, 282-3); but, though Darwin must previously have heard of the doctrine of Malthus, the passage cited by Mr. Hutton is posterior to his actual reading of the *Essay*. And, in point of fact, the use of the terms "geometrical" and "tendency" show him to have proceeded upon a knowledge of the Malthusian argument.

The reasonable inference is, surely, that up to 1838 Darwin did not see the larger bearing of the clue, and did so later, as he himself avows, only on a reading of Malthus. "Thus the turning-point in the formation of his theory took place between the writing of the two editions," writes his son (*Life*, ii, p. 2). When we recall the avowal of Spencer as to his own case, the argument becomes hardly resistible. In his essay on the Theory of Population (finished in 1852) he had written that "From the beginning, pressure of population has been the proximate cause of progress," and had noted how the fittest survive. "It seems strange," he writes in old age, "that having long entertained a belief in the development of species through the operation of natural causes, I should have failed to see that the truth indicated in the above-quoted passages must hold, not of mankind only, but of all animals; and must everywhere be working changes among them." Yet he "completely overlooked this obvious corollary."¹

And we have the no less emphatic avowal of Huxley: "My reflec-

¹ *Autobiography*, i, 389-90.

tion, when I first made myself master of the central idea of the 'Origin,' was, 'How extremely stupid not to have thought of that!'"¹ Is it then otherwise than reasonable to conclude that the recognition of the clue by Darwin, so averse from deduction, was due directly to his reading of Malthus at an important stage of his work? More docile than Spencer, who avowedly did little inquiry save on the impulse of a thought of his own,² he went afield, this once, for ideas, and was rewarded.

"It was only his excessive modesty," says Mr. Hutton, "that made him push the name of Malthus to the front." Darwin was indeed admirably modest; but his curious failure to see any merit in Lamarck is a special reason for satisfaction in his recognition of a "debt" (to use the questionable term so often employed in these matters) to Malthus. Apart from the statements cited, neither Darwin nor his colleagues "pushed the name of Malthus to the front." Malthus is not named in the *Origin*, though he is cited in the *Descent* (2nd ed. i, 66-9) without any avowal of debt.

The inference would seem to be that Malthusianism was felt to be a matter as to which silence was then prudent. E. L. Youmans,³ writing home from London in 1862, is "surprised to learn in regard to Mill" that "while intellectually there is accorded to him the same supremacy here as with us, yet personally he is regarded as a *fanatic*. He was so carried away with Malthusianism that he personally distributed tracts through London.....went round throwing them into the cellars."⁴ Apart from Mill's quixotry, the lesson of Birth Control was then being taught chiefly by Secularists, though the Law of Population was recognized by many economists, and had been defended by Macaulay against Sadler.

In the index to the Life of Huxley, who was indeed something of a sociologist as against Spencer's *laissez faire*, the name of Malthus does not occur; in the index to the Life of Darwin it is cited but once, though it arises oftener in the text. Spencer himself may be said to have partly burked the population problem; it was the humanists and the free-thinkers, the Mills and the Bradlaughs, who forced that vital issue on the attention of their age. And in Darwin's own attitude to the principle of Birth Control, the scientific emendation of Malthus's own faulty application of his discovery, we find the most signal lacuna in the thinking of the great naturalist.

4. For him, any attempt at a rational individual control of the birth-rate, by family prudence, was an attempt to *defeat* the law of Natural Selection, and was therefore to be discouraged and discredited. The great biologist had simply left Sociology outside his thought. If that

¹ Chapter in *Life of Darwin*, ii, 197.

² *Autobiography*, i, 304.

³ Fiske's *Life of Youmans*, 1894, pp. 132-3.

⁴ Really into "areas," so as to reach servant girls.

generalization be rejected, the only alternative is a decision that in Sociology he remained unscientific.¹ Nor indeed did he ever profess to judge, save incidentally, of sociological any more than of political or religious issues. But it belongs to our survey to note how typical leading men adjusted themselves to the evolution principle in all its bearings, and Darwin's adjustment to the new social issues involved in or connecting with his own discovery is a matter of peculiar interest.

Privately, in a letter written by him to Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant when he was invited to give testimony in court in their trial over the Knowlton pamphlet, he was quite explicit on Birth Control :—

He disagreed with preventive checks to population on the ground that *over-multiplication was useful*, since it caused a struggle for existence in which only the strongest and the ablest survived, and that he doubted whether it was possible for preventive checks to serve as well as positive.²

The most perplexing thing in the deliverance, even when we remember that it is one of old age, is the laxity of the inferences. "Ablest" is posited without discrimination between mental and physical endowment; and "strongest" is posited without note of the fact (recognized in the *Descent of Man*) that the strong in a poor man's family may succumb where the weak in a well-to-do family may be preserved. The argument, further, would logically involve the condemnation of all charitable agencies for the upbringing of poor children whose parents could not support them, or left them orphans. Such condemnation Darwin had of course seen to be impossible.³

And the deductive course is taken without apparent reflection on the tremendous moral and sociological implications, though Darwin had expressly deplored the breeding of sickly individuals. For men who sociologize in the light of ethical and social ideals, right conduct becomes a matter of *controlling* all blind instinctive action for the individual and common good. For Darwin, here, it is a matter of "obeying Nature," in the old sense in which "art" is "not Nature" but "anti-Nature." Finding human like animal progress to have been fundamentally determined by the pressure of prolificacy on subsistence, he took for granted that any attempt by men to modify the determination by control of their own prolificacy would tend to cancel the progression which the struggle for existence had involved. That is to say, men were fitly to go on procreating more children than they could reasonably hope to support,

¹ His acceptance in the *Descent of Man* of such generalizations as he cites from Greg (i, 213) and Zincke (pp. 218-9) is noticeably naïve.

² Mrs. Besant's *Autobiographical Sketches*, 1885, p. 136. See also Darwin's letter to Mr. G. A. Gaskell, in Miss J. H. Clapperton's *Scientific Meliorism*, 1885, p. 340. The subject is ignored in the Life of Darwin. If it be urged that letters are not adequate evidence of his opinion, the answer is that the opinion is clearly enough indicated at the close of the *Origin of Species*, and in the *Descent of Man*, 2nd ed. i, 219.

³ *Descent*, i, 206.

because the competition for subsistence, by eliminating the "unfit," was the ostensibly necessary means of improvement in respect of the survivors.

Whatever measure of truth there is in Huxley's account of Spencer's *laissez-faire* doctrine as "Administrative Nihilism" will be found to be present in the description of Darwin's view of birth control as "Biological Fatalism." Logically developed, it would be a negation of ethics. For Darwin, one of the most admirable of men in respect of selflessness, candour, benevolence, and charity, such logical development was quite impossible. But the fact remains that the precept: "Do not check your prolificacy because you find it inexpedient in your personal interest" is ethically on all fours with "Make wars because wars check overpopulation." Blind prolificacy means destruction of life and impoverishment for the many. Because out of the carnage and the misery there has emerged "progress" for the survivors, Darwin held that the overpopulation, with its horrors and its Nemesis, ought to continue.

In a word, man was to gain nothing socially from his discovery that in the past his collective life had been destructively conditioned by the spontaneous play of instinct even as had been the collective life of animals. He was to let instinct rule him with his eyes open as he had done with his eyes shut. If there had been on the theistic side any real insight into the moral logic of Evolution, this ethico-logical collapse on Darwin's part might have been made much of, however little the theists as such could gain. As it was, in the nature of the case, the theists were as much at sea as Darwin, alike on the particular and on the general sociological issue.

Darwin had thus illustrated in his own person the truth that the standing obstacle to human education is presupposition, of which the body of religious belief is only the most massive form. He had reasoned concerning Birth Control very much as pre-Copernican men had reasoned from phenomena to their geocentric belief, and he had done it with less excuse. If it were not that a much more bigoted antipathy to the Law of Population and its lessons has been exhibited by Marxian Socialists in general, Darwin's attitude might be pronounced an astonishing intellectual miscarriage. The two Robert Owens, whose Socialism was dubbed "pre-scientific" by the Marxians, had realized the truth.¹ Marx, whom it exasperated, met it by mere vituperation. For him and for his followers, pre-supposition served to bar vision, where vision was vital, their problem being sociological. In Darwin's case, it was a matter of sheer absence of critical reflection, a survival of "pre-logical" thinking.

5. That there is a collective causation, a "reign of law," in social as in animal life, had been progressively recognized in the modern period in which the natural sciences had been tentatively built up. To say nothing

¹ It has been made clear, however, by Mr. Norman E. Himes (*The Places of J. S. Mill and of Robert Owen in the Hist. of English Neo-Malthusianism*, 1928) that Robert Owen repudiated the English origination ascribed to him.

of the *aperçus* of such thinkers as Montaigne and Bacon, and such theologians as Bossuet, the conception had dawned broadly on Vico and on Montesquieu; and much of the solid work of Voltaire had consisted in his pioneering search for causation in human history. In France and in Scotland he had followers who, further helped by the inquiries of Hume and Smith, were building something like a sociology when the tempest of the Revolution turned all minds away from social science to a clash of Utopism and authoritarianism. Saint-Simon and Comte, taking up the problem anew, sought a new synthesis, which in Comte's hands took promising shape until he had planned an impossible polity.

What is valuable, what is scientific in his work is the study of social causation in terms of history, and in the light of a variety of generalizations by his predecessors. What hinders a scientific extension by him of their work is the *à priori* tendency which dominated his period, even apart from its schemes of reconstruction. His merit is to have schemed and formally constituted 'Sociology,' coining the name¹ and broadening the foundations. His most acclaimed generalization, the Law of the Three Stages, has great suggestive value. But it is rather a psychological than a sociological statement; and in his handling of European history he heavily leans to the dialectic procedure which he most frequently condemned—the resort to Abstraction. There is often more of concrete historical vision in the *Traité de Législation* (1835) of the powerful publicist Charles Comte, a latterly neglected author, but one greatly appreciated by Buckle.

The basal position of Sociology is that all social like all cosmic change is to be viewed as "natural," not supernatural. This had been taken for granted by rationalistic writers since Vico, but had always been either explicitly or implicitly denied by theistic historians. Lewes, accepting Comte, had in his 'Biographical History of Philosophy' (1845-6) explicitly condemned as obsolete Niebuhr's account of Roman history as an operation of "the finger of God."² He might have equally indicted Hallam.³ The oracular method, nevertheless, survived so long as the late Dr. Hodgkin.⁴ But it was assailed in force, before the appearance of Darwin's 'Origin of Species,' by a new and powerful English sociological historian.

6. At bottom, Auguste Comte's disqualification is his lack of concrete historical and economic knowledge: the aspect in which he most markedly contrasts with Darwin, who, always suspicious of deductive reasoning in his own field, steeped himself in knowledge of facts. And it is in respect of an unsurpassed knowledge of the history then most available, that of the post-Renaissance world, that Henry Thomas Buckle (1821-62) challenges attention as a pioneer in sociology. Here he compares, as

¹ That it is a hybrid of Greek and Latin is a true but not an effective objection. It has held its ground.

² Work cited, iv, 258.

³ See *ante*, p. 9.

⁴ See *Buckle and his Critics*, p. 16, note.

Comte contrasts, with Darwin. As recognizant as Comte of the importance of the sciences, Buckle adds to his survey of them a range of historic study probably not compassed by any other Englishman of his time, and certainly not by Comte. For him, every aspect of human affairs, physical, political, literary, economic, intellectual, religious, is significant of universal causation, and is to be so thought. In the philosophical problem he is as spontaneously interested as in any other, or any science, though he here handles it only to reach the position that the concept of Free Will affects the science of history no more than any other field of phenomena. The breadth of his conception and the range of his argument are the more memorable when it is remembered that he died at forty-one.

The result of his twofold relation to exact knowledge is a definite acceptance of all social phenomena as causal sequences equally with those of the physical and animal world of the naturalists. Differences and fluctuations in civilization are for him evolutionary phenomena, like those of animal species. While retaining the prevalent theistic pre-supposition, and in the end clinging emotionally to immortality, he flatly refuses to treat human progress as a matter of moral or other initiative. Progress in the mass he sees as an equation of the human organism and its environment, in which the lifting factor is not religious or moral but intellectual—that of accumulated knowledge. Apart from all direct criticism of historical religion, this position is in itself as radically free-thinking, as audacious, as provocative, as the evolutionary doctrine of species; and in respect of the presentment of the obstructive effects of hierocratic institutions and beliefs it is directly anti-clerical where Darwinism is neutral.

The impact made by Buckle's work was great, despite the fragmentary condition in which it was left by his early death. It is but a portion of an *introduction* to a projected history of civilization in England—a scheme which in itself was the curtailment of an earlier plan for a history of civilization in general. No theorist or doctrinaire had hitherto supported any such body of doctrine with such a mass of documentary evidence. It thus incurred as many quasi-systematic criticisms, mostly hostile, as were spent on Darwin's *Origin*. That it did not, like that, set up an "ism," a school of thought or doctrine, has been made the ground of a disparagement of it as abortive. Such criticism is fundamentally fallacious, to say nothing of its affinity with all intuitionist hostility to new truth, and the correlative iniquity. Buckle's work, in so far as it was sound, has entered into the bloodstream of sociological history; and the mass of disparagements are found to root, ultimately, in religious animus, which persists, while the concept of social causation, not being special to Buckle, involves no invocation of his principles.

Further, his concrete errors of generalization—the inevitable errors of the pioneer—have tended to his disadvantage, where the errors candidly

acknowledged by Darwin, and the branches of *his* doctrine which have not found acceptance, have been largely discounted because of the supreme value of his central theory. Buckle's main errors, as it happens, were products of presupposition. Heartily accepting the principle of Free Trade, he carried the criticism of Protection, as Smith had done before him, into an inconsequent arraignment of all forms of governmental fostering or evocation of *mental* activity, as in the arts, sciences, and scholarship. Here, like Smith, he sought to prove inductively what he had assumed deductively. The result is a faulty induction and a series of explicit and implicit self-contradictions. The general historic facts are not as he declared them to be; and his own words are to be cited against him.¹

Mr. A. W. Benn (*Revaluations: Historical and Ideal*, 1909, pref. p. xiv) claimed to have put forth "the only complete explanation of [Buckle's] system ever offered to the public." His early essay (1880) on 'Buckle and the Economics of Knowledge' (rep. in vol. cited) justifies that claim inasmuch as it shows how Buckle applied the economic principle of Free Trade to the modern phenomena of the accumulation, diffusion, and practice of the sciences, literature, and the arts; and how his thesis of the determining effect of accumulated knowledge in making civilization is in a sense an "Economics of Knowledge." Strictly speaking, however, Buckle supplies a prior "biology of civilization," setting forth the natural conditions under which social life and mind flourish or cannot flourish; and this leads to his postulate that progress is finally determined by accumulation of knowledge, which does not consist with his "economics." Mr. Benn's own criticisms of Buckle, often acute and just, as well as his own sociological generalizations, are at times open to destructive criticism; but he concludes with the high encomium:

"Twenty-five years ago [i.e. in 1855] the idea of law, universal and unbroken, was almost a paradox. It is now almost a commonplace; and among those by whose efforts so vast a change in public opinion was accomplished must be placed the name of this noble thinker, whose learning and eloquence have not often been singly equalled, and, in their combination, have never, to my knowledge, been surpassed."

It is to be observed, however, that Buckle like Darwin proceeded on much scattered scientific thought of previous generations. Thus his principles of the decreasing influence of local conditions on advancing civilization is traceable back through Comte, Dunbar, and Robertson, to Montesquieu; that of the climatic limitation of the early American civilizations to the second and third of those writers;

¹ See the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, 1895; and, *passim*, his notes to the Routledge 1-vol. ed. of the *Introduction*.

that of the effect of earthquakes on superstition, through Lyell, to Micali and Benjamin Constant ; that of the effect of cheap food on Chinese civilization to Davis ; and so on. Comte duly recognized his predecessors in these matters ; and Buckle, though he had not, so far as he went, noted all the light-giving work done, gave the most generous recognition to all his teachers, past and contemporary. Among the first to acclaim Comte, Darwin, and Spencer, he was also one of the first to point out the solid contribution of Voltaire to historic science.

The really illuminative power of Buckle's survey is perhaps best to be gathered from his studies of the Scottish Intellect in the Seventeenth Century¹ and the Spanish Intellect in the Eighteenth. As compared with the earlier 'History of Priestcraft' of William Howitt, these are magistral treatises ; and as such they are among the most effectual manifestoes of freethought in their time. Buckle's devotion to liberty, as expounded throughout his chief work and crystallized in his massive review of Mill *On Liberty*, was in itself an inspiration to his age ; but his emancipating power was most effectual in his comprehensive rebuttal and dismissal of that traditionary concept of perpetual "providential" intervention in history which had half-paralysed the sagacity of Bossuet, darkened at times the vision of Hallam, and turned to obscurantism the genius of Carlyle.

7. The fact that the immediate English follower of Buckle, W. E. H. Lecky, receded from instead of raising the scientific standard of Buckle's thought, was one of the proofs of Buckle's special originality and courage. It carried, however, the compensation that Lecky's expositions found their way inside barriers of prejudice which repelled the greater thinker. For the rest, English sociology in the latter part of the century shows little advance on his achievement ; and the status long accorded to Sir Henry Maine, in comparison, was largely earned by the conventional attitude of that writer to the Bible. It certainly was not earned by exact sociological thinking.²

8. If Buckle's undertaking, begun before the idea of evolution had been stabilized, is fitly to be characterized as premature,³ that of J. S. Mill in the 'Ethology' section of his *System of Logic* (1843) is much more open to the charge. Mill was not only pre-evolutionary at this point : he was only partially attunable to evolutionary principles. Beginning on

¹ Dean Stanley (*Life and Letters*, by R. E. Prothero, Nelson's ed., p. 411) condemned Buckle's survey as presenting "an untruthful monotony of fanatical and superstitious gloom." Such a criticism would bar, by sheer misconception, any special cultural survey whatever. A specialized survey, as such, does not pretend to present all social history. Stanley was but evading the truths presented.

² The subject is discussed in the author's *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 392-420.

³ It was so condemned by Macaulay (Trevelyan's *Life*, ed. 1908, p. 673 n.) and by Spencer (*Autobiography*, ii, 4), who had no ear for new ideas that did not impinge on his own path.

the stimulus of Comte, he thought to discover inductively a law or laws of "national character" which should guide practical politics. But the very concept of "national character" is an *à priori* construction, tolerable only in the absence of analysis. In his later editions, recognizing the importance of Buckle, Mill dealt with him critically yet sympathetically, but apparently never recognized that Buckle's method outweighed his own.

Evidently, however, he did at length realize that what he had called Ethology could only be an attempt to find special social results from the play of special factors in a nation's history; that the emergence of those factors remained to be accounted for; that in all nations there are wide variations of individual character; that a nation cannot be regarded as a species; and that a Sociology proper could be constituted only by a notation of the process of modification of all society from the lowest upward. As his competent biographer has curtly pronounced, the scheme of an Ethology "never came to anything; and he seems shortly to have dropped thinking of it. I do not believe that there was anything to be got in the direction that he was looking."¹ And Mill's later treatment of Christian origins is the product of a non-sociological habit of mind.

9. What is signally lacking in the English sociology—as apart from the anthropology—of the forty years after Buckle is the due attempt to apply Darwin's principle of Natural Selection, with the necessary differences of data, to the evolution of human societies, and, within them, of institutions, religions, ideas, arts, proclivities. To these, in particular, should have been scientifically applied the principle of *economic* selection and conservation. Arbitrarily applied by Marx to civilization in the light of a class gospel and a doctrinaire purpose, it has not been applied at all by the would-be sociologists who might have been expected to apply it dispassionately. Bagehot, whose 'Physics and Politics' (1872) had a temporary success of style and epigram, offered no concept of causation, and explained stages in terms of themselves. Rejecting much of the light that Buckle could have given him, he compassed for himself no regulative principle.

10. Spencer, who approached the sociological problem with his unfailing energy of ratiocination, but with more than Comte's insufficiency of historical knowledge and the more serious defect of lack of interest in history, achieved rather an anatomy of social forms than a recognition of a universal process of causation in terms of mental action, of *choices*, of all that is signified on that side of things by the concept of "creative evolution." His 'Principles of Sociology,' in fact, constitute rather an Anthropology—in the English application of that term, which is typified by Tylor's Manual—than a Sociology in the proper sense. It is chiefly in his powerful handling of the origins of religion that his work is effectively sociological, as exhibiting causation. Viewed as an ordered pre-

¹ Bain, *J. S. Mill*, pp. 78-9.

sentment of facts of primary social structure in connection with the fundamental data of social psychology, it is indeed a compilation of the greatest instructive value, representing as it does the unsurpassed schematic faculty of its author and a vast amount of sifted evidence collected under his direction by others. His still more massive compilation, 'Descriptive Sociology,' is as it were a great annex to the other work.

11. Of Sociology proper, the most notable achievements in English, in the age of Spencer, have been those of American writers, notably the late Lester F. Ward and Professor Franklin H. Giddings. The rapid endowment of sociological chairs in the American universities supplied the conditions for an amount of activity unapproached in Britain, where such chairs have only in the present generation been thought of. Ward's 'Dynamic Sociology' (1883) was definitely directed to the ends at which Spencer did not aim, and, with whatever insufficiency of theory and demonstration, constituted a real contribution to the science; while the treatise of Professor Giddings on 'The Principles of Sociology: an Analysis of the Phenomena of Association and of Social Organization' (1896) may be reckoned the most thoroughly scientific work produced in its department, in any country, up to the close of the century.

12. In France and Germany likewise, the output of sociology has been much in excess of the British. France, which had given the chief stimulus to the study in the eighteenth century, returned to it with undiminished energy after the fall of Napoleon had left an open platform for the "ideologues" of his detestation. Already in the days of the Directoire the *Essai sur l'histoire de l'espèce humaine* of C. A. Walckenaer (1798) had shown that the revolutionary age could bring new critical force to the task of Montesquieu; and the work of Eusèbe Salverte (1813), an Introduction¹ to a proposed study of 'Civilization from the earliest historic times to the end of the eighteenth century,' deserves to be classed as a scientific clearing of the ground for sociology. But the hoped-for interest was not aroused, in an age in which political earthquakes engrossed the attention of the most studious, and Salverte turned to other forms of research.

Those writers, like all the French sociologists from Montesquieu onwards, including even the formally orthodox Goguet,² quite definitely recognize all historical movement as a process of sequent causation, thus attaining a scientific standpoint not reached by some English historians of the late Victorian period. Proceeding inductively, they substitute for the ancient pagan concept of a necessary death of all aged States, and the Judæo-Christian concept of a "Providential" control, the view of national life as potentially perpetual, given the fit conditions; and they

¹ The title is *De la Civilisation*, etc., but the volume is really introductory to a planned work on a large scale.

² Whose large work, *De l'origine des lois, des arts et des sciences et de leurs progrès chez les anciens peuples*, 1758, was translated into English (Edinburgh, 1761).

clearly recognize the physical causation of the primary and the complex conditioning of the secondary civilizations. They have thus already placed Sociology at the Darwinian standpoint, simply ignoring the theological. But in France as elsewhere the general level of thought was not yet equal to sustaining the inquiry on the scientific plane.

13. What followed is typified on one side by the work of Guizot,¹ who, remaining a deist, produced not only great collections of national archives but studies of political history² which, as such, reached at points valid views of social causation, largely stultified by his chronic resort to the old theistic interpretations. Charles Comte, on the contrary, is in the same line of Walckenaer and Salverte; but Auguste Comte, in virtue of his special "constructive" energy, produced a sociology dominated by doctrinaire bias and presupposition even in its best aspects, which his followers since Littré, instead of rectifying and raising it to a scientific standard, have left as they found it, clamped to a scheme of social reconstruction, irreconcilable with the entire modern movement of political life, and finally representing only the intense "personal equation" of its strenuous framer. Later French sociology has passed him by. In the main, it conforms to the requirements of the scientific spirit, substituting a study of causation for the dictation of religion, whether traditional or "positive."

Even Le Play (1806-82), the travelled Catholic, obsessed by fear of "scepticism" and craving for a return to the patriarchal ideal, under the ægis of the Second Empire, was so far the disciple of science that, like Walckenaer and Salverte, he recognized the potential perpetuity of rightly adjusted States, dismissing the delusion set up by the spurious analogy of the individual organism and the "super-organism" of society. Even more than Auguste Comte, however, he was lamed by lack of comprehensive and exact historical knowledge.

In the case of a writer who had great historical knowledge, Fustel de Coulanges, we meet with another sociological divagation. After a soundly anthropological investigation, *La Cité Antique* (1864) concludes with an account of the political action and influence of Christianity which is demonstrably false, by the showing even of ecclesiastical history. Here there has been substituted for the exact study of history an abstract generalization, in the manner of Comte.

14. It is worth noting that the two Utopistic schemes which won the widest attention in the earlier post-revolutionary period, those of Robert Owen and Charles Fourier, were the constructions of men of industrial and commercial training; while that of Le Play is the work of an engineer who had seen much of the actual world in many lands. All three framed schemes of social reconstruction in the light of ideals held

¹ François-Pierre-Guillaume Guizot, 1787-1874.

² *Cours d'histoire moderne*, 6 tom. 1828-30.

à priori, with no such study of the mass of traceable data as underlies the great achievement of Darwin. Auguste Comte, primarily a mathematician, belongs finally to the same category. It becomes progressively clear that a decisive sociology is to be reached, in the manner of Giddings, only in the light of a comprehensive study of social and political history.

15. Such an achievement might have been looked for, if anywhere, in Germany, where the sheer accumulation of humanist historical knowledge was carried further, and with more zeal, than in any other country in modern times. There too there had been powerful scientific impulses, from Herder and from Kant, before the Revolution. Kant's 'Idea of a Universal History on a Cosmo-political Plan' (1784) was original and impressive enough to enlist the sympathetic study of such diverse minds as De Quincey and Huxley, and has had renewed attention during and since the tempest of the World War. But Kant's sociology, often deeply penetrating and broadly sagacious, chronically reverts to theistic concepts, and remains rather a great suggestion than a scientific performance; while Hegel's 'Philosophy of History' is rather an exposition of his philosophy of 'Spirit' than a study of historic movement, and is as often extravagant as percipient.

16. Much more systematic efforts have been made by German thinkers in the latter part of the nineteenth century; but the most monumental of all, that of Schaeffle¹ (who, un-Germanlike, did half his work before reading his predecessors), conforms to the anatomic method of Spencer rather than to the "genetic" view of social evolution.² As regards genetic sociology, Germany was popularly dominated to the end of the century by the doctrine of Karl Marx, who, framing his theory of economic causation before the doctrine of evolution had been inductively established, puts a catastrophic and finally static theory of social destiny under a pseudo-evolutionary form. Imposed by his personality and that of Lassalle on generations of German workmen whom it hypnotized with a quasi-religious hope, analogous to that of the 'Second Advent,' it is thus in itself an extremely interesting sociological phenomenon.

As an ultimate negation of the concept of evolution, it stands in sharp contrast with the general scientific movement; and though its adherents in Germany have been largely non-religionists, it would be a straining of terms to call them "freethinkers." The catastrophic character of Marx's sociology was, however, clearly seen and stated latterly by Jaurès, the most scientific and most enlightened of modern French Socialists; and the future of the movement is a question of choice between the original catastrophic ideal of Marx, adopted and applied in Russia after the World War, and a strictly evolutionary ideal which avowedly dominates the "responsible" exponents of Socialism in England. On the other

¹ *Bau und Leben des sozialen Körpers*, 4 Bde. 1875-8.

² Schaeffle is criticized in *Buckle and his Critics*, pp. 434-8.

hand, those most alarmed by all forms of social transformism avowedly ground their hopes largely on a recrudescence of docile faith, under Catholic leadership. Protestant theological sociology is obscurantist with a difference.

17. There has perhaps been no more specifically anti-rational treatise in modern times than the *Social Evolution* of the late Benjamin Kidd (1894), of which the express thesis is that the application of reason to the instinctive proclivities of national life is dangerous and indeed fatal, because "there is no rational sanction for the conditions of progress"; and that to undermine instinctive religion by rational argument is to tend to bring about the decay and fall of national energy in the manner in which such decay and fall took place in the "classic" civilizations of antiquity.¹ The thesis is that nations thrive by whole-heartedly believing what is not rationally credible; that religion is the main form of such belief; and that the truly sociological way of handling religion is to ignore its falsity—which the thesis implicitly concedes—and to dwell on its life-giving value as a fountain of energy and sincerity.

Thus Mr. Kidd argues, in regard to religion, worse than Darwin had argued in regard to Birth Control. What man has hitherto done blindly he must continue to do blindly in defiance of acquired knowledge, there being no safety in any rational control of either instinctive or traditional habit. Whatever may be the demonstrable evils of heedless human procreation, it must go on in order to provide the social struggle for existence under which past progress has been achieved. Reason—reconsideration—must not presume to meddle with the practices or institutions set up by the primitive mind. The primitive mind—reason at a minimum—alone can be trusted to find the right way of thinking for social man as a whole.

It is chastening to realize that the great biologist, who re-reasoned for himself the great problem which he so decisively solved, is thus in his sociology logically at one with the religious obscurantist in an attitude which logically leads to a veto on all reconsideration of any problems whatever. For if it is dangerous to depart from the first instinctive practice of man in procreation, and from his traditions in religion, it is dangerous to investigate the origin of species. But the saving difference between the working scientist and the traditionist sociologist is that the former does study his biological data and the other does not study any.

Such teaching as Mr. Kidd's reveals at once the concrete historical ignorance upon which religious sociology usually proceeds and the fundamentally unethical tendency of religious conservatism. Critical study of the decay of the "classic" Mediterranean civilizations² reveals a process of military and mental enfeeblement resulting not from any form of

¹ The book is analysed in the present writer's paper on 'Inverted Sociology' in his *Essays in Sociology*, vol. i.

² See *The Evolution of States*, 1912.

religious scepticism—for Christianity was spreading step for step with the decay in the imperial period—but from the imperial suppression of all free *political* life, and the concurrent *fiscal* strangulation, which finally left the Empire a congeries of economically exhausted societies, devoid of self-adaptive energy and, beyond the chief Eastern centre, impotent for self-defence. The final collapse actually took place under Christianized conditions, with "reason" functioning at a minimum. The anti-rational thesis is thus a chimera.

On the other hand, that thesis is unveridical in that it expressly turns to naught every question of veracity as to religion. From its point of view, there is no question of truth in religion at all. Earnest belief, whether polytheistic, monotheistic, or trinitarian, is all that is requisite. Thus a quite false historic theory is supported by an explicit dismissal of the veridical principle from social science. The claim is in effect "to reinstate unreason, by *reasoning* that it pays mankind to be unreasonable." And this intellectually suicidal and morally lawless teaching was for a number of years acclaimed in England from thousands of pulpits as a valuable and "scientific" service to the cause of religion. There is nothing more ominous to the decline of religious belief than the flatly unethical conclusions to which all the defences thus ultimately lead.

18. Perhaps the most learned British representative, in his day, of what may be termed theistic sociology was the late Professor Robert Flint. Yet, while capable at times of just and acute criticism, that scholar is reduced by his presuppositions to a kind of doctrine which even theists now renounce. Faced by the scientific concept of causation in social evolution, and in particular by the data of climatic determination, he is reduced to citing,¹ as from "a thoughtful writer," this proposition: "It is not Nature which is in India too grand—not Nature which is in excess, but man who is too little man, who is in defect. Man there is *not what he ought to be, not what he was meant to be, not properly man*..... Nature is no man's enemy except in so far as he is an enemy to himself."² From such sociology, such ethic, such philosophy—which is but a development of Kingsley's apophthegm that the monkey is what he is because he is a muf and a fool—it is one of the services of Buckle to have delivered even the clerisy of his country, though these pronouncements were posterior to his.

19. The alternative to dismissal, it should be noted, is the acceptance of the worst forms of "imperialism," the so-called Nietzschean doctrine of the will to power, pointing to the subjection of (a) the backward race by the more advanced, and (b) class subjection of the weaker types within the conquering people. That ideal, though certainly not absent from British life, was understood to be repudiated throughout the World War

¹ *Philosophy of History in France and Germany*, 1874, pp. 104–5, rep. in *Hist. of the Philos. of History*, 1893, p. 276.

² McCombie's *Modern Civilisation in relation to Christianity*, pp. 50–1.

as the gospel of the enemy. However that may be, it is the corollary of the theistic pseudo-sociology and pseud-anthropology which denounces the backward race as being punished for its sin—a doctrine that goes back to the Hebrew Bible and the story of the Canaanites.

Such quasi-theistic sociosophy, however, is as it were paired with its counter extreme inasmuch as Anarchism in the last generation was largely associated with a profession of atheism. A number of its exponents—of whom there were very few in Britain—summed up their creed, with the Russian aristocrat Bakunin (1814–76), in the formula, “Neither God nor Master.” Anarchism was in fact a motto rather than an argument;¹ and its adherents contributed no more to the education of the general mind on the religious than on the political problem. Where Freethought in the past had proceeded by the scientific method of collation of data, criticism, research, and inference, to the end of reaching rational views on cosmic and historical fact, ethical principle, and individual duty, Anarchism treated the problem of socio-political *praxis* by cutting the knot and proclaiming an abstract ideal as an immediate rule for aggregate action. For scientific method its devotees substituted manifestoes, curtly exemplifying their ethic by their bombs.

It was not unjustly observed that the total movement included some of the best and some of the worst men in Europe: (a) men who, incapable of anti-social action, theorized that it needed only the withdrawal of all compulsion to make all men live by the spontaneous law of reciprocity; and (b) men who, fiercely reacting against every idea of compulsion, proposed to create by violence and terrorism the abstractly ideal environment. Inasmuch as such men professed atheism they naturally evoked the strongest intellectual reaction against rationalism that had arisen for half a century; and one of the phenomena in France was a recrudescence of movements of Catholic mysticism. The association of atheism with political murder was found to be an excellent argument in the hands of a Church that in the past had practised political murder on a scale of which Anarchists could not dream.

It was highly significant that “practical” Anarchism, of which the vogue was happily brief, flourished almost exclusively among the peoples which thitherto had tasted most of political tyranny. Its exponents were in fact men in whom the reactions of temperamental passion overrode critical reason to the extent of blinding them to the difference between a problem of credence and a problem of praxis. For them the immense complexity and difficulty of the problem of right social action and adjustment did not exist; they approached it as religionists in the past had approached that of the cosmos. Science was simply excluded from the procedure, save inasmuch as different idealists, such as Proudhon and Prince Kropotkin, had formulated a theory with no practical perception

¹ Bakunin's posthumous treatise, *God and the State*, exhibits the mental attitude.

of the problems of action in terms of existing proclivities and capacities. The total lesson was that "a good will," as in the cases of Proudhon and Kropotkin, could in itself throw no more light on the realities of the social problem than could the mere good will of religiously thinking men attain truth as to the matters of their creed. The fact that they unwittingly lent countenance to men who had no good will whatever, but only an evil one, was the crowning proof of their scientific incompetence. Those who described their failure as a case of "excess of reason" merely exhibited their own deficiency in reasoning faculty. The one thing needed was more comprehensive reasoning.

Thus dramatically emerged the demonstration that a humanity which, after millenniums of delusion, was only gradually struggling into a life of reason as regards its cosmic and historical beliefs, could not without another era of mental discipline rightly master the most intricate and intimate problem of all, that of social reconstruction. So much had been terribly revealed in the French Revolution, which had in effect meant for the time a far-reaching reversal of all intellectual progress. The fact that Socialists and Anarchists alike (apart from Owen) had contemptuously rejected the prescription of Birth Control was decisive as to the futility of intuitionist idealism. That prescript, which is to social science what Copernicanism had been to cosmic science, was still a banned and damned heresy at the end of the past century, when rationalistic heresy as to religion was visibly outfacing the unreason of orthodoxy. The age of collectively applied social science was not yet reached.

20. On retrospect, however, the movement of Sociology, theoretical and applied, bears out the generalization that the theosophic principle is being irrevocably expelled from all forms of scientific thought. Everywhere it has progressively receded; soon becoming much less active in any form of sociological study than in philosophy and ethics, its chosen fields. Even in those fields it has been widely encroached upon by the monitory revelations of the branches of historico-sociological study which we name Anthropology and Hierology. Like Sociology in general, they are not new forms of inquiry, having been considerably cultivated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But in the nineteenth they have been greatly extended and co-ordinated; and the mere process has insensibly substituted, for myriads of readers, a humanist conception of all religion for the Judæo-Christian creed of supernatural revelation and prescription.

Here too, however, the way has been blocked by presuppositions not merely of religious but of social origin. Men in mass have their cults of nationalism, of race, of race-prejudice. As the Jews proclaimed themselves the Chosen People, and other races claimed to stand by special favour of their Gods, so nascent science framed formulas of racial classification founded as much in collective pride as in reflection. Here too there had to be new and better thinking,

§ 8. *Ethnology*

1. The evolutionary theory of animal species had a very obviously direct bearing on the science of human races; and the emergence of Darwin's doctrine at the time of the American Civil War, precipitated by the problems involved in the modern enslavement of the African races in the United States, speedily forced ethnologists to adapt themselves to the critical principles of inductive science. Hitherto they had achieved little, a fact not relatively discreditable, seeing that ethnology, a century after the notable pioneer works¹ of Dr. James Cowles Prichard (1786-1848), is still a field of radical dispute, only slowly delivering itself from the illusory presupposition of fixed "race characters."²

At the date of the *Origin of Species* the authority of the Hebrew Bible was actually being founded-on for the justification of negro slavery in particular, in terms of the myth of Shem, Ham, and Japhet, supported by the acceptance of slavery in the gospels and in the Paulines. At the same time professedly naturalistic ethnologists sought to establish the assumption of diverse origins of the human race; and the Slave Power welcomed alike Biblical orthodoxy and quasi-scientific doctrines of the plurality of races against either Darwinian or Christian doctrines of the unity of the human species, as held to be declared in Acts xvii, 26. The effect of Darwinism was, as Darwin said, to render meaningless the dispute between "monogenists" and "polygenists."³ Whatever might be the stadial difference between black and white in terms of civilizing experience, the theorem of a separate evolution of human "pairs" in completely separated areas was as incogitable as those of the primary Adamic pair and the supernatural degradation of the race of Ham.

2. Polygenism is indeed still heard of, but the Semitic myth is dismissed in ethnology as in geology and biology. In the 'sixties the clash was striking. In 1863 Georges Pouchet, naturalist and son of a naturalist, produced the second edition of his *De la pluralité des races humaines* (1858); and the Ethnological Society of London committed to Mr. H. J. C. Beavan, F.R.G.S., F.A.S.L., barrister-at-law, the task of translating and editing it. There was then presented the spectacle of a pious translator lecturing his author, in footnotes, for indicating impious principles in propounding the pluralist theory of races. Pouchet, a Positivist, was respectful to Lamarck, but had not yet assimilated Darwin; and he still belonged to the age of scientific rhetoric, which Darwin ended. He had, however, quite definitely accepted, from Steinthal and Grimm and Renan,⁴ the doctrine that language was neither

¹ *Researches into the Physical History of Mankind* (1813, 1826, 1836-47); *The Eastern Origin of the Celtic Nations*, 1831.

² The problem is examined in the author's treatises, *The Saxon and the Celt*, 1897; *The Germans*, 1916; *The Evolution of States*, 1912; and *Buckle and his Critics*, 1895.

³ *Descent of Man*, ed. 1891, i, 280.

⁴ *The Plurality of the Human Race*, Eng. tr. 1864, p. 31,

an innate gift nor a revelation to primary man. Thus was the polygenist directly at issue with the orthodox religionist and with the theistic idealist represented by the young Max Müller.

Holding that the doctrine of the revelation of language did not deserve even the honour of being criticized by Jacob Grimm, Pouchet refuses to admit of any theological or Scriptural dictation to science. With such a declaration he sets out. As geology has thrown off the yoke of Genesis, so must anthropology. He is the more zealous in his polygeny because "most monogenists have, up to the present time, done the universal wrong of invoking, in proof of their ideas, an authority which it is not allowable to discuss."¹ No less explicitly he flouts the assent of Isidore Geoffroy Saint-Hilaire² to the notion of a miraculous peopling of the earth with perfect beings by the will of God. "Science teaches us at the present day what to think of all divine interventions, either past or present."³

At this point intervenes the representative of the Ethnological Society to exclaim: "Our author is quite right. Science does teach what to think of divine power in its outward manifestations. The more we understand nature the more ready will earnest-minded men be to praise and give glory to the God who made it, who created man and beast with such marvellous and exquisite regularity, and who continues to govern the world and all that is upon it. Perhaps M. Pouchet thinks that he himself could have made a better one." And at another point, where Pouchet had equated the words *religion* and *mythology*, with the remark that "every religion is necessarily based on a *fable*," the devout translator registers a fierce if incoherent protest. If science was tending to be irreligious, the Ethnological Society was not to be blamed.

3. Pouchet delivers, in his introduction, a *coup de chapeau* to American science, as having "reinstated" anthropology "in its rank, in that country of every kind of liberty."⁴ He would seem to have in view the group of Morton, Nott, and Gliddon, who were zealously engaged, as ethnologists, in proving that negroes are of another ancestry than whites. The works of Nott and Gliddon⁵ had thus acquired among Biblical monogenists a certain reputation for freethinking. But the American polygenists were freethinkers only *ad hoc*. While contemporary fundamentalists were well content, for slavery purposes, to found on the curse passed upon Ham in the race of Canaan, the ethnologists realized that that gambit involved the acceptance of Ham as a "white," to say nothing of the

¹ Work cited, p. 4.

² Son of Étienne Geoffroy St.-Hilaire, whom Pouchet justly ranks as the abler thinker. ³ *Id.* p. 123.

⁴ Work cited, p. 6.

⁵ *Types of Mankind: or, Ethnological Researches*, etc., by J. C. Nott, M.D., and Geo. R. Gliddon, Philadelphia, 1854 (with extracts from chapters by Dr. S. G. Morton, and contributions from Agassiz, Dr. Usher, and Prof. H. S. Patterson); *Indigenous Races of the Earth, or, New Chapters of Ethnological Inquiry*, by the same authors, 1857 (with contributions from A. Maury, F. Pulszky, and Dr. J. A. Meigs).

apparent deduction of the curse of Canaan from the curse of Cain. Science must save the situation, albeit with no denial of "creation."

The result is an impressively learned demonstration¹ that in the tenth chapter of Genesis the specification of races—a late "Jehovistic" insertion in the older narrative, as Gliddon points out—has no reference to, because it proceeds on no knowledge of, African races south of the Sahara. Ham, accordingly, just signifies Egypt; and the negro races are simply unrecognized. As to these, the "scientific" position is that "the surface of our globe is naturally divided into several zoological provinces, each of which is a *distinct centre of creation*, possessing a peculiar fauna and flora; and that every species of animal and plant was originally assigned to its appropriate province"; also that "certain Types have been permanent through all recorded time, and despite the most opposite moral and physical influences."² Thus negroes were separately created, and innately predestinate to inferiority.

With equal energy and industry of learning, the pre-Darwinian ethnologists demonstrate that the word "blood" in Acts xvii, 26, unwarily cited by the monogenists, is an interpolation in the original text—as is now admitted by its exclusion from the Revised Version. In the course of their exposition they are able to cite from the newer exegetes—who include Davidson, Sharpe, Alford, and Tregelles—avowals that the apostles were illiterates, and that verbal inspiration must be abandoned as regards the written text. The fact that, with the word "blood" removed, the text still reads "made of one," does not disturb the triumphant polygenists: they let it stand for what it is worth.³ For the rest, Gliddon, unlike Pouchet, is careful to associate himself with language of the devoutest order of theism.⁴

If Nott and Gliddon were to rank as freethinkers, it would not be to the credit of their cause in the matter of courtesy. In Gliddon's polemic, a monogenist opponent is an "ass"; the French nation are the food of the laughter of Europe in respect of their pretensions to be capable of self-government⁵—an amenity which seems to have been overlooked by Pouchet; and even an English polygenist is commiserated because, in his "parliamentary-stifled" country, the "dreary atmosphere of national prejudices which surrounds him" causes him to publish anonymously "a volume that augurs well for ethnological progress in Great Britain."⁶ Such were the scientific amenities of the region of the Slave Power, unprescient of the exigencies of the Civil War.

4. Ethnology in England did not proceed on either Biblical or polygenist principles, Darwinism having provided it with new foundations. Its progress has been indeed slow. Even before Darwin, the brilliant and accomplished philologist, R. G. Latham (1812–88), had brought to

¹ *Types of Mankind*, 1854, ch. xiv.

² *Indigenous Races of the Earth*, 1857, pp. 588–95.

³ *Types of Mankind*, pp. 404–5.

⁴ *Id.* p. 465.

⁵ *Id.* p. 601.

⁶ *Indigenous Races*, p. 414.

bear on the ethnic problem the vigorous logic and the insight which marked all his many studies,¹ being, as one of his friends testified, "certainly less enslaved by authority than any other man."² Had he been founded on evolution—ready as he was to appreciate Spencer³—he might have carried still further his penetration of his problem. From among all the specialists of his day he stands out as resolutely dismissing⁴ the idle theories of "race-character" which then, as later, turned the science into a field of impressionist prejudice. Such bias may well retard scientific agreement to a degree seen in no other science.

5. But while that substitution of prejudice for analysis has kept ethnology, well into the twentieth century, relatively unprogressive—a means of incitement to war rather than a lead to peace—the sheer play of inductive investigation was turning the general thought to a wider field, with a saner outlook. Even independently of Darwinism, there was proceeding a disinterested study of all the aspects of savage life,⁵ in which Christian missionaries often did good service.⁶ They were building better than they knew. In observing and describing the rites and creeds and "mysteries" of "the heathen," they were preparing men to see in all religion, from its lowest to its so-called highest forms, the play of universal human proclivity. Where national jealousy could not arise, the very sense of superiority initiated dispassionate study.

There has thus been set up, outside the provocations and pre-suppositions of ethnology, a larger science, largely grounded before Darwinism and naturally adaptable to the doctrine of Evolution—the catholic Science of Man. Throughout its progress, despite the persistence of the passions and follies which generate wars, there has slowly been growing up the perception that, in the words of Mr. George Moore, "all men are made of the same dust, though some of the dust has been blown higher up the road than the rest." And though racialism was to survive in certain forms down to our own day, historic science has at least been delivered from such racialism as that of Mommsen, whose pretended discrimination between the characters of Celts and Teutons,⁷ and whose egregious analysis of the religion of the Romans,⁸ resolve themselves on simple scrutiny into tissues of contradiction not to be matched in serious modern scholarship. The contradictions are to be recognized as results of the deliberate superposing of the *à priori* on the historic evidence. The very fact that the contradictions are concrete, flagrant, specific, and irreducible, is the proof that the imposed apriorism

¹ See L. Geiger's *Development of the Human Race*, Eng. tr. 1880, p. 123, as to Latham's originality on the "Aryan" question.

² T. Watts-Dunton, cited in *D. N. B.*

³ Duncan's *Life of Spencer*, p. 90.

⁴ *The Ethnology of Europe*, 1852, p. 127—passage cited in *The Germans*, pp. 110-1.

⁵ Cp. Waitz, *passim*.

⁶ E.g. W. Ellis, *Polynesian Researches*, 2nd ed. 4 vols., 1831.

⁷ Examined in *The Saxon and the Celt*, 1897, pp. 190-6.

⁸ Examined in *Christianity and Mythology*, 2nd ed. pp. 115-16.

is false. Scientific German anthropology, broadly founded by Waitz, was to make impossible for serious students such dogmatism as Mommsen's.

§ 9. *Anthropology and Hierology*

1. In French studies, Anthropology broadly corresponds to what in England we term anthropometry; in German, it is expandable to the extent of Feuerbach's account of all theology as anthropology. In Karl Schmidt's *Geschichte der Anthropologie* (1865) it is primarily "somatic," a study of man beginning with his physiology. It is broadly convenient to survey the progress of the science under the accepted English definition, which is elucidated by E. B. Tylor's 'Anthropology: an Introduction to the Study of Man and Civilization' (1881). That distinguished writer (1832-1917) had made his mark first by his comparatively immature 'Anahuac,' a study of Mexico (1861); more effectively by his 'Researches into the Early History of Mankind and the Development of Civilization' (1865); and decisively by his 'Primitive Culture: Researches into the Development of Mythology, Philosophy, Religion, Art, and Custom' (1871: 4th ed. 1903).

In 1871 Tylor could still say that "to many educated minds there seems something presumptuous and repulsive in the view that the history of mankind is part and parcel of the history of nature; that our thoughts, wills, and actions accord with laws as definite as those which govern the motion of waves, the combination of acids and bases, and the growth of plants and animals."¹ But the old repulsion had already been profoundly impaired by biological and social science; and Tylor's book met with hardly any of the odium that had been lavished on Darwin and Buckle. "It will make me for the future look on religion—a belief in the soul, etc.—from a different point of view," wrote Darwin² to Tylor on its appearance. So thoroughly did the book press home the fact of the evolution of religious thought from savagery that thenceforward the science of mythology, which had never yet risen in professional hands to the height of vision of Fontenelle, began to be decisively adapted to the anthropological standpoint.

Tylor's outstanding theorem of "Animism" (which goes back to Vico and Hume and indeed to Greek antiquity)—the conception of primitive polytheism as a spontaneous process of taking all natural forces to be expressions of will and personality like the savage's own—was soon combated by Spencer, in a controversy forced on him by Tylor. Spencer's own partly justifiable view of the case was that Tylor posited the proclivity to Animism as primordial; whereas he, Spencer, regarded it as secondary to, and derivative from, the belief in ghosts. In a temperate and largely favourable review of vol. i of Spencer's *Principles of Sociology* (*Mind*, April, 1877) Tylor treats

¹ *Primitive Culture*, i, 2.

² *Life and Letters of Darwin*, i, 151.


Spencer as having adopted and developed *his* view of Animism, which he thus finally expounds: "The notion of a ghost-soul, as the animating principle in man, being once arrived at, it is *extended* by easy steps to souls of lower animals, and *even* of lifeless objects." On this he founds his claim to priority—a thing hardly worth battling over, in view of the previous exploration.

In point of fact, "Animism" as conceived by Tylor is actually defined in *Primitive Culture* (3rd ed. i, 23, 425) as "the doctrine of souls and other spiritual beings in general"; in the index it is indicated as "*based on* [cp. ii, 356: "*founded on a doctrine of souls*"] the *conception* of the *human* soul"; and that conception is declared (i, 499) to be "deeply ingrained" at "the *lowest* levels of culture of which we have clear knowledge." Spencer was thus not entitled to affirm unreservedly, as he repeatedly did (*Life*, by Dr. Duncan, pp. 356, 409, 451), that with Tylor "animism is original and the ghost theory derived," unless it can be shown that Tylor so wrote originally and altered his book and his doctrine after the appearance of Spencer's. And this has not been shown. On the other hand, Comte had expressly posited (*Cours de Philos. Pos.*, 52e Leçon) Animism, called by him Fetishism, as primordial; and that was probably why Spencer, with his constitutional need for having always a theory of his own, rejected it, and suspected its presence in Tylor.

The fact remains, however, that in the first of his three chapters on Mythology Tylor declares (i, 285): "*First and foremost* among the causes which transfigure into myth the facts of daily experience is the belief in the *animation of all nature*, rising at its highest pitch to personification"....."that *primitive* mental state where man recognizes *in every detail of his world the operation of personal life and will*." There is here no hint of an "extension" of a prior ghost-animism "even" to inanimate things. The primitive attitude is compared with that of children with their dolls. But, as Lang remarks (*Making of Religion*, 2nd ed. 1900, p. 52), children do not animate their dolls because of having a prior theory of human souls.

Tylor's doctrine, then, can fairly be described as twofold, and not unified; and Spencer, who so often confessed that in general he never read his predecessors (e.g. *Life*, p. 418), probably formed his idea of Tylor's total doctrine as he avowedly did his idea of that of Bentham, from knowledge of one detail; though he complained of other people who so conducted their criticism of his own writings. (E.g. his complaint against Professors Giddings and Lester Ward. *Life*, p. 570, *note*.)

The theory of primordial animism, in fact, had been the standing view of thoughtful anthropologists since Hume (who may have profited by Fontenelle's *De l'origine des fables*) and Adam Smith (*Hist. of Astron.* sec. iii); and Comte was only stating an accepted



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position. (Voltaire in his article on Religion in the Philosophical Dictionary partly saw the truth ; but persisted *a priori* in assuming a primary monotheism for each human group.) It had been maintained by the German Reinhard in 1794 (Cp. F. Schultze, *Der Fetischismus*, 1871, p. 20 *sq.*) ; by Meiners in 1806 (*id.* p. 16) ; by Benjamin Constant in 1824 (*De la Religion*, t. i, liv. ii, p. 6) ; and in effect by Hegel (*Philos. of Religion*, Eng. tr. i, Pt. ii) before Comte. Nevertheless, the substitution of another theory of beginnings was for Spencer a course in keeping with his bias and habits. At first, it is fairly clear, he left the problem of animism or fetishism out of sight, being bent solely on the ghost-theory ; and when he comes to the task of deriving animism from the ghost-idea he wilfully professes (*Princ. of Soc.*, i, § 161 : 3rd ed. p. 314) to have previously shown the identity of the fetish with the ghost where (§ 58) he had actually not even named it. What is worse, he cites from Sir Alfred Lyall (p. 313) a passage in which animism is taken as primordial and the ghost-idea as derivative, professing to find that it "perfectly harmonizes" with his view. It certainly does not. And the entire strenuous argument as to the origination of all religion in ancestor worship is by him established more or less in this arbitrary fashion.

Tylor, on his part, had been remiss inasmuch as he avowedly (pref. to 2nd edition, 1873) composed his doctrine without express regard to either Spencer or Darwin ; for Darwin had independently submitted a hypothesis of a primordial animism (or "animatism") in 1871, which it very much behoved Tylor to consider. But Spencer was on that score equally remiss, as, apparently, was Grant Allen, who, following Spencer, traced all God-making to the concrete concept of and belief in ghosts. Allen was a vigorous and independent thinker, and Spencer welcomed his help (see Clodd's *Grant Allen : A Memoir*, 1900, p. 144) as supplying a missing link in his ghost theory. The debate still continues. Mr. N. W. Thomas in his expert *Britannica* article on Animism points out that in the pantheon are "a multitude of spirits in human, sometimes in animal form, which bear no signs of ever having been incarnate."

Spencer had not duly weighed such data, having proceeded to stake everything on his own hypothesis, as was his tendency. His "debt" to Tylor may have consisted in shaping his own theory by way of resisting what he thought to be Tylor's. (See the *Life*, p. 590, for a very frank avowal of a blunder on his own part.) So long as the phenomena noted by Darwin are not better accounted for, Spencer's insistence on finding the starting-point of religion in ghosts and ancestor-worship cannot be regarded as decisive, in view, especially, of the overwhelming preponderance of the Gods of Fear among primitives. Frazer (Clodd, as cited, pp. 144-5), while avowedly regarding his own speculations on primitive religion as "pro-

visional," did not surrender the larger theory of animism. Later specialists have criticized it on other lines than Allen's.

What is lacking in the Spencer-Allen theory is a due consideration of the animal instincts which have been noted as "germ-plasm of religion"—an unexpected failure in the case of Allen, who was primarily a student of natural history, and an ardent Darwinian. Darwin, avowing (*Descent of Man*, 2nd ed. i, 144-5) that he "cannot but suspect that there is a still earlier and ruder stage" than the belief in ghosts, "when anything which manifests power or movement is thought to be endowed with some form of life," gives his well-known story of the dog alarmed by the moving parasol. Spencer's treatment of such phenomena (*Princ. of Sociol.*, i, § 62, and App. A, pp. 787-8) is inconclusive. There is here, and in all manifestations of animal "fear of the unknown," an apparent clue to a motivation of early human religious fears and guesses prior to a definite concept of ghosts—also classifiable as a mode of fear.

It affords, apparently, a far stronger ground than does the ghost-theory for the practice of fetishism; though it is easy to conceive of that as being conjoined to ghost-ideas. It is possible, on the other hand, to give an *à priori* air to the inference of an animal proclivity to animism, as is to some extent done by Tito Vignoli (*Myth and Science*, Eng. tr. 1882), whose hierology is often open to criticism. But Vignoli (ch. ii) added largely by experiment to Darwin's datum; and the general doctrine of animism, accepted or independently reached by Darwin, has so much evidence from animal psychology on its side that it still remains the most widely accepted. Frazer's latest compilation (*The Worship of Nature*, vol. i, 1926), while still treating animism as a provisional hypothesis (p. 6), tends substantially to support it. (And see p. 7 for the confident *profession* of animism by a Papuan in opposition to his missionary teacher.)

As is remarked by Mr. Whittaker (*Comte and Mill*, p. 89), the two theories may very well be combined. But neither the derivation of the belief in spirits from animal animism nor the Spencerian and Tylorian derivation, the other way about, can scientifically stand. Animal animism is primordial; but the universal human belief in spirits can be held to arise and maintain itself in virtue of misunderstood experience, reacting on the primary way of thinking. And both ways of thinking would inevitably operate in the origination of religion, as the evidence goes to show that they did. To this day, probably, the inherited psychic proclivity to animism is the root of much theism and pantheism, as it visibly is of the pantheistic poetry of Wordsworth; and perhaps few thoughtful persons would claim to be devoid of the propension.

Tylor and Spencer, in fine, were both broadly but loosely scientific. Tylor missed his overlooked opportunity for a synthesis by claiming

originality in an error which part of his own exposition impugned ; while Spencer, insisting on being original, forced on his so-called sociology a liminary theory of religious origins, where an exact hierological method would have reached an anthropology that an exact sociology could have taken up.

2. Alongside of Tylor's 'Primitive Culture' appeared Dr. Fritz Schultze's *Der Fetischismus* (1871), in which, after making an examination of the intermediate positions of Schelling and Hegel and Pfeiderer, and contrasting the inductive results of others, the critic definitely adopts and proceeds from the psychological position of Hume, who in his 'Natural History of Religion' first (after Vico¹) demonstrated the nullity of the "primordial monotheism" which now survives only as an unreasoned dogma. Schultze, thoroughly developing his special problem, takes no account of the machinery of ghost- and ancestor-worship, but lucidly sets forth the progression from the cult of the external and tangible to that of the unattainable and illimitable. He also indicates the socio-economic process, the establishment and aggrandizement of the fetish-priest;² and, again, the resort to sun-worship in connection with monarchy³—thus laying the bases of an inductive hierology, in which the phenomena of ghost-cults and ancestor-worship readily come into line.

Scientific hierology, however, apart from special studies such as Kuenen's and Tiele's, was to be the last of the scientific growths of the evolution theory as applied to the phenomena of human society. All the theological prepossessions stand in the way of the contemplation of religions as economic evocations ; the professional theologians, even when bent on scientific history, naturally see the creeds as "spiritual" phenomena, leaving finance to the historian proper ; and the anthropologists, as such, justifiably content themselves with the colligation and interpretation of the immediate data.

3. The above-mentioned works stand for the synthetic harvest of the mass of newly exact study of savage life, in the light of all recovered prehistoric remains, accumulated in an age of greatly extended travel and exploration. All the chief seafaring nations had contributed ; and German and English students were among the most methodical compilers. The great 'Anthropologie der Naturvölker' (6 vols. 1859-72 ; two posthumous) of Professor Theodor Waitz (1821-64) set a standard of research and exactitude never before attained, and brought the whole subject up to the scientific level. Reacting critically against the "spiritual" philosophies which had held the ground in Germany up to Feuerbach, he produced, partly before the appearance of Darwin's *Origin*, his strictly inductive

¹ Schultze says nothing of De Brosse's *Des dieux fétiches* (1764), which in time follows Hume (1757). Hume may have read Vico, and also Fontenelle's *De l'origine des fables*. Smith, who coincides with him in his *History of Astronomy*, may or may not have been independent. He speaks of the MS. as early work, but left it for posthumous publication.

² *Id.* p. 156.

³ *Id.* p. 282.

study of the "Nature-races" or uncivilized peoples, rejecting all assumptions of separate "creation" and recognizing a psychic unity in man in all varieties. For him, anthropology is not somatic but psycho-sociological, a study of social man, intermediate between physiology and the 'History of Civilization.' No one thus far had so impartially, so broadly, and so judiciously conceived and handled the subject; and Waitz by his method created the conception of Anthropology which has since prevailed in English work.

His book was at once recognized by the newly founded (1863) Anthropological Society of London¹ as the best yet produced in its kind; and the introductory volume was in the society's first year translated under its auspices by a student as modest as the translator of Pouchet had been otherwise. The rest of the great treatise was to follow, but it never appeared. The Anthropological Society was presumably too much in advance of the general state of English opinion and knowledge² to find adequate support for such a purpose. Buckle, who would have acclaimed and welcomed Waitz, had published his first volume in 1857, and died in 1862. Waitz died in 1864, at the age of forty-three. At that stage the ethnological works of Nott and Gliddon, which the Anthropological Society rejected as violent and unscientific,³ still found countenance in England.⁴

For competent readers, however, Waitz had compelled a scientific direction in the study; and in England there came forward, besides Spencer, new students in tune with the new scientific spirit. Sir John Lubbock (afterwards Lord Avebury), proceeding independently on the archæological data, and enthusiastically declaring for Darwinism from his outset, gave a similar impulse by his 'Prehistoric Times'⁵ (1865); and his later 'Origin of Civilization' (1870; 7th ed. 1912) framed on the bases of archæology and anthropology a strictly naturalistic picture and concept of social and moral beginnings.

4. Lubbock, Tylor, and Spencer were thus simultaneously essaying an evolutionary anthropology; and Tylor, who of the three chiefly concentrated on this problem, produced the most comprehensive body of generalization in his 'Primitive Culture.' That the subject was—as it still is—open to much speculation has already been noted; and in the divergences between these and other experts Tylor is not always to be upheld, the less schematic Lubbock being at times sustainable against him in virtue of a notable practical *fleur* for probabilities. Lubbock's

¹ Founded by Dr. James Hunt (1833-69) as an improvement on the spirit of the Ethnological Society.

² Though in its first year it had over 200 Fellows, among them Mr. Edward Clodd.

³ Translator's pref. to Waitz's Introduction, p. xv.

⁴ They were in fact countenanced by Hunt, the founder of the Anthropological Society. See his preface to the translation (1864) of Vogt's *Lectures on Man*.

⁵ A construction from five essays on Pre-Historic Archæology, beginning in 1861. The improved second edition (1869) remained the form of the book (6th ed. 1912).

original theories, for instance, on the subject of primitive marriage have been notably supported¹ by the later special researches of B. Spencer and F. J. Gillen in Australia; and his empirical discrimination between fetishism and idolatry,² while clearly open to the schematic objections incurred by the reasoning of Sir J. G. Frazer and other experts on magic and religion, yields a direct clue to the evolutionary solution.

Lubbock was indeed one of the most versatile scientific minds of his age. While Tylor confined himself to anthropology, and Spencer remained a collator and generalizer rather than a practitioner in the sciences, Lubbock throughout his life was an experimental and investigating student of archæology, geology, zoology, entomology, and botany, as well as an original generalizer in anthropology, an economist, an educationist,³ and a politician who left the mark of his name in the daily life of his country.⁴ And all this load of mental activities was carried by him as a working banker, constantly in touch with public and political life. No man ever made more use of his time, more thoroughly lived his life, more filled it with kindness,⁵ or could produce a longer list of memberships of all manner of scientific bodies. The one direction in which he did not pursue his thought to scientific conclusions was, naturally, that of philosophy; there he illustrates the general law which limits the man of constant action in the face of ultimate problems, though he was the first President of the Metaphysical Society (1869).

5. It was doubtless his personal pietism that made Lubbock unrecognisant of the "spiritual" side of fetishism—the psychology of a process which involves a far larger range of feeling than is indicated by the objective notations of many travellers. Here the excellent monograph of Schultze is corrective of Lubbock's general view, showing the fetish-worshipper relatively as much in the thrall of his cult as any Christian, whatever may be the psychosis of the fetish-priest. Lubbock's account of fetishism⁶ is narrowed by religious presupposition. And so with his tendency to cover accounts of religionless tribes by excluding from the scope of religion data which are among its primitive features. Here he is critically corrected by the monograph of Gustav Roskoff, 'The Nature of the Religion of the Most Backward Races' (1880),⁷ as he is broadly by Tylor.⁸ The personal conception of religion as something "elevated" has been in his case a hindrance to a true notation of the process of

¹ See the preface to the 7th ed. of his *Origin*, and his *Marriage, Totemism, and Religion, in Answer to Critics* (1911).

² *Origin*, 7th ed. pp. 177, 287; *Marriage, Totemism, etc.*, p. 131 sq.

³ See *The Life-Work of Lord Avebury (Sir John Lubbock)*, edited by his Daughter, the Hon. Mrs. Adrian Grant-Duff, 1924. Comprising seven essays by specialists.

⁴ By his Bank-Holiday Act, which earned him the popular title of Saint Lubbock. His Shop Hours Regulation Act (1886) is no less worthy of remembrance.

⁵ He could educate a wasp by sheer kindness. *Ants, Bees, and Wasps*, pp. 315-16.

⁶ *Origin of Civilisation*, 7th ed. p. 177; *Prehistoric Times*, 6th ed. p. 585.

⁷ *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, ⁸ *Prim. Cult.* ch. xi.

evolution. The German monographers are there the better anthropologists because they are the better philosophers.

In leaving his own religion outside of scientific reconsideration Lubbock was diverging from the general course of the English anthropologists of his day. In 1870, the new *Journal of Anthropology* is introduced by its editor, C. Staniland Wake, with an article on 'The Aim and Scope of Anthropology,' in which, after a complaint that by many Christians who should know better the aim of the science is held to be "the subversion of Christianity and religion in general," the writer proceeds to explain that the anthropologist is fundamentally neutral to creeds, yet that he considers Christianity to be "*prima facie* capable of a natural explanation. He may be mistaken in this notion, but the principles of scientific induction require that the attempt to give such an explanation should be made.....He cannot, in this relation, treat Christianity differently from any other religion."¹ Yet Wake was no aggressive freethinker; and he finally resorts in his own books to theistic positions.² Lubbock's private retention of his inculcated creed and practice is but a special case, like Faraday's, of the personal equation.³

It is to be recorded of him that he was one of the best men of his age; and that though a Darwinian of the first flight, "All his life, with the exception of one short interval of insistent scepticism, he went to church. Every day he read a chapter of the Bible, and said his prayers night and morning, thus paying tribute to the Great Mystery....."⁴ This is in itself a significant fact in culture-history, typifying as it does the survival of the religious psychic habit in a man whose whole scientific work undermines all the religious premises. In the long list of Lubbock's pursuits there is no mention of Biblical Criticism, or of any study of critical philosophy. He was too widely occupied otherwise to have time for those specialisms. And it is a religious prepossession which makes him beg the question as to the origin of religion by declaring that what passes for religion in the lowest races is not religion.⁵

This position was rebutted by, among others, Gustav Roskoff in *Das Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, 1880. After indicating the badness of the evidence as to the absence of all religious belief among whole races, he showed the untenability of the position that a belief which falls short of reverence for the unknown Power is psychologically alien to the reverential belief. As "alle Sitten sind sittlich" ("all *mores* are moral") so all supernaturalist belief

¹ Art. cited, p. 13.

² E.g. *Chapters on Man*, 1868, *end*; *The Evolution of Morality*, 2 vols. 1878, *end*. The latter work is a creditable performance for its time.

³ It is interesting to note that he avows Darwin to have been his "dear master," and to have been always for him "a wonderful cordial" in personal intercourse. *Life-Work*, p. 26. Cp. Sir Michael Sadler's chapter, p. 206.

⁴ Mrs. Grant-Duff, in the *Life-Work*, p. 14.

⁵ *Origin*, 7th ed. p. 184.

is religious. Lubbock's position was held previously by Grimm. (Roskoff, p. 135.)

6. And yet Lubbock's incidental work on primitive hierology, conducted as it was on honestly if narrowly inductive lines, gives to the student one of the clues which lead to the recognition of all religion as an evolution of error up to its latest stages, and exclude all the theological theories of the process. In that special modern development of hierology in which Sir James George Frazer has been the greatest of all the compilers and collators, producing the most largely and exactly learned collection of knowledge ever gathered by one scholar,¹ there are significant points at which the ruling evolutionary conception is marked by theoretic lacunæ. Of these the most important are the stages at which magic and religion are treated as utterly contradictory movements, standing, as it were, for a cataclysm in human evolution. Of such a situation advantage has naturally been taken by those specialists and others who seek to make the anthropological phenomena of religion subserve the presuppositions of theism and theology. Not till the data are all resolved in a truly evolutionary conception is the doctrine of evolution approximately complete on that side.

7. Lubbock, as aforesaid, supplies a clue when he argues (after Hegel) that whereas the fetishist claims to be practically master of his fetish, the idolater professes to be the subject of his idol. In the developed sense of the word, then, the fetishist is not truly a worshipper, but the possessor of a magical instrument, which he employs and coerces, whereas the idolater humbly worships his idol. When this generalization is brought into relation with that of Sir J. G. Frazer and those from whom he accepted it, the issue becomes concretely clear. They maintain that magic and religion represent contrary attitudes—the magician undertaking to command his Gods while the priest professes to submit to and depend on his. The student who is loyal to induction can see that there never has been any willed *reversal* of tendency, but simply a variation in terms of the economico-social or institutional conditions. Lubbock points the way by beginning with the idol, where Frazer passes straight to "religion," not suggesting that religion thrive on idolatry.

Where the pro-religionist sees, *prima facie*, an analogy to the entrance of the æsthetic problem, the emergence of the sense of Beauty, inductive science finds itself faced by a perfectly explicable adaptation. While the æsthetic problem is perhaps not yet reduced to a right synthesis, the religious problem is visibly soluble. Specific "religion," as delimited from fetishism and magic, represents the outcome of the development of the priestly *function*. In sum, all the data prove the rise of the religious emotion in the predominating fear which universally stamps the mental

¹ *The Golden Bough*, first ed. 1890, 2 vols. ; 2nd ed. 1900, 3 vols. ; 3rd ed. 12 vols. 1911-15 ; *Totemism and Exogamy*, 4 vols. 1910 ; etc.

world of magic and primitive religion alike. The gradual intermixture of sentiments of hope with that fear is traceable in a number of cases in the lore of contemporary primitives.¹ It needs only the step of henotheism, the special magnification of a few fetishes into idols, of a few idol-Gods into relatively placable and good Gods, to account for the whole subsequent evolution.

8. The functioning institution or matrix is the complex of the priest, the idol, the temple, the cult. Once the survival of cults is seen as a set of socio-economic struggles for individual existence, the processus is recognizable in terms of traceable evolution. The magician-priest who offers a relatively friendly and placable God, while retaining the primary conception of the powerful and primitive God, has clearly a stronger fulcrum and a longer lever than the simple magician. The approximation of the fetish to the idol, perfectly intelligible as a crude psychic process, is actually traceable in archæology and anthropology. The widely feared and revered idol, equally with the tomb of the great ancestor or hero, is a causal factor of the temple, given the priest. The God-priest, economically motived like the fetish-priest or sorcerer, is so obviously a gainer in the social struggle for existence than even pro-religious theorists have so recognized him.

That the priest, thus economically fostered, quite naturally becomes psychically specialized into the seer, the official prophet, the revealer, the primitive legislator, the framer and compiler of myth and legend, the Bible-maker, is just as obvious when the inductive principle is loyally accepted. Thus the ostensible flat contrariety of fetishist and idolater, sorcerer and priest, is scientifically resolved into a series of steps and variants, economically determined, analogous to the variations of species. It represents no elemental conflict of radically opposite motives but the prosecution of primary motives of fear and hope in psychically changing directions to the same primary ends.

And the economic motive is a constant determinant. The absence of the concept of immortality from the Old Testament, as from the Babylonian systems, has been a stumbling block alternately for Bibliolaters and hierologists. If all the primitives believe in the continued life of spirits, and if this belief dominates the Egyptian systems, how comes it to be absent from the early Semitic? The answer is supplied by Hebrew hierology. Yahwism was a process of suppression of all the local cults in the economic interest of that of Jerusalem. The local cults belonged to the magical tradition, rooted in the belief in *post mortem* spiritual life; and the interest of the centralized cult dictated an exclusive religion of earthly prosperity as depending on the favour of the God towards his

¹ E.g. the Morioris of Chatham Island, all but exterminated by the Maories in 1835. They looked to the spirits of the recently deceased to send them food, and believed in a chief Good Spirit, Atua, who gave all food. *Journal of the Anthropological Society*, Feb. 15, 1870 p. xcix.

obedient worshippers. The later emergence of a religion of immortality was in turn an economic exploitation of the primitive notion of a future life, germinating in new populations under alien influences. The new cult, in turn, found its priests responsive to the new opportunity.

The latest theory in Egyptology exhibits the priests of Heliopolis as playing a similar part when, after the breakdown of the monarchic feudalism of the Memphite dynasty, they collaborated with the Theban Kings in extending to the whole population the religious privileges of the immortality cult of Osiris.¹ The priest is thus no more radically alien in his way of thought to the magician than he is to the prophet, who claims to apply more truly or justly the priest's professed principles through a new seership.

9. Here indeed there may arise a new factor of economic disinterestedness, which may for a time avail the reforming prophet against the self-seeking priest. To the more evolved "moral sense," disinterestedness makes a special appeal, as testifying honesty in doctrine. But in the end the priest, with his economic basis, absorbs more or less the prophet's doctrine, as he had previously absorbed much of the special machinery of the magician. The magical rite of the sacrament, the semi-magical rites of prayers and hymns, remain, like rudimentary organs in the animal body, to show the line of descent of the institution; and the prophet's books are bound up with the older sacred books of the priest. As the Egyptian syncretic cults absorbed the single, so Brahmanism absorbs Krishnaism, and in large spheres overrides Buddhism. The ultimate determinant is organized power; and of this the most general element is economic. It is through lack of due recognition of the economic factor, the enduring social determinant, that the connections have not been made in sociological history—a state of things not surprising in view of the fact that economic science, as distinguished from commercial practice, is to this day much less widely diffused and studied than physical science.

10. But while hierological science in the nineteenth century thus fell short of the complete application of the principle of evolution to some of its problems, and so necessarily fell short of a complete scientific treatment of the concrete problems presented by the reigning religion of Europe, it none the less contributed powerfully to the general dismissal of all supernaturalism from the field of instructed thought. Lord Avebury, going to church to the end of his days, was the cause of many men turning aside from that path. Social science, following the lead of the science of Nature, is progressively atheological; and the transition from a theistic to a naturalistic attitude and method has been only less effectively made in history than in natural history.

¹ Prof. Alexandre Moret, *The Nile and Civilisation*, Eng. trans. 1927, Part II, chs. iii, iv.

11. And the gradual result is the pervading perception that all religion alike is man-made, that between the myths and rites of the savage and the Scriptures and creeds and rites of the civilized there is only a difference of evolution. What had not been made clear to educated believers by the negative criticism of the Christian records, from Toland to Strauss and Renan, was imperceptibly conveyed by the sheer ever-growing mass of proofs that there is nothing specific in Christian creed, ritual, or ethic, that is not to be found in prior belief.¹ So much had been realized by English Christian students in the age of Milman, Newman, and Maurice, in respect of the doctrines of the Trinity, the Virgin-Birth, the Incarnation, the Resurrection. But when there came the later revelation, by travellers and administrators, that the special features of the Crucifixion belonged to a primitive and world-wide practice of human sacrifice, the accumulated impact was signal.

As revealed by Colonel Macpherson and his corrivals, the Khonds of India sacrificed annually their victims, bought with a price, "to take away the sin of the world,"² while primarily promoting their own agriculture; all the while deifying the victim, whose injury was ritually recognized, and was met by the assurance that his deification is his reward. The latest English ritualism, carefully ignorant of all such historic discovery while laboriously investigating the chronology of Easter, finds "one date only for the crowning iniquity of mankind and the Crucifixion of the Son of God."³ The anthropological student, knowing that the "crowning iniquity" had been a millionfold occurrence through thousands of years, does not disturb himself to comment the moral and philosophical puerility of the Anglo-Catholic theology. Once more, for him, "the true criticism of dogma is its history."

12. Later attempts to retrieve religious apriorism or intuitionism in the name of evolutionary science have demonstrably failed to give it the philosophico-scientific footing they seek. Evolutionary hierology, we have seen, is primarily the work of free laymen—Waitz, Tylor, Lubbock, Spencer, Schultze, Roskoff—proceeding on the generalization adumbrated by Vico and made definite by Hume and his successors. In the hands of enlightened professional theologians, such as Kuenen and Tiele, we shall see the principle scientifically applied to the concrete religions of antiquity. Later come the efforts of men of religious training and theistic bias to recover for the "religious principle" an ambiguous footing in the presence of the accepted results of disinterested science. Four such attempts may be taken as typical, being competent and scholarlike—the 'Prolégomènes de l'Histoire des Religions' of Professor Albert Réville

¹ This, after being affirmed by rationalists and denied by Christians, is now being theologically set forth. See *The Jewish Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments*, by Prof. T. Gavin of New York. S. P. C. K. 1928.

² Cp. *Pagan Christs*, 2nd ed. pp. 108, 111 sq.

³ *The Date of Easter*, by the Rev. D. R. Fotheringham, F.R.A.S., 1928, p. 42.

(1880), Professor Robertson Smith's 'Religion of the Semites' (1889), the 'Introduction to the History of Religion' of Professor F. B. Jevons (1896), and Andrew Lang's 'Making of Religion' (1898; 2nd ed. 1900).

13. The work of Réville, which moved the orthodox Gladstone to polemic protest, is substantially an acceptance of the conclusion that all religion grows from primeval roots of animism in the soil of savage ignorance. But Réville, having been originally the pastor of a French Protestant congregation at Rotterdam, was naturally moved to keep a place of dignity in his thought for the long preoccupation of his youth, and made his progression—with Kuenen and many more—from traditional dogma to comparative hierology without drawing the philosophic consequences, or even reaching a wholly scientific attitude on his old creed and function. To the mainly true and important thesis that religions are priest-*built* he opposes¹ the truism that "religion"—in the bare sense of animism—preceded the priest. He had not even noted the demonstration of Schultze that the fetish-priest abounds, and that the sorcerer is the pioneer of the temple-priest. His aim is to establish the inference that, as science is but a progression through errors to an ever-growing precision in an ever-growing complexity of truth, so religion, albeit a progression of error-engendering error, is to be regarded as a progression to a yet unattained truth.²

For this thesis the broad justification amounts only to the usual claim that with the evolution of religions there has been bound up a mass of moral sentiment—the very sentiment which has generally formed one of the grounds for rejection of the religious forms imposed on it with corrupting effects. In his anxiety to associate religion with progress he actually claims, in his closing section,³ that the Christian Church, by its very hostility to science, engendered the progressive resistance to its own attitude, and thus made men freethinking by persecuting them. It would be difficult to make a wilder use of the generalization that evil may engender good. The question whether we ought to maintain a persecuting church in order to provoke scientific activity is naturally not raised. But the theorist does not scruple to put the plea that science "has been developed, has been pursued with constancy, only within the Christian societies." This absolute disregard of the whole stimulant operation of the Saracen influence on medieval Christendom⁴ is the measure of the *parti pris* of the professional Christian priest; who thus reveals that, *qua* theologian, he has no sociology, and will not even study aright Christian culture-history.

We conclude on the main thesis. Ignoring the fundamental fact, implicit in his own survey, that science arises out of the testable notation of the known, and religion out of untestable guessing at the unknown,

¹ *Prolegomènes*, 3e édit. p. 82.

² *Id.* pp. 88–91.

³ *Id.* p. 314.

⁴ Cp. *The Evolution of States*, pp. 149–52 and refs.

he ends, where Spencer began, on the position that we must go on guessing at the incogitable, yet without Spencer's avowal that that must remain unknowable. A "synthesis of the universe," he proclaims,¹ is the "fundamental and persistent pretension of religion," omitting Spencer's fatal avowal that the synthesis of the Infinite is impossible. Thus the French ex-theologian presents to religion, with Spencer, the key to "all outside." For himself, he ends in rhetoric, professing to speak for those who persistently "feel the breath of God athwart the immensity of the universe,"² offering no philosophy of God, and finally acclaiming concrete hierology as the study of the "ardent effort of humanity" to reach the knowledge which science has always been progressively showing to be illusory. In his own words, he reverts to "the *à priori*" of the men who "study religious history with the preconceived idea of justifying one or other of the forms of religion which divide men at the present moment."³

14. Robertson Smith, in his turn, presents the spectacle of a scholar with rare gifts for humanist science remaining to the end in the formal faith in which he was nurtured,⁴ while all his scientific work went to destroy its historic foundations. Like Sir James Frazer, he expressly posited the maxim of mythological science, that "the rite is always older than the myth," without accepting its obvious application to the case of Christianity. His great contribution to anthropology and hierology, admittedly, lies in his searching study of the practice of sacrifice. Its scientific outcome is that the Christian doctrine of the divine sacrifice is but a "natural" development of the previously developed theory and practice; and his whole work establishes the natural emergence of systematized religion from unsystematized animism and the cults of savagery. The opening presentation in the 'Religion of the Semites' of the religious life of barbaric antiquity as a "praxis" growing up out of tradition (a conspectus which owes something to Fustel de Coulanges) is one of the most lucid chapters of modern anthropology. Yet upon this strictly naturalistic view of the facts he quite arbitrarily imposes⁵ the assertion that "from the earliest times" religion "as distinct from magic and sorcery" deals with "known gods" as distinct from "unknown powers," the "known" gods being the spirits recognized as placable.

Seeing that in point of ascertained fact the feared spirits of known primitives are in the vast majority, and that their relatively good Gods tend to receive little attention or worship precisely because they are counted benevolent, the theorem of known *versus* unknown Gods (in which Smith perhaps proceeded on Spencer's theory of a primordial ancestor-worship) is seen to be a flatly unscientific presupposition, motivated by sheer concern for the incidental vindication of current religious

¹ *Prolégomènes*, p. 318.

² *Id.* p. 316.

³ *Id.* p. 87.

⁴ *The Life of W. R. Smith*, by J. S. Black and G. Chrystal, 1912, pp. 537-8.

⁵ Work cited, pp. 54-5 in both editions.

sentiment. The interjected theorem is virtually cancelled in the next lecture,¹ in which the study reverts to the naturalistic basis and method ; and we reach the acceptance of "the transformation of certain groups of hostile demons into friendly and kindred powers," with the avowal that "we cannot tell" how it was effected.² We are thus left to the plain inference that it was effected through the ministry of the priest, with his economic motives.

15. The services of our scholar to scientific hierology have been so great that they far outweigh his strokes of obscurantism ; but the simple notation of his self-contradiction is a sufficient proof that the craving for a transcendental hold on religious tradition is a vitiating factor in even scholarly study. A similar criticism, with a similar tribute, is due to the 'Introduction' of Dr. F. B. Jevons. There the abounding presence of contradiction³ points to the invalidity of the assumption of a special racial "genius" for religion in the sense of a special power of intellectual divination. Professing an evolutionary attitude, Dr. Jevons makes no attempt to realize religion as progressing perpetually beyond the "inspired" starting-points of Christian credence. Thus he frequently divagates from scientific inference to inference biased by theism. The fact that his treatise is nevertheless highly stimulating to the open-minded student is at once a particular and a general ground for satisfaction.

16. Akin in many aspects to the method of Dr. Jevons is that of the late Andrew Lang, who added to his status as one of the most brilliant *littérateurs* of his age that of a diligent student and critic of anthropological and mythological science. Of his critical work, much is valid. His 'Custom and Myth' (1884), though it assumed an opposition of principles which did not exist, was soundly corrective of the mythological methods of Sir George Cox and his German predecessors ; and 'Myth, Ritual and Religion' (1887 and 1899) is a work of mostly alert scholarship. The specialty of his hierology lay in a combination of evolutionary method in mythology with a primary aversion from the general concept of evolution,⁴ a kindred objection to the idea of "Hebrew Mythology"; a *parti pris* for Christianity and "the beautiful Church of England," and an arbitrary and visibly factitious bias in favour of his thesis of "supernormal" elements in savage religion—hinting at the kind of prospective religious discovery hoped for by Réville. In his case, as in that of Dr. Jevons, manifold self-contradiction⁵ is the evidence of critical incoherence. The "supernormal" monotheism of Australians remains an untenable proposition in anthropology. If that line of polemic is not to be emphasized as finally impairing Lang's rank as a scientific thinker, it

¹ First ed. pp. 83-90, 2nd ed. pp. 85-92.

² P. 129, 1st ed.; p. 136, 2nd ed.

³ Set forth in *Pagan Christs*, pp. 1-65, etc.

⁴ Cp. Clodd's *Grant Allen*, 1900, p. 98.

⁵ Examined in *Studies in Religious Fallacy* (1900); in *Christianity and Mythology*, 2nd ed. pp. 37 sq., 46 sq.; and in *Pagan Christs*, as *per Index*.

will be because there is some reason for doubting whether he finally held to it. Apparently no one else does.

17. Needless to say, our hierology, like every other science, is liable to error from imperfect induction. Sir James Frazer, apart from his inconsistency as to Christian origins, has maintained the interesting thesis¹ that it was sorcerers in general who, being enterprising *arrivistes*, broke up the primordial conservatism of savagery and thus made progress possible. This is a different line of reasoning from Réville's plea for a persecuting Papacy, but, like that, it conflicts with actual evidence. It is in fact offered as a hypothesis for which barely a shred of apparent evidence can be found;² and it is perceptibly in conflict with his assumption that religion is something wholly antithetic to magic—unless we are to fall back on the view that the magician is a real benefactor up to the point at which the priest turns in an absolutely opposite direction. When both terms of the contradiction are solved in the view of all the phenomena as a sequent progression in the exploitation of natural error, we reach the conclusion that of progressive science as of dogma the true criticism is its history.

§ 10. *Psychology*

That critical generalization is further illustrated in the conspectus of the scientific activity which we term psychology. It is, broadly speaking, on the ground of psychology, in respect of the problem of the Origin of Language, that the modern movement of evolutionary thought may be said to have begun, in the eighteenth century; and it is in psychology that the outcome of the concept of evolution is consummated, as regards the conflict between science and religion.

So long, apparently, as institutional religion lasts, it will cling to the primitive belief in the entozoic soul. That concept, in fact, furnishes a wide foothold for the special cult or praxis termed "Spiritualism," which retains or wins the adherence of many who have drifted away from the religion of Salvation by Faith. Most of them, doubtless, study neither anthropology nor any other science; but they may claim a fundamental community of credence with the mass of primitive mankind throughout the ages. At the same time, the more circumspect theist connects with the primary basis by adhering to the procedure of auto-suggestion, or of primitive hypothesis, as against critical induction, by founding on his so-called "sense," or "instinct," or "intuition" of a quasi-personal masculine Power immanent in or president over the cosmic process.

1. The very name, Psychology, derives from the primitive concept of the *psychê*, *pneuma*, *spiritus*, *anima*, *geist*, shade, ghost, soul, spirit, wraith, phantom, spectre—a concept which in the old Egyptian system

¹ *Lectures on The Early History of the Kingship*, 1905, p. 82 sq. Cp. his *Totemism and Exogamy*, iv, 25 sq.

² The question is argued in *Pagan Christs*, 2nd ed. pp. 35-9,

divides into at least eight, all hypostases of facets of the same notion. The analytic study of mental processes should properly have been called Phrenology, the study now so named being strictly "cerebrology," a science of brain as the organ of mind. But under the traditionally imposed title the study of Psychology—also a modern term¹—has yielded a kind of knowledge which Comte declared it could not ; and it has done so because it has been pursued in the light of the concept of evolution. And, immense as is the latter-day literature devoted to it, it may be said to owe its effective establishment to Spencer, if to any one.²

Of his 'Principles of Psychology,' the great work of his prime, in the making of which he incurred his penalty of cerebral overstrain, the decisive result is the proposition³ that "There exists a unity of composition throughout all the phenomena of intelligence.....The most complex processes of reasoning are resolvable into intuitions of likeness and unlikeness between terms more or less involved. When regarded under its fundamental aspect, the highest reasoning is seen to be one with all the lower forms of thought, and one with instinct and reflex action even in their simplest manifestations."

It is still important to point out, what Spencer, by reason of his refusal to read his predecessors, never could point out in this as in other junctures—that the generalization before us was substantially set forth long before him by A. L. C. Destutt de Tracy (1754-1836) in his *Éléments d'Idéologie* ; *Logique*, 2e édit. 1817, p. 185. But Destutt de Tracy was ignored. Damiron in his criticism could not realize the importance of the proposition, being engrossed by his own nugatory thesis of "liberty," and Lewes equally fails to note the main issue. The "Spiritual" philosophers who dominated in France up to the Second Empire could learn nothing from such teaching, and it was left to Spencer to put it into the stream of modern thought.

The first notable British appreciation of Destutt de Tracy appears to be that of Professor G. Croom Robertson in his excellent review in *Mind* (N.S. vol. i) of Picavet's *Les Idéologues*, 1891 (rep. at end of *Philosophical Remains*, 1894). The appreciation there given to Cabanis is equally notable, as is his criticism of Hamilton with regard to Cousin. Croom Robertson's critical work is indeed among the best of his day.

It has further to be recognized that Spencer at times collided with his own doctrine, falling back, in moods of oppugnancy or pessimism, on assertions that feelings and ideas are *not* solidary. Thus, after axiomatically replying to Matthew Arnold that "Methods that answer

¹ It is perhaps significant that the theistic school evade research as to the entrance of the term into modern use.

² Cp. G. Villa, *Contemporary Psychology*, Eng. tr. 1903, pp. 38-39 (as to Lewes, see p. 41); Prof. J. M. Baldwin, *Hist. of Psychology*, i, 81-6.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, 3rd ed. ii, 291-9.

are preceded by thoughts that are true" (*Study of Sociology*, 1873, p. 220), he as summarily negates, in the same book (p. 329), Comte's earlier doctrine that "true theory would bring right practice." On this head he affirms, in his *Reasons for Dissenting from the Philosophy of M. Comte* (ed. 1884, p. 15; *Essays*, iii, 69), that "the world is governed or overthrown by feelings, to which ideas *only* serve as guides"—a particularly idle verbalism, which wholly ignores his own synthesis in the *Psychology*. The correct proposition would have been that men are often swayed by proclivities, passions, and prejudices—"first thoughts"—which they refuse to submit to judicial tests—"second thoughts." The matter is one of intellectual ethic.

These self-contradictions are seen to be the fruits of the spirit of oppugnancy, taking command of the process of truth-seeking. Comte, equally pugnacious, had as flatly contradicted himself on the same topic, not merely in his later writings as compared with the earlier, but in different parts of his *Discours sur l'ensemble du Positivisme*. There he makes sometimes ideas, sometimes feelings, paramount. Comte's confusion is indeed the more grievous in that he repeatedly insists on the deliberate *subordination* of Reason to Feeling, when the very essence of his philosophy is that it shall give *reasons for* the subordination of preponderant self-love to a social love newly generated, and *reasons against* the rule of the "sentiment" of the revolutionary age.

The whole imbroglio is congested in the proposition (Eng. trans. pp. 132-3) that "the office of the *mind* is to *strengthen* and *cultivate* the *heart*: the heart again should *animate* and *direct* the mental powers." Here we have the unhappy outcome of Comte's refusal to study psychology. The very language is the negation of philosophic method. As against such verbalism, Spencer has at least supplied the scientific rectification in the *Psychology*, however he may have reverted to the psychology of rhetoric in his polemics. He could plead the excuse that many opponents were always refusing to allow the logical development of feeling, which is untested idea, into the purified feeling which follows upon reasoning.

The value of this generalization lies in reducing to a comprehensive proposition all the incomplete statements of so-called "sensationalism" from Locke to Condillac. Here the objective and the subjective inquiries, so often confusingly separated, are fused, as if the concept of evolution had lifted the observer to a new vantage-ground of vision. And whereas it is possible for a partial generalization to obscure realities, as has happened so often in the vast literature of *Æsthetics*, Spencer's is illuminative, as against the perpetual fallacy involved in *Psychism*. We reach not so much a new truth as a new grasp of many facets of truth, with a resulting conception of the truth as to Mind.

It is possible to overrate the differentiating value of the evolu-

tionary theory at certain points. As we have seen, it proceeded, in Darwin's hands, from a sociological generalization already made. And in *Æsthetics*, though there lacked an adequate unitary synthesis, the *membra* of the scientific truth, so often disguised in Psychism, had been indicated many times over without regard to any evolutionary conception. (See the useful survey of the literature in Knight's *Philosophy of the Beautiful*, 1891, which covers more ground than the bulkier *History of Æsthetics* by Bosanquet, 1892.) The clashing schools, of course, could not see the element of truth in each other's doctrines, though they were always interconnected and interdependent—a notable proof of the rarity and value of the generalizing faculty. There has been an immense amount of discursive "psychography" in comparison with a small amount of valid psychology. So in *Æsthetics*. The present writer has not chanced to meet with a satisfactory synthesis, though Guyau comes near one.

As soon, however, as the evolutionary principle had begun to be applied to æsthetic science—notably by Grant Allen in his *Physiological Æsthetics* (1877) and *The Colour Sense: its Origin and Development* (1879)—it became evident that the fundamental problems took on deeper aspects, the study of which, in turn, threw new light on sociology and psychology. Had Allen been free to follow his strong scientific bent, instead of spending his powers on popular fiction under economic necessity, he would in all likelihood have greatly extended his service to æsthetic science.

2. Another science, that of Language, had like *Æsthetics* been vigorously prosecuted before Spencer and Darwin. Herder's naturalistic speculations, which appear to have been suggested to him by Rousseau,¹ and which he finally recanted, introduced the evolutionary conception in modern thought, albeit on lines of ancient speculation; and Adam Smith and Humboldt had independently explored the probabilities as to the beginnings of language. But in British religious circles the problem of the origin of speech was still a vexatious novelty when Darwinism was making its way to scientific acceptance; and the "experts" of the time were duly confused. Max Müller had committed himself in advance to a contemptuous rejection of human evolution; and Canon Farrar, who opposed him on other issues, agreed with him in calling the Darwinian doctrine "humiliating," and "wholly undemonstrable."² But on the question of the origin of speech, upon which Darwin had been so impressive in his reasoning, the theistic experts were hopelessly at odds with each other and themselves. The cool and comprehensive retort of a rationalistic clergyman³ upon Farrar was decisive in the eyes of

¹ Cp. Geiger, *Der Ursprung der Sprache*, 1869, p. 211.

² *Chapters on Language*, 1865, p. 4.

³ Rev. T. R. R. Stebbing, art. on 'The Origin of Language' in the *Westminster Review*, 1874. Rep. in *Plain Speaking*, 1924.

reasoning readers. Farrar had realized that speech must have been a "human discovery" and not a miraculous revelation, but he could not accept the inevitable implications. Müller, driven to recognize that "roots" go back to interjections, floundered to the end in the dogma that "no animal has ever spoken," as against the demonstration that man evolved as a speaking animal. As the clerical critic observed, the statement that "no infant has ever spoken" is equally true, and equally inconclusive.

The upshot was that Müller's protracted attempt to hypostatize "thought" as something inseparable from speech, and therefore primordial in man and not in animals, was relegated to the category of pre-scientific dialectic; evolutionary psychology took its place as part of the machinery of science; and Müller and Farrar alike, after winning acceptance largely by their conciliation of religious prejudice, left irretrievable reputations for incoherence and subterfuge, part of the collective monument to the perverting power of presupposition. They had but contrived to keep English humanist science, on the philosophic side, ostensibly in the rear of that of other countries, by means of their gift for utterance without logical thought.¹

Hume's curiously fortuitous progress to the recognition that the pseudo-logical antitheses between "reason and experience" and "reason and sentiment" form an epistemological fallacy, dramatizes the problem for us. Kant's arbitrary dichotomy between "reason and understanding" is a dogmatic reversion to the fallacy; yet it was embraced by theists who were affirming the unity of the soul. His "practical reason"—another arbitrary dichotomy—is a perhaps less wilful reversion to the psychological method of primitive man, who by that "practical reason" found purposive Gods in all cosmic activities by intuitive analogy from himself. It is by the same line of analogy that the modern theist finds a single morally purposive God in the cosmos in terms of his own unanalysed moral nature. The scientific dissolution of all the false dichotomies and pseud-inferences is reached by the evolutionary method in psychology.

Here we are concerned chiefly with the bearing of the synthesis on all religious concepts. Feuerbach had posited, as a philosophic generalization, the residual truth about all theology, that it is but man's attempt to figure the law of the cosmos in terms of himself. His goodness and his badness, his aspirations and his fallacies, alike play their part in his constructions, from savagery upwards; and the theist's retrospective conclusion that "at last" he has reached the truth by correcting previous theology with modern atheological ethic is merely the fallacy of a stage of theism faced by a new mass of scientific knowledge. Still he must outface his own philosophy with the prescription of his inculcated

¹ The best that can be said for Müller's services to Linguistics is urged by Noiré, *Max Müller and the Philosophy of Language*, 1879; but Noiré's own predilections make him evade the ultimate critical issues as to Müller's attitude on evolution,

assumption: his ethic *must* be his means to divination of the mystery of the All. And still his Theos is demonstrably "the Brocken-Phantom of Self projected on the mists of the Non-Ego."

3. In the light of the doctrine of evolution the accumulating horrors of early religion are the expression of the same "concupiscence of unattainable knowledges" as has formulated the latest countersense of a morally-minded God who hates evil but purposively works through the æons an infinity of moral evil to the transitory and sporadic results of purified ideals in men. The theorists themselves represent moral impurity in their own will-worship, their defiance of the law of rational consistency which they profess to invoke. Remaining disloyal to the ideal of truth, as attained in the discipline of science, they claim to expound the highest morality yet reached. This plain-speaking is dictated by the critical need of meeting their confused gospel with a definite statement of the issues. But, made in terms of evolutionary science, it involves the avowal that men of imperfect intellectual rectitude *may* be in other regards no less, nay more, morally minded in respect of their affections than some of the men who can think more truly.

That they are nevertheless "immoral" in their argumentation is a proposition which becomes simple in the light of psychology. All ethic is seen to be reducible to a ground principle of Reciprocity, which is the intellectual or logical formulation of a concept first inspired by spontaneous feeling, in a single relation. It embodied a "variation," by which alone could society exist, either for men or for animals. And it had to undergo evolution. When the rule for the single relation is revised in the light of the larger social relations, the primary "Golden Rule" is seen to call for expansions and adjustments if it is not to be made a pretext for breach of its own moral motive. The loved offender, for instance, must be recognized as only one of the "others" to be considered. But, thus rectified, the Law of Reciprocity is the homologue of the Law of Consistency, which can be seen to be the mode of reciprocity in all intellectual relations.

In both cases the primitive man is visibly but half-intelligent. One writer¹ has spoken of "the ages before morals" by way of exaggerative expression of our judgment of primitive moral poverty; another² has much more justly spoken of primitive man as "pre-logical," conscious logic being the product of a much later stage. It is a fair corollary that the logical impulse will evolve in the rear of the moral; and whereas the latter is seen to be readily deflected by passional impulses, the former will be no less so. But we have actually seen as much, historically, in the simple notation of the resistance of the religious temper to *every* step in the rectification of orthodox belief, whether scientific or ethical. Every

¹ Jowett, cited by Bagehot, *Physics and Politics*, pp. 55, 116.

² Prof. J. M. Baldwin, *History of Psychology*, i, 15 n,

criticism in turn has been denounced as atheistic. Galileo, Newton, the geologists, the biologists, the psychologists, the sociologists, are met with the same monotony of malediction, by men who preach the crassly immoral doctrines of Election, Salvation by Blood Sacrifice, Salvation by Faith, Damnation for Unbelief.

The sequence is intelligible in terms of a psychology which notes how intense prepossession warps at once judgment and honesty. Those who feel blindly reason foolishly and act iniquitously. "Mind" is, so to say, a composite in which conviction can arise out of all manner of perceptions, from hallucination to mathematics. God-ideas are "allotropic." Intense feeling leads to *any* long inculcated conviction the quality of self-suggested authority which normally clothes all strong conviction and deep feeling. You "believe" in your God as you believe in your right to your property and your duty to protect the orphan. Thus the very fervour of the psychic state of adoration of the Invisible, actually claimed by the theist as a proof of his "communion with God" and thus a certificate of his superior percipience, is the condition of demonstrably false belief and anti-moral action.

In that temper he can stand earnestly for the authenticity of the text of the Three Witnesses, the truth of Genesis, the pretence that six days mean six ages, the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch, the "inspiration" of grossly barbarous ethic and childishly fabulous narrative, the rightness of a doctrine of Atonement which is felt by the more sensitive among his colleagues to be revolting, and the credibility of a Resurrection which his whole generation, lay and clerical alike, are on the way to dismissing as a pathetic fable. It is perfectly congruous with all this procedure that the successors of the age in which cultured men believed quite sincerely in the actuality of Satan should still believe quite sincerely in an Immanent God who is but an adaptation of Yahweh.

4. For this is how "mind" is historically seen to evolve. Scientifically considered, it is but a progressive reconsidering of its own beliefs, of which an appalling percentage are gradually found to have been ridiculous. Primarily, it is neither moral nor logical; it is only potentially so, as the ape-man is potentially human. And it "climbs slow, how slowly!" As the (relatively) honest man confesses himself apt to deviate from his avowed moral law, he must confess himself apt to deviate from his avowed intellectual law. And the demonstration and the conviction of this are yielded just by that reconsideration which is Reason—mind at its carefulest—mind checking first thoughts by second thoughts, the individual doing for himself what the race has been doing in the past.

In the Ages of Faith theistic man devoutly avowed himself a worm. As soon as he was seriously shown that he really was, by descent, something of the sort, he fiercely denied it! He played the same part when he was shown that his witches were lunatics or martyrs, and his Devil a hallucination. A fortiori, he will repeat the process with his God.

Collectively, he gets his enlightenment through the fortunate intellectual variation of a minority of his fellows, whom he spontaneously hates.

The apparent fortuity of the advance, in respect of its depending on the special grasping power of individual minds, is a fact of prime psychological importance. It is a main mental aspect of that potency of variation which is taken for granted in the theory of the origin of species. As such it was widely recognized long before biological variation. Men saw it in such cases as that of Newton, and generalized the phenomenon as "genius." They had been less ready to note that genius, considered as true power of newly perceiving relations, operates sporadically, leaving the scientific man of genius—as in the cases of Newton and Priestley—variously impercipient where other men saw more truly. What is true of the greatest gift is true of the less great.

Perception of new truth (which means new perception of relations), even by way of acquisition through teaching, often partakes of the same suddenness as that noted in the mind of the first discoverer or framer of the right hypothesis. It is visibly so in the study of the higher mathematics,¹ the learner finding himself, after long groping, suddenly master of the chain of relations expounded to him. These phenomena of sudden or quasi-intuitive perception by the original thinker, and later by the recipient mind, are vital data in psychology, especially when put in collation with the phenomena of non-percipient on the part of either the otherwise original mind or the resistant hearer of new truth.

Psychology is seen anew to root in physiology. No brain is in all respects, or at all times, truly percipient, whether of new or newly stated truth. We have seen Darwin impercipient on the side of the sociological bearings of his biology. We meet with similar variation in every order of study. Genius is but the pioneer; sequent reasoning supplements and corrects its errors; and the "general deed of man" slowly assimilates the truth.

In a striking sketch of a modern geologist who is to be classed as a man of genius, Benjamin Neeve Peach (1842-1926), it is noted by the warmly appreciative writer,² that "There seemed to be two Peaches. One of them appeared to be in the grip of the dead hand of the past: then suddenly that would vanish.....I think that..... the phenomenon of dual alternating personality, now well recognized by psychologists, occurs in normal mental functioning, and that not infrequently." Peach exhibited throughout his life a rare faculty for new and sudden perceptions of hitherto unrecognized relations; yet for him the *temperament* (in his case a very winning one) which

¹ Todhunter, *The Conflict of Studies*, 1873, p. 15. Cp. J. S. Mill, *Autobiography*, p. 18.

² Dr. Edward Greenly, *Benjamin Neeve Peach: A Study*, in Transactions of the Edinburgh Geological Society, Sessions 1924-7, read October 20, 1926. Pp. 4-5.

so commonly accompanies genius could deflect as well as quicken the perceptions. Potential conservatism is everywhere a factor. The psychology which takes account of cerebral physiology will be a means to a new catholicity of vision of the intellectual as of the moral divergences of men.

5. The doom of the Gods, so to speak, is forewritten in the doom of the Devils. Anthropologically speaking, the latter are the older line, though Satan reappears in Hebrew religion as a "loan God" from another culture. And he has had a long reign, by relatively good right. Every *a priori* argument for Deism is as valid, and as invalid, for Diabolism. The Design Argument, indeed, functions more obviously for the doctrine of the Adversary than for the doctrine of the Good God. An omnipotent but baffled Good God is a feeble tenet, critically speaking, in comparison with that of a whole-hearted Evil One, diligently bent on frustrating the Good God. And both tenets arose on precisely the same psychological (and "pre-logical") tenure. Every theistic argument from intuition holds good for Satan.¹ If the universe needs a God to account for its moral and physical order, it needs a Devil to account for its moral and physical disorder—its destructiveness, its waste, its "wickedness."

And, in point of fact, the age-long belief in the Devil was just as undoubting as the belief in Deity. Many theists dreaded him much more than they "feared" the other. Psychologically speaking, they were perfectly "sincere"; it was only their logic that was half-hearted. Why then has the belief in Satan—so devoutly held by the Thomas Arnolds, the Coningtons, the Newmans, only the other day—been latterly shuffled off while theism continues to be voluble and vociferous, argumentative and ecstatic? For two correlative "reasons." Objectively, because of the economic advantage anciently reaped by the priest who substituted a nominally Good for a nominally Bad God; subjectively, because of the cumulative preference for the ostensibly comfortable tenet "Men believe what they want to believe." And this is not to say that they are intellectually knaves; it is merely to say that they are *ad hoc* "a-logical."

6. The primitive operator of murderous sorcery and human sacrifice was but applying the theology of his time and his tribe, and he is not to be classed as a criminal—an anti-social being. If he were so classed, he would still remain, on theistic principles, part of the Divine Purpose. Representing the average of men with the then possible social ideals, the primitive religionist supposed himself the custodian of divine knowledge. The modern theist is committed to affirming that he really was so, such being the purposive, "educative," and "creative" action of the Immanent God. And the modern theist cannot be more sure—is probably less sure—of the divinity of the whole business than was the primitive. That is

¹ The argument was put, in the eighteen-fifties, by Robert Cooper, against Thomas Cooper, who met it by calling it nonsense.

how "mind" works, at that stage. It is by an unbroken sequence of evolutionary change that "mind" has reached the stage at which a large number of instructed men class the process on the same plane of generalization with the process of the biological evolution of species, while another body of differently instructed men, fixed in one of the forms of acquired psychic bias, continue to assure the mass of the uninstructed who have had the same bias given them that "mind" has now reached cosmic truth by simply revising in detail some presuppositions of the primitive.

Such are the latest "consolations of religion," which leave us facing a God composed of countersenses, who planned the dread evolution of evil as a man plans a building or a campaign, always counting as evil the evil work of his plan, always counting on man to hate evil and become good, always knowing and planning that evil shall subsist. The unbiased psychologist replies, first, that the God of contradictions is as completely man-made as the God of the primitive, a composite of arbitrary guesses which idly defy the law of consistency; and, secondly, that what we can properly pretend to know is just an inexplicable universe, negatively describable as infinite, in which things have happened and will happen in certain sequences.

One of those sequences is the evolution of "mind," bound up with life, from indescribably simple forms up to the grade of mind which broods on the problem of mind. And as to that the scientific and veridical psychologist is bound to say that he cannot pretend to "explain the universe" in terms of the agency or the concept thus evolved. Psychism is as vain a formula as Vitalism. "Mind" is so fragile and constricted a thing at best, and so ignoble at worst; so corruptible by a blow on the brain, a drug, or a poison from a diseased membrane; so instantly thus transmutable from a good to an evil bias, that the thought of taking it as "identical" with a Force swaying the cosmos is dismissible as the survival of the dream of a savage.

If the universe holds nothing utterly and incomparably transcending Mind at its greatest—Mind abstracted to a compound of the highest minds known to have existed—the universe, so considered, is just as incogitable a mystery as ever. And the consolation of science, consummated by Psychology, is that while scientific sanity lasts, man is *not* condemned to the mummery of framing idle phantoms of deities in his own "magnified, non-natural" image. The alleged necessity is part of the mummery. It is a cultural product, neither an instinct nor an intuition, still less a "revelation." We may just as well say that the veridical reasoning which rejects it is one or other of these. Psychology, growing more strictly scientific, is making short work of the lists of "instincts" which used to cumber its ground. It cannot harbour a theistic instinct any more than an instinct for war, or for alcohol, or for gambling. These are all alike cultural phases.

When, then, theism stakes itself on "our" need for a God-idea, it is merely staking on the survival of a proclivity that defies logical reason, the process of critical reflection upon first thoughts of all grades. Myriads of men have dismissed all the man-made phantoms since there began the effective process of dismissing the "revelation" which the bulk of Christendom a century ago took as the most irrefragable known truth. To say that Man cannot live without a God-idea is tantamount to saying that he cannot live without war, because he has always had it. Reason decides that he can, when he collectively will, on the one issue as on the other. Such, summarily put, is the "consolation of science," given in terms of all evolutionary knowledge.

It is true that Spencer, in his latter years, depressed by a recrudescence of the militarism which he, like Buckle, had expected to be rapidly eliminated by industrialism, threw out, as virtual certitudes, sombre vaticinations of an arrest of progress.

"Two days ago," he writes in 1898, "in answer to a letter of Moncure Conway, similarly expressing a dread of the future and urging that I should take part in an effort to form a kind of supreme court of select men to pass opinions on international relations, I said *just as you say*, that we are in course of re-barbarization, and that there is no prospect but that of military despotisms, which we are rapidly approaching."¹

But here we have tired temperaments talking. It is to be remembered as a specialty of the higher intellectual activity of last century that it was carried on to a singularly large extent by invalids. Carlyle, Mill, Ruskin, Buckle, Spencer, Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, George Eliot, Lewes, Lange, Clifford, Stephen were all either normally sufferers or, beginning vigorously, became victims of overstrain or malady. Spencer, it has been said, was the most marvellous invalid of them all. It is the less surprising that he should see social danger as coming doom. But one of his happier forecasts was that the general levels of health will rise; and till that forecast is falsified the other will remain discounted.

It is to be remembered that for the neutral Sidgwick the general cast of Spencer's cosmic philosophy was not pessimistic but unduly optimistic. In Spencer's view, writes the Cambridge Professor of Moral Philosophy, the future of society "is so bright that I am obliged regretfully to point out that its roseate hues are palpably not warranted by the knowledge we possess of past biological and sociological evolution. But in any case the world of science remains, from an ethical point of view, an imperfect world. The result worked out by its invariable laws is a chequered result of good mixed with evil."²

To contrast this with Spencer's pessimistic forecast of a militarized society is to receive a pungent impression of the effects of mood upon the mental operations of philosophers. There is no occasion to seek to rein-

¹ Cited by E. Clodd, in *Grant Allen: a Memoir*, 1900, p. 199.

² *Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations*, 1902, p. 224.

force Spencer's optimism against his pessimism. The scientific attitude involves not the acceptance of either, but merely the notation of the vital psychological fact of the variation. The author of *The Study of Sociology* had indicated that consideration clearly enough, but had forgotten it. He had expressly argued for the inelasticity of society, the inability of the aggregate to assimilate the thought of the most progressive, the need to preserve a balance between impetus and inertia. In that case he had viewed inertia with neither alarm nor censure. In the case of militarism he ought, in consistency, to have seen just such a conflict between forward and backward bias, and to have shown the resignation with which he viewed conservatism in politics and religion. Those who were more bent on advance, and less at ease over reaction, could by the light of his logic reach a code of possibilism that kept pessimism at bay.

§ 11. *Ethics*

Ethics, considered as a code or system of principles of right action, obviously, is not immediately affected by the acceptance of the law of evolution, unless the code be theologically shaped. And theological control had been formally shaken off by competent moralists before evolution was established. Whether or not they believed in absolution by divine sacrifice, they considered human duty as something to be settled in terms of human reciprocities, sympathies, laws, and contracts. Amid all the dispute over utilitarianism, it was recognized that a utilitarian test of conduct is ultimately undeniable. On that very ground, some argued that the doctrine of evolution had nothing to do with ethics at all; and Henry Sidgwick in the first edition of his 'Methods of Ethics' (1874) avowedly ignored the question of the "origin of the moral faculty," which he thought had been over-discussed. But in his second edition (1877) he avowed a number of changes of view, one being a granting of some importance to the bearing of the doctrine of evolution on practice. Evolution, in fact, sheds a new light on the whole field of ethics, and raises with a new force the ethical problem of the duty of veracity on all issues of opinion.

Many of Sidgwick's modifications of his doctrine, indeed, might have been unnecessary had he taken the evolutionary standpoint to start with. That at once indicates the solution of the earlier conflict between utilitarians and intuitionists which he (like Spencer) claimed to have finally reached. It is implicit in the conception of the relation of morals to social needs from the outset, and of the emergence of "instinct" as the acquired proclivity to do the things useful to the organism and to the group. Furthermore, the concept of evolution at once "explains" the presence of evil or anti-social proclivities as survivals of (a) the primary animal self-seeking of the individual, and (b) the secondary self-seeking of the group, horde, tribe, nation, caste, or class, as against all others. That is to say, the good elements in man, the elements making for general

well-being, and the countervailing bad elements, are alike evolutionary products ; and their conflict is part of an evolution from a low to a higher sociality.

The logical collapse of intuitionism, which stakes all on the authority of conscience as a moral sense of "oughtness," lies in non-recognition of the fact that the same kind of proclivity operates for evil. And if the corrective demand for the recognition of the principle of utility has in the past been at times made with non-recognition of the importance of good proclivity, the evolutionary synthesis again solves the conflict. It not only makes clear the general difficulty of right utilitarianism, imposing the *critical* concept on the ideal : it supplies the warning against the dangers of pseudo-moral codes and impulses of all kinds. And above all it enables us to realize as a process of causation all the aberrations of conduct which occur under such cognate proclivities as those of religion and of the normal forms of gregariousness.

These proclivities have often combined, as in the maxim, "It is meet that one man should die for the people," the extremity of abstract iniquity raised to a religious dogma. Strictly, that formulation might be classed as a crime of ignorant religious utilitarianism. Despite such frightful miscarriages, the "social" principle has evolved towards equity, up to a point at which it is frequently taken as an all-sufficing code, casting pure light on all problems of conduct. Yet the evolution has been halting and aberrant. Long before the rise of Christianity, though late in the evolution of Judaism, the maxim "Love thy neighbour as thyself"¹ had been seen to be the chief ethical principle and clue. Its difficulty of application was shown by the question "Who is my neighbour?"—a reminder of the tribal, racial, and sectarian limitations which are savagely prescribed in the same scripture. In the modern world we have had professed social idealists who see their neighbour in terms only of economic class, exhibiting themselves as the most murderous of all haters, with an "ought" which is an embodiment of evil.

Not only against that but against other destructive courses, the ethic shaped or lighted by knowledge of evolution offers decisive guidance. The difficult principle of "the greatest good of the greatest number," uncritically applied, could conceivably yield a world of mental mediocrity, from which genius, special intellectual faculty, special intellectual exploration, high art, were eliminated as non-conducive to the happiness of most. The utilitarian enlightened by the lore of evolution is warned of the danger. When *all* progress is realized as turning on individual upward variation, the rational limits to the practice of socialization become scientifically no less clear than the rational and moral limits to the proclivity of procreation—itsself the supreme example of instinct generating alike good and evil, high and low joy, sympathy and egoism, happiness and misery,

¹ Leviticus, xix, 18, with a limitation to "thy people."

idealism and brutality. The *greatest* good must then be thought of, if at all, as a good of ever expanding mentality ; progress as rise in quantity and *quality* of pleasurable life.

As in the social, so in the correlative mental life, evolution explains alike aspiration and perversion. Out of religion, conceived as aspiration towards unpossessed knowledge, has arisen the protracted frustration of the "instinct for" truth, if such an instinct there be. It is only in civilized man that the bias ever becomes pre-potent ; and its establishment has always been deferred by the economically advantaged action of the adepts of religion, whether sincere or insincere. Religion might be not unveridically figured as the cuckoo that lays its eggs in the nest of truth—provided, that is, that we logically realize that Religion is a verbal hypostasis—a name put in place of the fact of congeries of religious opinions and persons—not an entity. By the same reasoning, truth is the ideal of certain persons.

The veracity of the pre-logical man is the limited evolution of his practical needs. Man becoming logical manipulates the unveridical religious guesses of his predecessors into illusive creeds and philosophies. Religion sanctifies, ossifies, and normalizes them into false codes. Ananias, the name of a legendary prevaricator whose sin was a peccadillo, becomes in virtue of institutional religion the type-name of the supreme liar ; while Peter, the name of the legendary traitor, coward, perjurer, and judicial murderer, becomes the sainted foundation stone of the Church of God on earth. The process is quite palpably "natural" in the religious stage. In the same fashion "Ass," the name of a large-brained animal wisely recalcitrant to human coercion, becomes the type-name for the blockhead, when, demonstrably, the ideal "ass" is evolvable only by *homo sapiens*, the progressive biped who, having pre-potency of wisdom, has also that of stupidity.

The immediate practical application of the scientific discovery is to the fact of the unveridical attitude of the normal and the specialized religious man towards obtrusions of new truth in opposition to his creed. The supposed or claimed possession of super-truth, we have seen, paralyses first judgment and then veracity in the special field. In detail, we have seen the gifted Thirlwall juggling on inspiration, Maurice and Arnold striking at Colenso, the Church in general tricking with geology, and anxious philosophers evolving a spurious logic and psychology by which "Practical Reason" is made to supply a God-idea that "Pure Reason" excludes. In ethics, Kant's stand on a categorical imperative, with the declaration that there is "no moral value" in calculated action, is a sheer stoppage of the process of rational thought. Such is the stumbling evolution alike of the logical faculty and the moral judgment, which is newly challenged to be as truthful as science in the handling of its problems. The concept of evolution forces on the thinker a new ethic of veracity in the intellectual life.

How far such an ethic is from the possibilities of the religious ages is seen in the Hebrew decalogue, where the precept of veracity occurs only as a veto on perjury in litigation or in criminal procedure. Where there is no further veto even on falsehood, the conception of an ethic of belief and statement in strict accord with evidence, on matters outside legal conflict, cannot have arisen. Apart from the pioneering work of the thinkers of classic Greece it broadly emerges for the modern world only as a result of the discipline of the physical and mathematical sciences, and the conflict forced upon them by the custodians of dogma. Once emergent, it places the latter in a new predicament, and lays a new task on the would-be scientific moralist.

In terms of evolutionism, all prevalent beliefs and the correlative practices are the outcome of the balance of the forces going to their formation, establishment, and continuance. Every general change is in respect of an alteration in the balance. The scientific conclusion is that all intellectual progress is a matter of successful variation—successful, that is, in point of power of survival. But the very fact of variation implies the impermanence of either the affected belief or the machinery for its maintenance; and as the general evolution of mental faculty proceeds the given belief must incur increasing criticism, tending to new variation. For the rational moralist the practical conclusion is, Maximize knowledge and judgment by stating what appears to be the whole truth as to the past evolution, exposing all the error.

At once there arises dissidence. Even the intelligent priest is moved to stress the adaptation-to-ignorance of the belief recognized by intelligence as false; and the imperfectly logical evolutionist, in turn, is apt to see the issue from the priest's point of view so far as to affirm that the false beliefs have been "useful" in the past. This virtual paralogism has been embraced at times by Spencer, among others. "Useful" is a predicate ethically justifiable only by proof that the given belief and practice *promoted* rise in quantity and quality of well-being; and if *that* be conceived as resulting from what is confessed as error, no rational regulation of conduct is possible. The concept of "the right lies," posited by Plato, at once challenges the question: Is *that* offered as a "right lie" or as a truth? In the terms of the issue, we may politicly lie about the policy of lying, and all logical debate ends.

That this issue should arise at all is one of the evidences of the imperfect evolution alike of the impulse to veracity and the faculty of logic. For the scientific evolutionist, whatever his innate or acquired concern for veracity outside his own field, it is the only rational course, since without it his whole science is hopelessly at hazard. That arises and exists in terms of veracity. Recognizing the evolution of faculty and judgment as part and parcel of the cosmic process, he must in bare consistency study and state *that* evolution as he does every other. To treat the mental life as non-evolutionary is to impugn the entire concept

of cosmic evolution. This being so, the question of the alleged "usefulness" of error must be put to the test of a complete induction; and as one of the first data is the fact that acceptance of error is an impairment of the faculties of knowing and judging, the alleged service is at once seen to be countered by a vital disservice. The thesis of the "past usefulness" of error is, in fact, a childish incomplete induction where it is not a mere stratagem. When the whole data are faced, it is overwhelmingly clear that error is the prolific parent of moral and physical evil. Religious history is the record.

The evolutionary moralist is thus above all men bound to recognize and stress the duty of veracity in the widest social aspect. It may indeed be justly argued that there are fit limitations here as in respect of the inter-individual duty—limitations which Kant refused to admit, but which defenders of religion since his time are actually found stressing as against the claim for complete veracity concerning past history.¹ It may readily be granted that the unreserved publication of all privately known discreditable facts in regard to all men would be an inhuman and demoralizing course. But when the issue is the statement of the broad and vital historic truth as to the "general deed of man," no such question arises. To stress the known action of Kant towards his sisters as a stultification of his ethical position would savour rather of malice than of science, though science is not unconcerned with the phenomenon. When, however, we are discussing not individual perversity but general moral and intellectual divagation, the problem is vitally different. This is matter of science, if there is to be any humanist science at all.

The ethical course, then, is clear. All vital general facts as to the evolution of religion are to be put on record. The logical man, whose intellectual ideal is consistency, will act on the knowledge as he can, admitting that deliberate inconsistency is unethical. The alogical or capriciously logical man will act according to his nature. The conflict, the adjustment, the resulting variation, are matters of tactic; the one thing clear being the duty of veracity in the light of all ethico-historical knowledge.

Yet the difficulties of the new orientation are seen to begin with the first formulation of it. Spencer, in particular, is found to be perplexed by the ostensible fatalism of his concept of cosmic evolution, as was Spinoza by the implicit fatalism of his pantheism. Spinoza resorted to the verbal device of calling evil "a lesser perfection" in order to save the formula of an infinitely Good Omnipotence. Spencer² oscillated between an explicit declaration of the duty of the good man to express the faith which is in him (denouncing "the worst of all infidelity, the fear lest the truth should be bad") and the feeling that "theological conservatism,

¹ The late Mr. Llewellyn Davies so argued as against Secularists.

² *First Principles*, § 34.

like political conservatism, has an all-important function."¹ Here arises another logical dilemma: the conservatism is held to be important because sudden and great *social* change makes for chaos, men in mass being incapable of rapid adaptation. Does it follow, then, that theological conservatism is to maintain theological pretensions known to be false, because the majority cannot without great moral confusion reverse their beliefs on moral and religious matters?

Once more, the problem has been wrongly stated, as in the thesis of the "usefulness of error." The alleged *need* for theological conservatism is to be confronted with the fact that at any given moment the majority of men *cannot and will not* overturn and change their religious beliefs. The process *must* be slow, do what we will. Conservatism *qua* immobility is omnipresent; why call for water in the Flood? In the case of political cataclysm the evil lies in the forcing of a new system on the majority by the minority, or at least on the many by many. In the case of belief such forcing is impossible, save in the special sense that there might be set up a new anti-religious terrorism in the manner of the religious terrorism of the past. But that in turn would be a matter of political *action*, not of simple propagation of doctrine. Thus the theorem of the "need" for a theological conservatism which would in the nature of the case be unveridical falls to the ground as a fallacy of confusion of issues.

Spencer, of course, may be regarded, and may have regarded himself, as meaning by "theological conservatism" the simple promulgation of the theorem of "The Unknowable" as a common standing-ground between Religion and Science, the two latter being hypostatized like the former. But that would be a truly fantastic fashion of defining "theological conservatism." On that view Spencer would be *the* theological conservative—a view as little assimilable by the normal religious man as the concrete denial of his creed. We are left facing the fact of the imperfect adaptation of the new as of the old philosopher to the complete handling of his problem. Spencer's doctrine of social ethic is apt in the end to look like a counsel to put our faith in evolution and our hands in our pockets. Nonetheless he expressly formulated the *creative* concept of evolution, in his own fashion, in the dictum that the thinking man, "like *every other* man, may properly consider himself as one of the myriad agencies through whom works the Unknown Cause; and *when the Unknown Cause produces in him a belief*, he is *thereby authorised* to profess and act out that belief."²

This is a fairly nugatory proposition as ethics, since it amounts to saying that every man is as such authorized by the Unknown Cause to say what he thinks. On the other hand Spencer rightly suggests to opinionated men that they should be "somewhat less eager to act in

¹ *Id.* § 32, end.

² *Id.* § 34, end.

pursuance" of their beliefs.¹ We are left asking whether the ethic of human relationship, in which the ultimate critical test, as distinct from the normal impulse, is social utility, has nothing to say on the subject. In professing to transcend Utilitarianism, Spencer was imperfectly alive to the implications. But it is quite certain that he absolutely recognized the social duty of doing our utmost to eliminate error from our belief—however imperfectly, under stress of malady, he may at times have fulfilled it. That is in fact the *conditio sine qua non* of science; and the full realization of the duty in all fields of thought is the crowning contribution of evolutionary science to ethics.

Spencer's self-contradictions are the sufficient evidence of his non-completion of the duty of reaching perfectly veridical statement. Here he conforms to the law of fallibility, exemplified by all philosophers as by the rest of us. In his case the error seems rather frequently to arise, as we have seen, from his strong innate oppugnancy. Here the shortcoming falls under ethics and sociology at once, the total lesson being the normal imperfection of the realization of ethic in conduct. It is even more striking in Comte, whom we see full of wrath and uncharitableness while fervently preaching the gospel of social love. We are to love everybody, but the "pedantocracy" remain hateful, and the "anarchic" people who will not come into line with Comtism are no less so. For the freethinker it is chastening to realize that just such a conjunction of a preaching of love with a praxis of malice pervades all Christian lore from the gospels onwards to our own day.

The antithesis is so constant that we might almost diagnose the talismanic use of the term "love" in matters social as the mark of the divided spirit, who cannot love save by help of hating.² It is one of the great practical merits of Spencer that he concerned himself rather about "justice," the more practicable ideal, difficult as even that is.

For the rest, all his philosophic shortcomings are to be viewed in the light of his quietly melancholy avowal in old age (*Life*, App. E. p. 590) that "a shattered nervous system entails countless evils—failure of judgment being one." That and other confessions, in the *Autobiography* and in the autobiographical appendices to the *Life*, reveal the fundamental rectitude behind all the logical divagation of his immense enterprise—the greatest ever achieved by an invalid, and one of the greatest ever accomplished by any. He is to be remembered, further, as the man who in his age most consistently, most powerfully, and most unweariedly wrought against the criminal proclivity to wanton war—a service naturally little recognized at

¹ *Study of Sociology*, p. 391.

² Cp. Winwood Reade, *The Martyrdom of Man*, ed. 1872, p. 223.

home when his countrymen were collectively among the sinners, but fitly to be recorded when, having been sinned against, they grow more percipient of the evil.

In sum, Spencer's partial arrest, in his ethic, of the philosophy of evolution, is to be realized as a "defect of his quality." An overcharge of self-will capacitated him for his tremendous task. It involved procedure on certain pre-judgments; and though he was forced to modifications, he remained partly prejudiced, in respect of didactic positions scientifically irreconcilable with his philosophy as a whole. His error is thus to be seen as an imposition of will, of pre-supposition, on a process that should be purely logical. Yet the error is not unfruitful. His warnings against ill-calculated political action are of all such warnings the most competently put; and the vivid truth of his illustration of the mechanical fallacy of hammering on the bulge in the iron plate makes it a truly valuable instruction, even though he proceeds to ignore the real lesson to be drawn from his own conclusion.

Spencer's 'Data of Ethics' (1879), penned while he feared that he might not live to round as he had planned his great 'System of Synthetic Philosophy,' but finally embodied in his 'Principles of Ethics' (1892-3), has the masterly breadth of conception that belongs to his 'Principles of Psychology' and 'Principles of Biology,' and, like them, gives a large directing impulse to the philosophic thought of the age. With some enlivening anti-theological polemic,¹ it definitely establishes the atheological science of morals, already in course of construction before the doctrine of evolution was fully shaped. At the same time, it suffers more than do his Psychology and his Biology from his individualism of method, which leaves him indifferent to the previous discussion and unalert to the full scope of the philosophic problem. A product of the last stage of his constructive period, it is not his most athletic performance.

Technically, it is faulty in respect of his presupposition of a distinction between "absolute" and "relative" ethics. That conception had really broken down in advance. In exposition of the Law of Equal Liberty in the *Social Statics* (1851) he had maintained on the ground of "absolute ethics" the "equal rights of all men to the land"; later, he found himself driven to the cancelment of his proposition. Right or wrong at either point, he had shown that the "absolute" concept was unworkable. He had set out with the assumption that that ethic is absolute which safeguards the life of the subject. But it is precisely over the proclivity to make our need of life override the need of others that ethics begins. When we avow the recognition that the risking or the throwing away of one's own life for a cause or for a friend may be the highest flight of noble goodness, we dismiss the *a priori* assumption as a moral rule.

¹ E.g. §§ 10, 18.

What is true in its implications is just the fundamental truth of Utilitarianism, that the general promotion of well-being is the ultimate *test* of all ethical codes and propositions. The pretended confutation of Utilitarianism (in which Spencer is implicated) by emphasis on the fact that moral *impulses* are spontaneous and not calculating is a mere failure to realize the issue, either logically or anthropologically. But to make either the law of self-preservation or the familial law of family preservation an absolute, and other ethical issues merely relative, is to revert to biology rather than to carry on ethics. All ethic is relative, inasmuch as it is a study and regulation of the relations of human individuals and aggregates. Spencer's own defence of his terms is a confusion in metaphysic; the proper course would be to posit primary and secondary obligations. To say¹ that "a large part of human conduct is not absolutely right but *only* relatively right" is to empty "right" of meaning. The further declaration that often there is (not merely) "no absolutely right course, but only courses that are more or less wrong," is to extend confusion further, by making "wrong" meaningless.

Yet Spencer's ethic is a real contribution to moral philosophy, up to the limits of his politics. Those limits are set by his partial refusal, with Darwin, to recognize that man grown conscious of the law of evolution can newly adjust himself to his problems. As a result he incurs the criticism² that, while he declares societies to be incapable of being changed by purposive action, he protests that modern legislators are making such changes. Such contradictions he would readily have detected in the writing of other men, the critical elements in the *Data* being among its best. On the other hand, his replies to criticisms of the book³ are among his best dialectic performances; and the completed work leaves him, at the close as at the outset of his system, a helper to all rational thinking even when challenging criticism by his effort.

¹ *Data*, § 103.

² D. G. Ritchie, *The Principles of State Interference*, 1891.

³ Rep. in 3rd ed.

PART IV

THE PASSING OF ORTHODOXY

CHAPTER XIII

THE TURNING OF THE BALANCE

§ 1. *Britain*

1. It is in the eighth decade of the century that the turning of the balance of educated intelligence from the current creed to "unbelief" is recognized in England as actually coming about. The decade, indeed, opened inauspiciously enough in one aspect. Huxley, always warmly zealous for social betterment, had been a candidate for the newly created School Board in London (1870), and he saw fit to declare himself, as against the advocates of Secular Education, in favour of the continued use of the Bible in schools. Later, he was to describe Comtism as "Catholicism *minus* Christianity." He was now entitling Comtists to charge him with advocating the educational use of the Bible *minus* belief in it.

He was certainly right in holding that the Secular policy was then impracticable;¹ but he had elected to deliver a panegyric on the Sacred Book as an admirable means of cultivating the historic sense in young and adult alike, thus providing the Bibliolaters with the very testimony they most wanted. He won his election, and gave chagrin to many, not alone the Secularists so called. For a generation his tribute was the strength and stay of his intellectual enemies. Matthew Arnold soon created a similar situation by panegyrics of the Bible which idealized its merits and studiously ignored its demerits; but that did not excuse Huxley.

The scientific flaw in his pronouncement lay in the confusion of a valuation of the Bible, as a great collection of ancient literature, and a body of good Tudor English, with the question of its fitness as a schoolbook. To many it was astonishing that he should not see it to be supremely unfit, in respect not only of its motley content of barbaric ethic, indecent narrative, and false history, but of the very fact of its archaic quality as English literature. That the author of 'Man's Place

¹ In 1871, when the new Board decided for Bible teaching in its schools, only three members voted against—J. Allanson Picton, the Rev. Benjamin Waugh, and Chatfield Clarke, "a sincerely religious Unitarian."

in Nature,' the champion of Darwinism and the apostle of scientific thought, should thus play into the hands of all the opposing forces seemed symptomatic of invincible conservatism where any question arose of controlling public religious practice in the interest of veracity. That the step was a false one Huxley ultimately recognized. Already in the early 'seventies he told the London School Board that "if these islands had no religion at all, it would not enter into his mind to introduce the religious idea by the agency of the Bible."¹ And we have it from his son that "it always remained his belief 'that the principle of strict secularity in State education is sound, and must ultimately prevail.'"²

Where he, the Agnostic, had elected to conform to the popular conventions, not only a number of orthodox Christians, but an ex-preacher who had turned pantheist, J. Allanson Picton, had striven to secure from the first an approximation at once to political justice and to good educational policy by barring the use of the Bible as an official schoolbook. It is on Picton's testimony that we are led to regard Huxley as being latterly convinced of the error of his course.³ A few years later he was sorrowfully avowing that the green bay-tree of Bibliolatry was as flourishing as ever.⁴

2. And still the upper tide of thought was visibly setting the other way, Huxley aiding powerfully in several respects. Hitherto clerical complaint against "modern scepticism" had been balanced, in pulpit and on platform, by the comfortable assumption that sceptical opinions are "peculiar"—the favourite journalistic term; and that all "right-thinking people" are orthodox. But in 1871 the Christian Evidence Society felt constrained to meet the modern situation with a series of lectures by prominent religionists, the Archbishop of York leading off with one on 'Materialistic Theories,' which was followed by the Dean of Canterbury (Dr. Payne Smith) with one on 'Science and Revelation.' Canon Rawlinson, the Bishop of Carlisle (Goodwin), Dr. Stoughton, and the Bishop of Ely (Browne) carried on the campaign.

It is recorded by "Julian" ('Natural Reason *versus* Divine Revelation,' 1879, p. 17) that "though the Christian Evidence Society in 1871 selected the then most learned Churchman," appointing Dr. Lightfoot, Bishop of Durham, "to plead for the fourth gospel" in

¹ Cited by Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, 5th ed. p. 14.

² *Life and Letters of T. H. Huxley*, ed. 1903, ii, 33.

³ Huxley had advocated the "selection of non-controversial passages" from the Bible as a solution of the school difficulty. "But when he realized his failure, and saw what came of it," writes Picton, "he was candid enough to own that the third solution [exclusion of the Bible from the schools] would have worked practically better than his." [Footnote] "In a conversation with myself" (*The Bible in School: A Question of Ethics*, 1901, p. 12).

⁴ *Collected Essays*, v, 23. Cp. his preface to Haeckel's *Freedom in Science and Teaching*, 1879, p. xvii, as to the "falsities.....at present foisted upon the young in the name of the Church,"

their course of lectures, neither the Society nor the Bishop "would venture to print the lecture."

To that series there was promptly published a set of rejoinders by "Julian," concerning whose identity there is doubt. It is a curious circumstance that the ascription is commonly made to one of two Anglican clergymen, and that a clerical authorship, at least, is certain. By some it is assigned to the well-known Dr. Ebenezer Cobham Brewer (1810-97), who was undoubtedly, as "Julian," a frequent contributor to *The Agnostic* and the *Agnostic Annual* (1884-96). A brilliant student at Trinity Hall, Cambridge, he became deacon in 1834, priest in 1836, and LL.D. in 1840. His 'Guide to the Scientific Knowledge of Things Familiar' (1848; 11th ed. 1857) appeared in French as *La Clef de la Science*; and he produced also a History of France (1863), and one of Germany (1881), as well as a 'Dictionary of Miracles, Imitative, Realistic, and Dogmatic' (1884). But his most widely known work is the 'Dictionary of Phrase and Fable' (1870; 100th thousand, 1895).

By some, on the other hand, the "Julian" of the "Replies" was thought to have been Dr. John Allen Giles (1808-84), the learned author of many educational works, including 'Keys to the Classics'; editor of the 'Patres Ecclesiæ Anglicanæ' in 34 vols., and of several volumes for the Caxton Society; translator and editor of Bede and Matthew Paris; and of *Hebrew Records* (1850 and '56), *Christian Records* (1854 and '57; both rep. completed, 1877), *Codex Apocryphus N. T.* (1852), and *Apostolical Records* (posth., 1886). Dr. Robert Lewins, who in 1879 issued and edited 'Natural Reason *versus* Divine Revelation: An Appeal for Freethought, by Julian,' described it as "written by my request, and on *data* of my suggestion, by the same profound scholar and divine with whom I was associated years ago in 'Replies to the Lectures of the Christian Evidence Society,' and in a series of [twelve] pamphlets, 'Biology *versus* Theology.'"¹

The open freethought work of Dr. Giles was not much discussed in his lifetime, and he is not mentioned by Mr. Benn. But whosoever wrote them, the 'Replies,' to say nothing of the other twelve pamphlets, are among the most competent and convincing freethought writings of their age, their literary merit being as striking as their dialectic force. In these pamphlets no important position of the religious defence is left unrefuted by valid argument and scholarship; and no publicist of the day could excel the terse lucidity of their style. Their lack of recognition may be explained by the fact that the author had special reason for remaining anonymous. A leading scholar at Charterhouse and at Oxford (where he obtained a double first class and the Vinerian scholarship, and took the degree of D.C.L. in 1838), Giles was persuaded by his

¹ Dr. Lewins, who was later associated with the work of Constance Naden, signalized himself by combining an explicit "materialism" and a no less explicit idealism, in a pertinacious advocacy, in the *National Reformer*, of a "solipsism" to which he won few adherents.

mother to take orders ; and, after being a curate, was headmaster of Camberwell College School and of the City of London School, later took private pupils and devoted himself to literary work, and again took a curacy. Over the first edition of his *Christian Records* (1854), in which he contended that the Gospels and Acts were not in existence before the year 150, he was called upon by his Bishop, Samuel Wilberforce, to suppress the work and give up his other literary undertakings.¹

A more serious hindrance to his career was his trial and imprisonment, at Oxford Castle in 1855, for having out of good nature performed an irregular marriage ceremony, with a false signature of a witness, on behalf of one of his servants. His good intentions in the matter were so generally recognized that after three months' imprisonment he was released by royal warrant, and twice later held a curacy, finally being presented in 1867 to the living of Sutton in Surrey, which he held till his death. A man so placed, living by his scholarly and educational work as well as by his incumbency, could not do polemical freethought work under his name. In any case "Julian" is to be recognized and remembered as an exceptionally efficient publicist. Work such as his 'Replies,' published in pamphlet form and never collected, passes out of sight and memory, and thus misses its due credit. Yet it is as well worth re-reading as the best polemic of Clifford and Huxley in the same decade ; and there is reason to think that its forthright fashion gave inspiration to both. For qualified readers it effectually turned the official defence.

A third candidate for the authorship of the "Julian" pamphlets might be suggested in the person of George B. Jackson, A.B., author of 'The Foundation of Christianity, a Critical Analysis of the Pentateuch, and Theology of the Old Testament' (pub. by Farrah ; reached a second edition, *n.d.*). Jackson is not mentioned either by Wheeler or Mr. McCabe ; though his critical competence is high, and his 'Address to the Reader' states that his book, though published after, was written before Colenso's on the Pentateuch. The *Westminster Review*, noticing it, pronounced it "much better adapted for popular circulation," and the *National Reformer* adjudged it "the most complete work on the Colenso controversy that has yet appeared." But though Jackson is both scholarly and critically competent, his style decisively rules him out as author of the "Julian" tracts. In that respect he is inferior. Much good work, indeed, was done in that age by men now unnoticed, and only a complete Bibliography of Freethought can do them commemorative justice.

What is to be realized is that the body of opinion which sustained prominent polemicists such as Huxley in the 'eighties and 'nineties was only in part created by themselves, and had been largely built up in advance by little-recognized writers who, as well as the habitually

¹ Art. in *D. N. B.*

militant freethinkers, had ably covered the Biblical ground for many readers. Of that propaganda the efficiency had been recognized by champions of orthodoxy before Huxley came to the front as he so effectively did. Men in earnest about their opinions had been studying the Biblical problems in the 'sixties and in the early 'seventies, welcoming Huxley's exposition of Darwinism from the first on its special merits. It was in fact because opinion had been thus created in advance that a platform was given for advanced polemic in *The Nineteenth Century*, which would never admit an article from Bradlaugh in his own defence.

So great was now the intellectual commotion that in the new decade even the leading politicians are moved to confess that there has been at least a large disturbance of belief. Disraeli, in his orotund preface to his collected works in 1870, sees fit to make the avowal :—

It cannot be denied that the aspect of the world and this country, to those who have faith in the spiritual nature of man, is at this time dark and distressful. They listen to doubts, and even denials, of an active Providence; what is styled materialism is in the ascendant. To those who believe that an atheistical society, though it may be polished and amiable, involves the seeds of anarchy, the prospect is full of gloom.

This disturbance of the mind of nations has been occasioned by two causes—firstly, by the powerful assault on the divinity of Semitic literature by the Germans; and, secondly, by recent discoveries of science, which are hastily supposed to be inconsistent with our long-received convictions as to the relations between the Creator and the created.....But there is no reason to believe that the Teutonic rebellion against the Divine truths intrusted to the Semites will ultimately meet with more success than the Celtic insurrection of the preceding age.

The grounds of reassurance adduced are that those whose "amazed intelligence takes refuge in the theory of what is conveniently called Progress" have forgotten the fact that modern inventions and discoveries are much less momentous than ancient; that Hipparchus "ranks with the Newtons and the Keplers"; that Copernicus was but the disciple of Pythagoras; that fire, writing, and language were far greater discoveries than printing and algebra and chemistry, and that the "new theories..... will be found mainly to rest on the atom of Epicurus and the monad of Thales." That Disraeli, whom no wise man ever suspected of any religious convictions, should thus appoint himself the consoler of menaced Christianity, gave a special piquancy to the situation. Twenty years earlier he had written, concerning the faith, by way of justifying the admission of Jews to Parliament :—

Had it not been for the Jews of Palestine, the good tidings of our Lord would have been unknown forever to the northern and western races.....No one has ever been permitted to write under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit except a Jew.¹

¹ *Lord George Bentinck, a Political Biography*, 2nd ed. 1852, p. 485. The account of language as an "invention" is itself notably "infidel."

It has been suggested that in its day this proposition had the undesigned effect of adding to the growing unpopularity of the doctrine of inspiration. And the young Disraeli had not stopped there :—

The immolators were pre-ordained like the victim, and the holy race supplied both. Could that be a crime which secured for all mankind eternal joy? Which vanquished Satan, and opened the gates of Paradise?¹

Conservative gentlemen who recognized that a Jew could very properly stand up for his race had never affected to think that this was the language of Christian faith.² Nor did they mind. The pronouncement that "the word of God is eternal, and will survive the spheres," was the correct thing to say, and was in the recognized "Asian" manner.

3. But the more "erected" spirit who at that time led the opposing political party was in his different fashion as emphatic about the evil state of the times, while less fertile in unguents for the frayed nerves of the orthodox. At the end of 1872 Gladstone hotly entered the fray in an address to the Collegiate Institution of Liverpool :—

I doubt whether any such noxious crop has been gathered in such rank abundance from the press of England in any former year of our literary history as in this present year of our redemption.....It is not only the Christian Church, or only the Holy Scripture, or only Christianity, which is attacked. The disposition is boldly proclaimed to deal with root and branch, and to snap utterly the ties which, under the still venerable name of Religion, unite man with the unseen world, and lighten the struggles and the woes of life by the hope of a better land.

4. Gladstone's examples, for the moment, are (1) Spencer's *First Principles*, with which he appears to have just then become acquainted, (2) Strauss's *Der alte und der neue Glaube*, and (3) Winwood Reade's *Martyrdom of Man* (1871)—a sufficiently formidable trio. He says nothing of Darwin's *Descent of Man* (1871) or of Tylor's *Primitive Culture* (1871), which, if he could have seen it, were to be as largely dissolvent of theistic presuppositions as the other books cited. Bagehot's *Physics and Politics* (1872) might have supplied him with grounds for challenge of the forms of quasi-evolutionary ethic there put forward; though Bagehot's pious friend R. H. Hutton, the editor of the *Spectator*, seems never to have detected the openings. Yet again, the preface to W. R. Greg's *Enigmas of Life* (1872) ought to have antagonized him by its definite thesis of a non-omnipotent God. But the three books which he picked out were certainly "enough to go on with." The fact that all three had lately been placidly reviewed in the *Pall Mall Gazette* is probably significant. Such impious liberality was something new in an English

¹ *Id.* p. 488.

² One of Disraeli's exploits had been the intimation that Christ had been crucified in the reign of Augustus. His imprudent avowal (cited by Arnold, *Literature and Dogma*, p. 1) that our aristocratic class "never reads" was thus not felt to be an expert indictment.

daily journal; and a contemporary clerical propagandist sombrely comments that

One daily newspaper, attractively written, devotes many of its clever pages to making known in a forensic manner the many different phases of sceptical opinion. And some religious journals explain, with complete freedom, what the disbeliefs are which they consider most reprehensible. Reticence, therefore, is simply thrown away.¹

At that stage Gladstone did not attempt to vindicate Genesis, the central fortress being under fire. "Upon the ground of what is termed evolution," he cries, "God is relieved of the labour of creation; in the name of unchangeable laws, He is discharged from governing the world; and His function of judgment is also dispensed with." The champion appears to resent equally the dismissal of future punishment. Justly enough he ironically animadverts on Spencer's reconciliation of Religion and Science. "The mode is in principle most equitable. He divides the field of thought between them. To Science he awards all that of which we know, or may know, something; to Religion he leaves a far wider domain—that of which we know, and can know, nothing." In a note he acknowledges the ability and sincerity of the offender, but compares him to the man in the story who said: "Sir, there are two sides to my house, and we will divide them: you shall take the outside." "I believe," he tensely adds, "Mr. Spencer has been described in one of our daily journals as the first thinker of the age."²

5. Winwood Reade's position is adequately outlined by Gladstone. He does not indeed cite the terse summary³: "All attempts to define the Creator bring us only to a ridiculous conclusion.....the Supreme Power is not a Mind, but something higher than a Mind; not a Force, but something higher than a Force;.....something for which we have no words, something for which we have no ideas." That thesis he either did not cognize or felt to be beyond his competence to handle. Neither does he cite Reade's mordant criticism⁴ of the canonical teaching of Jesus as one "based upon self-interest.....applied to a future life," which also would have given him sore trouble. But he fairly states the upshot:—

When the faith in a personal God is extinguished; when prayer and praise are no longer to be heard; when the belief is universal that with the body dies the soul; then the false morals of theology will no longer lead the human mind astray.....God is so great that he does not deign to have human relations with us human atoms that are called men. Those who desire to worship their Creator must worship him through mankind.

Reade had in fact reduced the metaphysical issues to plain terms in the light of the life of man through the ages, writing for the plain man, who has ever since given him an audience. He had constructed the data

¹ *The Philosophy of Natural Theology*, by the Rev. W. Jackson, 1874, pref. p. xiv.

² Later, Spencer was several times at Gladstone's breakfasts (*Life*, p. 414), and Gladstone held him in high regard (p. 385). ³ Ed. 1872, p. 521. ⁴ Pp. 221 sq.

given him by Darwin, Spencer, Mill, and history, into a large philosophy of history and life from which all current religious ideas were dismissed. In so many words he claimed to have shown "that the destruction of Christianity is essential to the interests of civilization."¹

6. The stringent final anti-Christianism and anti-theism of Strauss were to Gladstone, naturally, "astonishing." Still more astonishing to him, and still more disturbing, must have been the recent pronouncement of the *Liberal Gazette*, that "Strauss's religion, though equally without a God, is deformed by no such crudities of thought and feeling as Comte's. Rather is his book a representation in brief compass of the views to which, whether we regret it not, *the majority of educated and thinking men are in our day more and more attracted.*"² For Gladstone, so long absorbed in politics, the situation was quite newly startling. The powerful Christian who in his youth had so earnestly, and yet with such high moral sympathy, pronounced on the renunciation of his creed made by such spirits as Blanco White, Leopardi, and Shelley, found himself confronted with an intellectual world in which their attitude could no longer be viewed as the sad aberration of exceptional spirits, partly unstrung by their very sensitiveness to pain and evil,³ but was visibly the considered conviction of cool thinkers, ripe students, men unbroken by sorrow, and perfectly determined to adjust their lives to their logical conclusions.

7. Nor was the movement confined to systematic thinkers and propagandists on the one hand, or to militant freethinkers on the other. On the heels of Gladstone's protest against Spencer and Strauss and Winwood Reade there appeared a new portent, Mrs. Lynn Linton's novel *The True History of Joshua Davidson* (1872), which made a commotion approaching to that which was to be created in the next decade by Mrs. Humphry Ward's *Robert Elsmere*. The earlier like the later book was Neo-Unitarian, positing a philanthropic Jesus, whose social gospel—in the first case communistic—was declared to be the essential thing in religion, the established institutional system being vehemently assailed as false alike to its founder and to the spirit of social justice. In a later novel, *Under which Lord* (1879), Mrs. Linton figured as definitely agnostic. Yet such books found a wide public, whose suffrages outweighed the hostility of pious reviewers. Orthodox Christianity was visibly decaying among the educated classes so-called.

8. A book like the 'Manual of Anthropology, or Science of Man'

¹ Work cited, p. 524. It has now had some twenty editions.

² Cited by Jackson, p. 24. It has not been made known whether these *Pall Mall* articles were by Fitzjames Stephen, who was then a contributor (*Life*, by Leslie Stephen, 1895, pp. 213-4); but they are very much in his manner.

³ This, indeed, Gladstone had never quite felt. In his day the physiological side of mental life had been little considered, though he glanced at it in dealing with Leopardi.

(1871) by Charles Bray, the friend of George Eliot, was naturally beneath Gladstone's notice. It was the work of a plain man, a theist, looking back in tranquil old age on the causes and ideas for which he had striven. His previous books had been 'The Philosophy of Necessity,' 'Force and Mental Correlates,' and 'The Education of the Feelings'; but his strongest article of faith was perhaps phrenology, which he quaintly applied to national character, to the detriment of his defence of his science against Lewes and Spencer and other critics in the house of its friends. But, like his previous works, it was one of the books which reach thousands of quiet people, and to them it conveyed a multitude of excerpts from all manner of modern thinkers, spreading a pale theism without dogma, and installing a way of thinking likely to lead them further than Bray had gone. Deism was still "infidelity."

9. Something much worse than this happened, from the respectable English point of view, when a respected aristocrat indicated leanings to the "infidel" view. The Duke of Somerset's *Christian Theology and Modern Scepticism* (1872) is a work of very moderate rationalism, but, coming from a peer, it was all the more "unsettling." The peerage had so long been expected rather to turn Catholic than to take to unbelief.

10. Gladstone of course did not attack the Duke, and did not notice the re-written *English Life of Jesus* by Thomas Scott, an earnest theist, who seems to have had in that volume the collaboration of the Rev. Sir George W. Cox, the biographer of Colenso. In the 'sixties and 'seventies Scott carried on at his own expense, publishing at his private address, a propaganda of pamphlets and leaflets which would compare with the output of any organized association, religionist or rationalistic, in the nineteenth century. The complete list runs to about two hundred items, all penned by more or less scholarly men, including a number of liberal clergymen, and such polemicists as F. W. Newman, Conway, Zerffi, Bray, T. L. Strange, R. W. Mackay, W. G. Clark, the Rev. James Cranbrook, Vansittart Neale, Edward Clodd, Francis E. Abbot, the Rev. J. Page Hopps, and Scott himself;¹ and such scholars as Kalisch and Dr. John Muir. In the mass, it constituted a liberal education on religious questions for many thousands of readers. The whole series bore Scott's device of the serpent twined on the *tau* cross, crowned with the Hebrew word *Memra*.

Such propaganda, like the pamphlets and journals of the freethinkers in general, passes out of sight; but Scott's must have played a large part in shifting the balance of educated English opinion from orthodoxy to various forms of rationalism. Himself a theist, he sought in general the aid of theists, but always with a critical bearing against Bibliolatry and dogma; and, being devoid of bigotry, he fraternized with serious freethinkers of all kinds, who found in his *English Life of Jesus* (revised ed.

¹ The *English Life of Jesus*, in book form, was included.

1871) a careful documentary study, applying to the problem soberer methods than those of Renan. It was under his influence that Mrs. Annie Besant passed from High Church orthodoxy to theism; and upon her later advance under the magnetic influence of Bradlaugh he found in the latter a Hebrew student whose judgment he valued.

The list of Scott's publications includes Dr. John Muir's valuable compilation, 'Religious and Moral Sentiments freely translated from Indian Writers'; Kalisch's 'Theology of the Past and Future' (rep. from Part I of his Comm. on Leviticus); E. Vansittart Neale's 'Genesis Critically Analysed and continuously arranged' (an exact translation, exhibiting the sources in different types), and his 'Mythical Element in Christianity'; A. Bernstein's 'Origin of the Legends of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob' (trans.); sixteen pamphlets by F. W. Newman, ten by Judge T. Lumisden Strange, eight by the Rev. James Cranbrook, six by Scott himself, six by "A Clergyman of the Church of England," seven by Charles Bray, and over forty unsigned. Among the (named) other clergymen contributing were E. M. Geldart, Page Hopps, T. V. Kirkman, J. D. La Touche, J. Oxlee, R. R. Suffield, G. Wheelwright, and W. R. Worthington.

11. One of the unavowed thorns in Gladstone's pillow at that date was the other battery of propaganda which was then beginning to be conducted in the *Fortnightly Review* under the editorship of John Morley, who in 1867 had succeeded Lewes in the post. In Morley's hands the periodical became more and more definitely an organ of rationalism. His own monograph on Voltaire, after having appeared in sections in the *Review*, was now (1872) issued in book form—a polemic which, if finally irreducible to consistent positions, was nonetheless a manifesto of defiant freethought. No such eloquent criticism of orthodox doctrine and ethics had yet appeared in English; and the prestige of a distinguished style threatened to lend to unbelief the ascendancy which Voltaire himself had achieved in his day. And, whatever Morley might say in one of his temperamental turns concerning the religious deficiencies of deism, no such concessions could outweigh the fact that throughout the book he had spelt "God" with a small "g." Yet the new atheism was openly conjoined with a vigorous propaganda of advanced Liberalism.

12. Perhaps, however, nothing in the current criticism of religion was more distasteful to Gladstone than the works in which Matthew Arnold, at this period, developed his singular attitude to Church, Bible, and creed. Arnold's spiritual history has not been traced for us;¹ and the intellectual process by which the son of the devout Dr. Arnold of Rugby became the debonair mocker of the creed of miracles, Trinity, Protestantism, and the

¹ In a letter, Charlotte Brontë, after keenly commenting (as did Harriet Martineau in private) on the young Matthew's airs of foppery, primly adds; "I was given to understand that his theological opinions were very vague and unsettled." (Letter of Jan. 15, 1851, in Clement Shorter's *The Brontës and their Circle*, ed. 1914, p. 432.)




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VISCOUNT MORLEY OF BLACKBURN

anthropomorphic Deity, is matter for speculation. It was after earning a distinguished status as poet, and a certain pontifical notoriety as critic and as exponent of 'Culture and Anarchy,' that he troubled the Anglican waters by 'Literature and Dogma' (1873) and 'God and the Bible' (1875). His unpardonable offence in Gladstone's eyes was that of "patronizing Jesus Christ," whom he had adopted not as Saviour but as (in the main) an oracle of "sweet reasonableness." To the average English reader, however, prepared for an undeified Jesus by Seeley and Renan, the staggering factor in the case was that, whereas atheism was supposed to be mainly confined to uncultured Secularists, Arnold really had no belief in "a God" of any definable kind.

No more striking challenge had been offered in English "higher" literature to the mass of religious belief than Arnold's genial account of the popular Deity as "a magnified non-natural man." Feuerbach's long analysis and polemic were here reduced—whether with or without knowledge of Feuerbach—to a phrase that made all open their eyes and "think furiously." When to his banter of the bishops who laboured for "the honour of our Lord's Godhead," and who almost felt themselves to be in "the council chamber of the Trinity," the tormentor added the suggestion that the doctrine of the Trinity was a "fairy tale of three Lord Shaftesburys,"¹ and the popular God "a kind of tribal God of the Birmingham League,"² the alleged blasphemies of Bradlaugh, who was never ribald,³ were heavily discounted. Such language might even then have entailed imprisonment on any poor freethinker, as would, indeed, Swinburne's phrase in *Atalanta in Calydon* (1864)—"the supreme evil, God." But you could not imprison poets who were university men.

Arnold, preaching the efficacy of the Bible as a manual of righteousness, and the potency of the teaching of Christ (properly edited) as a manual of sweet reasonableness, was really one of the most efficient underminers of the Church to which he exhorted every man to go. His Christ was "dead, in the lorn Syrian town"; his God was defecated, illogically enough, to a "something not ourselves that makes for righteousness"—leaving the cause of evil unassigned as usual; and still he stood for the Bible and the Church of England as essential to good life. That in his opinion "Atheism is the religion of the Church of England"

¹ *Literature and Dogma*, 5th ed. pp. 319-20, 323. Later, in the cheap popular edition, Arnold explained that he deleted the expression because it had given pain to Lord Shaftesbury. ² *God and the Bible*, 1875, p. 8.

³ The late C. H. Pearson, in his *National Life and Character: a Forecast* (1893, p. 201), cited a story that Bradlaugh had pictured the Trinity as "a monkey with three tails." The figure was not Bradlaugh's at all, and was really an apologue, not a description as was Arnold's phrase. The author of *Dod Grile*, on the other hand, figured the Trinity as "three men tied at the waist by a rope." Arnold easily won in the literary competition. The "three tails" story (distorted) goes back to Charles Southwell, as Bradlaugh pointed out, in 1867, in a letter of self-defence to the *Saturday Review*, which that journal refused to insert.

was a natural if a humorous inference. By his polemic against Protestantism as the dark chamber in which the English mind had turned the key upon itself, as well as by his urbane derision of all the dogmas, he was in effect one of the chief factors of literary rationalism in his time. Yet he always regarded himself as a religious person; and in his exquisite verse he breathed melodious sighs and sang unhistorical dirges over the decay of faith.

Arnold's cult of the Bible, a result of his predominantly literary line of approach to the religious problem, was curiously countervailed by his own attitude towards Colenso. To his censure of Colenso's work (art. in *Macmillan's Magazine*, Jan. 1863, and later) he obstinately adhered throughout his life, arguing that from men of religion we look for religion, not science; repeating that Colenso should have written in Latin if at all; and standing to his very characteristic verdict that when the "hit" of criticism in Germany was that of Strauss, and the hit in France was that of Renan, the fact that Colenso's book was the hit in England was a revelation of English crudity and backwardness in all matters of the spirit.

In point of fact (1) Strauss had been told in Germany that *he* ought to have written in Latin; and (2) his work was as essentially a work of science as Colenso's. Furthermore, a great "hit" had been made in England by F. W. Newman's *Phases of Faith*, of which Arnold makes no mention; and yet further, the "hits" in *Essays and Reviews* had all come from "men of religion." The natural verdict of plain men was that Arnold was "put off his play" by the revelation of a mass of sheer historic untruth in that Bible which he was always urging his benighted compatriots to read for edification. Many of them justifiably decided that he did not want to have the truth known, and discounted accordingly his Bibliolatrous unctious. Equally frustrative of his aim was the general recognition by students that he was strangely ignorant of the results of Biblical criticism as regards the real evolution of Judaism.

That ignorance appears to be shared by the monographer who, sometimes rightly colliding with his subject, adds his quota of contempt to Arnold's aspersion of Colenso's book (Herbert Paul, *Matthew Arnold*, pp. 68-9). Colenso, he informs us, "has long been forgotten"; and, faintly deprecating Arnold's phrase about the "titter from educated Europe," he adds that the Bishop's "arithmetical computations neither edified the many nor informed the few." The monographer here suffers from his "superiority complex." As it happens, Kuenen has put on lasting record the fact that Colenso imposed a right direction on a historical reconstruction that had long been astray. On the other hand, if ever the "titter of educated Europe" could be said to have been earned in that age by an individual English utterance, it was when Arnold predicted, in 1859, that if ever

the Prussian army faced that of France it would be swept away by "a charge of Zouaves." (Pamphlet on *England and the Italian Question*, 1859, pp. 33-4.)

The erection of inordinate certitudes on a basis of fatally limited information appears to be a regrettably frequent result of the academic discipline of Oxford in the last century. Something approaching to a "titter of educated Europe" over the Bibliolatry of Arnold was actually conveyed to him, as he informed us (*Last Essays*, p. x), by the amused criticism of Professor Angelo de Gubernatis; but his power of learning seems to have been early arrested. His reply to Gubernatis is a piece of undergraduate sophistry. The finally instructive aspect of his case as a prophet is that his most enduring hold on the English mind lies in his undying verse, which, here strangely contrasting with his no less limpid prose, is in the main a poetry of doubt and diffidence, finely akin to that of Leopardi. It hints at the physio-psychological clue to his many self-contradictions.

13. If there could be said to be a standing antithesis to Matthew Arnold within the camp of rationalism it was Herbert Spencer, the man of scientific culture who made light of the educational value of the classics, who regarded the "anti-patriotic" bias of Arnold's social criticism as a species of prejudice no less unjudicial than the patriotic bias,¹ and who pulled to pieces the prose structure of a passage of Addison which Arnold had cited as perfect in form though empty of matter.² But they joined hands all the same. About 1860 we have seen Spencer still prudentially using current theistic language without theistic belief: in 1873 he shakes off the old restraint. If he can ever be said to have really enjoyed himself in writing a book it was over *The Study of Sociology*, published in that year. In the chapter on 'The Theological Bias' we have the picture of the pious old fire-eater for whom "God was symbolized as a kind of transcendently-powerful sea-captain," and the summary of the doctrine that there are three Almighties who are not three but one Almighty, and "that one of the Almighties suffered on the cross and descended into hell to pacify another of them."³

Throughout the close-packed book recurs the Arnoldian note of light or sombre irony over the irrationality of men, pleasantly illustrated by their religion. What the fighting freethinkers had been doing on the platform for a generation, the men of social and literary and philosophic status are now doing in print, with a zest of blasphemy which would have put the platform men in danger of the law. Thus was communicated to the middle classes a kind of instruction hitherto given—with less of "cocksureness" and more of argument—to the workers by Secularist lecturers. Spencer is no longer prudential and placatory: he tranquilly

¹ *The Study of Sociology*, 1873, p. 217 sq.

² *Id.* p. 413 sq.

³ *Id.* pp. 297-8,

indicates to the orthodox that they are really not worth arguing with. And the result was that the new book, which, though hardly fitting its title, had abundant literary and critical merit, greatly extended his popularity, already enhanced by Gladstone's advertisement. His unflagging argument is not seldom open to criticism, and it offers at least one obvious foothold to the enemy in its attitude on ethics;¹ but it is an incessant gymnastic in the use of reason on every aspect of life.

14. The gravity of the intellectual situation was signally impressed on the educated world when on the issue of J. S. Mill's Autobiography (1873) there followed (1874) the posthumous issue of his 'Three Essays on Religion.' By the common consent of studious university men² Mill had been the chief educative influence of his generation in all that concerned the conduct of reason on the plane of abstract thought, and no less so in the application of such thought to public and private conduct. He ranked as the chief English logician, economist, philosophical and ethical critic, and political moralist. When, then, the very newspapers had to convey the knowledge that this forceful and noble mind had never had any of the current religious beliefs whatever, and had done its work "without God in the world," the simple fact was momentous for all who were beginning to frame their philosophy of life.

At such a moment, naturally, the voice of militant orthodoxy was raised in commination. The *Church Herald* distinguished itself by the announcement that

Mr. J. Stuart Mill, who has just gone to his account, would have been a remarkable writer of English³ if his innate self-consciousness and abounding self-confidence had not made him a notorious literary prig.....His death is no loss to anybody, for he was a rank but amiable infidel, and a most dangerous person. The sooner those "lights of thought" who agree with him go to the same place, the better it will be for both Church and State.⁴

Such pronouncements usefully quickened, in "the new army," the consciousness that it was arrayed against a hostile force which, alike as Catholicism and as Protestantism, would be brutal so long as it remained powerful. In the next decade the stimulus was to be given on a larger scale.


Mill's *Three Essays*, indeed, were at important points disconcerting no less for friends than for foes. He had remained to the end unable to accept Darwinism as proved. On Morley the effect was such as to make him follow his affectionately admiring memorial article on Mill's death with a stringent criticism—the most advanced that he ever wrote—on

¹ "The unthinking ineptitude with which even the routine of life is carried on by the mass of men, shows clearly that they have nothing like the insight required for self-guidance in the absence of an authoritative code of conduct" (p. 303).

² See citations in *Modern Humanists Reconsidered*, pp. 132-5.

³ The *Times* would not allow even this.

⁴ Cited by Spencer, *Study of Sociology*, p. 419.



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the posthumous teachings as to theism,¹ which at the moment he regarded as harmfully reactionary. They did not prove to be so in their influence, any more than Morley's own dissonances in his account of Voltaire, of which he appears to have been unconscious. Mill's substitution of a Limited Liability God, a God-who-cannot-get-his-own-way, for the conventional Omnipotence, the All-Good creator of all evil, gave small comfort to serious theists of any school, though in the next generation it was to be variously re-stated by William James, Mr. H. G. Wells, and others. And though the unstinted tribute to Jesus has been made much of by later Neo-Unitarians, it was in itself a definite negation of the supernatural Jesus of the orthodox creed, which on that head was just then crumbling.

Mill, in fact, had not trained himself for a scientific estimate of Christianity either as a social factor or as a historic problem. "He scarcely ever read a theological book."² He was writing in the emotional mood apparently developed in him by the cherished companion of his private life. "He is not even well read in the sceptics that preceded him",³ and of the intricate problem of the gospels as historic documents he had made no study. His admiringly friendly but always judicial biographer is struck by the "immense superiority" to Mill's book of that of Strauss on 'The Old Faith and the New' in "all but the logic and metaphysics" — a qualification which some readers would question. But nothing in all this could cancel the large significance of the fact that the admirable man who thus posthumously stirred anew the thought of his age had been as fundamentally non-religious⁴ as the father who trained him, whatever might be made of him as an "essentially religious" spirit by the adepts of verbal reconstruction.

15. Small attention seems to have been aroused in 1873 by the publication of Leslie Stephen's 'Essays on Freethinking and Plain-speaking',⁵ though in the following year the Rev. Llewellyn Davies (an earnest cleric and a good scholar, but a mediocre thinker) assailed the book, with Morley's 'On Compromise.' Charles Eliot Norton, the valued American friend to whom Stephen's volume is dedicated, thought that in it the value of freethinking principles "is perhaps not presented as fully and strongly as it might be to advantage";⁶ but the book was, as he avowed, "the clearest and most definite statement yet made" [that is, by

¹ Extracts and summary in Mr. F. W. Hirst's *Early Life and Letters of John Morley*, 1927, vol. i, ch. vi. Mr. Hirst remarks (p. 305) that Morley did not reprint his articles on *Supernatural Religion* and on Mill's essays "in his Collected Works, for reasons not difficult to fathom." But the Mill article was reprinted in the first issue of the *Critical Miscellanies* (2nd series), though not in the later and cheaper edition, and Morley expressly reiterates his criticism of Mill's theism in his *Recollections* (1917), i, 106-7.

² Bain, *J. S. Mill*, p. 139.

³ *Id. ib.*

⁴ Cp. Bain, p. 140.

⁵ *Life and Letters of Leslie Stephen*, by F. W. Maitland, 1906, p. 238. The *Essays* are a collection of previously printed articles with a new one, 'An Apology for Plain-speaking,' added.

⁶ *Letters of Charles Eliot Norton*, 1913, i, 476.

an upper-class English writer] "of the attitude of the thought of serious men who reject the old religion, and of their views on morality, duty, and life." And, as the work of a young university man, it had the due oracular note of confidence.

Of the contents, the opening essay on 'The Broad Church' was one of the first vigorous pressures on the defective sense of truth in the clerisy; and that entitled 'Are we Christians?', à propos of Strauss's 'The Old Faith and the New,' is a very straightforward if unsubtle answer in the negative to the question of the title, though it begins in the *Saturday Review* manner by calling Gladstone's protest "a pathetic appeal to the schoolboys of Liverpool." That manner imparts crudity to the essays on Shaftesbury and Mandeville, of whom the latter is declared to have held the "bestial" view of human nature; but the final essay is worthily serious. At Cambridge, Stephen, holding a clerical fellowship, had taken holy orders, but had furiously repented, and in 1875, under the Act of 1870, he thankfully divested himself of his frock. Already, as editor of the *Cornhill Magazine*, he had published chapters of Arnold's 'Literature and Dogma.'

In 1876 he printed in the *Fortnightly* the original form of his essay 'An Agnostic's Apology'; and in the same year appeared his 'History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century,' the first massive and scholarly contribution to the critical history of English freethought. That it took contemptuous views of such men as Toland and Collins, and ascribed to the orthodox defence against the deists a preponderating ability never evidenced from the extracts, belonged to the situation and the preparation of the writer. Thenceforth his status as a literary critic widened his influence as a freethinker, which was deepened further by his 'Science of Ethics' for a smaller circle of students. Whatever his tendency to self-contradiction in criticism, he never flinched from his main principles. Simplicity and sincerity of character endeared him to his friends; and if recklessness in misstatement earned him distaste with others, he has nonetheless found worthy commemoration from an admirable biographer, one of the most gifted historians of the time, which will keep his memory green.

In the reprint of the *Essays on Freethinking and Plainspeaking* (1907) there are appreciations by Lord Bryce and Mr. Herbert Paul, of which that by the latter is valuable. It is in fact Mr. Paul's best critical performance. But both writers critically divagate in calling Stephen a "judicial" critic. "The most careful and measured of writers" is Lord Bryce's verdict, which is sufficiently upset by Mr. Paul, though he partly endorses it. Stephen, he confesses, "like other historians, was not always just to individuals" (p. xxviii).

F. W. Maitland, in his charming biography, has left in the penetrable disguise of A. B. C. initials (p. 452) Stephen's private account of the present writer as one who "boasts of being a thorough-going

atheist and materialist." That was a sufficiently imaginative fabrication; and the rest of the letter is a badly distorted record of what took place. What had exasperated Stephen was not any shadow of suggestion that he had not made proper retraction, but the remark that in handsomely retracting as to Paine he had fallen into a new historical error. Needless to say, he had never been called "cowardly and illogical as well as insincere," or either of the first and last. His anger was apt to take pathological forms (cp. Maitland, p. 494), and was at times wildly hurled even at his old friends. But the record of his fortitude under his heavy trials, and finally under his sufferings from cancer, outweighs and effaces all memory of infirmities. His final modesty of self-estimate, indeed, was as excessive as any of his judgments had ever been.

16. A sally which Gladstone would have found it difficult to meet, and of which he seems to have taken no notice, appeared in 1873 under the title 'Modern Christianity a Civilized Heathenism.' This vivacious treatise, which in 1876 had reached its sixteenth thousand, was issued as "by the Author of 'The Fight at Dame Europa's School,'" another effervescent pamphlet of which the sale in its day had run to nearly 200,000. Later advertisements revealed the author as really what he purported to be in the second pamphlet, a clergyman of the Church of England, who had preached in 1875, in Salisbury Cathedral, a sermon on 'Creed and Conduct.' He was, in fact, Canon H. W. Pullen, of Salisbury.

The pamphlet of 1873 reveals a very latitudinarian view of creed, and an exacting one of conduct, being an assault on institutional Christianity as a mere defiance of the teaching and example of the Founder, which teaching is at the same time declared to be so incredible that only an utterly devoted and ecstatic ascetic (exemplified in the narrative) can live up to it. The writer's views, largely put in dialogue, include a prefatory declaration of doubt as to whether "Christianity, as the professed religion of English men and women, will survive the scrutinies of the next sixty or eighty years," and of the conviction that "if Public Opinion cared to speak its mind, Public Opinion would proclaim itself infidel to the very core." Pyrotechnic in aspect, the treatise appears none the less sincere.

17. No single manifesto of the decade, perhaps, produced a more widespread commotion than did the famous "Belfast Address" of Professor John Tyndall to the British Association in 1874. The academic free-thinkers were at this stage visibly stimulating each other to new audacities; and Tyndall was chargeable with making a Presidential address a war-cry, albeit in the name of science in general. Huxley had privately bantered him as a "raging infidel," and given him monitions of prudence. Tyndall was not docile. After his lucid survey of the expansion of scientific theory came the battle-cries: "I discern in matter the promise and potency of all terrestrial life"—the doctrine of Büchner—and "We shall

wrest from theology the entire dominion of cosmological theory." "We fought and won our battle even in the Middle Ages; should we doubt the issue of another conflict with our broken foe?"

There ensued the usual sham-fight about "materialism," Tyndall having, like Spencer and Huxley, declared that he was not a materialist carefully omitting to intimate who the real materialists were or are. It seems never to have occurred to either Huxley or Tyndall to investigate as to whether there is any doctrine of Materialism such as theistic and other philosophers are wont to denounce. The clergy, still less able to cite the theoretic materialist who says there is "nothing but matter," decided that Tyndall was materialistic enough for their purposes. And when Huxley added to Tyndall's Address his own paper on 'Animal Automatism' at the same meeting, they had abundant ground for outcry. In other circles there was recognition that the use of the word "automaton" had been singularly unfortunate, in respect of the connotations of that term, which inevitably confused the argument—as had already happened, and was continuously to happen, in respect of the application by scientific men of the term "mechanism" to the cosmic process. Huxley's claim to special vigilance in terminology was here as later discounted by himself.

The publication of a manifesto by the Catholic hierarchy of Ireland, denouncing Tyndall's Address, gave him the opportunity for an 'Apology' in which he on the one hand demonstrated and denounced the destructive action of the Catholic Church against science throughout Christian history, and on the other hand gave a biting account of the devotion of the religious world to "things unworthy, if I may say it without discourtesy, of the attention of enlightened heathens; the fight about the fripperies of Ritualism, and the verbalism of the Athanasian Creed" and other "chimeras which astound all thinking men." The respectable world of readers of newspapers and reviews were now in the way of hearing speech even plainer than that of the fighting freethinkers.

18. To all the new sharpshooting was added, for the English reading world, the heavy battery of *Supernatural Religion*,¹ a work at first anonymous, later avowed as by W. R. Cassels. Here was collected, by an extraordinarily diligent scholar, the substance of the debate and research of two generations over all the problems of the authenticity and historicity of the Christian gospels. At that stage the author declared himself a theist, committing himself to positions which he afterwards renounced; and to his documentary analysis he prefaced a stringent exposure of the atmosphere of superstition, ignorance, and credulity in which the gospels emerged. The natural tactic of the Church was to impugn his scholarship, and this was zealously undertaken by the really

¹ Three vols. 1874-7. Sixth ed. 1879. Rep. revised and condensed, by the R. P. A. (1902) with a new chapter and much fresh matter.



WALTER R. CASSELS

From a photograph in the R.P.A. Library

learned yet professionally obscurantist Bishop Lightfoot. When, however, to the author's own very effective reply were added the authoritative declarations of two such professional scholars as Pfleiderer and Samuel Davidson,¹ pronouncing Lightfoot's polemic wholly inadequate as an answer to the attack, the orthodox defence rapidly receded, leaving the main critical positions standing. Henceforth the historical trustworthiness of the gospels, and the "supernatural" in their record, ceased to be affirmed by competent English scholars. By the end of the century clerical scholarship had become broadly Neo-Unitarian, with James Martineau as its philosopher, while the routine of the Church went on as usual.

It is to be remembered, in re-tracing the cumulative campaign of the 'seventies, that 'Supernatural Religion' was coincident with Kuenen's 'Religion of Israel' in its English dress. That great three-decker, coming into English action alongside of the native craft—a consummate product of expert scholarship beside a less ripe though extremely energetic performance in a different field—more than doubled the impression of an irresistible advance of scientific criticism throughout the world. If Kuenen's victory was the more quickly complete, the expectation in the other field was the more stimulated. It had become already clear that the day of orthodoxy was nearly over for the educated world, whatever the Churches might save from the wreck. Draper's 'History of the Conflict between Religion and Science,' appearing in 1874, was eagerly welcomed, and reached its eighteenth edition within ten years.

And Kuenen's contribution was nearly synchronous with other continental work which directly affected English culture. In 1876 appeared Renan's *Dialogues et Fragments Philosophiques*, setting forth with a ripe serenity his dissolving view of the ancient theological problem, and capturing readers everywhere by the undecaying charm of his style. Taine's *On Intelligence*, with its rigorously rationalistic analysis, had been translated in 1871—the year of issue of Tylor's *Primitive Culture*. In 1877, yet again, appeared the first volume of the translation of Lange's *History of Materialism*. The whole intellectual atmosphere was thus being charged with dynamic forces, all collaborating towards the direct attack on the traditional creed.

19. Before Leslie Stephen had written anything of a freethinking cast, his elder brother, James Fitzjames Stephen, had contributed to the *Saturday Review* a multitude of critiques which sufficiently indicate that he was no more orthodox than the other. They all, of course, preserve the *Saturday* style of more or less supercilious detachment from common opinion; and the medium compelled cursory treatment. But many times over the criticism is such as only an unbeliever could have penned.² The

¹ Pfleiderer, *The Development of Theology since Kant*, Eng. tr. 1890, p. 390; Davidson, *Introd. to the Study of the New Testament*, pref. to 2nd ed.

² This was known in the literary world. See letter in Mr. Hirst's *Morley*, i, 242.

concluding sentence of the paper on Paley,¹ a far from laudatory account of the *Evidences*, is a sufficient example: "With all its defects, Paley's *Evidences* is worth a cart-load of *Ecce Homos*." Collected long afterwards, under the sardonic title of *Horæ Sabbaticæ*, the series found no great acceptance, but they form a noteworthy record of their period.

20. The part played by periodical literature in disseminating critical thought is obviously likely to be large, and as obviously difficult to estimate. The *Westminster Review* can never have had a large circulation. There is nothing, however, to show that the *Saturday* was held to be dangerous to orthodoxy; and James Thomson's general verdict² on its literary and intellectual aspects was probably assented to by many freethinkers. But there could be no doubt, after 1872, of the tendency and influence of the *Fortnightly Review* under Morley. Like his predecessor in the *Fortnightly* chair, he had been at first careful to exclude freethinking manifestoes from the Review. Even in 1874,³ reviewing 'Supernatural Religion,' he endorsed Lecky's attitude of leaving things to "the prevailing habit of thought." "Men," he added, "surrender a superstition because they have acquired in other regions a way of thinking which silently dissolves the superstition." But after the serial appearance of his own *Voltaire* there could be no abstinence from fresh polemic; and in 1873 Francis Newman and Leslie Stephen were carrying on in his pages a vigorous campaign for secular education; till in 1874 appeared his own chapter on 'Religious Compromise,' the most resonantly outspoken section of his volume 'On Compromise' in general.

Even in that powerful and largely reasonable chapter, however, he is careful to speak⁴ ill of "the unbelief of a hundred years ago," as well as of a modern "purely negative and purely destructive school of free-thinkers," without specifications beyond a reference to the "coarse and realistic criticism of which Voltaire was the consummate master"—as if there had been no English freethought in the seventeen-seventies. Of Voltaire's criticism he alleges⁵ that it has "done its work," and that "after victory it vanished." Who then were the contemporary destructives? Further we are told that the "vanishing" had occurred, for one thing, because "the coarse and realistic forms of belief had either vanished before it, or else they forsook their ancient pretensions and clothed themselves in more modest robes." Only inattention to modern religious history could account for such a statement. Coarse and realistic forms of religious belief had flourished down to Morley's own day.

He soon had, in fact, cause to realize as much. The exploit of spelling "God" with a small "g"—which Voltaire might have signalized as

¹ *Horæ Sabbaticæ*, Reprint of Articles Contributed to the *Saturday Review* (3 vols. 1892), vol. ii, p. 92.

² Rep. in *Poems, Essays, and Fragments*, 1892. Compare the estimate by Bagehot, cited by Mr. Hirst, *Morley*, i, 46.

³ As noted by Benn, ii, 355.

⁴ Ed. 1886, p. 158.

⁵ *Id.* p. 150.



Yours most truly

W. K. Clifford

W. K. CLIFFORD.

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W. K. Clifford, F.R.S. (Macmillan.)

"coarse and realistic"—gave a kind of offence more acute¹ than that conveyed by argument, and could more readily be brought home to the religious mass which did not read his books. As an aspiring politician he thus tended to suffer; hence, in one of his temperaments, hesitations and later deprecations on the platform. But the better feeling of his countrymen realized that such outspokenness as his told of radical honesty of mind; and he never ceased to hold the respect of educated men.² When, in the 'nineties, he became a Parliamentary candidate for Montrose Boroughs, the young Free Church clergy of the county were found to include many of his most ardent supporters. The pious Gladstone, it is to be remembered, valued him above all his other colleagues. And it was to Morley that the aged Spencer first turned when he was moved to find a worthy friend to say some words of remembrance at his funeral.

21. There is no flavour of propitiation or deprecation in the essays of William Kingdon Clifford (1845–79), Professor of Applied Mathematics at University College, London, from 1871 till his death. Bred a High Churchman, Clifford early reached, by his own force and through his acceptance of Darwinism, a scientific position in regard to religious problems; and in 1872 he was tersely declaring that "Scientific thought does not mean thought about scientific subjects with long names. There are no scientific subjects. The subject of science is the human universe, that is to say, everything that is, or has been, or may be related to man."³ That code and temper were soon turned on semi-religious issues; and in the *Fortnightly* in 1875 appeared a frontal attack on the kite-flying work of Professors Balfour Stewart and Tait, entitled 'The Unseen Universe.'

It was a novel experience for scientific English professors to be told point-blank by another professor that the theory of the entozoic soul, in all its forms, was a mere flout to physiological science; and that their hypothesis of an unseen spiritual universe built up in the ether by molecular brain action was wholly gratuitous. In reality he left them the entozoic soul, inasmuch as, paying no heed to Hume, he assumed that physical causation is perfectly clear, but that all psycho-physical sequences are to be treated as "parallelisms." Yet that breach in the assailant's case seems to have been mostly overlooked. Still more disturbing to orthodox readers must have been the concluding paragraph, beginning: "'Only for another half-century let us keep our hells and

¹ Cp. Sully, *My Life and Friends*, 1918, pp. 205–6.

² Reaction against Morley's fame to-day appears to arise from the modern distaste for literary mosaic and calculated rhetoric. But that distaste ought not to exclude recognition of literary art, and Morley's rhetoric is often admirable. He tells us, too, that a love of unction was in him congenital (*Recollections*, i, 8).

³ Lecture 'On the Aims and Instruments of Scientific Thought' in *Lectures and Essays*, 2nd ed. 1886, p. 86.

heavens and gods.'.....These sickly dreams of hysterical women and half-starved men, what have they to do with the sturdy strength of a wide-eyed hero who fears no foe with pen or club?" and ending: "Take heed lest you have given soil and shelter to the seed of that awful plague which has destroyed two civilizations, and but barely failed to slay such promise of good as is now struggling to live among men."

Morley must have had some misgivings; but he could not ban the rhetoric, that being his own instrument; and Clifford, in the few years left him, went on from strength to strength of freethinking and plain-speaking as no one else had yet done in the reviews. "I suppose," he writes in 1876 to his friend Frederick Pollock, "it frightens people to be told that historical Christianity as a social system invariably makes men wicked when it has full swing. Then I think the sooner they are well frightened the better."¹ They were duly told, accordingly,² that "the stories which you send your servants and children to hear are adapted to the promotion of vice."

The man who thus unsparingly struck at the institutional religion of his country was one of the most lovable of his time, and grievously shortened his life by sheer ardent and unmeasured expenditure of his energy. At the close of his attack on the Ethics of Religion he arrests himself to pay warm tributes to Maurice, Martineau, and Kingsley, and declares that no man's "comradeship with the Great Companion shall have anything but reverence from me." It is not all congruous; and the thinking is at times chargeable with exaggeration; but it was a trumpet call to young readers to shake themselves free of traditional thinking. The essays 'On the Scientific Basis of Morals' and 'The Ethics of Belief' (1875-77), and the lecture on 'Right and Wrong' (1875), gave a strong and clear lead to a scientific ethic, then much needed. He died, as he had lived his adult life, in a perfectly serene disbelief as to immortality. On his tombstone is the inscription:—

I was not, and I began to be.
I loved, and did a little work.
I am not, and grieve not.

It is memorable that in 1878, when Clifford was going abroad to die, there appeared a newspaper report that he, like Mr. W. H. Mallock, had been converted to Roman Catholicism. He at once replied that his doctor "had certified he was ill, but it was not mental derangement, and he gave flat contradiction" (*The Journals of Walter White*, 1898, p. 168).

One of the happiest proofs he gave of his candour was the avowal, added to the reprint of the lecture on 'The First and the Last Catastrophe,' that Mr. Higgins had shown him to be quite wrong in assuming the contrary of the proposition that the ultimate effect of

¹ Introd. to vol. cited, p. 41.

² Essay on *The Ethics of Religion*, 1877; *id.* p. 273.

tides in the sun caused by the earth's attraction will diminish the orbit of the earth and increase its velocity—though the conclusion remained the same, "that there must be an end, but whether by heat or by cold we cannot tell" (*Lectures and Essays*, 2nd ed. p. 160).

Perhaps he would with the same candour have avowed on challenge that in his lecture on 'Body and Mind' he had assented to an unwarrantable account of psychic action on body. He had affirmed, in the common fashion, "two classes of facts and the *parallelism* between them," and "an enormous gulf.....between these two classes of facts" (*id.* p. 260), adding that "there is no interference of one with the other.....If anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, but it is nonsense. The will is not a material thing....." The implication is that in our knowledge material things do influence each other.

There appears here to be no recognition of the demonstration by Hume, and by others (including Raleigh, long before him), that the concept of physical causation is justified only by an unbroken experience of the sequences noted. If we know of an "invariable parallelism" between mental and bodily action, we have just that kind of experience in that regard; and there is no more "gulf" in the one order of causation than in the other. The laws of mechanics are no more intuitively certain than the psycho-physical parallelism.

Clifford's way of stating the case, which implies that causation by physical impact is quite clear, but that parallelism of mind and body is a mystery on another plane, has been the general doctrine since his time, as before. F. H. Bradley seems to have been the first metaphysician to point out, in a note (*Appearance and Reality*, ed. 1899, p. 616), that "You cannot by making use of a formula, such as 'psycho-physical parallelism'—or even a longer formula—absolve yourself from facing the question as to the causal succession of events in the body and the mind." Bradley himself leaves the question in a sufficiently crude state when he argues (p. 333) that "bare soul" is one thing and the duality of physically conditioned soul another. He was thus leaving the notion of the entozoic soul unsynthesized, as did Clifford, and the latter's formula of "mind stuff" remained in the same case.

All criticism of this kind, however, tends not to the rebuttal but to the systematization of Clifford's philosophy—a task which he did not live long enough even to contemplate. A not unskilful criticism of his teaching was contributed by Mr. W. H. Mallock to the *Edinburgh Review* (rep. in his 'Atheism and the Value of Life,' 1884) on the publication of the 'Lectures and Essays' in 1879. Curiously, the criticism of Clifford's doctrine on 'mind' and 'soul' tells in favour not of the theological but of a more strictly rationalist view or statement of the problem; and the culminating criticism of

Clifford and his school, which is put as the practical one, is stale commonplace. It is to the effect that all Clifford's moral 'instincts,' which underlay his humanist or social ethic, were really instilled into him in his religious youth, and that the belief in a rationalistic social application of that ethic tells only of complete practical ignorance of human history and human nature. A mere reference to the application of Christian ethic in Catholic Spain would suffice to prove that the ignorance was on the critic's side, and that his argument recoiled on his creed. The ethical influence acquired by him through his subsequent novel, *A Nineteenth Century Romance*, did not redound to his critical authority.

22. When in 1880 Mr. (afterwards Sir) Frederick Pollock dedicated to Clifford's memory his standard monograph on Spinoza, the fame of the dead teacher was as it were buttressed by the calmly searching vindication of the great thinker who, despite his formal inconsistencies—accruing at once to his process of mental growth and to the immense hostile pressures of his environment—had for two centuries been a portent of monition and change to European thought. This was the first systematic exposition and encomium of Spinoza in English, though the changeful Coleridge had given him praise enough to check the animus of orthodoxy, while professing to condemn all pantheism, including Wordsworth's. Henceforth the thought of Spinoza—which had been respectfully expounded and criticized by Bradlaugh—was matter for serious reverie with all English-reading students of philosophic problems; and the monographer's own avowed acceptance of all the deeper implications of the *Ethica* was one more weighty declaration that orthodox religion was past philosophic defence or credence. When the second (revised) edition appeared in 1899, after Martineau had avowed that Spinozism is atheistic, and less sympathetic critics were soon to call it "atheistic monism" (a label which perhaps Pollock would still have forensically disputed), that conception of things was in the philosophic forefront.

23. A very different personality and career are presented by George John Romanes (1848-94), who in 1878 produced anonymously 'A Candid Examination of Theism, by *Physicus*.' Romanes had started on the path to rationalism in a college prize essay (1873) on 'Christian Prayer considered in relation to the belief that the Almighty governs the world by general laws.' Critical reflection on prayer, in the case of a student of science, is not conducive to faith; and this student speedily passed to anti-theistic conclusions. They are carefully argued in the 'Examination'; but it concludes with a plangent cry of desolation which appealed to the pious as much as the reasoning did to the rationalistic:—

It is.....with the utmost sorrow that I find myself compelled to accept the conclusions here worked out.....I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God the universe has lost to me its soul of loveliness..... When at times I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast

between the hallowed glory of that creed which once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,—*at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible.*

It had not occurred to the young physicist that his elegiac grief was at most his personal equation—that uncounted men had reached conclusions equivalent to his without any such tragical tumult, and that his wail was thus not a corollary but a statement of temperament. Clifford, finding “no room for God in the universe” (while presenting his own hypothesis of “mind stuff”), faced the world, and disease, and death, with a cheerful soul, on which none of Nature’s loveliness was lost. Balanced men said of Romanes, “he doth protest too much,” and were not surprised when, in his Rede Lecture of 1885, he adversely criticized his former conclusions on mind and matter, or when, finally, in a state of suffering from cerebral malady, he avowed his reversion to the faith of his youth. The psychic reactions of the ill-strung human body are too abundantly evident in the whole history of religion to leave matter for surprise in such an individual experience. The fitting comment is that it was a very imperfect psychological preparation which left such an inquirer unconscious of his own psychopathy.

24. What might have seemed potentially the most effective treatise of the decade appeared in 1877—‘An Analysis of Religious Belief,’ the posthumous work of Viscount Amberley (1842–76), son of Earl Russell. No other performance of that generation is more comprehensive in its treatment of the religious problem, concrete and abstract, though it stands rather on general anthropological and hierological study than upon any special scrutiny of Christian origins. Amberley had patiently striven to grasp the morphology of all religious systems, and presents his independent results. Incidentally he passes a searching criticism on the gospel ethic, yet he proceeds quite sympathetically, as holding without question to the historicity of Jesus while tracing the “mythical Jesus” on lines now familiar.

The book must have been found highly convincing by most of its readers, but they do not seem to have been many, as it appears to have received little notice. Five or ten years earlier it would have been a notable event. Being describable as a work of the school of Spencer, thoroughly temperate and philosophic in spirit, ascending through comparative hierology to the thesis of The Unknowable, it probably figured as a subsidiary thing, there being nothing to excite scandal in a day of keen debate, while the death of the author naturally muted hostility. One application of the term “ridiculous” to one gospel story is almost the only warm expression in the two volumes; though the suggestion that it was interesting to think of how Socrates could have cross-examined Jesus would certainly have provoked Gladstone had he thought fit to deal with the book.

In respect of the handling of the Jesus problem it belongs to its day.

Much of the criticism of gospel contradictions—which is not always carried the whole way—raises the question as to whether the Teaching is any more historical than the contradictory and supernatural details of the story, and whether these are separable. Amberley does not name Strauss.¹ On the philosophic side, again, he rests in the Spencerian position that recognition of the unattainableness of knowledge is “religion.” For him, the consensus of all religion in the L. C. M. predication of “Something” constitutes a “cardinal truth”—a “necessary and permanent portion of *our* mental faculties”;² and he proceeds, by a paralogistic apologue of a ship’s crew who see a far-off “speck” in a hundred forms, to discredit the passenger who denies that they have seen anything.³

At the same time, while perforce denying Personality to the Unknowable, he concludes that “There is not only likeness but *identity of nature* between ourselves and our *unknown* Origin. And it is literally true that in *it* ‘we live, and move, and have our being.’”⁴ Here we have explicit pantheism imposed on the Spencerian position; and for the rest a working community with the theistic Neo-Unitarians. A doctrine which thus appealed to both sides and yet suited neither may be held to have fallen between two stools. But the book will still well repay study by inquirers.⁵

25. It was in 1879 that there appeared the poem *The Light of Asia* by Sir Edwin Arnold (1832–1904), a presentment of Buddhism so sympathetic that the British religious press was stirred by it to indignant protest,⁶ though Canon Liddon admired it. The course of things in the intellectual world was fitly summed-up in that year by the aged Cardinal Newman, to whom men of all Churches now listened with subdued respect. In the speech which he delivered ‘On Receiving Notice of his Elevation to the Sacred College,’⁷ he pronounced upon the religious situation as he saw it throughout Europe:—

For thirty, forty, fifty years I have resisted, to the best of my powers, the spirit of liberalism in religion. Never did the Holy Church need champions against it more sorely than now, when, alas! it is an error overspreading as a snare the whole earth..... Liberalism in religion is the doctrine that there is no positive truth in religion, but that one creed is as good as another; and this is the teaching which is gaining substance and force daily. It is inconsistent with the teaching of any religion as true. It teaches that all are to be tolerated, as all are matters of opinion. Revealed religion is not a truth, but a sentiment and a taste; and it is the right of each individual to make it say just what strikes his fancy.

What had been claimed by the modern theologians, since Schleier-

¹ As all modern names are excluded from the index, this may prove to be inaccurate; but there is no study of Strauss’s methods.

² Work cited, ii, 414–15.

³ *Id.* ii, 486.

⁴ *Id.* p. 463.

⁵ The touching dedication compares remarkably with that of Mill’s *Liberty*.

⁶ Arnold’s book, *Death and After* (1887), sufficiently established his unbelief in the Christian creed.

⁷ May 17, 1879, rep. in *Sayings of Cardinal Newman*, 1880, pp. 17–21,

macher, as a new basis for faith, is by Newman recognized as the logical dismissal of the historic faith which the changed tactic was supposed to save. The truth is pressed to its practical conclusions :—

Religion is [now] in no sense the bond of society. Hitherto the civil power has been Christian.....Now everywhere that goodly frame of society, which is the creation of Christianity, is throwing off Christianity. The *dictum* to which I have referred, with a hundred others which followed upon it, is gone or is going everywhere, and by the end of the century, unless the Almighty interferes, it will be forgotten. Hitherto it has been considered that religion alone, with its supernatural sanctions, was strong enough to secure the submission of the mass of the population to law and order. Now, philosophers and politicians are bent on satisfying this problem without the aid of Christianity.

Protestants did not spare to comment that the Cardinal in effect admitted Protestantism to have held society together at least as well as Catholicism had done, and that in the United States this had been done without even an Established Church. On such issues he no longer dwelt :—

The general character of this great apostasy is one and the same everywhere.....For myself, I would rather speak of it in my own country, which I know. There, I think, it threatens to have a formidable success, though it is not easy to see what will be its ultimate issue. At first sight it might be thought that Englishmen are too religious for a movement which on the Continent seems to be founded on infidelity ; but the misfortune with us is that, though it ends in infidelity, as in other places, it does not necessarily arise out of infidelity.....

There never was a device of the enemy so cleverly framed and with such promise of success. It is sweeping into its own ranks great numbers of able, earnest, virtuous men—elderly men of approved antecedents, young men with a career before them. Such is the state of things in England.

In the following year, preaching at Oxford for the first time since his secession, after having been entertained as a guest at his old college, which had made him an Honorary Fellow two years earlier, the Cardinal gave his audience the Catholic rule, in good set terms, concerning "that great mystery of the Holy Trinity in Unity" :—

They could take it as presented to them. If they attempted to decide upon the point ; if they attempted by their own skill and wit to come to a conclusion about it other or beyond what Almighty God had told them by Revelation, they were as if they blinded themselves. That blindness was what they meant by heresy.....The great defence of the Catholic faith was that they did not understand it, but they must take what was given them.¹

Not thus, clearly, was the tide to be turned. Newman's prescription of Catholic truth, accompanied as it was by helpless recognition of the uncontrollable movement of intelligence away from blind faith, could appeal only to broken spirits. And this held as clearly of the work of W. H. Mallock (1849–1923) entitled 'Is Life Worth Living?' which also appeared in 1879, and can have given little satisfaction to Newman.

¹ *Sayings*, as cited, pp. 55–6.

It is a very different kind of manifesto from the sprightly irony of his 'New Republic' (1877) and his 'New Paul and Virginia' (1878), in which he had youthfully girded at rationalists and rationalism. The new squib is surprisingly damp.

Mallock took for granted a growing predominance of the Pessimism which Professor James Sully had recently examined¹ on its philosophic side, merely dismissing Sully's answer with a negation. Within the pale of his personal equation of pessimism the Catholic accepts the claim of science to have reduced the processes of nature to intelligible sequences, and no less completely concedes the dissolution of the Bible record at the hands of criticism.² His positive case consists ultimately and solely in flaunting (1) the Papal Church's claim to infallibility as relieving it of all the difficulties that hem in Protestantism, and (2) the dogma of divine control and purpose as giving the pessimist a spiritual foundation immune to scientific criticism. Of the philosophic problem he attempts no analysis: we have but the wail: "It is only for the sake of the dreams that visit it that the world of reality has any certain value for us."³ Catholicism had simply abandoned the intellectual arena. Mallock's book, like its predecessors, had no more than a passing success of scandal; and its title for the most part evoked only rudely materialistic answers.

The nature of the Catholic influence may presumably be taken as typified in the case of Charles Kegan Paul (1828-1902), whose volume of 'Memories' was published in 1899. Kegan Paul had passed through various phases of orthodoxy, incipient Catholicism, clerical life, Positivism and doubt, up to his submission to the Church of Rome in 1890, on the day of Cardinal Newman's death. His narrative shows his conversion to have been a process of his temperament, which had always been ill-strung. In so far as he claims that it was intellectual he specifies as "arguments," (1) the "overwhelming evidence for modern miracles," citing first that of the cure of Pascal's niece by the touch of the Holy Thorn, and next the miracles of Lourdes, one of which had been wrought on a friend of his own. Without any detail, he refers further (2) to Newman's *Grammar of Assent* and Manning's *Religio Viatoris*. (*Memories*, pp. 369-72.)

His mental attitude is further defined by his statement (p. 354) that he is latterly "inclined to believe there is in spiritism much direct satanic agency." He was thus very much at one with the diabolism of the "Ranters" he had met in his youth (p. 35); and his religious outlook was but a temperamental defiance of science and philosophic criticism. To this level the Catholic reaction had

¹ In his work on Pessimism (1877), Sully tells how George Eliot acknowledged her invention of the term Meliorism. Pessimism she disliked (Sully's *Life and Friends*, p. 264), though she had acclaimed James Thomson's *City of Dreadful Night*.

² Work cited, ed. 1881, pp. 209, 255.

³ *Id.* end.

subsided at the end of the century, in the person of one of its best educated victims. Few others were noteworthy. Two of the sons of the famous William Wilberforce, both Anglican clerics, had gone over to Rome; as did, later, the daughter, the brother-in-law, and the son-in-law of the third son, Bishop Samuel Wilberforce. But such accessions did little for the Catholic Church.

In the Memoirs of Lord Oxford there is record of a singular forecast by George Eliot in this connection. Asked by her in his youth ("in the year 1873 or 1874") "whether the Church had still much hold on the intellectual élite of young Oxford," he

replied that "it had very little, and that little was on the wane." She answered: "I am getting an old woman, and you are a very young man, but unless my vision is at fault you—though not I—will live to see a great renascence of religion among thoughtful people." I asked her what Church or community would profit by it. She answered without hesitation: "The Roman Catholic Church." (*Memories and Reflections*, 1928, i, 36.)

Lord Oxford's verbal memory was so exceptionally good (there is perhaps only one—a minor—misquotation in his book) that we cannot well doubt George Eliot's use of the word "thoughtful" here, especially in view of her account (cited in a later section) of her sympathy with the great religions. It is sufficient comment to point out that at the close of the century the cases of Mallock (as to whom see George Eliot's own mordant criticism—*Letters to Elma Stuart*, 1909, pp. 74–5) and Kegan Paul in England were the only prominent ones that gave the least colour to her forecast, and that there is now very little to show for it even when we add the name of Oscar Browning to the Catholic list. As Lord Oxford remarks in his pregnant way: "It is, I think, an interesting illustration of the hazards of prophecy."

Finally, it is near the end of George Eliot's life that she writes to her friend Mrs. Stuart concerning another Catholic convert: "How can you by reasoning overturn what is not based on reasoning, but on a sense of need which Catholicism seems to imply?" (*Id.* p. 164.)

26. Newman's summary of the prospects of religion was privately endorsed, with extreme emphasis, by an Anglican whom he would have stigmatized as a Liberal, and who was not commonly regarded as given to pessimistic views. It is recorded of Dean Stanley, by his authorized biographer, that not long before his death (1881) he declared: "This generation is lost; it is either plunged in dogmatism or agnosticism. I look forward to the generation which is to come."¹ There is little reason to think that forty years later, with an unconfident group of Modernists faced by a growing host of Anglo-Catholics, and rationalism ever advancing outside, he would have found the situation more hopeful.

¹ *Life and Letters of Dean Stanley*, by R. E. Prothero, Nelson's 1-vol. ed. p. 290.

In Convocation in 1872 he had stood valiantly for the honest policy of omitting the Athanasian Creed from the services of the Church. His speech was received with furious clamour; Archdeacon Denison, after attempting to have him silenced, left the Chamber in disgust; and a savage bombardment of denunciatory pamphlets and sermons followed.¹ It had even been sought to dismiss him from the list of University preachers; and when the attempt was defeated by 349 votes to 247, Dean Goulburn resigned his post of Select Preacher by way of protest against the University's "unfaithfulness to the truth of God."² Such was the "dogmatism" of the day, very conducive to the "agnosticism."

From 1872, naturally, the detachment from religion which Newman lamented had gone on apace. Every dream of liberalizing the Church of England in the matter of doctrine was visibly vain. Kingsley, as we have seen, stood at once by the Athanasian Creed and by Darwinism. The "Synodical Declaration" of 1873, declaring in Elizabethan language that the Creed did not outgo the language of Scripture, but that "the Church doth not herein pronounce judgment on any particular person or persons, God alone being the Judge of all," was recognized as an intimation that "We shall never change our formularies, but they mean nothing in particular," and an avowal to straightforward reformers that the Church was no place for them.

Scotland indeed played up to the Church of England in the matter of the dismissal of Professor William Robertson Smith from his Hebrew Chair in the Free Church College of Aberdeen. He was first prosecuted for heresy on the score of his *Britannica* article, 'Bible' (1875), in which he admitted the non-Mosaic authorship of Deuteronomy, but was acquitted (1880). Another article in the same Encyclopædia, however (1880), led to his removal from his chair by the Free Church Assembly in 1881. His successive appointments to chairs of Arabic and to the University librarianship at Cambridge (1883, 1886, 1889) told how the balance was turning in scholarship, and rationalism grew apace in Scotland as elsewhere, many outgoing the heresy of Smith.

27. A characteristic variant of the estimates of Newman and Stanley was put by Matthew Arnold in a letter of 1882, to Grant Duff. "Events and personages," he writes, "succeed one another, but the central fact of the situation always remains for me this: that whereas the basis of things amidst all chance and change has even in Europe generally been for ever so long supernatural Christianity, and far more so in England than in Europe generally, this basis is certainly going—going amidst the full consciousness of the continentals that it is going, and amidst the provincial unconsciousness of the English that it is going."³ He proceeds to cite, as "a profound sentence" of Ewald, an echo by that theologian

¹ *Id.* p. 387.

² Goulburn, nevertheless, expressed to Stanley a hope that his course would not interrupt their friendship (*id.* p. 389).

³ *Letters*, ii, 234.

of the ancient opinion that all disaster comes of perversion of our relation to the divine, which leaves it doubtful whether or not Arnold was disturbed by the movement of the *Zeit-Geist*. But his customary distress over the "provincial unconsciousness of the English" seems at this stage to have been supererogatory, inasmuch as all manner of publicists had for a dozen years been proclaiming from the house-tops that the tide of unbelief was carrying all before it.

28. The general drift of opinion is again illustrated in 1881 by the appearance of the book entitled 'Rabbi Jeshua,' now known¹ to have been the work of Professor James E. Thorold Rogers (1823-90), who in youth had taken holy orders, but in 1870 had himself, like Leslie Stephen, legally unfrocked. This is one more "fictitious life" of Jesus, written with much literary care but applying none save an arbitrary critical method, and offering no references—in short, an imaginative and not a scientific performance. It was reviewed in the *Saturday* as a fascinating but very disingenuous work, ignoring Christianity in rejecting it. The Rabbi Jeshua of the book is an ideal figure, framed without critical method from selected gospel detail and local colour, a prophet and enthusiast of the Hasaya or Essenes, and—here conforming to later speculations—a deluded believer in eschatology above all things. All miracle is silently rejected, and a much simpler variant of the Jesus of Renan is limned with a firm and confident hand. There is no doubt of the historicity of the Founder.

In 1884 the anonymous author produced 'Bible Folk Lore : A Study in Comparative Mythology,' in which the scientific method of previous mythological science is applied with a complete rejection of all supernaturalist claims. In 1889 came, still anonymously, his 'Paul of Tarsus,' another effort of literary realism. In the first book, the first three gospels are taken as the composition (a) of Pharisees of Jerusalem, (b) Simeon, and (c) Rabbi Saul; and in the third there is no attempt at a scientific study of the problems of the authorship of the Epistles. The whole matter is handled with the confident arbitrariness which marks Rogers's treatment of medieval and other history under his own name, with the additional license of the anonymous and the imaginative. Thus offering no scientific principles, and missing personal appeal by his anonymity, Rogers seems to have made small dynamic impression on his age by those works. They do but illustrate in a picturesque fashion the prevailing abandonment of traditionary faith among educated people, and the still recognized menace of orthodoxy which dictated, to a publicist only politically pugnacious, anonymity in his religious speculation.

Much more influential was the work of Samuel Laing² (1812-97), 'Modern Science and Modern Thought' (1885), in which the cumulative

¹ See Halkett and Laing, *Dict. of Anon. and Pseudon. Eng. Lit.* new ed. pp. vi, 355.

² Son of the once famous traveller of the same name.

effect of science upon the old creed is urged with a sober conviction that carries its point with all reasonably open-minded people. Laing's long record, further, as a Cambridge second wrangler, a barrister, an official of the Board of Trade, thrice a member of Parliament (1852, '68, '73), an efficient finance minister in India (1860), and, above all, a highly successful Chairman of the L. B. and S. C. Railway Company, created for him a wide audience among business men; and the success of the first book won a hearing for the later, 'A Modern Zoroastrian' (1887), which had much less persuasive power. But the later books, 'Problems of the Future' (1889) and 'Human Origins' (1892), extended still further his audience and his influence, which were probably equal, with the general public, to those of the chief thinkers of the day. The supplemental chapter to the third edition of the 'Modern Science' (1886), a reply to Gladstone's defence of Genesis, was reckoned "fairly crushing" even by non-militants.

29. As if to underline and substantiate the diagnosis of Newman, Professor J. R. Seeley, long known to have been the author of *Ecce Homo*, came forward in 1882 with a new work entitled 'Natural Religion,' 'by the author of *Ecce Homo*.' Here, expounding a nebulous scheme for the reorganization of the world, he announced that "The *truth* of a religion is a phrase without meaning. You may speak of the truth of a philosophy, of a theory, of a proposition, but not of a religion, which is a condition of the feelings."¹ On this liberal footing, he contended, all men might work together for good. As for atheism, he recognized the term as applying only to a disbelief in *any* sort of natural law;² and, while describing that obscure mental attitude as a palsy, he cited nobody as holding it.

It would perhaps have surprised the author to know that a group of young rationalists who carefully examined the book on its appearance found it the most entirely futile modern treatise they had seen by any author of academic repute. To allege that it is "*certain* that we are in the presence of an Infinite and Eternal Being,"³ that that certainty is nevertheless only a "condition of the feelings," and that anyhow it does not matter so long as we are convinced that the cosmos presents a constancy of natural law, was to demonstrate, with a vengeance, that religion—here traced to "Nature-worship"⁴—was near the vanishing point. Gladstone is not reported to have passed any comment on this exploit of his former protégé.

30. A natural result of the heightening pressure of criticism on all the religious positions was a further deliquescence of belief in the Unitarian pulpit, which had been relatively critical from its outset. The developments of W. J. Fox and Moncure Conway at South Place, though seldom matched openly, were reflected in other cases. Samuel Sharpe (1799–

¹ Ed. 1891, p. 212.

² *Id.* pp. 26, 41.

³ *Id.* p. 44.

⁴ *Id.* p. 24.

1881), the scholarly "Biblical Unitarian," though he had championed the cause of James Martineau (with whom he did not agree) when the party of Grote objected to making him Professor of Philosophy at University College, spent much of his time in his latter years in combating the new movement. "Most of the articles contributed by Samuel Sharpe to the *Christian Life* [a weekly journal founded by him] were either against agnosticism in Unitarian pulpits or against indifference among the congregations, and their prevailing motive was to urge the bringing out of the positive and the Christian aspects of Unitarianism."¹

In the next decade an institutional effort was made in that direction, arising out of the impulse given by Mrs. Humphry Ward in and after her famous novel, *Robert Elsmere* (1888). The commotion set up by that work, outgoing the achievement of Mrs. Lynn Linton in the 'seventies, brought Gladstone once more into the polemical field, more in sorrow than in anger, against a respected friend. His discussion of the book involves some good criticism of it as a novel, but concentrates mainly in a keen argument to the effect that the moralization of life at which the author aims will never be attained by stripping the Christ figure of its supernatural status and calling on the world to be guided by the Man as they had formerly been guided by the God.

Gladstone and Mrs. Ward alike illustrated, on their different lines, the fatality of the imposition of self-will on the process of judgment. She had realized, by the help of "the Germans," that the gospels could not be regarded as trustworthy history, but, retaining her uncritical theism, her emotional ethic, and her ecclesiastical bias, she yearned for a new Church in which human service should be divested of all dogma save the theistic. On that she was at one with Gladstone, as she was at one with the Church of England on church-going, and at one with the Unitarians—whose general position she had pronounced "devoid of logic"—on the nullity of Trinitarianism. Of philosophic logic she was herself substantially innocent.

As Gladstone complained, she was content, in her novel, to make her hero capitulate without argument to the conclusions of the freethinking Squire, and to ignore the Squire's final anti-theism, settling both problems for her readers by a *solvitur ambulando*. She thus reveals an interesting hereditary tendency to impose her will under a parade of persuasion, with no reasons shown. Neither the deeper problems of the historicity of the gospels, which lie behind those of supernaturalism, nor the philosophic problems of theism, were ever faced by her. An emotionalist disciplined only by scholarship, she abounded in philanthropy—under imperialist reservations—and her one detestation seems to have been "the secularist crew" exhibited (imaginatively enough) in *David Grieve*.

¹ *Samuel Sharpe, Egyptologist and Translator of the Bible*, by P. W. Clayden, 1883, p. 293.

The fortune of the "Settlement" which sought to realize the ideal projected in *Robert Elsmere* sufficiently justified Gladstone's challenge. Neo-Unitarians collaborated, but tentatively and dubiously, in the "New Reformation"; and the scheme lapsed into one of Social Service, only hazily distinguishable from similar institutions ecclesiastically managed,¹ leaving the attractive figure of the foundress, on retrospect, "sole sitting by the shores of old romance." For she, scholarly and ethically strenuous like George Eliot, in her turn illustrated the fatality of didactic art, and remains an admirable writer of partially inartistic fiction.

31. Gladstone's later sallies into the field of religious controversy may be noted as milestones on the line of retreat of orthodoxy. He died fighting, conscious of the steady advance of the enemy. Always sustained by the will to believe, he took up his arms against the *Prolegomènes de l'histoire des religions* (1880)² of Dr. Albert Réville, a work of moderate rationalism (1884), doing vain battle on obsolete lines, but with undiminished energy of swordsmanship, on behalf of the inspiration of the creation story of Genesis. His subsequent encounters with Huxley, if not wholly devoid of "scores" against his adversary, were so disastrous that they caused no satisfaction in the clerical camp, and gave much in the other; though freethinkers who had been rated by Huxley as remaining at a Voltairean standpoint confessed some astonishment at seeing veterans fighting o'er again battles which on the Secularist platform had long been stale.

The later tilt at 'Ingersoll on Christianity' (1888)³ was as gallant as the others, but hardly more fortunate. Privately, the ruffled Christian statesman had made a sad display of Christian temper against the new adversary;⁴ but in the lists he bore himself in his usual knightly fashion, and actually succeeded in dinting his antagonist's shield with a proved charge of inconsistency. But as a defence of 'The Impregnable Rock of Holy Scripture' the sally was a forlorn hope, like the book so entitled. Bradlaugh, who personally revered his political leader, criticized him with sad but unyielding deference, gravely grinding to powder his pitiful ethical case for the Scriptures in question.⁵ Gladstone of course did not reply, having had no loophole of escape left him in this instance. The total outcome of his campaign for his creed was a sense of failure on his own side, and of victory on the other.

His final attempt to set up a new general defence by a resort to Butler, in 'Studies Subsidiary to the Works of Bishop Butler' (1896), avowing as it does the unresting advance of unbelief and the difficulty of resistance,


¹ See *The Life of Mrs. Humphry Ward*, by her daughter, Mrs. Trevelyan, 1923, chs. v, vii, ix.

² Eng. trans. 1884. As Gladstone complains, the book does not fit its title.

³ Art. rep. in *Later Gleanings*.

⁴ *Alfred Lyttelton: An Account of his Life*, by Edith Lyttelton, 1923, p. 142.

⁵ Art. in *Our Corner*, July, 1888.



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was the seal to his strenuous campaign for his creed. As Matthew Arnold had in his way sufficiently shown,¹ Butler supplies no bulwark against modern rationalist criticism. His argument from analogy, in the first place, validates all religions equally with Christianity, since all alike present "difficulties" which the argument declares to be inherent in the scheme of things. Gladstone betrays his fundamental logical infirmity in blindly arraigning Islam for its imperfections, when the very point of the analogy argument is that "difficulties" are to be expected in religion just as in Nature. The residual implication was that Christianity had the right difficulties and Islam the wrong ones.

But still more fatal was the champion's failure to see that the principle of Probability, on which he laid his main stress, had been latterly turned decisively against the Christian claim. The whole studies of the century had made it overwhelmingly clear that every consideration of probability led to the classification of the Jewish and Christian "revelations" as the product of human error, aspiration, and ignorance, like all other Sacred Books and creeds. That verdict, apart from all metaphysic, was the outcome of all real research, orthodox and heterodox, for all competent students, theistic or atheistic. By resorting to the arguments from Analogy and Probability he in effect admitted that the argument from Revelation was done with. Orthodoxy was thus non-suited anew.

32. In the face of this result, Mr. Benn's generalization that after Clifford there was a dearth of "genius" in the whole debate—a proposition which he extends to the entire literature of the closing decades of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth²—appears at least supererogatory. As a critical thesis it would be hard to justify, though it is common ground that with the rapid extension of culture the personal title of "genius" is by serious critics more guardedly bestowed, and in practice less easily earned. Clifford's genius lay as much in his literary energy as in his logical validity. But the general literary issue is outside our field; and it may suffice to meet the special proposition by saying that there is an abundance of genius, critical and literary, in Mr. Benn's own brilliant book. That is to say, most of it is of the best order of competent critical thought, very expertly expressed—a form of genius perhaps less common, but certainly not less important, than some of the æsthetic forms in which it is oftenest acclaimed. Yet more, his work on 'The Greek Philosophers' (2 vols. 1882; revised ed. 1914) is the most brilliant English book on that field in its age, alike for its literary and critical power and its philosophic insight. And it is dynamically rationalistic from beginning to end. He was in fact the most erudite and the most accomplished philosophic critic of his time.

The further historical generalization, however, that the rationalistic

¹ 'Bishop Butler and the Zeit-Geist,' in *Essays in Criticism*, Second Series.

² *English Rationalism*, ii, 1, 388-94; *Revaluations*, 1909, pp. 202-3.

advance slackened in England after 1877, may be fitly rejected as a fallacy of historical inference. Extension of any order of opinion is not dependent, at any given moment, on the concurrent multiplication of writings in support, or even on the expansion of the sales of previous books. All books from time to time reach the saturation point of the market, yet may go on being still more widely read. In the 'eighties and 'nineties the books and essays of the 'seventies were being so read in England. Mr. Benn infers a retrogression in rationalism to have arisen through the movement against vivisection, which charged cruelty on the scientific spirit. But there is no reason to suppose that any rationalists were turned against rationalism in England by that wave of feeling any more than they were in France by the miracles at Lourdes.

There was not even an apparent arrest of effective propaganda in printed form at any point after Clifford's death. Samuel Laing was not a man of genius, but he perhaps converted more men to rationalism in the 'eighties and 'nineties than any one other British publicist did by book-work in the 'seventies. Such works as the massive compilation 'Rivers of Life'¹ (2 vols. 1883) of Major-General J. G. R. Forlong (1824-1904) and the treatise of Keningale Cook, 'The Fathers of Jesus: the Lineage of the Christian Doctrine and Tradition' (2 vols. 1886), were services to rational hierology which in their way reinforced everything previously done. The posthumous work of W. M. W. Call, 'Final Causes: a Refutation' (1891), which was completed for publication in 1889, and which represented twenty years of study and meditation, was for many thoughtful readers as convincing a piece of reasoning as any separate anti-theological treatise by a contemporary thinker. A complete list of the literature is not here possible, but it would reveal few gaps. The continuous impact on the general mind went on without arrest, even when such an esteemed writer as Dr. W. L. Courtney confidently professed to express a common view by saying that the sceptical age was but a stepping-stone to a religiously constructive one.² No intelligent freethinker was ever turned back by such a gesture.

The idea of an arrest or reversal may have been suggested to Mr. Benn on one side by one of Vernon Lee's dialogues in *Baldwin* (1886), though it is not there admitted that the aversion from vivisection turned many rationalists out of their path. Minds turned against rationalism by such an impulse would in fact be little given to reasoning. At most, the pretext would be flaunted by emotionalists. In due time the corrective was supplied by the poverty of the case made out for vivisection by its own advocates when they passed from general to particular assertion. When, on the other

¹ Embodied and expanded in the posthumous *Faiths of Man: a Cyclopædia of Religions*, 3 vols. 1906.

² Art. rep. in *Studies New and Old*, 1888, p. 225. Dr. Courtney's final position (in a recent work, n. d.) was that of the doctrine of the God-who-needs-assistance.

hand, Miss Frances Power Cobbe, the theist, avowed that she would not have resented vivisection of "the heavy beasts of our pastures" as she did that of dogs and cats, the ethic of the humanitarians was seen to be sufficiently puzzle-headed. The valid criticism of vivisection, ethic apart (on which Vernon Lee reasoned well), is that it has largely proceeded on intellectual inefficiency, researchers vainly dabbling in blood for lack of faculty or effort of inference.

But there was an anti-rationalist force at work in the last decade of the century of which Mr. Benn does not speak. This was the obtrusion of the propaganda of Socialism by publicists many of whom taught the workers that their interests lay not in knowledge and ideas but solely in monetary and social betterment. After the death of Bradlaugh, Mr. G. B. Shaw sought to press such counsels on his followers. Undoubtedly such appeals carry weight with some, though mostly with those little concerned about ideas to begin with. The tactic thus pursued by many (not by all) Socialists had the due effect of promoting confused thinking. After a generation the tacticians can consider whether they thus promoted Socialism or betterment of any kind.

Undoubtedly the bi-frontal policy of French and other Socialists began in that age to frustrate the international activity of Freethought. The first International Freethought Congress appears to have been that called at Naples in 1860 by Count Giuseppe Ricciardi. That held at Brussels in 1880 planned an International Federation; and in 1887 its Congress was held at London. At both that and the Paris Congress of 1889 it was clear, despite much good rationalistic discussion, that between the "Latin" disregard of orderly procedure and the determination of Socialists and Anarchists to force their doctrines on the Freethought movement properly so termed, little was to be internationally gained from the point of view of disinterested propaganda. Converts to rationalism proper were not so to be multiplied. The work of enlightening and turning from traditionism the general intelligence of the period had to be, and was, otherwise done, in Britain in particular.

33. In point of fact, British rationalism in general, in the 'eighties, was roused to special energy and earnestness by the battle over Bradlaugh's admission to Parliament. The action of his enemies was so crudely nefarious, and their main position so grossly anomalous, that there resulted a new intensity of polemic and propaganda among the fighting freethinkers as distinct from the academics, who were relatively lukewarm. The two main claims of the orthodox side, chiefly represented by Conservatives, were that "Christianity is part of the law of the land," and that Bradlaugh had flouted it, first by "refusing" to take the oath and then insisting on taking it. The second assertion was a flat falsehood; the first was a *reductio ad absurdum*,

The spectacle of a "Christian nation" professing to impose "Christianity" on public life by the maintenance of the Parliamentary Oath moved tens of thousands, first to indignant laughter, and next to indignant action. The Sermon on the Mount, the constantly cited Christian code, had given the command, "I say unto you, Swear not at all," as the actual words of the Founder; and the official formula "So help me God" was a vulgar tag of everyday blasphemy. Cardinal Manning, who had previously declared England to be "the most anti-Catholic and therefore the most anti-Christian power of the world,"¹ now declared that the native piety of the English people would not endure unbelievers in Parliament. Religion was thus being dramatically presented all round as an incarnate falsity, for the gratification of all the bigotry of Britain. The challenge was swiftly taken up. There must be not a few freethinkers left who can remember how, in the six years of platform fighting, their swords sat light in the scabbard, and their spirits stirred to the bugles of battle.

The entire popular freethought organization was at once extended, and its activity greatly multiplied. Liberal and even Conservative churchgoers left their churches when they found their pastors defending iniquity. The falsehood about "refusing the oath," which still stands in responsible histories,² revealed in a new fashion the corrupting power of institutional religion. Bradlaugh, having consulted in advance the provisional law-officers of the Liberal Government, was by them confirmed in his opinion that he was entitled to "make affirmation" of his allegiance under the existing law. He accordingly made his respectful application to affirm with the express object of avoiding what he felt would be regarded by many religious persons as the displeasing spectacle of an atheist needlessly taking the religious oath. He had his thanks.³

When the maladroit procedure of the first Parliamentary Committee and the malicious action of the Fourth Party compelled the claim to take the oath, the Opposition tactic revealed itself as one of embarrassing the Gladstone Government by "putting the atheist on them." In strict justice it must be recorded that not one man among the first movers was influenced by any sincere religious feeling whatever. Nobody supposed that Lord Randolph Churchill, who argued that the State should recognize "some divinity or other," cared a straw about creed; and Mr. Balfour's plea that Bradlaugh's claim wounded "respectable" feeling served only to discount in advance his own orthodoxy. It was privately known that Lord Beaconsfield regarded and described the first action of his party as

¹ *The Present Crisis of the Holy See.*

² Mr. Spencer Walpole has inserted the untruth in his work, *The Electorate and the Legislature*, ed. 1892, p. 75. It should here be avowed that in the present writer's monograph on Bradlaugh Mr. Spencer Walpole has been inadvertently identified with his father, who bore the same name.

³ The long story is told in detail in Part II of the Life of Bradlaugh, and briefly in the present writer's monograph (R. P. A., 1920).

utterly foolish ; and the event proved his practical sagacity ; for his party thus became on this ground the object of a new contempt in the eyes of a whole generation of intelligent youth.

The temper evoked among them was that of Voltaire's battle-cry, "Écrasez l'Infâme." Young men who had been regarding the "dying creed" as something to be treated with lenity, even as Voltaire had been disposed to treat Catholicism before the Jansenists outwent the Jesuits in a revival of savagery, at once saw that while its devotees could persecute they would, given a political lead. The fact that the Churches in mass—with the general (though not universal) exception of the Unitarians, and a number of noble exceptions among individual clergymen—were ready to follow any lead of unscrupulous politicians to the end of denying political rights to unbelievers, made a situation about which there could be no question. And so battle was joined along a newly extended line.

When Mrs. Besant was insultingly refused leave to use the garden of the Royal Botanic Society for her studies, on the score that the daughters of the Curator used it ; and when, further, in 1883, Mrs. Besant and Miss Alice Bradlaugh were refused—with circumstances of personal discourtesy¹—admittance to the Practical Botany Class at University College, London, there was a clenching of jaws outside. The House of Commons had revealed how English gentlemen could demean themselves in the cause of "Christianity." The Council of University College, an institution which had been actually founded with the object of dispensing with religious qualifications, officially endorsed the action of its officers ; and when an Extraordinary General Meeting, called on a memorial signed by Huxley, Bain, Tylor, and Frankland, was held to reopen the question, the notoriously pious medical graduates swarmed to the rescue of the creed and the proprieties. Mr. Justice Denman distinguished himself by alleging that the excluded ladies "had refused to comply with the rules of the College," which was an absolute falsehood, supported by no pretence of evidence. On this lead, there were only nine votes against the Council's action.

Christianity had been commonly vindicated on the score of its civilizing effects. It was now exhibited as inspiring alike mendacity and baseness, iniquity and poltroonery, in the very classes which claimed to maintain it on the side of culture against uncultured unbelief. The result was indignant revolt among men of all classes. It is a fair calculation that in the six years of the conflict over Bradlaugh's claim to sit in Parliament, more men were made active freethinkers than he had converted to his views in the thirty years of his fighting career. The pietists had committed the folly of rousing against themselves the spirit of justice, now identified

¹ They had made formal application, were told to present themselves, and were then told that they could not be admitted.

with the cause of a rationalism armed with weapons of a precision not before attained. Every resource of criticism supplied by Darwinism, by geology, by Biblical research, by comparative hierology, by history, by philosophy, was turned by many lecturers against the Christian creed. The great advertisement given to unbelief by the political struggle created an unprecedented audience for the publicists of freethought; and the general British multitude was made alive to the issues far more fully than it had ever been since the days of Owen. In the House of Commons itself, Henry Labouchere, Bradlaugh's brilliant colleague in the representation of Northampton, avowed that for him the words of the oath were "utterly and absolutely an unmeaning form. To me they are just the same superstitious incantation as the trash of any Mumbo Jumbo among African savages." And John Bright, the orthodox Quaker (who confessed that he had had "doubts" in his time), had declared, to the furious faces of the other side: "To a large extent the working people of this country do not care any more for the dogmas of Christianity than the upper classes care for the practice of that religion."¹

34. The prosecution and imprisonment, in 1883, of George William Foote, W. J. Ramsey, and H. A. Kemp, the editor, salesman, and printer of *The Freethinker*, on a charge of blasphemy, heightened the feeling and intensified the fighting. That particular prosecution had been initiated in the hope of involving Bradlaugh's firm as sellers of the indicted journal. Foote, a man of good culture and literary capacity, with debating and oratorical powers adequate to all his occasions, gave the persecutors their chance by publishing a coarse cartoon of the Hebrew Deity; and this fact, made known to the Home Office but not to the general public, was the secret of Sir William Harcourt's foolish (though technically supportable) decision that the cartoon was "obscene," when in point of fact Foote was indicted *not* for obscenity but for doctrinal blasphemy. What was perfectly clear was that Foote was being hunted for freethinking, with an eye to the Bradlaugh case; and the indignant demonstration in court when the sentence of imprisonment was delivered gave sufficient promise of the result. While Foote was in prison the sale of his journal was greatly extended, and he came out to find a larger audience than ever as a lecturer.

The trials of Foote and his comrades before Mr. Justice North and common juries² were recognized by all scrupulous lawyers as a judicial scandal. The prosecutions were really laid by "the City"; and Sir Hardinge Giffard (afterwards Lord Halsbury), the first prosecuting counsel, grounded his case on the shock or offence given by the defendants to Christian people, though the indictment specified scandal to the Christian

¹ Contemporary reports, cited in *Life*. Labouchere had further mentioned that some members had actually taken their seats without properly making oath, and that there were various unbelieving members.

² At the Old Bailey on March 1 and 5, 1883.

religion, "the high displeasure of Almighty God," and injury to "the peace of our Lady the Queen, her Crown, and dignity." Technically, the charge of a common offence against the three defendants collectively was incorrect, and the judge displayed violent animus in repelling the opening objections of the defence. When Foote in his speech came to the fact that painful shocks had been administered to Christian feelings by passages in Mill's Autobiography, and in Strauss, Buckle, Huxley, Arnold, and Lord Amberley, the judge blusterously strove to prevent his reading from any book, yet had at length to submit angrily to his doing so.

Thus the prisoner, charged with libelling Deity, was able to claim that he had but ridiculed a Hebrew myth, and to quote from an expensive book just published, entitled 'The Evolution of Christianity,'¹ a passage in which the story of the Ten Plagues inflicted on the Egyptian people was specified as a "grotesque parody of divine intervention in human affairs," terribly true to the purpose of a malignant satire on the God of the Hebrews. The judge declared that he was "going to put a stop to this," after it had been done; and the defendant proceeded to argue at length over the imbecilities of the theory of blasphemy, to quote Brougham's maxim that blasphemy can be committed only by a believer in the Deity blasphemed, and to discredit the entire procedure with great completeness; his co-defenders following to similar effect.

A London common jury is but a precarious selection of minds; but that which had listened to North and Foote at the first trial so far refused to consent to victimizing the journalist, while flat blasphemy was left free to all manner of distinguished writers, that after two hours' consultation the jurors declared there was no chance of their agreeing. The jury procured for the second trial seems to have been more carefully selected. Objections were again well urged to the bad informalities in the indictment, only to be finally swept aside by the determined judge. Yet Foote had to be permitted to make another very able speech, of three hours' length, in which he first showed how Christian writers had always been free to use language of the bitterest virulence not only against all other religions and their adherents but against heretics; while Protestants were at liberty to vilify and ridicule Catholics and Catholicism in particular.

Fresh citations of blasphemy from Shelley, Spencer, Leslie Stephen, and Huxley had now to be listened to by a judge and jury waiting piously to employ the *ultima ratio*. The critical case against all prosecutions for blasphemy was never more overwhelmingly put; and the judge, realizing the futility of the policy of suppression, attempted no juridical defence, but addressed himself to the due excitation of the feelings of the jury. That "the real prosecutor is her Majesty the Queen" was one of his

¹ This work, published in 1883 without a name on the title-page, was later issued (by R. Forder) with the author's name, C(harles) Gill, on the back. It is a powerful freethinking polemic. At the close a further volume is promised, but this did not appear. Gill (b. at Dublin, 1824) is unnoticed in *D. N. B.*

well-judged appeals ; and this time the well-selected jury "after a consultation of two minutes returned a verdict of 'Guilty' against all three prisoners." After the sentences, in which Foote was reproached by the learned and devout judge for having "chosen to prostitute his talents to the service of the Devil," the audience expressed their sentiments appropriately if indecorously.

It must have been with a somewhat acute sense of the vileness of the religious atmosphere that Lord Chief Justice Coleridge sat with a Special Jury seven weeks later to try the matter again, when the prisoners were "brought up on Habeas Corpus," Bradlaugh having moved that the case "be removed from the Old Bailey by *certiorari*" to the High Court of Justice. In the preliminary proceedings, Mr. Avory in a manner "scored" by quoting passages in which Foote, in 1882, had taunted the authorities with rank cowardice in prosecuting only nobodies, and leaving "Secular leaders" alone. In this trial the prosecution sought to create the impression that trials for blasphemy had in modern times been fitly rare, but were now forced upon reluctant religionists ; and the formal procedure went with a certain propriety. At one point, however, the Lord Chief Justice, who had in previous proceedings realized the governing purpose of implicating Bradlaugh, sternly challenged one of the prosecuting counsel :—

This case must be tried like every other case. I have regretted to observe the feeling imported into this prosecution. On a former occasion I restrained myself for obvious reasons. Why cannot this case be tried like any other case, without going one inch out of the legal path ? *Why does counsel go and examine a man's bankers'-book ?*¹

Again the defendants powerfully argued their case against penalties for blasphemy. Interruption from the bench came only when Foote referred to the fact that Mr. Justice North had allowed the prosecuting counsel "to walk out of court while he argued their case for them in their absence." A judge, his lordship courteously explained, must not listen to criticisms passed upon another judge. But the deliberate declaration that the whole funds for the prosecution had been supplied by Sir Henry Tyler "for a purely political purpose—to cripple, if possible, Mr. Bradlaugh, and to win through religious prejudice what could not be won by open political warfare,"² was calmly permitted. Foote, unchecked, delivered a long and destructive indictment of the religious spirit :—

In this nineteenth century, as at the dawn of science, the cosmogony of the semi-barbarous Hebrew is the incubus of the philosopher and the opprobrium of the orthodox. Who shall number the patient and earnest seekers after truth, from the days of Galileo until now, whose lives have been embittered and their good name blasted by the mistaken zeal of bibliolaters ? Who shall count the host of weaker men whose sense of truth has been destroyed in the effort to harmonize impossibilities—whose life has been wasted in the attempt to force the generous new wine of science into the old

¹ Report of Trial in question, p. 24.

² *Id.* p. 37.

bottles of Judaism?.....Extinguished theologians lie about the cradle of every science as the strangled snakes beside that of Hercules¹.....

And all the distinguished blasphemers of the time—Maudsley, Spencer, Mill, Matthew Arnold, Morley, Viscount Amberley, Swinburne, Thomson—were cited and quoted, with an unanswerable challenge to the injustice of a prosecution which left their works untouched, to concentrate, for reasons of private malice, on the action of the freethinking journalist.

But the Lord Chief Justice, who postponed till the next day his summing-up, had no way out against what he avowed to be "the very striking and able speech" to which the jury had listened. With fit dignity he handled the legalities of the evidence, and indicated his conviction that Christianity must now be considered in a more liberal spirit than that of the past, and that the persecuting defenders of the faith did it small credit. Foote, he freely admitted, was not a "licentious" writer.² But the Lord Chief Justice knew perfectly well that the blasphemies of his friend Matthew Arnold were to the full as indictable, under the existing law, as those of Foote; and in taking his stand on the letter of the law—"We have to administer this law, whether we like it or not"³—he knew he was helplessly endorsing an official iniquity. The final official abandonment of the High Court prosecution left the penal sentences passed by Mr. Justice North to run their course; and Foote served his year, Ramsey his nine months, and Kemp his three. Outside, the battle of the militants was fought with an unrelenting energy, not untouched with vengeance.

35. And "the end crowned the day." When, in 1886, the new Speaker of the House of Commons, Mr. Peel, curtly suppressed all attempts to stand between Bradlaugh, the many times re-elected member for Northampton, and his "duty" of taking the oath, the humiliation of orthodoxy was complete. Religion, the pietists declared outside, was insulted. And the answer was, in effect: "It is; and you shall swallow and digest the insult. *Vous l'avez voulu, George Dandin!*" "Christianity," officially represented as a great and benign civilizing force, had been made to function as an odious oppressor and a mint of falsehood, and its organizations had identified themselves with unscrupulous illegality. Millions of decent people, whether or not disembarassed of "religion," had seen it stripped of its haloes.

When Bradlaugh, broken by his long battle after a career of conflict with the same forces, died in 1891, there was visible a certain "turning of the balance" even within the pale of the Churches. The better elements had grown ashamed of the worse. In his last illness, as had happened in his dangerous illness of a year before, prayers were actually offered up for him in a number of churches—a historic irony which he could well appreciate. He had carried his Affirmation Bill (1888); and

¹ *Id.* p. 45.

² *Id.* p. 76.

³ *Id.* p. 78.

while he lay dying the House of Commons, on the motion of Professor William A. Hunter, carried a resolution expunging from the Journals of the House the derelict resolutions of the past, excluding him. The House of Commons, it was declared by the die-hards, had now been humiliated. It had, well and duly, in the persons of the members of the previous House.

36. On the day after Bradlaugh's funeral, Gladstone, speaking in the House of Commons on his Bill for Removal of Religious Disabilities, touched on the past with the moving dignity which never failed him in the parliamentary scene. "Does anybody who hears me," he concluded, "believe that that controversy, so prosecuted and so abandoned, was beneficial to the Christian religion?" He was under no illusion on the subject. He knew that the very defence of the faith which he had striven to reinforce had been turned to naught in that protracted broil, and that England had been made newly anti-clerical and anti-Biblical while he had been striving to conserve what the Conservatives had by their action wrecked. His final tone, in his book on Butler, tells of his sense of frustration.

He had never assented to the pious formula that "Atheists have no conscience," even when he idly condemned Bradlaugh for fighting his battle in the only way he could. "I cannot hold this proposition [as to atheists] in the face of such facts as Holyoake, such as (at one time) J. S. Mill. And I am very doubtful of the proposition as a proposition of philosophy." On the practical outcome he had seen and spoken with entire plainness. "I am thoroughly convinced, not that Bradlaugh's opinions are not mischievous, but that as a matter of fact the present exclusion of him by the House of Commons is doing tenfold more for Atheism than his taking the oath on his own responsibility could possibly do."¹ Such was the historic fact.

37. A deeper if a less extensive influence than that of Mrs. Ward's *Robert Elsmere* was judiciously ignored by Gladstone—though we know he was greatly impressed by the book and discussed it with the author.² 'The Story of a South African Farm,' by Olive Schreiner (1883), only gradually found its way to popularity—the more slowly, doubtless, because of its markedly freethinking tone—but it remains, among the intellectually innovating novels by modern women, the most unquestionably a work of genius. Without being an æsthetically flawless work, it is fused to wholeness by sheer intension, putting its doctrine of Nature as part of the dramatic picture of a mental life, not as a separable propaganda. Here the declaration of unbelief is made in terms of the

¹ Letters of 1881-2, in *Correspondence on Church and Religion*, ed. by D. C. Lathbury, 1910, i, 176-8. And cp. vol. ii, pp. 81, 122-3, as to Gladstone's sense of the Church's failure against rationalism.

² Pref. to 1927 ed. of *The Story of a South African Farm*, by C. Cronwright Schreiner, p. 19. He "would not let her go."



Photo: Elliott & Fry

CHARLES BRADLAUGH

X

"experience" which is so often supposed to tell only one way, intense experience of religion being countered by stark experience of inner negation.¹ And such a contribution from a woman of genius was in itself part of the demonstration that the intellectual balance had turned.

38. A hundred years before, as we saw, Henry Mackenzie in the *Edinburgh Mirror* had spoken of the advent of avowed women free-thinkers as a new phenomenon in society. In the interim, women so describable had become prominent in the life of all the chief civilized countries, alike in the reactionary and the progressive periods. Rationalistic women publicists were now among the forces of change. Mrs. Besant, indeed, was emotionally deflected from rationalism to theosophy, but her vigorous critical work subsisted in a multitude of conversions to the former position; and, to say nothing more of the *Natural Law* of Miss Edith Simcox, the brief career of Constance Naden (1858-89) served to reveal from another side the co-partnership of women with men in the intellectual life to the point of sharing in the ultimate warfare. Gladstone's tribute to her poetry² is one of his most chivalrous pronouncements; but her chief strength lay in her ratiocinative faculty. Miss Naden's sheer power was from her outset so exceptional as to offer unlimited promise for a normal span of life. That Spencer should have deduced from her case (not knowing the real nature of her malady) a warning against high mental culture for women, is one of the oddities of the epoch.

Spencer's argument (letters rep. with *Constance Naden: A Memoir*, by W. R. Hughes, 1890) for a "normal feminine" standard really entails the conclusion that he himself was not normally masculine. His stipulation that women are normal only in respect of child-bearing would so bar, on the male side, Mill and Grote, who had no children, and himself, who never married. And the general warning against overstrain from study bears alike on Spencer, Mill, Darwin, Huxley, Tyndall, George Eliot, Lewes, Buckle, Clifford, Lange, and a thousand more in that age of self-made invalids. Spencer made a quaint impression at the farewell banquet given to him in New York in 1882 by offering to all Americans a weighty warning against over-work, without once pointing to himself as the awful example. Miss Naden was noted for the ease with which she carried on her studies, and "mental strain, at least as far as study was concerned, bore no part in the development of the disease from which [she] died" (*Memoir* cited, p. 61).

39. The entrance of a woman scientifically trained, disciplined in philosophic thinking, and still spontaneously poetic, marked the distance travelled since the energetic founder of the London Anthropological Society made it a main part of his case against the reactionary Ethno-

¹ It would appear to be implied in Mr. Cronwright Schreiner's preface that the chance reading of Spencer's *First Principles* played some part in the process.

² *Constance Naden: A Memoir*, 1890, p. 39.

logical Society that it admitted women to its lectures.¹ The higher education of women had now "come to stay." And though Jane Hume Clapperton (1830-1914) did not attain a literary success by her 'Scientific Meliorism' (1885),² and partly hampered her cause by a concluding manifesto in support of a "new religion" of some sort which should cultivate social aspiration—a thesis which we have seen advanced by many men before her—she nonetheless demonstrated anew by that and other works that her sex was no bar to an actively rational attitude towards past creeds.

40. The advent (1886) of "Vernon Lee" (Miss Violet Paget) with a work of high literary competence, very definitely rationalistic, was yet another sign of the times. Miss Paget had already won distinction by her original and provocative æsthetic studies.³ 'Baldwin, a Book of Dialogues,'⁴ marked by the same æsthetic predilection, and a ripened gift and zest for finished expression, is a body of argument and criticism as thorough and cogent in its scope and fashion as any produced by any contemporary man of letters. And none revealed a more unflinching conviction that the way of advance for thinking minds is the way of truth.⁵ There is an almost merciless pressure, in one dialogue, on the position of the sensitive men who, seeing the harm wrought by blind belief in things traditional, yet shrink from disturbing the mental peace of dear ones so believing. On the fundamental issue of theistic as against naturalistic ethic and philosophy the reasoning is entirely expert. With a delicate precision of phrase and thought, and a variety of charm of style which challenged comparison with the rhetorical force of Morley's, the dialoguist does battle with all the orthodoxies in the name of reason and culture. Hers was at once a better written and a more deeply reasoned polemic than that of Cotter Morison's 'Service of Man' (1888).

Thus, while theological philosophers were still desperately striving to prove that human ethic could not subsist save in terms of a belief in a Personal Providence, Absolute and Relative, Omnipotent and Restricted, *sic et non*, a series of women writers were with a much clearer conviction confuting the claim at once by action and by argument. Olive Schreiner,⁶ Miss Clapperton,⁷ Miss Paget,⁸ and Miss Naden,⁹ all influenced (Miss

¹ See dedication by James Hunt to Eng. trans. of Carl Vogt's *Lectures on Man*, 1864, p. viii.

² Which was handicapped by an excess of the proclivity—then reckoned feminine—to the use of italics.

³ *Studies of the 18th Century in Italy*, 1880; *Euphorion: Studies.....in the Renaissance*, 1884.

⁴ Otherwise *Baldwin, being Dialogues on Views and Aspirations*.

⁵ The later volume, *Althea: A Second Book of Dialogues* (1894), betrayed an ebb of ratiocinative energy in a mood of introspection. The tide flows powerfully again in *Vital Lies: Studies of Some Varieties of Recent Obscurantism* (2 vols. 1912).

⁶ *African Farm*, ed. 1927, p. 206 (ch. ii, near end).

⁷ *Scientific Meliorism*, pp. 3, 108-9, 186-8, etc.

⁸ *Baldwin*, p. 67.

⁹ See, in the Memorial volume, pp. 25, 30, 31.

Clapperton avowedly) by George Eliot, unhesitatingly affirmed, with her, that morality is wholly the construction of social humanity, independently of all God-ideas and all pretended revelations. And they all wrought "in demonstration of the spirit and with power." There was no such array of feminine faculty on the side of faith.

41. Nor was there, for that matter, any such array of male talent. It is a main item in the demonstration of the turning of the balance that whereas up to the end of the 'seventies there was an unbroken series of sensations made by new assaults on orthodox belief, thereafter the new sensations were made by works of defence. Such were Henry Drummond's 'Natural Law in the Spiritual World' (1883; 30th ed. 1897) and Benjamin Kidd's 'Social Evolution' (1894), two prodigies of paralogism, the acclamation of which in a thousand pulpits was the crowning proof of the intellectual poverty of the Churches. Such books would have at once died of contempt in France or Germany; in Britain and in America they ministered to the host of alarmed believers who could not think, but supposed that in those treatises thinking was done for them. Of very different calibre was Mr. A. J. Balfour's skilfully misnamed 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt' (1879), later to be popularized by him in many treatises, as we shall see in a later section. The apologetic utterances of the Marquis of Salisbury were hardly fitted even to attract attention alongside of Mr. Gladstone's; and yet there was nothing weightier available.

A work produced by a lecturer of the Christian Evidence Society, 'Problems of Christianity and Scepticism' (1891),¹ may be taken as indicating the kind of intellectual pressure sought to be made by the officers of that organization. It records a progression from youthful doubt and perplexity to a sudden experience of "finding Christ," in the revivalist sense of the term, and an ensuing conviction that if scepticism should triumph over Christianity the whole moral world, together with "reason," will sink in a common ruin, with civilization.² This argument is proffered with "all the force of conviction" of one who had once been a sceptic. There are offered, in short, no "Evidences" at all; but blank asseverations, in the manner of the theistic gospel of Theodore Parker. The student must first "find Christ"; faith must come first, that being the only true "religious" procedure; after finding faith he may safely proceed to reject what in the Bible, on ethical grounds, he cannot believe. But, seeing what a marvel Christ is, it may be decided that there is a "balance of probability" in favour of miracles.

This propaganda being widely sanctioned in the Church of England, the broad inference would seem to be that by its means Christians were developed on the same footing as is reached by the millions who "find Krishna" or "find Buddha." The position would have moved Paley to

¹ By the Rev. A. J. Harrison, M.A., B.D.

² Work cited, p. 265.

speechless amazement. The rather unctuous author, at the outset, deals charitably, as he assures us, with the question of the sincerity of sceptics. He repels, as uncharitable, a clerical pronouncement that 95 per cent of sceptics are insincere; but he will not go so far as to say that that percentage are sincere. In his course, he gives entertaining glimpses of hosts who invite the Christian lecturer to claim "Perfection," but omit to provide him with food, and who, when he avows dissatisfaction with the evidential discourses of Dr. Samuel Kinns, refuse to stay in the same room with "a man who dares to attack the Word of God."¹ For himself, he avows that "vast numbers of intelligent men and women are continually augmenting the ranks of so-called sceptics."²

42. Perhaps the most dramatic of all the illustrations of the turning of the balance was the appearance in 1884 of an article by Mr. Justice Stephen³ commenting on the controversy between Frederic Harrison and Spencer as to what really constituted religion, or "a" religion. Harrison did not deal with Lange's summary dismissal of his own cult as non-religious, though he could make a sufficiently telling case against Spencer's prospective cult of a speechless recognition of the Unknowable. Stephen in turn opened a frightful fire of ridicule on the Comtist machinery, demanding to know how many people ever wanted to have anything to do with it. For his own part he declared in set terms that "we can get on very well without" religion. This pronouncement by an eminent English judge was made within a year of the prosecution of Foote, Ramsey, and Kemp for blasphemy. While they, being convenient victims in the effort to drag down Bradlaugh, could not without penalty look over the hedge, the judge could with impunity make away with the horse. In the very height of the Bradlaugh battle the alienation of the higher intelligences from religious belief was made plain in a fashion undreamt-of in the past.⁴

43. For the rest, the transformation was in effect proclaimed by the burial of Darwin in Westminster Abbey (1882), and by the general recognition of Spencer's philosophic and scientific status. Among the long list of public honours offered to him, and by him for the most part declined, were Lord-Rectorships of two Scottish universities, the degrees of F.R.S. and F.B.A., the Prussian Order "Pour le Mérite," membership of the Imperial Academy of Vienna, and of similar Academies in Denmark, Italy, Greece, and Belgium; the status of Correspondent of the Institut de France, the degree of Doctor of the University of Buda Pesth, also of Bologna; and degrees of D.L., D.Sc., or D.Litt. from St. Andrew's, Edinburgh, Cambridge, and London. Such a phenomenon as this widespread tendering of tribute to an anti-theological thinker would have

¹ *Id.* p. 263.

² *Id.* p. 252.

³ *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1884.

⁴ As to the general position of Justice Stephen see the *Life* by his brother Leslie, 1895, pp. 368-75. He had "ceased to believe in the historic truth of Christianity," and was agnostic as to theism, though dubious about "sanctions."

been unimaginable and impossible before 1870; and Spencer's rather ungracious declinatures seem to have been moved by a feeling that the honours were all offered too late to be of any help to him in his battle. But they served nonetheless completely to demonstrate the turning of the general balance of intelligence, in his old age, away from orthodoxy.

Nor can the subsequent English academic reaction against his philosophic doctrine in any degree countervail that evidence. Men who had never opened their mouths against the utter falsities of the traditional creed were eager, after Spencer's death, to detect and proclaim—indeed to invent—error in the greatest of modern cosmological constructions. This was but the revenge of academically trained men upon the fame of one who in the past had dwelt on the general absence of the concept of causation from all their thought, and the invalidity, thus proved, of their discipline in the past. Their very criticism was a fruit of the intellectual impulse he had given, and it leaves only the clearer the fact that this man had been a force for sheer truth such as the house of religion had never harboured. In the words of one who judges in virtue of the scientific discipline which Spencer did so much to establish, he was "one of the greatest influences of modern times, a glory to British thought."¹

44. In the ninth decade of the fruitful century, some fortunate steps were taken to consolidate in propagandist fashion the manifold advance that had now so incontestably been made. The active forces were thus far only incidentally co-ordinated, though Secularism had made use of all. The men of science fought in one phalanx, the academic freethinkers in another; freelances of all types played their parts, often powerfully; and the Secularist organization, in its press and on its platform, drew on all in turn. It was in 1884 that Charles Albert Watts, printer, son of Charles Watts and inheritor of the Holyoake tradition, made a step to co-ordination by issuing the first *Agnostic Annual*. In the opinion of many, the term "agnostic" offered a hopeful rallying flag, after "cosmist" had missed its market, and "monist" seemed to fail of more than a success of esteem, and "Secularism" was put in question by its founder's published definition, which made it equivocal.

"Atheism," like "infidelity," had always been a term of popular aspersion as well as of dialectic definition. The Comtists, whose founder and whose creed were as essentially atheistic as any, had from the first repudiated the label; and many freethinkers looked at it askance while admitting its logical exactitude. In the circumstances, Huxley's term "agnostic" appealed to many, and it remains in common use. But "agnosticism" and "agnostic" in turn were made ambiguous by their inventor. Always there had been the obvious objection that the agnostic, unless he speaks only autobiographically, really says not merely "I do

¹ Prof. J. M. Baldwin, *History of Psychology*, 1913, ii, 81, note,

not know," but "*you* do not know," which was just what the atheist said. But when in 1889 Huxley, riposting on the proposal of Dr. Wace at the Church Congress of 1888 to substitute the old label "infidel" for "agnostic," declared in so many words that "Agnosticism is not a creed but a method,"¹ he put that term out of action as a title for a movement.

Agnosticism is not properly a method but an attitude or a conclusion, as Huxley had previously shown; and he now moved critical and practical minds to reflect that neither an attitude nor a too elastically labelled method² is a fitting title for a propagandist movement bent on getting a hearing for all tolerable forms of freethinking inquiry and criticism. That salaried evidence-men on the platform, to the joy of the groundlings, said "agnostic" meant "ignoramus," was not much of a motive; and the threat to say "infidel" evoked merely the derisive retort (not from Huxley) that it would involve the use of "fidel," howsoever pronounced.³ But "agnostic" and "agnosticism" were fitly relegated to individual use, and another name was found for a newly organized propaganda.

In 1885 was established, by Charles Albert Watts, on a small scale, the *Literary Guide*, which stood aloof from politics; and in due course, on a Propagandist Fund of £100 raised by its means, was established (1890) the Propagandist Press Committee.⁴ In May, 1893, it altered its title to the Rationalist Press Committee, and in 1899 it was incorporated under the Companies Acts, now adopting the title of the Rationalist Press Association, destined to be the most widely influential organization of its kind. G. J. Holyoake vindicated his life-long concern for freethought by taking the chairmanship; Mr. Charles E. Hooper, afterwards author of several works of rationalist metaphysics, was the first Secretary; and among the first Honorary Associates were Leslie Stephen, Zola, and Haeckel.⁵ In the year following its incorporation Mr. George Anderson contributed £1,000 to its funds, and promised a further £1,000 if other friends contributed a similar sum. This was quickly subscribed, and with the capital of £3,000 was launched one of the chief enterprises in connection with the Freethought Movement.⁶

The subsequent propagandist work of the R. P. A. belongs to the culture history of the present century. After the death of Holyoake (1906) the chairmanship was taken by Edward Clodd (b. 1840), who had begun his critical and propagandist work in 1873, and was now

¹ Art. 'Agnosticism,' rep. in vol. v of 'Collected Essays' (*Science and Christian Tradition*, 1894), pp. 245-6. Cp. pp. 309-10. ² Cp. Benn, ii, 453.

³ Thus "Fidel D.D." was one of the pleasantries of the period.

⁴ The original members were C. A. Watts, Dr. R. Bithell (Agnostic), F. Millar, and F. J. Gould.

⁵ Mr. McCabe's translation of Haeckel's *Riddle of the Universe* was one of the first volumes published by the newly incorporated Association.

⁶ At the close of 1928 the output of its "Sixpenny Reprints" of well-known freethought books and other cheap volumes amounted to 4,000,000. Further details will be found in Mr. F. J. Gould's recent pamphlet, *Free Thought, Advance!*

known as the veteran friend of Clifford, Huxley, Grant Allen, Mark Pattison, George Meredith, Gissing, Cotter Morison, and Moncure Conway. His first rationalistic book, 'The Childhood of the World,' was the first step in a progressive propaganda, and as he passed from the theism he had adopted on renouncing the Baptist creed, of which his parents had planned to make him a minister, to a reasoned anti-supernaturalism, his successive treatises, 'The Childhood of Religions,' 'The Story of Creation,' 'A Primer of Evolution,' 'Pioneers of Evolution,' 'The Story of Primitive Man,' 'Jesus of Nazareth,' 'Myths and Dreams,' and 'Animism,' all from time to time carefully revised, constituted a service to rational education by a diligent and responsible man of business such as has been rendered by few professional bookmen.

Mr. Clodd's evolution has been very typical of that of the thoughtful life of England in his long day and generation. Every step in it was taken under pressure of studied evidence, every advance an assimilation of the best science and scholarship. It is by such as he that modern Rationalism has been justified of its children. He has told how George Meredith (1828-1900), after protesting against the Christian service over the grave of Cotter Morison, omitted to give the necessary directions to preclude such a service over his own. More recently, Lord Morley's body was be-serviced against his own wishes. Clodd's 'Memories' (1916) avail something against the stolid conspiracy of convention to conceal such facts from the general eye.

45. In the years 1899 and 1900 appeared two small books, 'Richard Holt Hutton of *The Spectator*'¹ and 'Thoughts of a Freethinker,' which compendiously stated the intellectual situation. The first, an excellent even if over-laudatory monograph, sums up for us the influence of Hutton on his day. A gifted critic, and, before his decline into prolixity, a very good writer, he may be described as the "greatest common measure"² between the cultured survivors of the congenitally religious English world and the men who had really thought out the issues. Beginning as a Unitarian, and joyfully adopting under Maurice a Trinitarian creed, always emotionally held, Hutton had quite enough of critical sensitiveness to appreciate the strength of the new writers and the new positions,³

¹ Second ed. 1900, as "By John Hogben."

² Cp. Hogben, pp. 99, 102, 103, 105.

³ As early as 1856, Hutton's deeply intimate friend Walter Bagehot (who as editor of the *Economist* was as influential in his way as Hutton in his) wrote to Hutton in a curiously searching fashion on the historical aspect of the gospels, noting how little the vividness of a tradition can count for real historicity (*Life of Walter Bagehot*, by Mrs. R. Barrington, 1914, pp. 126-8). It is fairly clear that Bagehot did not accept the gospel narratives. Hutton, who always rejected the "imputed merit" of the evangelical doctrine as immoral (Hogben, p. 106), and always remained a rapturous believer, was nevertheless Bagehot's devoted lifelong friend. In respect of their characters, the two friends were a good advertisement for University College, where they had met in youth.

while in him the inherited and inculcated religious velleities always had the casting vote.

He was thus, with all his merits, a transient force. Nothing can give lasting judicial weight to the temperamental verdicts of a mind in which the intellectual faculty is subordinate. Never did Hutton carry an issue of belief to the logical end. His pleasing humilities were affectional, not philosophic; and his charges of arrogance on rationalists whose humilities were of another order are among his poorest criticisms. He lacked, in short, what he calls in his able criticism of Goethe "the third eye": hence the absence of any common measure between his criticisms of Goethe and of Wordsworth. Thus it came about that the subsequent decline of *The Spectator* was ascribable not merely to the loss of an attractive personality but to the dwindling of the old audience under the new forces.

The book of 1900,¹ which very simply and gravely puts the great practical issue of the age as to the Bible, might have been written thirty—nay, fifty—years before. It says nothing of Darwin or Evolution, citing neither names nor documents, proceeding only with calm simplicity to insist that by geological science the Bible as a revealed religion is proved false, and that in respect of its essential morals also it is as revelation impossible. The reader is left to his theism, if he has any; the New Testament is left undiscussed; but inasmuch as it dogmatically claims to be founded on the Old it is shown, as revealed religion, to be incredible.

For studious men, these conclusions had long been clear, in the teeth of all manner of apologetics, from Paley to Hutton. The more intelligent of the remaining religionists had abandoned the Biblical basis and turned to the theism of auto-suggestion. And yet the anonymous writer of these 'Thoughts' justly assumed that for the majority of his countrymen the question remained unstudied and unstaled. That is to say, our phrase "The Passing of Orthodoxy" describes only what had happened for the thinking minority, leaving undenied the persistence of a confused mass of unthinking orthodoxy among the uncultured, as among their clerical guides.² That the permeation was to extend is certain; and the rate of the process is a matter of future computation. But that the balance had been turned, in respect of intelligent opinion, was already clear.

§ 2. *The United States*

1. The change of intellectual climate in the culture-life of the States is closely synchronous with that in England. The early movement set

¹ Published by the respected firm of A. and C. Black.

² In 1892 the then Bishop of Exeter occasioned a scandal by administering "confirmation" to thirty-eight selected inmates of the Western Counties Idiot Asylum. The press comments were mostly either censorious or satirical, but in face of the scandal the Bishop reminded an interviewer that "it is known that those who are weak in intellect lean very much more to religion than others" (*Exeter Evening Post*).

up by the Owens, though carried on by brilliant lecturers such as Ernestine Rose¹ (b. 1810), ranked as an "outside" activity. In the middle decades of the century the mass conditions had been so little changed that after the death of President Lincoln, who was certainly a non-Christian deist, and an agnostic deist at that,² it was sought by some to prove that he was latterly orthodox. In his presidential campaign of 1860 he escaped attack on his opinions simply because his opponent, Stephen A. Douglas, was likewise an unbeliever.³ The great negro orator Frederick Douglass was as heterodox as Lincoln⁴; and the biography of William Lloyd Garrison (1805-79) puts it on record that he, the chief orator of the Abolitionist movement, though a theist, never went to church, and rejected all Christian orthodoxy.⁵ It is even alleged that President Grant⁶ was of the same cast of opinion. The pressure of religion on public life which is implied in the fact that such matters were diligently concealed, may be said to exist to the present day in American public life, when an able critic discusses Paine in a volume entitled *Damaged Souls*,⁷ and dismisses the *Age of Reason* as "gay doings with the Bible" in "pure fun"—a "game.....so easy to play." But outside of politics there occurred in the last generation the "sea change" which we have seen in Europe.

2. We have noted the swiftly effective crusade by which, in the decade of Civil War, the flag of evolution had been carried through the northern States of America by Youmans and his friends. At the beginning of the 'seventies the resultant "turning of the balance" is set forth in popular literature, in the widely acceptable form of the 'Breakfast-Table' excursions of Oliver Wendell Holmes, which may be said to have created a new literary form. In the first volume of the series, 'The Autocrat of the Breakfast Table' (1857-8), that genial liberal was partly under the restraint of the experience of Boston bigotry which he afterwards described to Conway. In the second—the 'Professor' (1858-9)—there are distinct notes of neology. In the prelude a provocative person is heard exclaiming—"full of crooked little streets; but I tell you Boston has opened, and kept open, more turnpikes that lead straight to free

¹ Ernestine Louise Lasmond Potovsky Rose, daughter of a Polish-Jewish Rabbi. Author of *A Defence of Atheism*. Spent her last years, after 1873, in England.

² Cp. Lamon's *Life of Lincoln*, and J. E. Remsburg's *Abraham Lincoln: Was he a Christian?* (New York, 1893.)

³ Remsburg, pp. 318-19.

⁴ Personal information. Douglass appears to have been a theist, but was bitterly criticized by anti-slavery clerics for rejecting the doctrine of the Atonement. See *American States, Churches, and Slavery*, by the Rev. J. R. Balme, ed. 1863, pp. 216-22. To the last, Douglass maintained that the Churches as a whole had done nothing to end slavery.

⁵ *Life*, by his children, 1885-89, iv, 336.

⁶ Remsburg, p. 324.

⁷ *Damaged Souls*, by Gamaliel Bradford, n.d., pp. 65-6. The essay on Paine raises the question whether the chiefly damaged soul may not have been that of orthodox conformity in the United States.

thought and free speech and free deeds than any other city I know of live men or dead men....."

The prelude goes on with a rejoinder: "The great end of being is to harmonize man with the order of things; and the church has been a good pitch-pipe, and may be so still. But who shall tune the pitch-pipe? *Quis cus*—." This is interrupted by a feminine command, 'Go to the Bible!', which elicits the disclosure that in a book so entitled (1858) a Mr. Flournoy of Athens, Georgia, had just expounded a scriptural gospel of "trigamy"; whereafter the avowedly "zigzagging" art of the narrator proceeds to the significant maxim that it is desirable "to depolarize every fixed religious idea in the mind by changing the word which stands for it."

There is hardly anything more subversive in the book, which still tells of the age of restraint. But in 'The Poet at the Breakfast-Table' (1872) we find ourselves in a new age. The American God, it is true, still presides, but it is over an emancipated world of freely discussed Darwinism, in which emerge many ethical corollaries.

"Ten or a dozen years ago," says one interlocutor (ch. vii), "people said Sh! Sh! if you ventured to meddle with any question supposed to involve a doubt of the generally-accepted Hebrew traditions. To-day such questions are recognized as perfectly fair subjects for general conversation....."; and the narrator interposes: "I can't help thinking that if we had talked as freely as we can and do now in the days of the first boarder at this table..... it would have sounded a good deal more aggressively than it does now."

The aggressiveness is nevertheless perceptible. "The study of man has been so completely subjected to our pre-conceived opinions that we have got to begin all over again. We have studied anthropology through theology; we have now to begin the study of theology through anthropology." The new "depolarized" theology is poetically unfolded in the poems of the Young Astronomer—the best of Holmes's graver verse—concerning which the poet explains that "he had been taught strange things from old theologies, when he was a child, and had thought his way out of many of his early superstitions"—the narrator hinting that the young explorers are imperfectly aware of the extent to which they have been preceded. Holmes, for his own part, expresses (ch. xi) his scientific deduction from the new knowledge:—

The scientific study of man is the most difficult of all branches of knowledge. It requires, in the first place, an entire new terminology to get rid of that enormous load of prejudices with which every term applied to the malformations, the functional disturbances and the organic diseases of the moral nature, is at present burdened.

Ethics has not even now advanced further.

The genial discursiveness of Holmes leavened the cultured opinion of his time to an extent now apt to be forgotten in a country which tends to forget most things between Lincoln and the World War. He in fact represents a period in which American culture could be envisaged as an

influence radiating from New England, with Emerson as its precursor and inspirer. The earlier ferment of Transcendentalism was ostensibly superseded by a more scientific temper, well-represented by 'The Religion of Humanity' (1873) of Octavius Brooks Frothingham (1822-95), who had begun as a Transcendentalist Unitarian preacher, and was the first president of the National Free Religious Association (1867).¹ Thenceforth the bigotry of the pre-war period was broadly discredited, though expulsions of theological professors from their chairs for heresy were still to come when the new Biblical criticism made headway. That the subsequent diffusion of rational light in the States was less general than in Britain was due to the circumstances of the case.

3. The States, for one thing, represented a much larger mass of raw human material than was to be found in any other of the leading civilized countries; and if any weight can be attached to the narrative of W. D. Howells's late novel, *The Leatherstocking God*, the psychic and mental levels of the outlying populations in the Southern States about 1830 were no higher than those of the negroes. In similar agricultural conditions a relative backwardness has continued to subsist. And thus far, in the States, anything in the nature of organized freethought propaganda has been much less practicable than in the relatively much more industrialized mother country. One episode reveals strikingly the difficulty of any endowment of freethought.

In 1830 Stephen Girard, a multi-millionaire merchant and banker of Philadelphia, made a will by which, among other philanthropic provisions, he devised 2,000,000 dollars and certain lands to endow an orphanage for poor male white orphan children, directing that the children there housed should be taught the purest principles of morality, but that no cleric of any sect should be admitted into the building. The will explains that the testator acted not out of disrespect for the clergy, but in order to protect the children from the difficulties of sectarian teaching. Such was the foundation of Girard College. Girard was a Frenchman of the revolutionary period (1750-1831), and as he had given to some of his ships such names as Voltaire, Rousseau, Montesquieu, and Helvétius, it was fairly certain that he was a deist, rejecting Christian tenets.

Knowing, however, that any overt expression of an anti-Christian purpose would endanger his benefaction, he gave no instructions as to the non-teaching of Christianity; and in course of time, as was to be expected, a stately Chapel was added to the College buildings, where services were conducted on Sundays by orthodox preachers. The

¹ Colonel T. W. Higginson claimed for Frothingham that he was "a more original, more continuous, and far better trained thinker than Parker." This is substantially just, inasmuch as Frothingham evolved beyond Parker and the Transcendentalism with which he had set out. But his account of "dethroned" Christianity as "a supreme moment in the autobiography of God" (*Transcendentalism in New England*, p. 186) tells of survivals.

Directors decided that they were thus within the testator's will, since no ordained cleric was allowed to give instruction in the College itself. Girard's bequest was thus turned to naught as a scheme for non-religious ethical education, being exploited simply as a means of relieving the ratepayers of Philadelphia.


He may thus be regarded as having planned ill for an important experiment. But it is practically certain that had he made effectual provisions to exclude Christian teaching as well as clergymen his bequest would have been declared illegal. As it was, an attempt was made to upset the will, Daniel Webster being briefed to argue that Christianity was part of the law of Pennsylvania. The Court decided that that was true; but that the maxim only meant that the Christian religion must not be reviled. Girard's bequest accordingly stood good, and the Directors were left free to countervene its spirit while obeying the letter. Protest¹ has availed nothing; and Philadelphia saves at once its rates and its orthodoxy by means of the deist's millions—now estimated, in terms of the rise in property values, at ten times the amount of the bequest. What might have been a valuable experiment in education has been absolutely frustrated.

4. Individual energy, however, produced for a time in the States a freethinking platform and pamphlet propaganda of the most effective kind.² Only in the United States, indeed, has the public lecture platform been made a means of propaganda to anything like the extent seen in Britain; and the greatest part of the work in the States has thus far been done by the late Colonel Robert Green Ingersoll (1833–99), the leading American orator of the last generation, and the most widely influential platform propagandist of the last century. No other single freethinker, it is believed, has reached so large an audience by public speech; and between his propaganda and that of the freethought journals there has been maintained for more than a generation back a body of vigorous freethinking opinion in all parts of the States. Ingersoll had not only oratorical power of the highest order but a rare gift of humour; and if his *Mistakes of Moses* excited special outcry by its play of American ridicule on "Scripture" it was none the less effective. But Ingersoll's propaganda was not restricted to such effects. His ethical indictment of orthodox religion, couched in an eloquence not to be matched in the contemporary pulpit, was the deepest source of his influence, and had a practical effect on the pulpit itself. His indictment of religious delusion and Biblical ethic was never really answered by the clerics and others who affected to dismiss it.

5. Still, it cannot be said that in the States there had occurred in the

¹ *Girard's Will and Girard College Theology*. By Richard B. Westbrook, D.D., LL.D. Published by the Author. Philadelphia, 1888.

² Many biographical details are given in S. P. Putnam's *Four Hundred Years of Freethought*, New York, 1894,



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nineteenth century such a transformation of cultured thought as had taken place in Britain, Germany, France, and Italy. Writing to Leslie Stephen about his *Agnostic's Apology* in 1893, Charles Eliot Norton confesses :—

The reading of the volume makes me melancholy, because it compels the conclusion which one would rather avoid, that the lovers of Truth are a very small band—otherwise the Agnostics would be in a majority. There are more of them, indeed, than openly train in their ranks ; and this also may make a man melancholy, as a sign of the timidity which rules the lives of the mass of one's acquaintances.

Democracy does not tend to cherish courage. The independent grows less common. I do not see how any man accustomed to use his reason can resist the force of your argument—unless, indeed, like Lowell, he reject reason in favour of sentiment, or of something which he called intuition.....¹

And in 1897 he writes to Goldwin Smith : “The progress of freethinking appears to me, in spite of ecclesiastical reaction and resistance, much greater in England than America.....In my own circle, I find myself almost solitary in my open profession of freethinking.....”²

This after a generation of broadcast evolutionary science. Norton was himself constrained, by his professorial position, to a passive attitude. Academic liberty, long more restricted in England than in Germany, seems still more restricted in the Republic, where the mass of opinion remains intolerant of academic heresy. Against the case of Professor Robertson Smith, deprived of his chair for too advanced scholarship in the Scotland of 1881, there had been a series of similar displacements in the States. Latter-day rationalists can note the lesson, which is that as against a crowd of organized Churches diligently acquiring economic support from uncultured industrialists and agriculturists of all grades, the richest being often among the least educated, only concerted and consecutive propaganda can avail to lift the levels of opinion.

6. The average frustration of intellectual life in the last generation of the last century may be taken as mirrored in the life of “Mark Twain” —Samuel L. Clemens—the supreme popular favourite in the American literature of his day, in respect of his irresistible humour, his often masterly art, and his general care to restrict his audacities to the “safe” plane. That he was to a large extent a freethinker is made clear by the later biographies. Mr. Van Wyck Brooks, who draws a powerfully sombre portrait of him³ as an artist always in terror of his public, and inhibited by domestic criticism till his strongest impulses could produce only stale effects, puts it that he “became the Village Atheist” of America, without doing much to earn the distinction beyond such aphorisms as : “Heaven for climate ; hell for society.” Strictly speaking, Mark Twain is to be regarded as a pathological case,⁴ in view of his perpetual temperamental swing between active humour and acute

¹ *Letters*, ii, 215-16.

³ *The Ordeal of Mark Twain*, 1922.

² *Id.* pp. 248-9.

⁴ Cp. Brooks, p. 257.

pessimism ; but the American environment¹ was a powerful inhibitor on the literary side.

The fact that the long-laboured and long withheld book 'What is Man?' was published anonymously tells one half of the story ; the fact that the book can finally be pronounced² "quite worthless except for the light it throws on Mark Twain" tells the other. His intellectual life was indeed feebly developed, leaving him a hapless victim to Baconism, and a chronic dabbler in Christian Science ; and "a drab mass of crude speculation"³ is hardly an over-harsh account of his philosophy. "He was the supreme victim of an epoch in American history" ; and perhaps there is justice in the addendum, "an epoch that has closed."⁴ But it would not follow that a large percentage of educated Americans have yet become thinkers. Mr. Brooks's final picture of "driven, disenchanted, anxious faces" confirms the impression left by many vivid American autobiographies, that there is not time enough in American life for much disinterested thinking. The difference between American and British freethought history would thus finally seem to be that between the life of a relatively leisured and that of an unleisured population.

7. On the other hand, in the resolutely leisured section of the unleisured country, the habit of intellectual discipline is not often strenuous on the philosophic side. Much American serious feeling takes the optimistic way of Walt Whitman, whose admiring biographers complacently dismiss as impertinent the agnosticism of the freethinker, in contrast with the confident intuitional theism of "the good gray poet," the "more perfect faculty of reason."⁵ In his poetry he is represented by his optimistic and pantheistic theism, and his pronouncement : "I say that the real and permanent grandeur of these States must be their religion." But the religion is admittedly elusive, and the philosophy loosely poetic. Whitman never seriously philosophized, and his acclamation of Hegel⁶ seems to have proceeded on little study.⁷ On any view, he was never "Christian,"⁸ though sure of immortality. He even declared that "the whole ideal of the church is low and horrible," and was "in full sympathy" with Ingersoll's "anti-Christian crusade."⁹ Thus his not very wide influence on American opinion has been on the whole emancipatory.

Even the biographical deflation of the self-posed Whitman has made for sane thinking. The self-proclaimed prophet of comradeship who, by the avowal of an admirer, found no comrades (T. Donaldson, *Walt Whitman the Man*, 1896, pp. 6-7), the defiant singer

¹ "An environment so coercive as ours." Brooks, p. 261. Cp. pp. 126-7.

² Brooks, p. 255.

³ *Id.* p. 260.

⁴ *Id.* p. 267.

⁵ H. B. Binns, *A Life of Walt Whitman*, 1905, p. 333.

⁶ *Id.* p. 297.

⁷ Cp. Bliss Perry, p. 264, and W. S. Kennedy, *Reminiscences of Walt Whitman*, 1896, p. 100.

⁸ Bliss Perry, *Walt Whitman*, 1906, pp. 10, 38, 265.

⁹ *Id.* p. 266.

of sexual freedom who shunned his own children ("deserted" is Bliss Perry's word, p. 278—an incomplete statement of the facts), is not by these discoveries reduced to a charlatan; but they are part of the demonstration that sheer asseveration is no substitute for the sense of reality.

Continuance of uncritical idolatry in America evokes violent iconoclasm (e.g. *Literary Blasphemies*, by Ernest Boyd, 1927); but there is a better criterion—that of the poetry as art, and of the prophet as man and poet. What he has called, in a great line, "the test of death and night," leaves undying elements in the song at its best, and the record of the life which broke itself in selfless service to broken men is as real as the revelations of its moral and intellectual incoherence.

The final fact that the poet so confidently assured of his immortality was found at his death, in reputed poverty, to have spent a very large sum on a handsome tomb, and to have a considerable sum left in the bank (Perry, pp. 270–1), is certainly a corrective for the vociferous pretence of "spiritual" knowledge. The egoism, the swagger, which flaw so much of the poetry, are the roots of the theology. "Whitman's philosophy was only a sort of somnambulism" (Perry, p. 265).

8. One of the most "dynamic" forces in the intellectual life of North America in his age was Lester Frank Ward (1841–1913), author of 'Dynamic Sociology' (1883) and many other sociological and scientific works. Ward was largely an "autodidact." When, in his twentieth year, he entered the Susquehannah Collegiate Institute, his self-acquired Greek and Latin put him in advance of the foremost pupils.¹ In 1862, when about to enter Lafayette College, he was deflected by the call of the Civil War, on the anti-slavery side, and he had served for twenty-seven months when he was wounded. After the war he entered the U.S. civil service, and remained in it for over forty years, in various capacities. A born scientist, he worked through botany and geology to palæontology, doing much work in all three fields; thus being one of the few sociologists who have had a large preparation in practical science.

It is still not generally known that in his youth he edited for some time a very plain-spoken freethought periodical, *The Iconoclast* (1870–71), which grew out of a 'National Liberal Reform League,' planned (1869) as a secret association to protect freethinkers of all sorts from the ostracism and injury which religious bigotry was always seeking to inflict on them. The League did not flourish, and the *Iconoclast* was too heavy a burden for one young civil servant; but while it lived it said many pungently true things. Incidentally notable is the second number (April, 1870), giving the extremely explicit testimony of W. H. Hearndon,

¹ *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, vol. i, 1913, p. lvi.

for twenty years the law partner and intimate friend of Abraham Lincoln, as to the non-Christian opinions of the latter and his somewhat doubtful theism.

The anti-religious attitude of Ward, in which no eminent sociologist has outgone him, is very distinctly set forth in 'Dynamic Sociology.' In his somewhat tumultuous introduction, multiplying contradiction as did both Comte and Spencer by an empirical dichotomy of feeling and intellect, he declares that all religious systems have failed to promote human progress;¹ and that religious founders, whom he terms "the true rulers of the world," have "had to be.....in the majority of cases, insane persons, in a certain legitimate acceptance of that term."² Here religion is declared to be "the embodied and organized state of the emotions. It represents the combined forces of human feeling." Later³ it is declared to be, as shown by Spencer, "the product of thought. It develops after a long course of reasoning about the facts of experience. It is the outcome of a real experience." Again, "Superstition.....really constitutes one of the modes that reason has taught mankind for securing future benefits or averting future evils."⁴ But, nevertheless, the "popular belief" respecting the relations of religion to human progress "is wholly erroneous,"⁵ and is perpetually injurious to science and progress.⁶

Ward is thus much more explicitly anti-religious than Spencer, despite his inconsistencies.⁷ In one passage he conforms to a Spencerian paralogism by avowing⁸ that anthropomorphic deities "are the creatures of the most advanced minds of every people, and therefore always reflect the highest mental and moral attributes of every age." This is not only in marked contradiction with the previously cited propositions; it clearly cannot be true, inasmuch as the deities in question are by implication acceptable to the mass. The "most advanced minds," by Ward's own showing, could not appeal to the mass. A concern for a firm historical basis, and an attention to the economic factor, would have averted these inconsistencies, which tell of the prematurity of his sanguine sociology as a whole. Yet it remains a powerful and influential doctrine, and its rationalistic influence must have been great. He puts as the motto of his 'Glimpses of the Cosmos'—a compilation of his immense mass of miscellaneous papers⁹—the saying of Disraeli: "Youth is a blunder; manhood a struggle; old age a regret"; but there is no reason to think that he regretted his long and worthy career of high-minded propaganda. His solid work in the natural sciences balances the scientific inadequacies

¹ Work cited, i, 10.

² Pp. 11-12.

³ *Id.* p. 197.

⁴ *Id.* vol. ii, 288.


⁵ *Id.* p. 304.

⁶ *Id.* i, 692-4; ii, 287, 303-6.

⁷ In *Glimpses of the Cosmos*, vol. i, pref., he inadequately meets the charge of inconsistency by declaring that his opinions changed by force of increasing knowledge. The inconsistencies under notice occur in the one book—which doubtless was penned over a period of years.

⁸ Vol. ii, p. 285.

⁹ He was one of the hardest workers of his age; and his bibliography runs to about 600 items. The collection was only posthumously completed.



LESTER WARD

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of his sociology;¹ and if his psychology is incoherent he nonetheless forced on sociology the due recognition of the "psychological factor."²

9. It is probable that all along a considerable detachment was made from orthodoxy by doctrine that, apart from criticism of Christian ethic and fable, was purely theistic. Such had been the normal way of approach up to Youmans and Fiske; and Francis Ellingwood Abbot of Boston (born 1836), editor of the *Index* (1870-80) and author of 'An Impeachment of Christianity' (1872), stood on that ground as writer and lecturer, and as first president of the American National Liberal League. His 'Scientific Theism' (1886) was thus a popular work; and 'The Way Out of Agnosticism' (1890) made the emotional appeal to the readers who founded on the "needs" of their "hearts" without inquiring whether agnostics had "needs" and "hearts" also. But this facile line of argument was disastrously challenged when the sad death of Abbot, by suicide under stress of bereavement, revealed that the strictly emotional philosophy could stand only by and for emotionalism, and did not truly face life.³ Subsequent reiteration of the emotionalist case (as in 'Faith Built on Reason,' by F. L. Abbot, 1902) leaves the logical issues evaded as before. It was thus finally a question whether men would reason faithfully or would *not*.

§ 3. Germany

It would be difficult to show that in Germany there was such a dramatic turning of the balance of opinion as could be noted in the same period in England and France. This does not mean that in educated Germany science was not undermining and, for scientific men in all fields, ejecting religion as it was doing elsewhere. The explanation is that in Germany professional and quasi-philosophical theologians constituted a much more intellectually active and productive body than elsewhere. They thus maintained an air of religious energy when in England religion was being merely discredited by the futile efforts of theologians to vindicate concrete beliefs. Their German colleagues took the more hopeful course of wrapping up religion in philosophical forms; and while Anglicans were fighting o'er again the strifes of ritualism and the ideals of the Reformation, German theologians were battling, as we shall see, over the neo-theology of Ritschl and his rivals.

¹ His achievement is discussed by the present writer in *Buckle and His Critics*.

² Yet he gave little scientific study to psycho-physiology. Not content with rejecting the localization of brain function (*Dynamic Sociology*, i, 122), he committed himself to the curious proposition, concerning the "emotional forces," that "any one who will carefully observe such *sensations* will find that they appear to center in the region of the breast" (*id.* p. 473).

³ Abbot told the present writer in 1897 that to his knowledge the theistic teaching of W. James and J. Royce left certain Harvard students despairing of the attainment of reasoned truth by any means. But he did not appear to claim that his own *Scientific Theism* had given the students in question the certitude they required.

In doing so they were, however, standing on the essentially heretical ground of disbelief not only in miracles but in the general historicity of the Christian scriptures. It was mainly the German theologians who were doing what English clerics regarded as "destructive" work of this kind. But while actually far removed from what English Christians counted orthodoxy, they maintained by their philosophico-theological polemic the appearance of sustaining a religious reaction against critical rationalism. Ritschlianism, shown by a theological critic to be compact of philosophical contradictions and fundamentally "naturalistic" in its conception of religion, yet served as a flag of "religious thought." The fact was that German theologians, like German militarists, worked at their business, and produced what could pass for expert philosophic treatises in vindication of a Christianity that had no Articles whatever.

Such professional polemicists cannot, of course, have outnumbered the merely official or feebly polemic priests of England; but they made a much stronger literary appearance. Strauss, looking for final approval when in old age he produced 'The Old and the New Faith,' found instead a voluminous hostility in the clerical class; and in the 'seventies and 'eighties Ritschlianism so far availed as Godliness that earnest young clericals in Britain turned to Ritschl for religious support as their predecessors, and some of their contemporaries, had turned to Hegel, and even Hartmann, for theistic philosophy. But this was only one side of the situation. Wellhausen¹ and the disintegrators of the Old Testament were all the while producing their concrete effect; critical unbelief was ever growing; and German philosophical religion was only a professional demonstration, standing chiefly for the sense of need for a modern philosophy felt by clericals who did not believe in miracles, or human parthenogenesis, or the resurrection of Jesus, or blood salvation, or the fourth gospel, or, collectively, in any one interpretation of the life and teaching of the Founder. It was but an impressive literary parade, with a good sounding-board.

The real balance of belief throughout the nation was to be deduced from the statistics of church-attendance. This went on more or less steadily declining. Büchner and Haeckel and the evolutionists generally had really a much larger public than Ritschl—the public of the intelligent educated men who stood outside the Churches, and who, so far as they concerned themselves about philosophy, found what they wanted in Schopenhauer or Feuerbach or Hartmann as the case might be. Carl Vogt (1817–95), denized in Switzerland as professor of geology at Geneva, was read throughout the German-speaking world, and was so stringently anti-theological in his 'Lectures on Man' (1863) that the editor of the English translation, James Hunt, thought fit to protest in

¹ Wellhausen has in fact testified that it was Ritschlianism that drove him to his special work.

his preface.¹ But Vogt's atheism, revealed in his book on *Köhlerglaube und Wissenschaft* (1855), made his name proverbial throughout his life.

The influence of Feuerbach in particular remained constant; the work of Julius Duboc² (1829–1903), entitled 'Life Without God'³ (1875), was as outspoken as the teaching of his master; and his 'Optimism as World Philosophy' (1881)⁴ was a powerful contribution to practical freethought. Nietzsche's vogue, whether for good or for evil, meant either active or passive hostility to all the Churches. And while his final gospel of self-assertion ministered to the militarist temper and politics, the mentality of the Social-Democratic movement was overwhelmingly on the side of unbelief, as has been bitterly avowed by clerical critics.

Karl Marx had laid it down as part of its mission "to free consciousness from the religious spectre"; and his two most influential followers in Germany, Bebel and Liebknecht, were avowed atheists, the former even going so far as to declare officially in the Reichstag that "the aim of our party is on the political plane the republican form of State; on the economic, Socialism; and on the plane which we term the religious, atheism";⁵ though the party attempted no propaganda of the latter order. "Christianity and Social-Democracy," said Bebel again, "are opposed as fire and water."⁶ The imperial policy of bureaucracy really promoted this hostility by forcing religious teaching in the State schools and allowing no "conscience clause" for unbelieving parents.⁷

A Protestant pastor at the end of the century made an investigation into the state of religious opinion among the working Socialists of some provincial towns and rural districts, and found everywhere a determined attitude of rationalism. The formula of the Social Democrats, "Religion is a private matter," he bitterly perceives to carry the implication "a private matter for the fools"; and while he claims that the belief in a speedy collapse of the Christian religion is latterly less common than formerly among the upper and middle classes, he complains that the Socialists are not similarly enlightened.⁸ Bebel's drastic teaching as to the economic and social conditions of the rise of Christianity,⁹ and the materialistic theory of history set forth by Marx and Engels, he finds generally accepted. Not only do most of the party leaders declare themselves to be without religion, but those who do not so declare themselves are so no less.¹⁰ Nor is the unbelief a mere sequel to the

¹ Hunt was rashly reactionary as to the Neanderthal Skull, where Vogt held with Huxley.

² As to whose teaching see Dr. M. Brasch, *Die Philosophie der Gegenwart*, 1888, pp. 720–2.

³ *Das Leben ohne Gott*, 1875.

⁴ *Der Optimismus als Weltanschauung*, 1881.

⁵ Pastor Studemund, *Der moderne Unglaube in den unteren Ständen*, 1901, p. 14.

⁶ *Id.* p. 22. ⁷ A. D. McLaren, *An Australian in Germany*, 1911, pp. 181, 184.

⁸ Studemund, pp. 17, 21.

⁹ *Glossen zu Yves Guyot's und Sigismund Lacroix's "Die wahre Gestalt des Christentums."*

¹⁰ Studemund, p. 22.

Socialism: often the development is the other way.¹ The opinion is almost universal, further, that the clergy in general do not believe what they teach.² Atheists are numerous among the peasantry; more numerous among the workers in the provincial towns; and still more numerous in the large towns;³ and while many take a sympathetic view of Jesus as a man and teacher, not a few deny his historic existence⁴—a view set forth in non-Socialist circles also.⁵

For practical purposes, therefore, the Germany of the last decades was no less freethinking than the other leading countries of Europe—was indeed probably more so. When the very philosophy that sought to buttress official Christianity was demonstrably a confused form of rationalism, while the masses were in large part openly anti-religious, national faith was only a figure of speech.

§ 4. *Austria*

In the movement of freethought, Austria has never been foremost, though there, as in Germany, there was an inevitable subsidence of faith in the educated classes. It was involved in the ecclesiastical situation that the weak Protestant minority should be dogmatic and Bibliolatrous, while the ruling Catholic Church, from the day of Jahn onwards, was inclement to all progressive ideas. As in Italy, thinking men tended to be deistically anti-clerical, but were disposed to leave the Church alone if it did not meddle with them. Thus it is that in nineteenth-century Austria the one outstanding memorial of freethought activity is the life-record of Konrad Deubler (1814–84), the “peasant-philosopher,” who worked his way from juvenile orthodoxy to materialistic rationalism through the study of Strauss and Feuerbach, Moleschott, Darwin and Haeckel. While Austrian scholarship is a facet of German, Deubler figures as a type and a symbol.⁶ In 1870 he was chosen burgermeister of his village of Goisern.

Born of peasant stock in the Salzkammergut, Upper Austria, Deubler was successively labourer, miller, innkeeper, and latterly amateur naturalist, shaping his practical philosophy by his eager study of all the rational thought and science that came in his way, and winning the esteem and affection of a large body of correspondents among the men of letters and science in Austria and Germany. Neither scholar nor writer, he created a personal following throughout the German-speaking world by sheer charm and force of character, joined with absolute conviction of the

¹ *Id.* p. 23.

² *Id.* p. 27.

³ *Id.* pp. 37–8.

⁴ *Id.* pp. 40–2. Cp. p. 43. Pastor Studemund cites other inquirers, notably Rade, Gebhardt, Lorenz, and Dietzgen, all to the same effect.

⁵ E.g. Pastor A. Kalthoff's *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* 1904. Since that date the opinion has found new and powerful supporters in Germany.

⁶ See the enthusiastic memoir, *Konrad Deubler's Lebens- und Entwicklungsgang, und handschriftlicher Nachlass*, von Arnold Dodel-Port, Leipzig, 1886, 2 Bde.

supremacy of truth, and of the adequacy of reason to right living. While his teachers conveyed the knowledge, he embodied it in his life. It is a signal fact in the culture-history of the century that this genial and upright soul, the incarnation of cordial veracity, was by the action of the Catholic Church subjected to four years' imprisonment in Iglau, in Brünn, and in Olmutz, in the period 1853-57, on the score of being "freespoken" among his neighbours and friends in the years preceding¹—when, naturally, he was sympathetic to the revolutionary movement.

There seems to have been no specific charge of "blasphemy" or printed propaganda. Deubler was simply a personal influence, and his crime was communication. He was never properly taught to write²; but he was a close and careful reader, and his critical power is shown in his drastic handling (in a letter³) of the weak parts of Lange's 'History of Materialism,' which so repelled Deubler by their obvious inconsistency as to make him disparage the work as a whole, though Lange would surely have valued him had he known him. At his death Deubler left a kind of local museum at Goisern, containing an "atelier" of art objects, his library of books, and his mass of unarranged papers. Whatever may be the fortunes of that institute in a disrupted Austria, Deubler's name remains a significant one, as his biographer observes, "to the God-fearing for instruction, to Freethinkers for up-building." A letter of Carl Vogt's in 1866, thanking him for a box of ammonites, declares that acquaintance with him "does me more good than ten diplomas of learned societies."⁴

While Deubler's is thus a specially significant name, serving as a kind of rallying flag for freethinkers in a country where there has been no organized freethought movement, there have been a number of important and influential Austrian rationalistic writers, chiefly in ethics. Of these, one was Deubler's friend, Baron Bartolomäus von Carneri (1821-1909), the distinguished author of *Sittlichkeit und Darwinismus* (1871), *Der Mensch als Selbstzweck* ('Man as his Own End,' 1877), *Grundlegung der Ethik* (1881), and a volume of 'Ethical Essays on Evolution and Happiness' (1886). Carneri was a powerful propagandist of rationalism in the German-speaking lands, and wrought for it through the German 'Monistenbund' or Association of Monists, of which he was one of the founders. Like Deubler, he was of the philosophic school of Feuerbach, and like him he found his scientific ethical bases in the lore of evolution. When we note that Deubler's correspondent, Professor G. A. Roskoff, of the 'Evangelical-Theological' Faculty of the University of Vienna, avowed to him in 1863, "as theologian I no longer believe in miracles,"⁵ it can be inferred how liberally-minded was cultured society even in Catholic Austria.

The no less distinguished Professor Friedrich Jodl (b. 1849), who, after

¹ Dodel-Port, as cited, i, 114.

² *Id.* ii, 326.

³ Letter to Carneri, 1883, in Dodel-Port, ii, 323.

⁴ *Id.* ii, 78.

⁵ Dodel-Port, as cited, ii, 21.

holding posts at the universities of Munich and Prague, came to the chair of philosophy at Vienna in 1896, was already a notable rationalist. His early monograph on Hume (1872) has recognized merit; and his *Geschichte der Ethik in der neueren Philosophie* (2 Bde. 1882), expanded into the later *Geschichte der Ethik als philosophische Wissenschaft*, constitutes one of the standard treatises on the history of moral science. Professor Franz Brentano's 'Psychology, from the Empirical Standpoint' (1874, vol. i only) contributed usefully to the study, as did his later book 'On the Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong' (originally a lecture to the Vienna Law Society, 1889). Jodl's accession (1890) to the editorial board of the *International Journal of Ethics* was at once a declaration of his active rationalism and of the status accorded to such thinkers in Austria. Broadly speaking, the intellectual class there was as fully emancipated as in any part of the German-speaking world; and the Vienna in which Beethoven's pantheism¹ was known to all the educated lovers of music must have been as generally emancipated as any European capital.

On the scientific side, Vienna was particularly distinguished in medicine; and there the academic predominance of rationalism was perhaps most complete. Professor Ernst von Mach (1838-1916), trained as a mathematician and physicist, became Rector of Prague University, and was Professor at Vienna from 1895-1901, being made a member of the Austrian Upper House at his retirement. As his scientific doctrine is one of the most definite expositions of the two-sided unity of body and mind, to the complete exclusion of the concept of the entozoic soul, he was one of the outstanding forces of his day—as has been recognized by the American translators of his works on 'The Science of Mechanics' (1893), 'The Analysis of Sensations' (1897), and his later great treatise on 'Space and Geometry.' Such work has kept Austria in the front rank of the science on which rationalism has been rebuilt.

§ 5. France

1. In France we have noted the literary side of the religious reaction under Napoleon and after the Restoration, which subsisted in various forms as against the freethinking reaction that followed. In the day of Chateaubriand's popular supremacy, it was the correct fashion to affect to regard freethinking as a thing discredited, no matter what strife was going on between the newer and the older forces. Especially was this the case after 1848, when the fiasco of the Republic, driven by the Socialists to unworkable measures, made the middle and upper classes and the peasantry ready to welcome Louis Napoleon as the saviour of society. It was the most natural thing in the world that he should throw himself unreservedly into the arms of the Church, which was more

¹ Refs. in art. in Mr. McCabe's *Dictionary of Modern Rationalists*.

than ready to play a stabilizing part under his auspices. It was, indeed, the last chance for ecclesiastical domination in France. The hollowness of the new structure was to be the tragedy of the latter part of the century.

2. De Tocqueville,¹ who had produced a book which seemed likely to be a classic, on 'Democracy in America' (1835), illustrates in his public and private attitude on religion the factitious character of official orthodoxy in the first decade of the Second Empire. Writing in 1856,² he affects to believe that all scepticism is discredited, as having been found dangerous; and, echoing Burke's phrase as to Bolingbroke, he asks, Who now reads Diderot? As he must have known, and as we have seen, there was an abundance of contemporary freethinking, based on later reading than study of Diderot. But the question was merely foolish. A massive and powerful study of Diderot, in German, was to be published by Rosenkranz in 1866; another, in English, by Morley in 1878; and, to say nothing of a dozen essays, there were to be four French monographs between 1880 and 1895. And Tocqueville had privately avowed, in 1850, that the revolution of 1830 was almost as anti-religious as it was anti-legitimist.³ Preoccupied with his liberal concern for the political stability of France, which was certainly a matter for grave disquietude, he parades the conviction that in France, as in England, "the *respect* for religion has gradually recovered its empire in the different classes of the nation," as a result of their experience of "the hard school of revolutions."

There is no pretence, no question, of the writer's own belief in the current creed. In his private conversation he exhibits none. His case is that "no gentleman in the present century writes, or even speaks, irreligiously." His working conviction is that "a religious system which is taught in every school, preached from every pulpit, and treated by all the educated portion of society *as if it were true* will be received without examination by nine-tenths of those to whom it is offered."⁴ When this was being said, and *L'Ancien Régime* was being written, the outstanding name in recent French philosophy was that of Auguste Comte, who was following up his *Philosophie Positive* (1830-42), which treated all religious beliefs as grown wholly untenable, with his *Politique Positive* (1851-4), which schemed a replacement of Christian by Comtist institutions.

Whatever might be the *mode* of the talking world at a given period, there never was a time in the century when a sense of the unwavering pressure of rationalism upon religion was not weighing heavily on the more watchful minds in the Churches. Always the evolution in France can be seen to be ahead of that in England. If the bold note of Damiron is not officially

¹ Alexis Charles Henri Chérel de Tocqueville (1805-59).

² *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, 2e edit. p. 257.

³ *Correspondence and Conversations of Alexis de Tocqueville with N. W. Senior*, 2nd ed. 1872, i, 106.

⁴ *Id.* p. 107.

maintained under Louis Philippe, nonetheless the chanoine Maret, writing his book on Pantheism (rev. ed. 1841), recognizes that all critical religious thought tends fatally to pantheism = atheism ; that the really stirring intelligences are critical ; that Pierre Leroux, politician and publicist, is radically anti-Christian ; and that only in docile dogmatics is there safety.¹

Twenty years later the demobilized Guizot, Protestant ex-statesman, least French of Frenchmen, is still more explicit. Pleading for a concordat of all the Churches to save a society menaced by revolutionism, he avows that the Churches cannot structurally combine, or their beliefs coincide ; but knows that in the intellectual world, as M. Scherer is showing anew, the spirit of rationalism is corroding all religion worthy of the name ; and that "materialists, pantheists, rationalists, sceptics, learned critics, some loudly, some discreetly, all think and say under the empire that the world and man, moral as well as physical nature, are uniquely governed by general laws." To that gathering conviction there is nothing to be effectively opposed but the "innate instinct" of faith in a personal, prayer-hearing, providential God ; and nothing else can save the State.² And for that cause the rheumatic style of Guizot could avail little.³

The anti-Biblical critics of course repelled with indignant scorn the charge of irreligion. Patrice Larroque (1801-79), ex-rector of the Académie de Lyon (from which he had been dismissed for anti-clericalism), and whose books *De l'Esclavage chez les nations chrétiennes* (1857) and *Examen critique des doctrines de la religion chrétienne* (1859) were put upon the *Index Expurgatorius*, is as sure of his religious solidity as was Thomas Paine. Those who merely argue that it is imprudent to break the curb of the established religion, he declares, are not only themselves without religion, but confess that they do not in themselves feel the need of it as such.⁴ He acknowledges the immense services done by Voltaire to the cause of reason, but laments the many improprieties of that illustrious *frondeur*, in whom he finds a deplorable lack of the moral and religious sense.⁵

For himself, strong in the theistic faith, Larroque undertakes to expose the whole mass of falsities and incredibilities in the sacred books, very much as had been done by the militant freethinkers for a hundred and fifty years, calling in aid, however, the latest, including Strauss. His first edition having been sold off in a few months, he looks for an expanding audience such as Voltaire never had, condemning the æsthetic sentimentalism of the literary men who wanted to spare all creeds.⁶ The

¹ *Essai sur le Panthéisme dans les sociétés modernes*, 2e edit. 1841, pp. ii, iii, vi, ix, x, 325 sq. ² *L'Eglise et la Société chrétiennes*, 1861, pp. 8-9, 11-18, 19 sq.

³ Scherer, attacking the style, called him the most distinguished of the French writers who do not know French (*Études critiques*, 1863, p. 90). Saint-Beuve defended the assailed style, but surely Scherer was broadly right.

⁴ *Examen critique*, 2e édit. 1860, p. 9. ⁵ *Id.* pp. 10-11. ⁶ *Id.* pp. 16-17.

trouble was that, though people continued to read Voltaire after his work was said to be done, they did not so go on with M. Larroque, though he must have made converts. And Jules Janin at that period could hope to promote the sale of a classic novel of Marivaux by dwelling on the fact that that delicate artist had been a believing Christian, though unable to argue the question.¹

3. The religious reaction under the Second Empire is to be reckoned at the height of its strength about 1860, when Napoleon III found himself vehemently opposed, on the question of the temporal government of the Pope in Italy, by the Church for which he had done so much. French Catholicism, not content with the personal protection of the Holy Father, was hotly resolved that he should be the temporal sovereign of Italy. Cousin the philosopher, Villemain the one-time foe of the Jesuits, Guizot the Protestant and his antagonist Thiers, joined hands with Dupanloup the prelate and Lacordaire, the former ally of Lamennais, to shout for the temporal rule of the Pope in Italy and to call upon the Emperor to sustain it. Lacordaire warned the Italians: "God has made Rome for his Church. You have then set against you an eternal fiat of God. You will know it one day: do not doubt."² The French masses were broadly indifferent; the upper classes were convulsed. Ten years later, the Prussian war was to make an end of French pretensions to dominate Italy.

The Church, by this conflict with the Emperor, was beginning its own undoing. The more audacious Ultramontane journals, including *L'Univers*, the organ of the furious Louis Veuillot, were warned or suppressed, and thereafter set themselves to weaken the imperial authority. Thenceforth the Government had to face a factious alliance between an Ultramontane and a republican opposition; and while the Emperor gained some prestige with the rest of the world, France was for the time being declassed as relapsed into fanaticism. "People here," wrote Gregorovius in 1865 of the clerical world of Rome, "are delighted at the submission of the French episcopacy to the Encyclical and Syllabus; even Montalembert, de Falloux, Broglie, and Dupanloup do homage to this medieval illusion. This is the famous movement of freethought in France—devotees and pious legitimists. It is a disgrace."³ But here again "the feet of the young men were at the door."

4. Against the prestige of Dupanloup there began to rise the more vital prestige of Renan, with his *Vie de Jésus* (1863). Jules Romain Barni (1818–78), who had been secretary to Cousin, but turned out-and-out rationalist, published in Switzerland, in 1862, *Martyrs de la libre pensée*; and André Saturnin Marin (1807–88), who was associated with

¹ Préface to ed. of *La vie de Marianne*, pp. xxxv–vi. Janin is careful not to mention that Marivaux had detested the *dévots*.

² I. de St.-Amand, *L'Apogée de Napoléon III*, pp. 38–45.

³ *The Roman Journals of F. Gregorovius*, Eng. tr. 1907, p. 228.

the leading Italian freethinkers, produced in the same year his *Examen du Christianisme*, in three volumes. In 1864 P. A. Larousse began the *Grand Dictionnaire Universel du XIX^e Siècle*, largely written by freethinkers. In 1866 Louis Asseline (1829-78), an avocat, founded a weekly journal of scientific materialism, *La Libre Pensée*, and when that was suppressed he set up *La Pensée Nouvelle*. And while Catholics and Protestants were more or less furiously assailing Renan, Jules Levallois, sometime Secretary to Sainte-Beuve, was carrying on a soulful campaign for "deism pure and simple," of which he was ready to acclaim Jesus as the founder, up to the point of his making Messianic pretensions, which are admitted to be quite authentic.¹ Stripped of those mediatorial pretensions, Jesus is welcomed by M. Levallois and put in line with Voltaire, Lessing, Goethe, Saint-Simon, Proudhon, Edgar Quinet²—nay, with Rabelais and Molière and Courier.³ The deist is convinced, with Comte, that the "work of destruction" of the last century is terminated⁴—this while he is founding on the destructive work of Renan and Peyrat. What he is sure of is that certitude and religious solidarity are to be found in the deism which proclaims "a Personal God, in direct and natural communication with humanity"—the God of Guizot.

The actual state of things revealed by the disquisition of Levallois is in singular contrast with this proclamation of coming peace. Renan, he claims, had in his *Vie de Jésus* offered a rational standing-ground for religion as against atheism; and neither Protestants nor Catholics will look at it. Thereupon comes Peyrat, with his rigorously negative *Histoire de Jésus* (1864) in the manner of Strauss. And whereas M. Levallois professes to be more hopeful of the French Protestants, who seem to be breaking up, than of the polytheistic Catholics, he has to avow that the Protestants are much more exasperated than the Catholics against Renan.⁵ His grounds for optimism are thus reduced to his intuition that the world cannot live save by deism; and that certain Protestants have latterly declared for a Christian Theism in which the divinity and mediatorship of Jesus disappear. Of these the chief are the admirable M. Félix Pécaut, author of *Le Christ et la conscience* (1863) and *De l'avenir du théisme chrétien considéré comme religion*—works not now read—and Theodore Parker, on whom the Protestant Albert Réville had just produced a monograph, in which he confessed himself a little scandalized by Parker's aspiration for a series of new Christs.⁶

Had Levallois discussed the work of Gustave d'Eichthal (1804-66), *Les Évangiles* (1863), he could have shown that that offered as little ground for a consensus as any. D'Eichthal, the old and always affectionate friend of J. S. Mill, had in his youth been a zealous Saint-Simonian, telling Mill in 1830 that "to love, understand and

¹ *Déisme et Christianisme*, 1866, préf. p. xi.

⁴ *Id.* p. xx.

² *Id.* p. xii.

⁵ *Id.* p. 72.

³ *Id.* p. 146.

⁶ *Id.* p. 88.

practise Saint-Simon, one must have been a Christian, and ceased to be one" (*J. S. Mill: Correspondance intime avec Gustave d'Eichthal*, 1898, edited by Eugène d'Eichthal, pp. xiv n., 138). "A point of dissidence between them" had been Mill's "complete negation of every religious belief" (*id.* p. ix). Later, in the 'fifties, d'Eichthal found sociological salvation in Hilgenfeld's theory of the formation of the gospels; and in 1863 he propounds his new ideal, that the Papacy, despite its past failure to follow the lead of Gioberti, shall reform its dogmas and constitute itself the rightful religious and social leader of Europe (*Les Évangiles*, as cited, pp. xxxvi-xlii).

When we note that the idealist dismisses the fourth gospel as unhistorical and mystical, reduces the others to the first and its abridgment, the second, dismissing the third as an inferior composite, and finally eliminates from the first a long series of interpolations, it is clear that the French dream is as vain as the Italian had been. The Papacy could have nothing to do with this. The book could but serve to show critical French readers how destructive was the effect of all serious textual criticism of the gospels, even when expounded with the hope of leading the Papacy to regenerate itself on intellectual lines.

What Levallois confidently claims is that there is in the air a new and powerful religious aspiration; and he can point to E. M. Caro's *L'Idée de Dieu et ses nouveaux critiques*, and M. Hippolyte Destrem's *Du Moi divin et de son action sur l'univers*. But the arguments of those works he makes no attempt to appraise, having avowedly no faith in or faculty for metaphysic, though he is ready to welcome a "sound" metaphysic such as that of Kant. We thus find French Christian theism already standing at the Neo-Unitarian position which twenty years later was to become the prevailing substitute for orthodoxy in England. And though in his previous work on *La Piété au xix^e siècle* (1864) Levallois had written of "the often formidable objections of advanced philosophy," he meets them, here as there, by blankly declaring that deism is "the impassable barrier which preserves the human conscience and guards it from the bigotry of the pharisees and the atheism of the physiologists." He shows, in fact, no capacity to realize the hopeless philosophic contradictions embodied in the thesis of a Personal Omnipotence immanent in Nature, and in "natural communication" with men. The difficulties which had driven Mansel to a stand are unperceived by the French *littérateur*. He is simply a deist of the school of Voltaire and Paine. Of the shattering criticism of Taine's *Les philosophes classiques* (1856) he makes no mention.

5. Yet his later writings do not show him to have pursued further the undertaking he had declared to be so momentous. He had doubtless found that the mass of the Protestants were in their way as intractable as the Catholics, and that if deism was to be the religion of the future its establishment would have to be left to posterity. On the other hand, as

he had warned the bigots in disregard of his own claims, "if they imagined that the descendants of Molière, of Voltaire and Paul-Louis-Courier, were extinct, they were mistaken." So much was made clear when, in 1867, the versatile scholar and art critic Louis Viardot¹ produced his *Libre Examen: Apologie d'un Incrédule*,² which received the preliminary benison of Sainte-Beuve and Littré, and the good wishes of his friend Jules Simon the theist, whom he amicably but unyieldingly criticizes in his pages.³

The later editions of the *Libre Examen* constitute a workmanlike Freethinker's Handbook, compiling all the literary and scientific data on all the main issues of theism and pantheism, while leaving to Renan and Havet and the rest the historical and documentary criticism of the sacred books. For Viardot, evidently, the real battle is with theism; and he fortifies himself on the basis of Evolution, to which Levallois had paid no attention. All the English and German evolutionists are put in requisition, after an incisive survey of the theistic problem as handled in antiquity and in the modern past, from Montaigne and Bayle onwards. The insufficiency of the deism of Voltaire is demonstrated by his own concessions. Against this serried argument there was left to Levallois only the familiar wail, "If you take away my God-idea I shall cry"—which remained, in fact, as we shall see, the substance of philosophic theism so-called. With such a text-book as Viardot's in circulation, French freethought was adequately armed for the combat with the intuitionist religion which was the outstanding intellectual support of clericalism.⁴

6. Years before the fall of the Empire it was clear to seeing eyes that throne and Church alike had to face an ever-growing reaction of democracy and freethinking. Gambetta stood for both, and he had a host behind him. In France the freethinking tradition from the eighteenth century had never passed away, at least as regards the life of the great towns. And while Napoleon III made it his business to the last to conciliate the Church, which in the person of the somewhat latitudinarian Darboy, Archbishop of Paris, had endorsed his *coup d'état* of 1851,⁵ even under his rule the irreversible movement of freethought revealed itself among his own ministers. Victor Duruy, the eminent historian, his energetic Minister of Education, was a freethinker, non-aggressive towards the Church, but perfectly determined not to permit aggression by it.⁶ And when the Church, in its immemorial way, declaimed against

¹ Author of the *Histoire des Arabes et des Mores d'Espagne*; five volumes on the Museums of Europe, translations of Cervantes, Gogol, and Pouchkine, etc.

² Eng. trans. 1869. ³ *Libre Examen*, 6e édit. très-augmentée, 1881, p. 49.

⁴ In May, 1870, Hippolyte Barnout, who had published a *Rational Calendar* in 1859 and 1860, issued a journal, *L'Athée*, which the clergy declared to have drawn the vengeance of God on France.

⁵ Prof. E. Lavisé, *Un Ministre: Victor Duruy*, 1895 (rep. of art. in *Revue de Paris*, Janv. 15 and Mars 1, 1895), p. 117.

⁶ *Id.* pp. 99-105.

all forms of rationalistic teaching in the colleges, and insisted on controlling the instruction in all the schools,¹ his firm resistance made him one of its most hated antagonists. Even in the Senate, then the asylum of all forms of antiquated thought and prejudice, Duruy was able to carry his point against the prelates, Sainte-Beuve strongly and skilfully supporting him.² Thus in the France of the Second Empire, on the open field of the educational battle-ground between faith and reason, the rationalistic advance was apparent in administration no less than in the teaching of the professed men of science and the polemic of the professed critics of religion.

7. The cataclysm of 1870-71, accordingly, found the balance of intellectual prestige, in France as in England and Italy, visibly turned or turning against the creed of the Church. It was indeed more definitely so in France than in England, inasmuch as the Catholic Church had the least semblance of argumentative strength. Catholicism resembled the Evangelicalism of Protestant England in respect of the wholly authoritarian, dogmatic, and broadly superstitious structure of its case. It made no such appeal to educated intelligence as was still affected on the side of Anglicanism, being committed to the rigid maintenance of the documentary tradition where even High Churchmen in England accepted in some measure the results of Biblical criticism. If the Anglican Church in the 'fifties could be regarded as having "only possession" left, that of Catholic France could more emphatically be so described. Above all, it was anti-democratic and anti-republican; and Léon Gambetta, freethinker and fighter, gave the masses their political war-cry, "Clericalism is the enemy." It had no such orthodox combatant as Gladstone, and no such eminent names in scholarship, science, and philosophy as those of Littré, Renan, Taine, and Havet.

8. Émile Littré,³ the Saint Paul of Positivism, as Viardot called him, was the most distinguished all-round scholar in France. He had translated, with learned competence, Hippocrates, Pliny, and Strauss—in the last case doing his part in that extension of the criticism of tradition which Comte had declared to be unnecessary. Strongly embracing Comte's *Philosophie Positive*, he had tardily and reluctantly but decisively rejected the Comtist Cult of Humanity (1863). His great Dictionary of the French Language (1866-77), however open to revision by later scholarship, was the most consummate performance of the kind that had thus far appeared. He was indeed the most laborious scholar of his time; and yet he conducted, from 1867 till his death, *La Philosophie Positive*, maintaining a constant warfare for scientific truth in regard to religion. In 1863 Dupanloup could secure Littré's defeat as a candidate for the Academy; in 1871 he was elected.

¹ *Id.* pp. 107-18.

² *Id.* pp. 118-27.

³ Maximilien Paul Émile Littré (1801-81). Member of the Academy of Inscriptions in 1839, of the French Academy in 1871, of the Senate in 1875.


9. Ernest Havet¹ was only a less massive scholarly figure. One of the first of the academic class to respond to what was rational in the appeal of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*, he proceeded to compile his own magistral treatise (4 tom. 1872-84) on *Le Christianisme et ses Origines*, which constructs the sociological and literary-historical background for a more exactly scientific survey than Renan had accomplished. Here, almost for the first time since Gibbon, the question of the sociological causation of the rise and spread of Christianity is faced and grasped in a scientific spirit and with scholarly knowledge. That the historic process is not shown in its economic determination is an aspect of the general slowness of historic criticism to awake to economic causation, apart from the doctrinary exposition of Marx.

Against such a critical structure as was supplied on the one hand by the scholarly thinkers, and on the other by the ever-growing and ever-abler body of the experts in the physical sciences, the Church could bring nothing but her obsolete medieval artillery. She could no longer pretend to hold the allegiance of intellectual France. The nation, brought to defeat and humiliation by the Empire which had made the Church its ally and instrument, only to learn that Papalism cared more for itself than for any State, was henceforth irreconcilable with Catholic pretensions. Defeated France, convicted of practical incompetence, set itself spontaneously to build up anew a thorough and scientific knowledge in all branches of study, and that decision alone might be said to involve the reversal of religious rule. As Havet put it, the science of nature is essentially irreligious. And the science of nature was the first great task for the nation struck down for imperfect application of scientific method to life.

The writings of Renan, from 1871 onwards, mark the subsidence of the intuitionist religion with which he had set out. The *Vie de Jésus* especially had been read throughout the civilized world. It had been quite justly pronounced, by German and other critics, a romance; but no other "life" properly so called has been anything else, Strauss's first so-called *Life* being a dissection rather than a construction; and the epithet was but an unwitting avowal that to accept the gospels, barring miracles, as biography—which is what Renan did—is to be committed to the unhistorical. He began by using the fourth as equipollent with the synoptics; and upon this Strauss in his second *Life* confidently called for a recantation, which came in due course. But Renan, in his fitful way, had critical glimpses which were denied to Strauss—for instance, as to the material of the Sermon on the Mount.

The whole series of the *Origines*, which wound up with *Marc Aurèle*

¹ Ernest August Eugène Havet, 1813-89, was appointed in 1840 professor of Greek literature at the École Normale, and in 1855 professor of Latin eloquence at the Collège de France.



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(1882), has a similar fluctuating value, showing on the whole a progressive critical sense. The *Saint Paul*, for example, at the close suddenly discards the traditional view previously accepted in *Les Apôtres*, and recognizes that the ministry of Paul can have been no more than a propaganda of small conventicles, whose total membership throughout the Empire could not have been above a thousand. Any further analysis will be found to raise the question of the genuineness of the Paulines. But Renan's total service consisted rather in a highly artistic and winning application of some rational historical methods to early Christian history, with the effect of displacing the traditionist method, than in any lasting or comprehensive solution of the problem of the origins. Havet's survey is both corrective and complementary to his. Renan's influence on opinion throughout the world, however, was enormous, were it only because he was one of the most finished literary artists of his time.

It is not to be disputed that his chief work will have to be done over again, and that the searching criticism of M. Sorel¹ is largely injurious to his scientific status. Renan has himself, however, given his humorous estimate as to the solidity of the historical sciences, which he affected to class far below the natural.² But he had sufficiently carried his point for his time, as against an orthodoxy which merely defied reason at every turn. To teach, as he finally did, that we must act "as if" God and the soul existed, was to be more effectually disillusionist than anybody else. In the end, standing out as the most popular literary figure of his country, and indeed of Europe, he is agnostic, sane, and only humorously sentimental in his kindly attitude to the Catholicism which accused him of being subsidized by Rothschild to oppose the faith. Intellectual France travelled with him. It was another thing to turn the dead weight of traditional habit among the bourgeoisie who did not study or think.

Throughout the century, probably, the percentage of freethinkers in Paris had been highest among the skilled artisans; hence the pathetic reliance placed upon them by Comte. The bulk of the bourgeoisie had naturally gone with the fashionable reaction in and after 1848, and remained at the standpoint of the large non-intellectual section of the English middle classes. Thus there was possible, as late as 1872, the episode of the deletion of the name of Professor Charles Philippe Robin (1821-85), a scientific associate of Littré, from the list of Parisian jurors on the ground of his declared unbelief in any God. The name remained barred until 1876, in which year Robin was raised to the Senate. In his youth his students had fought for him against the hostile priesthood who sought to drive him from his chair. It was a longer task to overweigh a hostile bourgeoisie.

10. In 1876 Viardot exchanged letters³ with the aged Dupanloup,

¹ *Le système historique de Renan*, par G. Sorel, 1905.

² *Souvenirs d'enfance et de jeunesse*, 13e édit. p. 263.

³ Rep. in App. to éd. 6e of the *Libre Examen*.

who in his despairing pamphlet *Où Allons-Nous?* had called him an atheist. Viardot explained that he was not demurring to the description but to the offensive purpose of the term, and reminded the aged prelate that it had been applied by the pagans to the early Christians. The bishop, then a deputy in the Chambre, fighting a losing battle against the anti-clericals, feebly replied that the Christians had not been atheists, and that he regarded atheists as dangerous to social morals, thus eliciting the reply that it was precisely as being pernicious to society that the Christians had been impeached. The Church which had engineered the massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day, and had conducted France to revolution under the monarchy and to overthrow under the Empire, was ill advised to stake its cause on its moral and social efficacy. Yves Guyot by his *Études sur les doctrines sociales du christianisme* (1873) laid a basis for his popularity as a politician. In the two last decades of the century the municipality of Paris had come to be definitely regarded as a free-thinking body.

11. In no respect did the prestige of rationalism stand higher than in the debate on the foundations and sanctions of ethics. Jean Marie Guyau (1854-88), who had won an Academy prize for an essay on utilitarian ethics at the age of nineteen, devoted his short life to a radical study of ethical problems; and his two treatises, *Esquisse d'une morale sans obligation ni sanction* (1884) and *L'Irreligion de l'Avenir* (1887), belong to the main line of moral philosophy in a country which has much more assiduously discussed ethical science than is commonly realized elsewhere. The point at which the latter work is open to attack as unscientific, its rejection of the Law of Population and the precept of Birth Control, conduced rather to its acceptance in France, where the patriotic desire for population tended to exclude alike the economic problem and the vital fact of the high infantile death-rate.

12. In France too, where the preponderance of women in the churches is more notable than anywhere else save in Italy and Spain and in the ritualistic churches of England, there had emerged freethinking women of culture and literary gift. George Sand had opened the way for them. Louise-Victorine Choquet (1813-90) became Madame Ackermann (1838), marrying a young German who had renounced the faith for the ministry of which he was being trained. Both became friends of Proudhon; and after her husband's death she forced distinction as a poetess in whose work, according to M. Caro (1874), "God is dethroned." In France rationalism has long ceased to be a serious bar to a literary woman. Maria Desraimes (born 1836), first known as a writer of comedies, turned to more serious tasks, and, having been made the first female Freemason, presided at the Paris Anti-Clerical Congress of 1881.

13. In sum, before the end of the ninth decade the intelligence of France was more conspicuously on the side of freethought than even that of England and Italy, inasmuch as its strong array of eminent ration-



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alistic names was opposed by none of similar prestige,¹ while its political life was the freest of all from the domination of religious prejudice. From Gambetta and Freycinet, Brisson and Combes, to Delcassé and Clemenceau, freethinkers have been prominent and popular among its statesmen, and freethought was more widely associated with democracy than elsewhere save in Germany. Hence a relative immunity from the social and financial disadvantages which in England to the present day attach in some degree to the avowal of unbelief among men dependent on public favour for their incomes. Anti-clericalism in France became an increasingly powerful political movement, up to the point of the severance of Church and State. With such names as those of Taine, Renan, Havet, Littré, and Guyau in the front rank of serious writers, and the great body of French men of science grown so completely atheological that they were not concerned even to discuss religion, the claim that France was at heart Catholic had fallen to the ground. A "Bibliothèque Anti-Cléricale," in many volumes,² drove part of the truth home to the general mind, and a more solid "Library of Progress," edited by Maurice Lachâtre (born 1814) included his own 'History of the Inquisition' and 'History of the Popes' (1883).

14. It was under the stress of this situation that after the death of Littré the Catholic authorities proclaimed of him, as their priesthood had so often done of other eminent rationalists, that he "finally asked to be baptised," and died in the Catholic faith. The mental standards which would found on the wandering thoughts of a dying man as against the whole teaching of his vigorous life are at best significant of intellectual indigence; but this statement has been exposed as sheer clerical falsehood. A Catholic writer, J. d'Arsac, has disclosed the fact that Littré was baptised by a Jesuit when he was past the power of speech.³ It is but one more proof of the corrupting power of institutional religion that pious men can see nothing to blame in these ignoble artifices of furtive fanaticism.⁴ It is become a special mark of Catholicism that it can thus basely desecrate the natural sanctity of death. The more surely must it lose its hold of good minds.

English freethinkers—Bradlaugh being one—had often gravely censured the stress of political animosity exhibited by their French congeners in their battle with the Church. The Littré episode is one of many which tend to explain the temper of the conflict. It has been the fate of the Catholic Church in most Catholic countries to arouse against it the deep

¹ The Church was fain to make much of the fact that Pasteur was a *pratiquant* Catholic. But he contributed nothing to the Church's defence.

² Mostly unedifying. But the series included Voltaire's *Examen Important de milord Bolingbroke*.

³ *Émile Littré*, 1893, cited by McCabe.

⁴ Compare Morley on the action of Lamennais in putting Comte through the marriage ceremony in a state of insanity. (Encyc. art. on *Auguste Comte*, rep. in *Critical Miscellanies*, vol. iii, ed. 1909, p. 345.)

hostility of the masses as well as of the critical minds, by associating with its indiscriminate execration of all new ideas a passion for dominating life alike in the family and in the State, and a practice of perpetual tyranny to the limit of the possible.¹ Everywhere it has been the foe of popular education. The spirit of religious persecution, which is the special legacy of Christianity to modern civilization, has subsisted longest in the Church of Rome; and the political retaliations of democracy in France, so loudly denounced by British Protestants without a thought of the long history of the sins of the priesthood, have been the natural result.

15. But, as is fitting, the thinkers on the freethought side have often prescribed a better way than that of vengeance. It is perhaps Jules Guesde who has put it best: "We will say no ill of the priests. They were once useful. Their work is over. Let us get on with ours."² And Jean Jaurès, who was so much saner in his Socialism than Guesde—being perhaps the sanest mind that has yet emerged in the Socialist movement—was equally rational in his anti-clericalism. If a worse temper should arise, it can hardly be but that an unteachable clericalism is the cause. But the advances of knowledge, of science, of popular education, are steadily forcing back the old clerical ranks, and a new scholarship is quietly rebuilding the structure of rationalism which has been under progressive erection for over three hundred years.

§ 6. *Italy*

1. We have noted in Italy the constant presence of a large number of educated freethinking laymen, even in the period of Papal predominance. When that predominance was ended (1871), there would naturally be a swing of previously covert unbelievers to the anti-clerical side. A Radical journal declared that "it was time to clear the monuments of Rome of the Christian symbols";³ and fanatics urged the Pope to go into exile in Corsica. But the Pope, knowing the immense strength of his priesthood in Italy, and the nature of the local tenure by which he held the allegiance of the Catholic world, did no such thing. Ferdinand Gregorovius, his work done as historian of the Eternal City, confides to his diary his disgust "at the sight of this idolatry"—culminating in the Papal Decree of Infallibility—"of these old and new idols, and this perpetual condition of falsehood, hypocrisy, and the crassest superstition. Could almost despair of mankind, not alone on account of the priests, who are obliged to continue their handiwork, but on account of their vassals."⁴

2. This continuing counterpoise between a clericalism based on popular

¹ Cp. Laurence Jerrold, *The Real France*, 1911, p. 172.

² In préf. to *Les Prophètes* (1903), by Adolphe Brisson, author of *Portraits Intimes* (5 vols., 1894-1900)—not to be confused with Henri Brisson (1835-1912), twice President of the Chambre, and twice Premier, one of the eminent rationalist politicians of his time.

³ *The Roman Journals of F. Gregorovius*, Eng. tr. 1907, p. 403.

⁴ *Id.* p. 368.

ignorance and superstition, and a freethought largely confined to the educated classes, meant nevertheless that the balance of intelligence in Italy as in the northern countries was now on the side of science and rationalism. It had long been notoriously so. "How many of the educated persons in Rome possess this faith?" asked Nassau Senior of an Italian friend in 1851, after recounting a sermon he had heard propounding the correct attitude of the true believer. "Scarcely any," was the answer. "*There is less Christianity in Rome than in any part of Europe.*" The common people had only their confused notions about the Virgin, the Father, St. Peter and the saints in general. "And most of them scarcely possess even this belief. Their hatred of priestly government and of the priests often extends to the doctrines taught to them." The churches were thronged chiefly by women and old men.¹

It was even affirmed that few of the priests were believers, and "fewer still moral"; an instance being given in detail. And, continued the Italian,

When you recollect that we are forced to admit them into our houses, to commit to them the consciences of our wives and the education of our sons and daughters, and that they are our censors, our judges, our magistrates, and our rulers, that they can stifle the expression of our thoughts, and whisper away our employments and our liberty, and that we cannot venture, except to a foreigner like you, to reveal our contempt or our hatred, you may conceive how both boil within us.²

3. The men who thus spoke were not necessarily anti-theists. Many, probably, were undogmatic theists, as, apparently, was Garibaldi³ (1807-82), whose simple creed was that the race is slowly but surely improving, and that "Providence has designed that happiness shall come at length to this planet of suffering humanity, so grievously afflicted."⁴ On that nebulous footing the liberator, with the heart of a noble boy and the active efficiency of the born fighter, lived his heroic life. The hazy theism offered no ground of mutual understanding between him and Mazzini, in whom he found a spiritually arrogant dominator, "a second 'infallible,'" who would take counsel with none,⁵ and failed accordingly. Mazzini nevertheless had the devotion and esteem of many freethinkers. Swinburne revered him, and disparaged Garibaldi because of his common-sense "possibilism" in politics; and Bradlaugh carried despatches for the idealist. The one clear judgment that united all the Italian patriots was their conviction of the moral destructiveness and intolerableness of the rule of the priest; and this, while it left many of them to the theism of auto-suggestion, very generally meant a complete rejection of the

¹ *Journals Kept in France and Italy, 1848-52*, by the late N. W. Senior, ed. 1871, ii, 131-2.

² *Id.* p. 133.

³ Yet he is quoted (in Bent's *Life*) as writing in 1880 the laconic letter: "Man has created God, not God man." This was not long before his death.

⁴ Passage in his *Rule of the Monk*, 1870, cited in Elpis Melena's *Garibaldi*, 1887, p. 334.

⁵ *Id.* p. 335.

Christian creed.¹ They were, accordingly, as much detested by the priesthood as any atheists could have been. Voltaire's indomitable deism was anything but a merit in the eyes of the Church. But in Italy the antagonism was more than doubled by the irreconcilable political opposition of Papalism and the ever-growing aspiration for national independence.

4. It is hard to recover, without a long local research, the facts of the intellectual struggle in the middle decades ; but certain names of propagandists are on record. Wheeler (1850-98) has collected a number. Under the pen-name of "Ausonio Franchi," Francesco Cristoforo Bonavino (born 1821), an ex-priest, disillusioned in 1849 by the confessional, turned to free study, and in 1852 published a critical treatise on 'The Philosophy of the Italian Schools,' which in the next year he followed up with a more critical treatise on 'The Religion of the Nineteenth Century.' Aiming at practical results, Bonavino in the years 1854-7 established the periodical *La Razione* and also *Il Libero Pensiero*—which perished and was later resurrected ; and published at Geneva (1856) a book on 'The Rationalism of the People.' Always he appears to have been bent on the organization of anti-clerical societies. His criticism of Positivism (1866) and his three volumes of 'Critical and Polemical Essays,' 1870-72, exhibit the same unflinching rationalism ; and their author's appointment by Terenzio Mamiani, in 1868, to a professorship of Philosophy in the Academy of Milan, is some testimony to his acceptance.

When the tyranny had been politically broken, there could not but be a freer play of criticism among the laity. Already in the 'sixties the Church was learning its lesson. There was an Anti-Papal Freethought Council at Naples in 1869, called by Giuseppe Napoleone Ricciardi (1808-84) and dissolved by the Italian Government, but with the effect of leading to an International Federation of Freethinkers ; and in that year appeared (1) the work of Aristide Gabelli on 'Man and the Moral Sciences,' in which all supernaturalism is dismissed ; (2) the 'Catechism for Female Freethinkers,' published at Geneva, by Maria Alimonda Serafina ; and (3) the 'Critical History of Superstition' by Luigi Stefanoni, translator of Feuerbach and Büchner. The 'Critical History' had before appeared serially in the revived journal *Il Libero Pensiero*, re-founded by Stefanoni in 1866, along with a Society of Freethinkers, at Milan, where the Papacy was specially weak. A Milanese, Pietro Preda, had published at Geneva in 1865, under the pseudonym "Padre Pietro," a rationalistic work on 'Revelation and Reason.' And at Milan in 1882 appeared the aggressive work of Cosimo Randello, 'The Simple Story of a Great Fraud,' an attack on the Pauline origins of Christianity. It was the very slightness of the hold of the Bible on Italian life, as distin-

¹ As to the annoyance caused to Gladstone and others by Garibaldi's acceptance of Renan, see Morley's *Life*, ed. 1905, i, 742-8. But Gladstone's admiration of the man was enthusiastic,

guished from the hold of the Church, that kept such critical literature less abundant in Italy than in England and France.

5. After 1870, in fine, the directly repressive power of the Papacy was practically at an end. While the 'History of the City of Rome in the Middle Ages,' by Gregorovius, was being produced, it had been prudently left alone, as a strictly historical work. Four years after its completion it was put on the Index Expurgatorius (1874). The futile action was hailed by the author's friends as a "merited honour," and a good advertisement, though freethinkers tore down the placards.¹ The Papacy was but making an impotent protest against the contemporary anti-Jesuit policy of Bismarck in Germany. Ten years before, the Index being already felt to be an inadequate exorcism, Renan's *Vie de Jésus* had been made the subject of public Catholic prayers.² The philosophic campaign now went on more vigorously than ever.

6. The impotence of the Papacy for repression was dramatically revealed in the year of the flout to Gregorovius, when Count Angelo de Gubernatis (1840-1913),³ professor at the Institute of Higher Studies at Florence, published his 'Lectures on the Vedic Mythology,' in which the "legend of Christ" is quite dispassionately treated as embodying myths belonging to Vedic and Hellenic antiquity, the Divine Fish being linked up with the deluge myth, the Descent into Hell with the Vedic myth of Yama, as also the myth of the Sacrificed God; and the Holy Spirit with the Vedic Wind-God.⁴ There is no polemic: it is all matter of mythological science, in which the abundance of myth elements in both Old and New Testaments is taken as a matter of course. The glowing dedication of the book to Renan is in itself a manifesto; and the delicate allusion to "the *poem* of the Life of Jesus" sufficiently indicates the author's own views.

7. For Matthew Arnold in 1877, de Gubernatis represented the standpoint of cultured and scholarly Italians, indeed of intelligent Italian liberals in general. "Professor de Gubernatis is perhaps the most accomplished man in Italy: he is certainly one of the most intelligent."⁵ And he goes on to quote the language of the Professor concerning *Literature and Dogma* and the attempt there made to rebuild modern ethics on the Bible.

For Italy and for Italians, says Professor de Gubernatis, such an attempt has and can have no interest whatever. "In Italy the Bible is just this: for priests, a sacred text; for infidels, a book full of obscurities and contradictions; for the learned, an historical document to be used with great caution; for lovers of poetry, a collection of very fine specimens of Oriental

¹ Gregorovius, as cited, pp. 449-50.

² *Id.* p. 200.

³ He had begun as a dramatist, studied Sanskrit at Berlin, married a niece of Bakunin, and produced several Vedic and other treatises in the 'sixties, besides editing various reviews and producing new dramas.

⁴ *Letture sopra la mitologia vedica*, 1874, pp. 144-5, 197, 218 sq., 229, 234 sq.

⁵ *Last Essays on Church and Religion*, 1877, pref. p. ix.

poetic eloquence. But it never has been, and never will be, a fruitful inspirer of man's daily life!" "And how wonderful," Professor de Gubernatis adds, "that any one should wish to make it so, and should raise intellectual and literary discussions having this for their object!" "It is strange that the human genius should take pleasure in combating in such narrow lists, with such treacherous ground under one's feet, with such a cloudy sky over one's head; and all this in the name of freedom of discussion!"

Arnold at once admits that "Here we have, undoubtedly, the genuine opinion of Continental liberalism concerning the religion of the Bible and its future.....It is not an opinion which at present prevails at all widely either in this country or in America." We have seen that other judges took a very different view of the British and American situation in 1877 and long before; as indeed Arnold himself seemed to do when he wrote *Culture and Anarchy*. But the matter in hand here is the recognition of the predominance of freethinking views among Continental liberals in general. "The partisans of traditional religion in this country," declares Arnold, "do not know, I think, how decisively the whole force of progressive and liberal opinion on the Continent has pronounced against the Christian religion"; and he warns them that British opinion will go the same road.

The facts as to the prevalence of unbelief in Italy may be held to be established by the avowals of such a book as *La religione degli italiani* (1909), by Prof. G. Bartoli, who writes as an evangelical Protestant. First he balances the generalizations of those visitors who say that, by the test of church attendance, only women in Italy are believers, and that by the test of crime it is an irreligious country, against the inferences of others who point to religious processions and demonstrations as proving Italian religiosity. Then he notes (p. 5) the official statistic showing 23,315 declarations of non-religion, and 138,879 persons who, claiming to have a religion, decline to specify it. Then comes the explicit avowal (p. 23) that "it is quite indubitable that the great majority of cultured Italians no longer profess, either in theory or in practice, the Catholic religion," though most of them are neither atheists nor indifferentists. For the rest, the Professor charges practising Italian Catholics, especially the peasantry of the South, with being formalists and superstitious believers, and calls upon his countrymen to adopt the evangelical religion of Jesus.

From another angle, the testimony of Haeckel is emphatic and weighty. Contrasting the subserviency of German Catholics with the mental independence of enlightened Catholics, he writes in his *Last Words on Evolution* (1905): "In Italy,.....educated people generally look upon the papacy with the most profound disdain. I have spent many years in Italy, and have never met with an educated Italian of such bigoted and narrow views as we usually find amongst educated German Catholics—represented with success in the

Reichstag by the Centre party" (Eng. tr. pp. 46-7). *Per contra*, the orthodoxy of the large mass of German Catholics, representing an aggregate of the temperamental religiosity of the nation, is of course claimable on the Catholic side as an important asset.

8. It is hardly necessary, then, to labour the main point as to Italy. The outstanding facts are that in Italian life freethinking has usually been bound up with political liberalism and is in large part specifically anti-clerical rather than critically rationalist; while there has long subsisted a certain conflict between a merely patriotic satisfaction in the international prestige of the Papacy and a logical conviction that Catholicism is an exploitation of ignorance. And among the *intelligentsia* of anti-clericalism, at the same time, there has been a certain schism between strict rationalism and the socio-political idealism which takes the imposition of a new social system to be a quite facile and feasible thing.

The crux emerges clearly enough in the life and activity of Luigi Stefanoni (1842-1905), the founder of the Society of Freethinkers, long-time editor of the journal *Il Libero Pensiero*. No one, probably, did more effective propagandist work in Italy in his time. Apart from his romances, such books as his 'Critical History of Superstition,' his 'Philosophical Dictionary' (1873-75) and his translations from Büchner, La Mettrie, Morin, Letourneau, and Feuerbach, constituted a working library for the Italian movement. The Russian anarchist Bakunin called Stefanoni the Pope of the Italian freethinkers. Yet his influence was in a manner split and frustrated by the belief of many of his readers that social reconstruction—that is, a radically new socio-political system—could more easily be imposed by force on *all* than could the rational method in belief be communicated to the thinking minority.

Thus emerged in the Italian world the delusion that a *praxis* for all is a simple thing, despite the plain fact that only very gradually can men in mass be led by sheer reason, step by step, to the logical rejection of absurd beliefs dating from savagery. Ardent men embraced the notion that an intellectual minority could by rhetoric and revolution quickly establish a vitally new system (whether solidary or anarchic) in a world in which all social systems are changing and difficult adjustments of the passional and economic interests of ever-conflicting aggregates. Stefanoni held no such view. Personally anti-Socialist, he denied the capacity of men for the immense undertaking of universal co-operation, and equally for a sane life of anarchism. It is probable, then, as has been competently suggested, that while his rationalism repelled the Mazzinist republicans, who were mostly theistic, his clear distinction between the propaganda and possibilities of rational *belief* and the *praxis* of either Anarchism or Marxism repelled the zealots of both of those schools, leaving his own movement weak. Italy thus failed to support a disinterested rational propaganda.

9. Note may be taken, however, of some laudable activities recorded

by Wheeler. Francesco Fiorentino (1834–84), who had been professor of philosophy successively at Spoleto, Bologna, and Naples (1871), and had been elected to the Italian Parliament in 1870, added to his works on Giordano Bruno (1861) and Pomponazzi (1863) a treatise (1872) on Telesio, 'Studies on the idea of Nature in the Italian Resurrection (*risorgimento*).' Gaetano Trezza (b. 1828), who had been a priest and an eloquent preacher but withdrew from that avocation in 1860 and became later a professor of Latin literature at Florence, produced in 1878 his 'Confessions of a Sceptic,' and in 1883 contributed to the *Revue Internationale* an article 'Les Dieux s'en vont' ('The Gods pass away'); his work on 'Religion and Religions' following in 1884. Felice di Tocco (1845–1911), professor of philosophy at Pisa, added to his psychological studies and his 'Thoughts on the History of Philosophy' (1877) an informative and scholarly survey (1884) of *L'Eresia nel medio evo*, a period which, as he justly notes, has been "wrongly described by friends and foes as an era of concord and peace."

Such scholars, thinkers, and propagandists as these, whether neutrally scientific or actively didactic, have never been absent in modern Italy, and have always nourished in their different fashions the critical spirit which persists through all political vicissitudes. A record of the direct critical and propagandist work done by the Italian Freemasons in the latter part of the century will be a matter for special research, preferably by an Italian student.

§ 6. Other Countries

Arnold's declaration as to the anti-Christian movement of Continental liberalism had specific reference to France and Italy; but we have seen, and he implied, that it was equally true for Germany and other countries. Inasmuch as the latter had less widely influenced European thought, apart from the Biblical criticism of Holland, it is more difficult to estimate the course and momentum of opinion in those countries. Yet as regards some, in particular Belgium, it is broadly clear that intelligent opinion throughout the century was abreast of that of the neighbouring nations.

1. If post-Napoleonic Belgium was less eminent in literature than France, her *intelligentsia* was all the more awake to all French mental movement, literary, critical, and scientific. The reproduction of French books at Brussels was a standing industry, and the freethinking works had their full share of acceptance. But there were native scholars who rendered yeoman service. If Belgium had less of a scholarly tradition than Holland, it had more of the alert modern temper, and its scholars were more alive to modern issues. The six (in eight) volumes (1821) of 'The Spirit of the Church,'¹ by Louis Antoine Joseph de Potter (1786–1859), constituted an arsenal of anti-clerical learning and an indictment

¹ *L'Esprit de l'Eglise, ou Considérations philosophiques et politiques sur l'histoire des Conciles et des Papes*, etc. Par De Potter, Paris, 1821.

of historic Christianity not to be matched and not to be met. It appears to have been issued previously and pirated in France¹ in virtue of its vogue. Freethought was acquiring a new armoury.

Such a volunteer as De Potter, though of noble family and professing deism, could not escape harm in a tempestuous time; and De Potter, who particularly antagonized the Church by fighting for secular education, was repeatedly prosecuted, and underwent imprisonment for eighteen months in 1828. Like so many freethinkers of the age in the "Latin" countries, he wrought for the *praxis* of "rational Socialism" as being on all fours with deistic rationalism, and indeed much more quickly realizable, and it was in his political capacity that he was made a member of the Brussels provisional government of 1830. In his later exile at Paris, however, he wrote and published, on the basis of his first work, his anti-clerical 'History of Christianity' (8 vols. 1836-37), thus continuing his original avocation to good purpose. In his own land, in his declining years, he further produced his 'Rational Catechism' (1854) and his 'Rational Dictionary' (1859) and many other minor books, carrying on the deistic tradition rigorously to the end. And Ferdinand Eenens (1811-83), writing under various pseudonyms, did much skirmishing work by his *La Vérité* (1859), *Le Paradis Terrestre* (1860), and *Du Dieu Thaumaturge* (1876).

Professor Charles Potvin of Brussels, holding the chair of literature there and a seat in the Royal Academy of Letters, had to maintain in his youth the same significant pseudonymity, writing under the flags of 'Dom Liber' and 'Dom Jacobus' his two volumes on 'L'Église et la Morale,' his 'Tablettes d'un Libre-Penseur,' and other unsparing polemics. The editor of the *Tablettes* in 1879, noting the services of Potvin and the change since 1851 (when the *Tablettes* began), writes that "there is not a journalist who, in collecting his work, cannot add to the history of Freethought a series of documents and teachings which, put together under the pressure of circumstances, only the better preserve the impulse of the fight, and, as it were, the smell of powder." These *Tablettes* tell much of the story, from the "First Philosophic Congress of the Association of the *Dageraad* at Amsterdam" in 1857 to the 'Retour sur soi-même,' giving Potvin's retrospect, in the *Revue de Belgique* in 1877. "Europe escapes from Christianity" is the title given in 1876 to a review of Charles Renouvier's *Uchronie* in the same Review. It expresses the changed situation.

Belgium was thus being well penetrated with critical freethought on the historical side when the mid-century was passed; and, ever since, its cultured class has been about as predominantly freethinking as that of Italy. The son of De Potter founded the review *La Philosophie de l'Avenir* (1875). But in both countries alike the relation of the opposed

¹ Thus the edition of 1821 is the complete one.

forces is one of active strife, in which a concrete clericalism and the literary counter-force are always to the front. Thus Louis Lamborelle, author of books on 'The Good Old Times' (1874) and 'The Apostles and Martyrs of Liberty of Conscience' (1882), lost his post under the government on the score of his anti-clericalism. But there has never been a lack of competent propaganda. Paul Poulin re-wrote his book of 1865, 'What is God? What is Man?', as 'God according to Science' in 1875, logically negating theism. Désiré Brismée (1822-88), who like De Potter endured imprisonment in his youth, founder and lifelong secretary of the rationalist group '*Les Solidaires*,' was always a standard-bearer; and his colleague, Dr. César De Paepe (b. 1842), was another out-standing figure of the generation, powerfully figuring as a political and scientific reformer, with the usual anti-Catholic leaning to Socialism. It has long been clear that, however economic forces may continue to support Belgian Catholicism, the scientific trend to rationalism is ineradicable and progressive.

As to religious belief in Belgium the case is made very clear by the quaint admissions of Archbishop Mercier in his Lenten Pastoral of 1908. As Father Tyrrell points out in his mordant reply, entitled *Medievalism* (1908), the Archbishop avows not only the prevalence of rationalism—or indifference—among the educated Belgian laity but a signal indifference to all religious thought among his avowed flock, most of whom, by his own account, have not only no religious books on their shelves but not even copies of the Sacred Books—a state of things not to be matched in any Protestant country. Thus the vaunt that there is no modernism among the Belgian clergy—a vaunt made, as Tyrrell notes, by the Catholic authorities of all other countries as regards *their* priesthoods—is merely an avowal of complete intellectual apathy all round. Tyrrell accordingly makes a notable prediction (p. 33) that if Belgium is just a well-drilled unthinking Catholic community, as France appeared to be under the Second Empire, "The history of the French Church will soon repeat itself in Belgium—'Ye shall all likewise perish.' " To the devastating criticism of Tyrrell's entire book the Church has made, and can make, no tolerable reply. Here the liberal Jesuit of *A Much Abused Letter* (1906), gingerly defending a private letter which he thought ought not to have been published, is stung into the assertion of his manhood, bought with the price of his expulsion, and into arraigning the existing Catholic system, while holding to his uncriticized theistic assumptions.

2. Holland, ostensibly buttressed by her Protestant theology as by her sea-dykes—and, as the French critic said of the Anglo-Saxon spirit, *terriblement enfoncé dans la matière*—showed in the first half of the century little of the new intellectual ferment that was working in Europe. In the next chapter we shall see how, after the sixth decade had turned,

that theology began to transform under the hands of its own experts till its new lore became one of the decisive freethinking forces of the age. But while theology and scholarship were the specialties of the more cultured class, a new critical force emerged also in literature, in the form of the didactic satirical romance entitled *Max Havelaar* (1860) by a new writer whose pseudonym was "Multatuli" (= "Much have I suffered"). This was Edward Douwes Dekker (1820-87), the most widely influential Dutch writer of the century, and by many compatriots reckoned one of the first in Europe. His first book at once "caused such a sensation in Holland as was never before experienced in that country."¹

Max Havelaar is primarily inspired by Dekker's burning indignation at the abuses and iniquities of the Dutch colonial administration in Java, as he had seen and felt them; and it is due to the crusade he began that the system was reformed till it became exemplary. The battle he fought on that side belongs to social history; and the question of the immortality of his book to literary history. But he became in his own country a dynamic influence for freethought. His *Ideas* (which he called "the Times of my soul"²—1862-79, 7 vols.) have never been translated in English, and probably never will be, though they would well repay selection; and these best represent, in their manifold content, the many-sided play of his critical rationalism. But the mordant satire in *Max Havelaar*³ on the unctuous and unscrupulous pietism of the Dutch exploiters of the Javanese will indicate to the general reader the intellectual temper of the author and the nature of his mental lead to his countrymen. Dr. Jan Ten Brink, in 1882, calls *Max Havelaar* "the ideal of our studious and non-studious youth."⁴

The novel being freethinking to start with, the man who wrote: "Jesus was no Christian,"⁵ and "I have at many points respect for Christ, but absolutely none for Christianity";⁶ who re-wrote Mt. xix, 10 sq., on the score that Jesus knew nothing of women;⁷ and who drops the footnote that "Jesus has been thrice crucified: once by the Jews, then by the biographers, and finally by the Christians themselves; he had no worse enemies than the last"⁸—was putting into Dutch literature a leaven that had not hitherto entered it. In no European country was a popular and powerful penman so utterly freespoken, or so entirely irreverent. In the Holland of the 'seventies, under this impact, the balance was already perceptibly turning for the educated class.

Dekker, doubtless, pays the penalty of his willed adherence, or

¹ Baron A. Nahuijs, in pref. to his English trans., 1868. The book was newly translated in 1927.

² Vosmaer, *Studien*, rep. in 1900 ed. of *Max Havelaar*, p. 24.

³ E.g. in the trans. of 1868, pp. 158-68, 312-17. (Dutch ed. 1900, pp. 102-8, 196-9.)

⁴ *Kleine Geschiedenis der Nederlandsche Letteren*, 2de druk, p. 249.

⁵ *Ideen*, eerste Bundel, 66.

⁷ *Id.* 183, 188. (Ed. 1906, pp. 89, 93.)

⁶ *Id.* 186.

⁸ *Id.* 186.

temperamental subjection, to his nervously humoristic key, his cryptic tone, and his staccato literary method. He lacks the notes of reverie and charm, and his drama will not play. The literary historians of his country, preoccupied with the mass of their industrious *littérateurs* who do not get across the frontier, make little of him, eying him askance; and though the first English translation of his first book evoked some enthusiastic encomiums in the British press,¹ he has never become popular, even with our professional penmen. As such, they are not truth-seekers. It is *their* penalty to find thought irksome, and to treat creed as an agreed convention; and the ruthless stroke of Dekker's searing blade at all conventions, including the religious, is for them disconcerting.

He does not fit into any convenient category: even if his manifold polemic be in the mode of satire, and therefore *art*, they cannot allow him to be an artist.² He thinks and argues too much for them. They do not read the *Ideen*. But their inhibitions and those of the correct belletrists of Holland can hardly bar the acknowledgment that he was a man of genius, an untrained but an untrammelled freelance employing the terrible weapon of style. He will remain Multatuli, perhaps, after Dickens has ceased to be Boz. And it is a significant thing that the first personality to shake the Dutch every-day life into a modern receptivity, albeit he finally cast the Dutch dust off his feet and died in Germany, was thus potent because he incarnated the spirit, if not the discipline, of freethought. And there are scores of books about him.

3. Of all the leading countries of Europe, Spain is that in which the Catholic Church has longest retained its hold of the people, and its repressive power over thought, science, and scholarship. The deadly exploits of the expulsion, in mass, of the Jews and the Moors in the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries, began a willed impoverishment at once of economic energy and of the natural forces of mental variation, such as is not to be seen elsewhere in human history; and the evil fate of the acquisition of the gold and silver mines of the New World riveted on the Spanish monarchy the twofold chain of kingly and priestly power. Had the acquisition been made by England or France it would have had a similar effect in those countries. The immediate enrichment of both crown and Church gave them a special economic ascendancy while the flow of bullion lasted, the asphyxiation of productive industry being the concomitant of the unearned riches, which could but buy products from without.³

Buckle has traced the results in the mental, industrial, and military life. Spain in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries remained the fortress of the Inquisition, the stronghold of pious ignorance, the supreme

¹ Quoted by Vosmaer, *Studien*, as cited, p. 8.

² See the article of the late Sir E. Gosse in *Encyc. Brit.*

³ Refs. in *The Evolution of States*, p. 461.

breeding-ground of priests, the land of beggary and bigotry *par excellence*. And yet we find in eighteenth-century Spain a clear response to the new heresy of reason ; a response which in fact had never wholly ceased, and has never ceased since. For there is no more of innate or predestinate antipathy of "race character" to reason in Spain than anywhere else. Spanish bigotry is a cultural product like another. Her people had again and again fiercely resisted the establishment of the Inquisition which was to paralyse her intellectual life and so to figure as a Spanish specialty. It was the specially enriched Church that eliminated the brains, in age after age—first the Jewish element, next the Moorish, later the Spanish Protestant and the heretic, always the more critical and the philosophic in general. Spain for a time threw up about as many Protestants as Italy ; it was the overwhelming power of the Church in both countries that extirpated them. Spain, never much devoted to the Papacy as such, was pre-eminently the Church-strangled nation.

And the very recognition of this fact in the period of the French Revolution fired anew the spirit of freethought in the minority capable of freethinking—a minority not to be extinguished in any civilized race. We have seen the priests bitterly avowing its persistence in the day of triumphant reaction ; and never since have they been without cause for the same wrath. Spain had still in the nineteenth century learned Catholic historians capable of exulting over the Dead Sea fruit of "unity of Catholic faith" which had been secured by the ecclesiastical policy of slaughter and expulsion through ages of decadence and ruin ; and the students of other nations could not but avow, as George Eliot's Lydgate said of the basil-plant, that it had flourished wonderfully on the murdered brains of a great people. But neither Church nor king or dictator can forever expel the breath of thought from a nation in a world of reviving and expanding knowledge. That curious persistence of the spirit of class equality which has been noted in Spain even in the worst times of tyranny¹ is alone a warrant of an ultimate emergence of liberty, little as the nation has been trained for self-government.

Buckle's chapter on the history of the Spanish intellect was promptly translated into Spanish, though the book had to be published in London,² without a publisher's imprint and with only the initials of the translator. Sparing all criticism and commentary, he proffers to his nation this revelation of how others see it. The translator was Fernando Garrido (d. 1884), who in his *L'Espagne contemporaine* (1862), after a long and lucid presentment of past oppressions and recent developments, devotes a few pages to the contemporary intellectual movement. He notes³ the "curious phenomenon" that "our 'classic' authors have nearly all

¹ *History of the Spanish Revolution*, by Joseph Hemingway (1823), p. 242.

² *Historia de la civilización en España*, por Enrique Tomas Buckle. Capitulo 1^o del segundo tomo de la historia de la civilización en Inglaterra. Traducida de la primera edición inglesa por F. G. y T. Londres, 1861.

³ Work cited, p. 382.

become sceptics, while most of the romantics have turned neo-Catholics," but finds further that social science has become a force for intellectual innovation, against clerical resistance. He himself had written 'Memoirs of a Sceptic' (1843), and a work on the Jesuits, as well as part of a History of Persecutions. Arnold Ruge, Buckle's German translator, justly reproached his author¹ with having failed to note the recent intellectual revival. Even in the previous generation Spain had never been without a witness to anti-clericalism. The sceptic Mariano José Larra (1809-37), who died so young, started in 1831 the periodical *El Pobrecito Habrador* ('The Poor Little Babbler'), which was so anti-clerical that it was suppressed. José de Espronceda (1810-42), who also died young, put into his poetry a half-deistic, half-fatalistic unbelief which the censorship would never have let pass in a reasoned treatise.

Naturally Spain, where a strict censorship of all books on religion dates from 1810, has the shortest list of freethinking publicists among the principal nations; but, to say nothing here of the phenomenon of the fiction and drama of Benito Perez Galdos (1849-1920), the chronic conflicts between authority and rationalist heterodoxy sufficiently register the steady advance of modern thought. The two brothers Calderon y Arana, Laureano and Salvador, both scientific professors, are instances. The former, deposed from his chair of pharmacy at Santiago for his opinions, received another chair at Madrid in 1888. Salvador, deposed from his chair at Las Palmas, proceeded with other victimized professors to found the Free Teaching Institution at Madrid, and in 1887 obtained the chair of geology at Seville. Professor Miguel Moraita (b. 1845), of Madrid, Grand Master of the Spanish Freemasons, was excommunicated in 1884 for his freethinking criticism of the Old Testament in his lectures as professor of history, but the rebellious devotion of his students prevented his dismissal.

Orthodoxy in Spain is finally a political phenomenon. The Church retains possession without intellectual prestige. The spread of free-thinking among the industrial population hand-in-hand with a spirit of revolutionary Socialism cemented the alliance between Church and State, leaving many of the *intelligentsia* hopeless of a sane evolution for the present. And yet, by hostile testimony, Spanish intelligence is about as notoriously freethinking as that of other countries. When the United States in 1897 made war on Spain on the pretext of the blowing-up of the *Maine*, certain sentimental English Liberal journalists found a semblance of justification for their spontaneous adoption of the American cause in the unbelief which they knew to be prevalent in educated Madrid. The mental life, in short, is ineradicable, even where the forces of destruction have wrought longest and hardest.

But the strife has been and still is a cruel one. Wheeler notes how

¹ *Vorwort des Uebersetzers* to 2te Ausgabe of Bd. II of the German translation, 1865,

the Spanish journalist Adolfo de Maglia (b. 1859), who founded the free-thinking group 'El Independiente' and edited one journal after another, was in 1889 condemned to six years' imprisonment and a fine of 4,000 francs for attacking Leo XIII and the Catholic dogmas; and even the younger men to-day remember the red tragedy of Francisco Ferrer in 1909, which aroused passionate reprobation in every civilized country, yet was defended in England and elsewhere with extravagant baseness by Catholic *littérateurs*, who, with their reactionary priests, are the last to learn the lesson of tolerance. The indignation everywhere excited by the judicial murder¹ of Ferrer, however, gives promise that even the most zealous fanatics of the Catholic Church will hesitate again to rouse the wrath of the nations by such a reversion to the methods of the eras of religious rule.

No one had yet looked to Spain in the nineteenth century for modern philosophy; but there is significance in a paragraph in the latest native history of Spanish literature, relative to the work of Don Marcelino Menéndez y Palayo (1856-1912), a humanist, bibliographer, culture historian,² and philosopher. It was, we are told, "without prejudice to his orthodoxy" that that writer declared himself "a free citizen of the republic of letters"; and so he appears in his declaration that

Nobody [i.e. in Spain] undertakes to connect his doctrines with the old Iberian thinkers; no one troubles to inquire if there are valuable elements in the philosophic treasure accumulated for so many generations; nobody founds on Suarez; neither do the sceptics invoke the name of Sanchez³ nor the pantheists that of Servetus; and Spanish science ignores, forgets our books, counting them of no importance.⁴

It is within the present century that there has been published in Spain a series of scores of volumes issued by "La España Moderna," including translations from Darwin (*Voyage*), Emerson, Bagehot, Fouillée, Guyau, Lester Ward, Giddings, and Spencer (*Principles of Sociology and Principles of Morals*) in many vols., including a compilation, *De las leyes en general*, by Professor Miguel de Unamuno of Salamanca, and a version of Collins's Epitome of Spencer's works.

4. In other countries the balance varies. Russia, in Eastern Europe, was throughout the century the analogue of Spain in the West, the Orthodox Church there playing the part of the Catholic in southern Europe. Up to the period of the war, rationalism appears to have been common among the educated classes, but in no European country was

¹ On the whole case see *The Life, Trial, and Death of Francisco Ferrer*, by William Archer (Chapman & Hall; 1911); and *The Martyrdom of Ferrer*, by Joseph McCabe (R. P. A.; 1910). ² He has written a *Historia de los heterodoxos españoles*.

³ They hardly could. Sanchez produced a forensic or academic exercise, though it may have stood for real scepticism.

⁴ *Historia de la literatura española*, por J. Hurtado y J. De la Serna y Angel Gonzalez Palencia, 2a ed. 1925, p. 1042.

there a greater mass of popular ignorance.¹ The popular icon-worship in Moscow could hardly be paralleled outside of Asia. On the other hand, the aristocracy had become Voltairean in the eighteenth century, and had remained more or less incredulous since, though it joined hands with the Church; while the democratic movement, in its various phases of socialism, constitutionalism, and Nihilism, had been markedly anti-religious since the second quarter of the century.² Subsidiary revivals of mysticism, such as are chronicled in other countries, were frequent in Russia; but the instructed class, the *intelligentsia*, was essentially naturalistic in its cast of thought. This state of things subsisted despite the readiness of the government to suppress the slightest sign of official heterodoxy in the universities.³

The most widely powerful mental influence of the age in Russia was that of Tolstoy,⁴ which latterly penetrated the civilized world; and that influence, albeit largely one of personality, was quite definitely subversive of orthodoxy. Most men and women are for the greater part impressible rather by personality than by reason, and Tolstoy's multitude of readers "swore by the word of the master," following him through vehement rationalistic criticism of the traditionary creed to a no less vehement proclamation of a law of emotional Christism on ethical issues. Tolstoy, essentially a wilful prophet of bias, held himself to be reasoning convincingly, alike when he declared for the paramountcy of reason and for its futility as distinguished from emotional surrender. Thus his positions were alternately critical and passionate, logical and illogical, and his devotees partook of his incoherence.

The result for Russia was at once fermentative and unfortunate. The men and women who did not naturally belong to the critical *intelligentsia*, but had been dislodged by Tolstoy's prophetic fervour from the conventional creed, were by him made heretical and reformist, yet neither scientific nor practical in their attitude to the vast problems which faced them after his death. Their gospel of *a priori* pacifism, absorbed from him, was no more efficacious than that of the primitive Christians had been for their world; and as little did it reach the illiterate world of the *moujik*. Russian thought was thus hopelessly divided between a merely semi-rational sentimentalism, a non-popular scientific rationalism, and a crudely sentimental doctrinaire rationalism which took shape as mere brutality.

When the Revolution came in 1917, the violent overthrow and

¹ "The people in the country do not read; in the towns they read little. The journals are little circulated. In Russia one never sees a cabman, an artisan, a labourer reading a newspaper" (Ivan Strannik, *La pensée russe contemporaine*, 1903, p. 5).

² Cp. E. Lavigne, *Introduction à l'histoire du Nihilisme russe*, 1880, pp. 149, 161, 224; Arnaudo, *Le Nihilisme*, French trans. pp. 37, 58, 61, 63, 77, 86, etc.; Tikhomirov, *La Russie*, p. 290.

³ Tikhomirov, *La Russie*, pp. 325-6, 338-9.

⁴ Count Lyof or Lef (= Leo) Nicolaievitch Tolstoy, 1828-1910.

subsequent persecution of the orthodox Church was a feature of the general cataclysm. The sequel is matter for the history of the present century. Tolstoy's variegated body of doctrine is usefully traced and set in conspectus by Prince P. A. Kropotkin (1842-1921), himself a benevolent rationalist, in his *Russian Literature*, 1905, pp. 110-48; and a brief estimate of Tolstoy as man, mind, personality, thinker, moralist, prophet, critic, and artist, is attempted in the present writer's volume entitled *Explorations*, 1923. See also the many biographical works on Tolstoy, and Dr. Hagbert Wright's valuable article in *Encyc. Brit.*

Note should be taken here of a Russian thinker (a friend of Tourguénief) who in the latter half of the last century stood for reason in thought and politics, but had only a mediate action on his age—Petr Lavrovich Lavrov or Piotr (or Pytr) Lavroff (1823-1901), who "represented, under the name of 'anthropologism,' a reconciliation of natural science materialism with Kantianism."¹ He had been in his earlier life a colonel of artillery, a professor of mathematics, and a member of the St. Petersburg municipal government at its foundation. After arrest and exile and escape, he founded in London, in 1874, the Socialist review *Forward*, and published his 'Mechanical Theory of the Universe' and, later, four or five introductory volumes to an 'Evolution and History of Modern Thought' which he never completed, and in his learned hands would have been interminable.

Lavrov's widest influence in Russia was exerted through his 'Historical Letters,'² described by Tikhomirov "as a little heavy, but very profound," and as working a great effect on the development of the revolutionary movement.³ His influence was in fact scientific and rationalistic, yet sanely progressive, since Lavrov was too philosophic to join hands with the Marxists, or to believe in any save a gradual uplift.⁴ His quiet, self-denying life at Paris, as austere frugal as had been that of Comte, and sunned by a larger thought, is thus far a promise rather than a pledge of a better future for his country.

5. Switzerland latterly presents an apparent balance of forces. In that country, always in intellectual touch with France and Germany, the tendencies which had been stamped as Socinian in the days of Voltaire reasserted themselves soon after the close of the Napoleonic period so strongly as to provoke fanatical reaction.⁵ The nomination of Strauss to a chair of theology at Zürich by a Radical Government in 1839 actually gave rise to a violent revolt, inflamed and led by Protestant clergymen. The Executive Council were expelled, and a number of persons killed in

¹ Kropotkin, p. 276. ² Published under the pseudonym of Nivittoff. *Id.* p. 277.

³ *La Russie politique et sociale*, pp. 355-6.

⁴ Sir D. Mackenzie Wallace, *Russia*, ed. 1912, p. 628.

⁵ Hagenbach, *Kirchengeschichte des 18. und 19. Jahrhunderts*, 1848, ii, 422. Rationalism seems to have spread soonest in the canton of Zürich. *Id.* ii, 427.

the strife.¹ In the canton of Aargau in 1841, again, the cry of "religion in danger" sufficed to bring about a Catholic insurrection against a Liberal Council; and yet again in 1844 it led, among the Catholics of the Valais canton, to the bloodiest insurrection of all. Since these disgraceful outbreaks the progress of Rationalism in Switzerland has been steady. In 1847 a chair was given at Berne to the rationalistic scholar Eduard Zeller, without any such resistance as was made to Strauss at Zürich.

It was in 1850 that Edmond Scherer,² who had been a Protestant pastor, and was promoted in 1845 to a professorship of Exegesis at the École Évangélique at Geneva, incurred so much obloquy by his advanced views that he resigned his chair and was excommunicated by his co-religionists, though he continued to lecture till 1860. He had undergone the influence of A. R. Vinet (1797-1847), whom he, like Sainte-Beuve, had greatly loved; but he could not stay in the attitude of Jesus-worship. His *Mélanges de critique religieuse* (1860) indicate the path by which he had travelled, exhibiting always the critical and literary faculties which were to make him later one of the most distinguished of French critics, only second to Sainte-Beuve. Already he is conscious that his volume, composed of essays and studies written between 1851 and 1859, "embodies modes of speech and of thought which have become gradually alien to me." We can see his thought crystallizing as he scrutinizes the earlier writings of Renan, whom he already hails as a master in literature, but puts to the challenge as regards his fundamental beliefs.

Ere long he had travelled, by way of Hegelianism (1861), the whole ground of freethought, abandoning his liberal Protestantism for a complete rationalism. After founding *L'Anti-Jésuite*, which later bore the title *La Réformation au XIX^e Siècle*, he turned from the intellectual climate of Switzerland to that of Paris, and came to the front in French politics, being elected to the National Assembly in 1871 and to the Senate in 1875. Scholarly studies on *Diderot* (1880) and *Grimm* are among his solid contributions to freethought literature. In the words of Professor Boutmy he "had passed from the narrowest of faiths to the broadest of scepticisms."³ At all his stages he had fought sincerely for his present opinion, but while reckoning Christianity "the perfect religion" as such, he recognized it as but a phase in a perpetual evolution.⁴ His career reveals the "inevitability of gradualness" for men in whom a strong emotion always holds the ground up to the point at which an irreducible critical faculty takes command. He was thus "of the small number of

¹ Grote, *Seven Letters concerning the Politics of Switzerland*, pp. 34-35. Hagenbach (*Kirchengeschichte*, ii, 427-8) shows no shame over the insurrection at Zürich. But cp. Beard, in *Voices of the Church in Reply to Dr. Strauss*, 1845, pp. 17-18.

² Edmond Henri Adolphe Scherer, D.D., 1815-89, born of Swiss and English parents.

³ Taine, *Scherer, Laboulaye*, 1901, p. 52.

⁴ Octave Gréard, *Edmond Scherer*, 1890, p. 133.

those who bear witness before posterity of the crises of human thought in the nineteenth century."¹

6. The career of another Swiss thinker, one of Scherer's contemporaries, illustrates the process with a difference. Daniel Schenkel (1813-1885), professor of theology successively at Basel and Heidelberg, joined the "liberal" Protestant movement, which took the view that Protestantism was a progressive principle, and not a fixed body of dogma. His *Bibel-Lexikon* (5 vols. 1869-1875) has been described in the present century by Mr. Maurice Canney as "a work so much in advance of its time that it is still useful." But by his *Charakterbild Jesu* (1864), which followed close on Renan's *Vie de Jésus* and was almost coincident with Strauss's second *Leben Jesu*, he evoked such malediction as had befallen his corrivals. In the modern fashion he rejected all miracles, explaining "psychologically" the acts of healing which had been recorded as such. And he claimed to have written "solely in the service of evangelical truth," to save the faith of those repelled by the defenders of tradition, whom he regarded as largely inspired by hierarchical interest.

With such developments at work, opinion in educated Switzerland inevitably conformed to the movement of that of the neighbouring countries, freethought making its way at the hands of earnest propagandists, while a large percentage of the intelligent reveal the indifferentism which elsewhere accompanies recognition of the scientific truth. Orthodoxy slowly sinks. In 1892, out of a total number of 3,151 students in the five universities of Switzerland and in the academies of Fribourg and Neuchâtel, the number of theological students was only 374, positively less than that of the teaching staff, which was 431. Leaving out the academies named, which had no medical faculty, the number of theological students stood at 275 out of 2,917. The Church in Switzerland had thus undergone the relative restriction in power and prestige seen in the other European countries of long-established culture. The evolution, however, remained negative rather than positive. Though a number of pastors latterly called themselves *libres penseurs* or *penseurs libres*, and a movement of ethical culture (*morale sociale*) made progress, the forces of positive freethought are not numerically strong. An economic basis still supports the Churches, and the lack of it has left rationalism non-aggressive.²

7. The history of popular freethought in Sweden yields a good illustration, in a compact form,³ of the normal play of forces and counter-forces. Since the day of Christina, though there have been many evidences of passive unbelief, active rationalism has been little known in

¹ *Id.* p. 4.

² Cp. the *rapport* of Ch. Fulpus in the *Almanach de Libre Pensée*, 1906. M. Fulpus was for many years president of the Société de Libres Penseurs, Geneva.

³ For the survey here reduced to outline I am largely indebted to two Swedish friends, long since inaccessible.

her kingdom down till modern times, Sweden as a whole having been little touched by the great ferment of the eighteenth century. The French Revolution, however, stirred the waters there as elsewhere. Tegnér, the poet-bishop, author of the once-famous *Frithiof's Saga*, was notable in his day for a determined rejection of the evangelical doctrine of salvation; and his letters contain much criticism of the ruling system. But the first recognizable champion of freethought in Sweden is the thinker and historian E. G. Geijer (d. 1847), whose history of his native land is one of the best European performances of his generation. In 1820 he was prosecuted for his attack upon the dogmas of the Trinity and redemption—long the special themes of discussion in Sweden—in his book *Thorild*, but was acquitted by the jury.

Thenceforth Sweden slowly follows the general development of Europe. In 1841 Strauss's *Leben Jesu* was translated in Swedish, and wrought its usual effect. On the popular side the poet Wilhelm von Braun carried on an anti-Biblical warfare; and a blacksmith in a provincial town contrived to print in 1850 a translation of Paine's *Age of Reason*. Once more the spirit of persecution blazed forth, and he was prosecuted and imprisoned. H. B. Palmaer (d. 1854) was likewise prosecuted for his satire, 'The Last Judgment in Cogaigne' (Kräkwinkel), with the result that his defence extended his influence. In the same period the Stockholm curate Nils Ignell (d. 1864) produced a whole series of critical pamphlets and a naturalistic 'History of the Development of Man,' besides supplying a preface to the Swedish translation of Renan's *Vie de Jésus*. Meantime translations of the works of Theodore Parker, by V. Pfeiff and A. F. Akerberg, had a large circulation and a wide influence; and the courage of the gymnasium rector N. J. Cramer (d. 1893), author of 'The Farewell to the Church,' gave an edge to the movement. The partly rationalistic doctrine of Abraham Victor Rydberg (1828-95) was in comparison uncritical, and was proportionally popular, and his appointment to a chair of the history of civilization at Stockholm in 1884 enlarged his influence.

On another line the books of Dr. Nils Lilja (d. 1870), written for working people, created a current of rationalism among the masses; and in the next generation G. J. Leufstedt maintained it by popular lectures and by the issue of translations of Colenso, Ingersoll, Büchner, and Renan. Hjalmar Stromer (d. 1886) did similar platform work. Meantime the followers of Parker and Rydberg founded in 1877 a monthly review, *The Truthseeker*, which lasted till 1894, and an association of "Believers in Reason," closely resembling the British Ethical Societies of our own day. Among its leading adherents has been K. P. Arnoldson (1844-1916), the well-known peace advocate. Liberal clerics were now fairly numerous; Positivism, represented by Dr. Anton Nyström's 'General History of Civilization,' played its part; and the more radical freethinking movement, nourished by new translations, became specially active, with

the usual effect on orthodox feeling. August Strindberg, author and lecturer, was prosecuted in 1884 on a charge of ridiculing the eucharist, but was declared not guilty. It is memorable that in 1888 Hjalmar Branting (b. 1860) was sentenced to three months' imprisonment for blasphemy in his journal *Social Demokraten*, and C. A. Rydgren to four months' imprisonment for the same offence.

The career of the strenuous Viktor E. Lennstrand illustrated at once the stress of Christian bigotry in Sweden and the irrepressible nature of the counter-force. Lennstrand (b. 1861) was the child of pious parents, who devoted him to religion; and in his 'teens, having been prevented from turning juvenile missionary, he was active in the evangelical field. It was only after entering Upsala University in 1881 that, reading Feuerbach, Haeckel, Darwin, Spencer, and Mill, he began to doubt, till he declared himself in 1886 an atheist. A lecture by him in that year, in the great hall of the University, on the question 'Is Christianity a religion for our time?' gave the negative answer; the continuation of the lecture was prohibited by the police; and Lennstrand escaped expulsion only by resignation, going to Stockholm, where he delivered weekly freethinking lectures in 1887-8.

In the latter year he founded the 'Utilitiska Stamfund' (Utilitarian Association), and, continuing to lecture, was in November, 1888, sentenced to three months' imprisonment. In 1889 he founded the *Fritänkaren* (*Freethinker*); in October of that year he received a second sentence of three months' imprisonment for blasphemy; and in December came a third sentence of six months, for the same offence, with "a prospect of an additional year or two for more blasphemy." In prison he was so badly treated, and became so dangerously ill, that public protest moved the King to have him released, with a pardon, in broken health. A great public meeting, attended by over five thousand freethinkers, and a protest signed by over eight thousand persons, told of the usual reaction against persecution.

The fortunes of his associate, Captain Otto Thomson (b. 1833), tell of the special difficulties affecting freethought movements in countries of small experience in self-government. Conducting Lennstrand's journal during Lennstrand's imprisonment, he found the younger members of the movement bent on mixing their theoretic politics with the cause of freethought proper, and was forced to retire. He was described in 1894 as an inmate of the Stockholm poorhouse.¹ Whatever the causation, it was made plain that without a steadfast care for sheer freethought as an enlightenment of the general mind, independently of socio-political doctrine, the enlightenment will not be attained. It is claimed, however, that the extensive reform of education in Sweden in the last decade of

¹ S. P. Putnam, *Four Hundred Years of Freethought*, 1894, p. 623. From Putnam comes the account of Lennstrand.

the century was largely due to the efforts of the freethinkers, whose numbers, as organized, rose from 4,300 in 1886 to 17,636 in 1893¹—a notable growth in a sufficiently inclement environment, and one not likely to be reversed. The fruit was to be reaped in the twentieth century, when the rationalistic novels of Johan Bojer (b. 1872), successively a fisherman, a cleric, a journalist, a dramatist, and a novelist, have not only found a large public in Sweden but translation in English.

8. Sweden has perhaps made less literary impact on Britain than has any other northern country, her language being comparatively little read abroad; but Finland, in despite of such a hindrance, has by its culture evolution, as by its political vicissitudes, attracted a widespread interest. Before the end of the century, still under the constrictive rule of the Tsar, Finland was recognized as abreast of Europe in the arts, notably in sculpture, and as having in a generation rapidly emancipated its popular education from the grasp of the Church, with excellent results.

In a nation so largely Lutheran, with a long restricted development in the higher university studies, the clerical influence had of course made for orthodoxy. It was the fashion to speak of the race at home as being sustained and characterized by its faith in God. But in the native stock, the most promising offshoot from the Mongolian, and equally in the Swedish, which had mixed with it much more largely than the Russian, there were all the requisite elements of freethinking development. One of the first notable native philosophers, Gabriel Israel Hartman (1776–1809), though professing independence of all previous thinkers, revealed himself in his 'Doctrine of Knowledge' (2 vols. 1807–8; 3rd vol. not issued) as a strict naturalist in his treatment of the elements of knowledge. A doctor of philosophy, and son of a clergyman, he seems to have been entirely unorthodox, rejecting as he did all *à priori* notions.

The most eminent of her later philosophers has been Professor Andreas Wilhelm Bolin (born 1835), the translator of Shakespeare into Swedish. Dr. Bolin edited the works and the letters of Feuerbach, and has written a warmly sympathetic monograph on that anti-theistic thinker, as well as studies on Hume and Spinoza. The fact that Bolin incurred the disfavour of the Russian Government by his open rationalism was a certificate in his favour in the eyes of his younger readers, and his influence has been great. The educated youth of Finland has in fact become as generally rationalistic as the educated class of any other country.

One of the eminent products of the scholarly culture of the now independent nation is Professor Edward Westermarck (b. 1862), author of the 'History of Human Marriage' (1891), 'The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas' (1906), and other standard works of great and original learning and research, who is an Honorary Associate of the Rationalist Press Association.

¹ Putnam, as cited, p. 625.

CHAPTER XIV

LATER BIBLICAL CRITICISM

§ 1. *The Movement in Holland*

1. NOWHERE is the pre-potency of the spirit of criticism in the religious field more striking than in its modern development in Holland. At the beginning of the century, despite the intellectual ferment ensuing on the Revolution in what had been a rather stagnant society, Dutch opinion was in the main solidly, even stolidly, orthodox. Its connection with freethought in the two previous centuries turned largely on the presence of the two great exiles, Descartes and Bayle, and the great alien, Spinoza. French freethought in the eighteenth century must indeed have affected intelligent Dutch readers, many of the works of the *philosophes* being printed and published at Amsterdam; but the average citizen or cleric remained a more or less dogged sectarian. The Revolution in Holland was not noticeably a movement of freethinking, one of its leading advocates, Van Palm, being an undoubting Christian; and though the Revolution disestablished the State Church, the political adjustments of Church claims after 1815 left matters ecclesiastical very much as before. Holland retained small devotion to the republican ideal, having heavily lost, financially, in the whole period.

Dutch thought and literature, accordingly, played no European part in the first half of the nineteenth century. Despite its cosmopolitanism in the matter of the languages useful in commerce, the national tendency is avowedly self-centred rather than otherwise; and only slowly did the innovating German influences represented by Strauss and Baur bear Dutch fruit. Philosophy was not a common pursuit; and Kant and Hegel had made no perceptible stir. Yet among theological students, about the middle of the century, the new ideas began irresistibly to operate; in the next three decades Dutch Biblical and hierological scholarship took the front rank in Europe, and Dutch theology was exhibiting all the progressive and adaptive tendencies seen in England and Germany. Orthodox scholarship, by merely recognizing the difficulties about the composition of the gospels, initiated young minds in studies that were to be fatal to their orthodoxy.¹ Indeed, to the eyes of English orthodoxy the Dutch pulpit already exhibited a prevailing

¹ J. H. Mackay, *Religious Thought in Holland during the Nineteenth Century*, 1911, pp. 136-8, citing Pierson and Réville.

rationalism, evangelicalism being "very generally repudiated by the teachers of the people," and "frowned upon by those who have been ordained to teach it," though young ministers are said to be returning to "the old Gospel truth."¹

2. The first notable message of change was an account of the theory of the Tübingen School by Coenraad Busken Huet in 1858, in a book entitled 'Letters about the Bible.' Already Cornelis Willem Opzoomer (1821-92), jurist and Professor of Philosophy at Utrecht, was developing² a naturalistic philosophy which involved the rejection of miracles and special Christian dogmas, while retaining faith in a God of love, a position vehemently antagonized by Jan Hendrik Scholten (1811-85), who was to proceed by stages to advanced positions alike in theology and in Biblical criticism. In 1864 he produced his book on the fourth gospel, in which, after Baur, the Johannine authorship is denied; and though his output as a whole was rather adaptive than originative, being always conditioned by his clerical function, his was a powerful influence throughout his battling life. It was always applied more or less to a re-thinking, deepening, and undoing of previous theological philosophy and scholarship.

3. But the most dynamic force in Dutch Biblical scholarship in his age was Abraham Kuenen (1828-91), in whom temperament and judgment combined to build a massive personality and a massive performance. Of gigantic stature, he was an entirely genial spirit.³ Unlike Scholten, he "never threw his personality into the scale" in his teaching. One of the unexpected features in nearly all of his compatriots of the progressive type is rapidity in change of view—a habit of propounding with confidence and even vehemence a thesis which is ere long abandoned by its exponent. Only at his outset does Kuenen partly recall them. As "extraordinary professor" of theology in 1853 he pointed out that the opinions of Von Bohlen, Vatke, "and others," could not be reconciled with the writings of Jesus and the apostles, and described them as "ravings," rejected by all critics of any note.⁴ In 1861, at the age of thirty-three, he began to publish his 'Historico-Critical Inquiry into the Origin and Compilation of the Books of the Old Testament,' at the standpoint of the scholarship of that date; but in the process of composition he became alive to the unsoundness of his positions. In the light of the contributions of Colenso (1861) and Graf (1866) he revised the whole problem, and the first great result was 'The Religion of Israel to the Fall of the Jewish State' (1869-70: Eng. trans. 3 vols. 1874-5).

¹ Pearson on *Infidelity*, 1853, pp. 578-9, citing *The Religious Condition of Christendom*, p. 409, and *Evangelical Christendom*, vii, 47.

² *De Weg der Wetenschap*, Leiden, 1851 (a manual of logic); *Het Wesen der Kennis*, 1852 (a recast of the first book); *Die Religion* (German translation), 1868.

³ It is pleasant to read (Mackay, as cited, p. 172) that though he had stringently criticized Scholten they remained very good friends, smoking together and always using the "old Gouda pipe." Cp. Cheyne, *Founders*, pp. 188-91.

⁴ *Id.* p. 187, citing Wicksteed.



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That may be termed the most decisive critical performance of its kind that had thus far appeared ;¹ and it is so because of its combination of skill of statement and unsurpassed judicial insight. Kuenen had no need to follow (unless he had anticipated) the advice of Allard Pierson to his countrymen to study French models in order to escape cumbrousness of style. The book is at once scientific and sympathetic, eschewing the manner and temper of the rhapsode, which had pervaded Dutch as other polemics, yet arresting and capturing every intelligent reader. It recalls Charles Darwin by the calm, continuous pressure of its evidences and its argument, while in readableness it quite transcends comparison with the works of that great contemporary builder of new opinion. Doubtless the mass of previous elucidation and argument had made Kuenen's task the simpler. Already the whole trend of critical science had wrought to establish the position that the Israelitish is just "one of 'the principal religions,'" "nothing less, but also nothing more."

All subsequent Biblical criticism has oriented itself to Kuenen's structure.² His 'Prophets and Prophecy in Israel' (1877), which owed its inception to Dr. John Muir,³ extended his service ; and his second edition (1885) of his 'Inquiry'—of which only the first section, 'The Hexateuch' is translated into English—so solidified the structure that "safe" critics thenceforth capitulated. Here the concrete evolution of Judaism is once for all reduced to intelligible form. His results have been and will continue to be revised and expanded ; and his psychological analysis, which remains that of a man theologically trained, is at points open to rectification. But that is in the way of all culture-evolution. The remarkable thing is that this vitally freethinking book is the work of a theological professor, trained for the pulpit—where, we are told, he always seemed "very shy and nervous," as befitted a man whose mental life was one of constant reflection on his immense store of scholarly knowledge.⁴ The fact is encouraging, but hardly convincing as to future possibilities. Kuenen remains, like Darwin, an exceptional personality in the whole field of intellectual life.

Revision of Kuenen is partly a matter of combining anthropological, sociological, and hierarchical results. Scientific analysis would tend to show, for instance, that the Semitic leaning to monotheism upon which he dwells (he was careful—Eng. trans. i, 224 sq.—to avoid Renan's exaggeration) was a cultural matter of (a) protracted existence under despotism, patriarchal, regal, or hierocratic ; (b) absence of fusion of extra-national cults ; and (c) systematic priestly effacement of native polytheism. But no

¹ "Perhaps the finest things of the kind that modern criticism can show," was Robertson Smith's estimate of Kuenen's analyses. Pref. to Wellhausen's *Prolegomena*, Eng. tr. 1885.

² Cp. Cheyne, pp. 193-4.

³ Mackay, p. 171.

⁴ "It was through critical exegesis that he came to the conviction that a dogmatic supernaturalism was untenable." Cheyne p. 189.

revision of Kuenen's performance can compare in importance with his construction ; and the requisite learning which he had amassed is as rare as his judicial and comprehensive use of it. For many of us in the last quarter of the century he was the most illuminating of hierologists.

4. A worthy companion figure to Kuenen was Cornelis Petrus Tiele (1830-1902), who began by publishing poems (1863) and sermons (1865), developing as a liberal preacher and a diligent student into the most learned hierologist of his age. After revealing his gift as a professor of theology in a sect-seminary, he was promoted in 1877 to a new chair of History of Religions at Leyden, created for him. Max Müller acknowledged his supremacy and his originality ; and his series of treatises on 'The Religion of Zarathustra' (1864), the 'Comparative History of the Egyptian and Mesopotamian Religions' (1872), 'The History of Religion' (1876 and 1891), and later works, were brought by French, English, and German translations to the notice of students throughout the world. In them as in the work of Kuenen the scientific and naturalistic position is taken for granted, and religion is definitely presented as a manifold evolution from the lowest beginnings. The effect of that impressive contribution, which quickly generated a great body of cognate research, was widespread and deep ; and the very fact that such minds as Kuenen's and Tiele's, bred to the pulpit, had found themselves forced by sheer study from the theological to the scientific position and outlook, was in itself a phenomenon outweighing all orthodox outcry. At the same time it encouraged a surmise that throughout the world there must be some thousands of scholarly clerics whose belief in the creeds they administered was at best tepid, and normally near zero.

5. In Holland, the spread of Modernism, so-called among the younger clergy, led to friction and clamour of the kinds familiar elsewhere in the same conjuncture. For a time the moot question was whether the Modernists ought to stay in the Church or leave it. The latter course might have quickened the pace of enlightenment ; but, the determining factor being the economic, they mostly stayed till laymen began to realize that rational thought was more conveniently to be received from books than from sermons and irrelevant ritual. When in 1863 the gifted Modernist preacher, Allard Pierson (1831-96), after expounding in his treatise on 'School and Life' the master tendencies of such thought, proffered the counsel 'Back to Jesus,' the situation became so anomalous that Pierson, realizing the fact, left the Church and renounced Christianity in 1865,¹ calling himself thenceforth a humanist, to the great perturbation of Scholten, Réville, and other Modernists.

Pierson, after residing for some years at Heidelberg, was appointed by the Baden Government to a chair in its university. Having lost the

¹ Mackay, p. 156.

rhapsodic feeling for religion which belonged to his youth, he became more and more scientific in his attitude to philosophy, and in 'An Outlook on Life' (1875) he made an impression of pessimism. But as a New Testament critic he gave a new forward impulsion by challenging the Tübingen conclusion that "the four" chief Pauline epistles are genuine, and still more radically by challenging the assumption that the Teaching ascribed to Jesus remains credible when the story of the Career is disintegrated. These steps were taken in 'The Sermon on the Mount and other Synoptic Fragments' (1878). Here he narrowly tests the Tacitean picture of a multitude of "Christiani" or "Chrestiani" at Rome under Nero, examines the grounds for the belief that the Teaching of Jesus was delivered by a historic person, and cogently argues that the Epistle to the Galatians cannot have been written by the historic Paul, and must be the work of a later ultra-Paulinist.¹

This critical attitude was not new, Bruno Bauer having taken it as early as 1850 against Baur, classing the gospels and the epistles together as late products of Christiani polemic. But Pierson reached his view independently, as did Steck later in Switzerland, and Professor W. B. Smith in America; and it was Pierson who gave the impetus in Holland. The first overt result was the right-about-face of the Dutch theologian Abraham Dirk Loman (1823-97). In 1861 he had "sounded a note of warning" in the journal *De Gids* against the assumption of the Modernists that religion and science were reconcilable. For himself he wrote conservatively on the Fourth Gospel (1865), and on the gospel history in a fashion that many found disturbing; carrying on his professorship of theology for about twenty years, and standing for a theistic theology without dogmatics. On the appearance of Pierson's book he was sharply hostile to the attack on the authenticity of Galatians. An expert in music, he was not spontaneously critical. Yet within three years he confessed himself converted to Pierson's view, and proceeded to develop a still more radical criticism of the gospel history.

It was in 1881 that, at a gathering at the 'Free Union' (*De Vrije Gemeente*)² at Amsterdam, Loman read a paper on 'The Oldest Christianity,' indicating as Pierson had done the lack of real evidence for the historical existence of Jesus of Nazareth. This also had been a position of Bruno Bauer's, but again the Dutch criticism was the more orderly, more coherent, and more weighty. In 1882, at the annual meeting of Dutch 'Modern Theologians' he defended his positions, thus figuring as the first serious scholar, after Bauer, to propound the Myth-Theory. Needless to say, it found small acceptance among theologians in Holland or anywhere else. That was a foregone result. Theologians

¹ *Radical Views about the New Testament*, by Prof. G. A. van den Bergh van Eysinga, Eng. trans. (R.P.A.) 1912, pp. 7-14.

² Founded in 1878 by Pastor P. H. Hugenholtz, who had withdrawn from the Dutch Reformed Church.

could under pressure accept sighingly the naturalistic view of Biblical history, abandoning miracles as so many had done before them, and giving up the Supernatural Jesus as the Unitarians had done; but to admit that Jesus is a mythical figure, not a historical person mythically clothed, and that the whole Pauline literature is either forged or so heavily interpolated as to be of no historical value, would be to avow that the Churches have no historical basis left.

Among others, Scholten resisted Loman. He necessarily would; though if he had lived another twenty years he might have assented. No man with the sacerdotal instinct, which Scholten retained in a large degree even when undoing the sacerdotalism of the past, could so "change his gears" at seventy as to face quite critically the grounds for the negation of the historicity of Jesus and the authenticity of the entire Pauline literature. To assent would mean the avowal of a wasted intellectual life, though as a matter of fact Scholten significantly affirmed that the gospels would retain their value as religion even if their historical value were confessed to be nil.¹ Later, the case against the Pauline literature was put by Willem Christiaan Van Manen (1842-1905), another Leyden Professor, who, after powerfully developing his views during ten years, was invited to state them in the English *Encyclopædia Biblica* (1899-1903).² This demonstration, again, has thus far been ignored or summarily dismissed by the great majority of professional scholars. It will be the task of the progressive scholarship of the twentieth century to deal with it.

6. For the student of past developments the rejection of radical theories has nothing surprising and nothing decisive. Theologians in general took half a century or more to assimilate geology. That experience largely prepared the next flight to submit, albeit still slowly, to Darwinism. But while it was ecclesiastically possible to accept geology and evolution, with a refuge in pseudo-panteism and in Christism, there is small standing-ground for normal men in a Christianity from which the Christian sacred books are eliminated as accretions of myth and literary fiction; though there are valiant spirits, like Professor Schmiedel, who after Scholten can claim—while seeing but a scant basis for the belief in historicity—to find an irrefragable basis in an Ideal Christ. While, indeed, such sincere and masterly scholars as Schmiedel and Professor van den Bergh van Eysinga ably fulfil their teaching functions, it is impossible to say that they will find no theological successors; but the adhesion of an educated laity to a cult avowed as that of a purely ideal Christ seems highly problematic.

Meantime, the pioneers are vindicated by the very debate they have aroused. One Dutch theologian has idly described Pierson's life as

¹ Mackay, p. 100.

² They are ably summarized by T. Whittaker in his *Origins of Christianity* (R.P.A.).

"a tragedy of vain search."¹ No search is vain which is honestly and thoughtfully made, and which leads some honest thinkers to follow. One day the verdict of history may well be, in this as in so many other regards, that the life of the mass of adherents of tradition has been either a tragedy of vain resistance to the urge of critical thought or a witless comedy of complacent pretension to a higher æsthetic and historic percipency, vested in minds proved incapable of distinguishing between myth and history, fraud and fact. While the natural sciences, steering by the compass of mental law, have been advancing from marvel to marvel of tested discovery, the pseudo-science of orthodox exegesis has been exhibited from decade to decade defending fable, prophecy, miracle, and dogma, absorbed by fallacious clues, vending an *à priori* sociology and a pre-scientific psychology, parading Supermen to account for the historic results of ignorant credulity and economic motive. Its Christology has been a turning kaleidoscope.

The last claim that can possibly be made for the clerical class as a whole is that it shows a superior capacity for the recognition of new truth. Men in mass, certainly, have small gift in that kind, being readily pervious only to such new truth as is constituted by decisive concrete discovery or demonstrated success in application, as in the cases of highly useful inventions, chemical or mechanical. In all matters remote from direct new gain, economic or hygienic or other, general acceptance of new truth is notoriously slow. New poetry, new modes of rhythm and diction, new subtlety and delicacy and veracity in any art, meet the same aversion as is shown for new scientific or critical doctrine that clashes with established creeds, habits, conventions.

But in the case of the clerical class, such resistance is at its very strongest, being fed at once by personal interest, economic pressure, self-esteem, and the psychic habit engendered by confident sacerdotal utterance. We have seen that, in the nature of the case, the temper and practice of religion tend to engender a specific bias of Untruth, compact of sanctified credulity and consequent recalcitrance to the intellectual law of veracity. Men expressly trained to believe the absurd are lamed at once in the faculty of judgment and in the intellectual conscience. The love of truth wanes and waxes with the vision for truth. Evasion and prevarication, "economy of truth," shuffling accommodation, have been the constant marks of the slow acceptance, step by step, of reasoned truth in place of sacrosanct delusion.

The more predominantly emotional is the individual mind, the more unready is it for the discipline of intellectual revision. Men like Baur, Strauss, Kuenen, and Tiele are obviously efficient for rectification in the ratio of their innate and trained critical faculty. They are not typically religious, though, being serious and upright, they seek to bring their

¹ Mackay, p. 161.

inherited creed and their professional function into a decent harmony with their acquired knowledge. It is inconceivable that, had they possessed much of that knowledge when they were adopting a career, they would have entered the Christian pulpit at all. They grew into rationalism as experts grow into skill. The cases of Blanco White and T. H. Green, Pierson and Loman, dramatically reveal the frequently painful or at least perturbing character of the process. *Si la jeunesse savait* is the cry of all human experience; and nowhere is it more pregnant with meaning than in regard to the lives of uncounted thousands committed to a sacerdotal career before they either knew or *could* know what they were doing. Only the few, even among the critically capable, can quite successfully cope with their dilemma.

When, then, we are told that the great mass of professional theological scholars reject certain "new" critical inferences, we are not merely told nothing of the critical merits of the case, we are but told that the bulk even of the scholarly clergy are doing what their order always did. They rejected just as confidently, at each historical stage of innovation, the critical case against pilgrimages and indulgences, the adoration of relics, the theory of Copernicus, the beliefs in witchcraft and in transubstantiation, the concrete doctrine of Galileo, the disclosures of geology, the cumulative discovery of the antiquity of man, the analysis of the composition of Genesis, of Deuteronomy, of the Hexateuch, of the Psalms, of the Prophets. They screamed successively at the denials of inspiration, of miracles, of the Resurrection. They execrated Colenso, who gave Kuenen one of his decisive cues. They vituperated alike Strauss and Renan; and now the successors of the prophet-stoners, standing substantially at the positions of Kuenen, Strauss, and Renan, take the same attitude against Van Manen and Drews, while they grudgingly approximate to Schmiedel, who has been so bitterly denounced by English and other clerics for his concessions to rational criticism.

Nothing is more "natural," in the light of history and of the law of evolution, which operates in mind as in matter, than that the most desperate and protracted stand of all should be made against the radical criticism which impugns the historicity of the gospel Jesus and the authenticity of the "Paulines." Here religious emotion has its last and strongest hold in the Christian world, as distinct from the theistic. The Teacher is for the more thoughtful pietist what the Saviour was and still is for the average. To lose "Him," they feel and cry, is to lose all that creed meant. And yet, as aforesaid, there are priestly scholars of the highest order as to character and mentality, sincerity and learning, who tranquilly avow that the Ideal suffices for them. The fate of *their* creed will be matter for the history of freethought in the twentieth century. It turns on the question whether in the Græco-Roman world of the first and second centuries a valid ideal for the modern world could be framed or dreamed.

It is fitly to be acknowledged that we find here the high-water mark of candour in the religious field—if the position in question be admitted to come within the strict definition of religion. On any view it is entirely candid. The common position of the religionists—the blank appeal to the “consensus of scholars”—may on the contrary be said to approach the other extreme. No serious scholar who has studied the history of opinion can pretend to himself that consensus of scholars against a new thesis is a valid argument. The Tell myth was not made any truer by the long consensus of the scholars in its favour than it is by the continued consensus of non-scholarly Swiss. All scientific advance, from Copernicus to Darwin, has consisted largely in the overthrowing of opinions universally taken for granted.

In Holland and elsewhere the Myth-Theory was resisted by argument. In England, after much unsuccessful arguing, the biographical school have with one accord resorted, usually with temper, to the argument from (imperfect) consensus: “the historic fact must be so because ‘competent scholars’ mostly think so.” Thus argued their fathers and grandfathers for the Hebrew doctrine of Creation: thus argue Dean Inge and Canon Streeter for the historicity of Jesus; the latter characteristically adding the enthymeme that the Myth Theory is on a par with the Baconian theory. That inexpensive expedient reveals the amusing fact that those who resort to it, themselves incompetent, as scholars, to confute the Baconians, are not really aware that the Baconians have been repeatedly confuted. They are in effect saying: “This is one of the cases in which one is entitled to reject a theory *without* being able to refute it.”

The present state of the issue is pleasantly illustrated in the volume of essays by Mr. Edwyn Bevan entitled *Hellenism and Christianity* (1921). In the paper on ‘Christianity in the Modern World’ that scholar, describing his opponents as “amateurs and cranks,” employs the “Baconian” gambit, adding, however, a quotation from the heated passage in which Sir J. G. Frazer in 1913 threw contempt on the Myth-Theory (Pt. VI of *The Golden Bough*, 3rd ed. p. 412). Somewhat prudently, Mr. Bevan omits the one argument with which Sir James sought to enforce his emotional verdict—the thesis that any great religion presupposes a great personality. This theorem, which would involve either ascribing historicity to Yahweh or denying that various powerful personalities, *not* Jesus, might have built up a Christ Myth—is so obviously untenable that Sir James has since tacitly abandoned his original tactic by writing an amicable preface to the translation of Dr. Couchoud’s *Le Mystère de Jésus* (1924; Eng. trans., R. P. A., 1924).

Mr. Bevan would seem to be thus left “in the air.” He will doubtless, however, continue to stand to his sage and safe formula

(p. 249) that "Whether the faith of the Christian Church be based upon reality or be a mere delusion, there can be no question as to the continued *existence of Christianity* as a fact in the world." The circumstance that the above-noted dialectic forms part of a professed philosophy of all-solving "love" is illuminating. The twinning of a doctrine of love with a temper of spontaneous malice has certainly been practised long enough to encourage Mr. Bevan in the hope that this creed will survive. That, again, will be matter for later history.

HISTORICAL NOTE

It has been fairly claimed that, though Pierson and Loman did not in their day set on foot a forward critical movement either in their own or in any other country, they are to be recognized as the first modern propounders of the Myth-Theory in a serious and scholarly form. The fact that later writers reopened the question independently is but the proof that, apart from translations, Dutch has been little read even in Germany, and less in England. At the same time it is fitting to note that, even apart from Dupuis and Volney and the later Bruno Bauer, they had an English predecessor.

To say nothing of the English freethinkers of Bolingbroke's day who, as Voltaire mentions, denied the historicity of Jesus, it is to be remembered that in the first generation of the nineteenth century Robert Taylor, author of the *Diegesis* and the *Devil's Pulpit*, had propounded very definitely the non-historicity doctrine on critical grounds, in a work of 128 pages, dated 1828, in vindication of an earlier manifesto.¹ Here the arguments of his other works are vehemently colligated and developed. His previous contentions had been rejected with unmeasured scurrility on the Christian side, his fire being met with fury. To this he retorts with a fire which is rather more scathing than persuasive, even for a friendly reader. But Taylor's exuberance and extravagance, genially noted by Hennell, does not nullify his stringent attack alike on the gospel records in respect of *their* history and on the whole body of their narratives. His criticism of the documents as such, based on the whole *apparatus criticus*, was as furiously denounced as his inferences.

As to the problem of the historicity of Jesus he follows the untenable assumption that the gospel narratives are not merely paralleled by but derived from the similar legends of India, Egypt, Greece, and Italy. The scholarly inquiry calls for a much closer analysis of the process of growth and composition. But Taylor's general criticism of the assumption of historicity is on the line of the modern argument, and raises the central issues. Of the *Syntagma*, as of his work in general, the outstanding lesson appears to be that little effect on thought is to be won by pyrotechnics. Yet he had a good many later readers, and influenced, among others, Judge Strange.

¹ The title is characteristic of the time :—

'SYNTAGMA of the Evidences of the Christian Religion. Being a Vindication of the Manifesto of the Christian Evidence Society against the assaults of the Christian Instruction Society, through their Deputy J. P. S., commonly reported to be Dr. John Pye Smith, of Homerton.

'By the Rev. Robert Taylor, A.B. and M.R.C.S. Orator of the Areopagus. Prisoner in Oakham Gaol, for the conscientious maintenance of the truths contained in that Manifesto. [With a motto from Arnobius.] London: Printed for the Author, 1828. Reprinted by William Dugdale, in Holywell Street, Strand.'

§ 2. *The Movement in Germany*

1. In 1864, after an abstention of twenty years from discussion of the problem, Strauss restated his case in a 'Life of Jesus, adapted for the German People.' Here, accepting the contention of F. C. Baur that the proper line of inquiry was to settle the order of composition of the synoptic gospels, and agreeing in Baur's view that Matthew came first, he undertook to offer more of positive result than was reached in his earlier research, which simply dealt scientifically with the abundant elements of dubiety in the records. The new procedure, however, was at some points less valid than the old. In the first 'Life' he had in effect dismissed the possibility of a biography, though it was only the miracles that as such he expressly negated. In the second, apparently as a result of his biographical labours on Ulrich von Hutten, he in effect outlines a biography, and this uncritically.¹

Baur had quite unwarrantably decided that the Sermon on the Mount was one of the most certainly genuine of the discourses ascribed to Jesus;² and Strauss, while exhibiting a reserve of doubt³ as to all "such speeches," nonetheless committed himself to the "certain" genuineness alike of the Sermon and of the seven parables in the thirteenth chapter of Matthew.⁴ Many scholars who continue to hold by the historicity of Jesus have since recognized that the Sermon is no real discourse, but a compilation of gnomic sayings or maxims previously current in Jewish literature.⁵ Thus the certainties of Baur and Strauss pass into the category of the cruder certainties which Strauss impugned; and the latter left the life of Jesus an unsolved enigma after all his analysis.

As he himself noted, the German New Testament criticism of the previous twenty years had "run to seed"⁶ in a multitude of treatises on the sources, aims, composition, and mutual relations of the Synoptics, as if these were the final issues. This had settled nothing; and after a lapse of fifty years the same problems are being endlessly discussed. The scientific course for Strauss would have been to develop more radically the method of his first 'Life': failing to do this, he made no new contribution to the problem, though he deftly enough indicated how little difference there was, save in formula, between Baur's negations and his own.

Something of the explanation is to be detected in the sub-title of the later work, "Adapted for the German People." From his first entrance

¹ Dr. Appleton, who disparaged the procedure as a return to early "rationalism" (*Dr. Appleton: His Life and Literary Relics*, 1881, pp. 151-8), seems to have had no belief in a historical Jesus. Yet he was a devout Anglican worshipper, with strong Catholic leanings!

² *Das Christenthum und die chr. Kirche*, 1854, p. 34.

³ *Das Leben Jesu für das deutsche Volk bearbeitet*, § 41, 3te Aufl. p. 254, 1st par.

⁴ *Id. ib.* ⁵ *Cp. Christianity and Mythology*, Pt. III, div. ii, § 6.

⁶ Pref. to second *Leben Jesu*, ed. cited, p. xv.

into the arena he had met with endless *odium theologicum*, being at once deprived of his post as a philosophical lecturer at Tübingen, and virulently denounced on all hands. His proposed appointment to a chair at Zürich in 1839, as we have seen, led there to something approaching a revolution. Later, he found that acquaintance with him was made a ground of damage to his friends; and though he had actually been elected to the Wirtemberg Diet in 1848 by his fellow citizens of Ludwigsburg town, after being defeated in his candidature for the new parliament at Frankfort through the hostility of the rural voters, he had abundant cause to regard himself as a banned person in Germany. A craving for the goodwill of the people as against the hatred of the priests was thus very naturally and justifiably operative in the conception of his second work; and this nonetheless because his fundamental political conservatism had soon cut short his representation of radical Ludwigsburg.

As he justly said, the question of the history of Christianity was not one for theologians alone. But the emotional aim affected the intellectual process. As previously in his *Life of Ulrich von Hutten*,¹ he strove to establish the proposition that the new Reformation he desired was akin to the old; and that the Germans, as the "people of the Reformation," would show themselves true to their past by casting out the religion of dogma and supernaturalism. Such an attempt to identify the spirit of freethought with the old spirit of Bibliolatry was in itself fantastic, and could not create a genuine movement, though the book had a wide audience. The *Glaubenslehre*, in which he made good his maxim that "the true criticism of dogma is its history,"² is a sounder performance. Strauss's avowed desire to write a book as suitable to Germans as was Renan's *Vie de Jésus* to Frenchmen was something less than scientific. The right book would be written for all nations.

Like most other Germans, Strauss exulted immensely over the war of 1870. In what was later recognized as the national manner, he wrote two boastful open-letters to Renan explaining that whatsoever Germany did was right, and whatsoever France did was wrong, and that the annexation of Alsace and Lorraine was altogether just. These letters form an important contribution to the vast cairn of self-praise raised by latter-day German culture.³ But Strauss's literary life ended on a nobler note and in a higher warfare. After all his efforts at popularity, and all his fraternization with his people on the ground of racial animosity (not visible in his volume of lectures on *Voltaire*, 1870, written and delivered at the request of the Princess Alice), his fundamental sincerity moved him to produce a final "Confession," under the title of 'The Old and the New Faith' (1872). It asked the questions: "Are we still Christians?"

¹ First ed. 1858-60. Second ed. 1871. The work on Reimarus appeared in 1862.

² This is usually quoted (as by Appleton) from Zeller, who gives the reference wrongly, as I, x, 71. It should be I, vi, 71.

³ This passage was written before the World War, and is left as it stood.

"Have we still religion?"; "How do we conceive the world?"; "How do we order our life?"; and it answered them all in a calmly and uncompromisingly naturalistic sense, dismissing all that men commonly call religious belief.

The book as a whole is heterogeneous in respect of its two final chapters, "Of our Great Poets" and "Of our Great Musicians," which seem to have been appended by way of keeping up the attitude of national fraternity evoked by the war. But they could not and did not avail to conciliate the theologians, who opened fire on the book with all their old animosity, and with an unconcealed delight in the definite committal of the great negative critic to an attitude of practical atheism. The book ran through six editions in as many months, and crystallized much of the indefinite freethinking of Germany into something clearer and firmer. All the more was it a new engine of strife and disintegration; and the aging author, shocked but steadied by the unexpected outburst of hostility, penned a quatrain to himself, ending: "In storm hast thou begun; in storm shalt thou end."

On the last day of the year he wrote an "afterword" summing up his work and his position. He had not written, he declared, by way of contending with opponents; he had sought rather to commune with those of his own way of thinking; and to them, he felt, he had the right to appeal to live up to their convictions, not compromising with other opinions, and not adhering to any Church. For his "Confession" he anticipated the thanks of a more enlightened future generation. "The time of agreement," he concluded, "will come, as it came for the *Leben Jesu*; only this time I shall not live to see it."¹ A little more than a year later (1874) he passed away.

2. It is noteworthy that he should have felt that agreement *had* come as to the first *Leben Jesu*. He was in fact convinced that all educated men—at least in Germany—had ceased to believe in miracles and the supernatural, however they might affect to conform to orthodoxy. And, broadly speaking, this was true: all New Testament criticism of any standing had come round to the naturalistic point of view. But, as we have seen, the second *Leben Jesu* was far enough from reaching a solid historical footing; and the generation which followed was to make only a piecemeal and unsystematic advance to a scientific solution. For the time being, the critical activity of professional theologians was felt to be more safely directed to matters of Old Testament criticism, on which German research had been happily proceeding before Strauss in 1835 showed to what startling results a similar method of uncompromising analysis could lead in matters lying at the foundations of Christian faith. To Old Testament criticism Kuenen was giving a new solidity and thoroughness, impressive for every one capable of critical judgment;

¹ Zeller, *David Friedrich Strauss*, 2te Aufl. p. 113.

and the fresh interest aroused in Hebrew cosmology by the doctrine of evolution readily extended itself to an evolutionary view of Hebrew history.

3. From the positions established by Kuenen, development was now powerfully carried on in Germany. Wilhelm Vatke (1806-82), professor at Berlin, a Hegelian, had in 1835 applied the evolutionary principle to Hebrew history; but not till Kuenen concretely laid out the results was Vatke appreciated in his own country. The boasted "freedom" of German academic teaching did not mean that the free researchers were readily followed.¹ Ilgen of Jena had in 1799 specified seventeen documents in Genesis, where Astruc in 1753 had detected thirteen; but not till Professor Hermann Hupfeld of Halle (1796-1866) had rediscovered Ilgen's results in 1853 was the analysis at all commonly accepted. J. F. L. George, of Berlin, had shown in 1835 the superior antiquity of Deuteronomy as deducible from Jeremiah's sole use of it; while Ezekiel knows of Levites, yet not of a high priest. But again the discovery did not make its way until Eduard Riehm of Halle (1830-88) pressed it home in 1854.² The real nature of the factitious structure of the Old Testament canon was now being rapidly revealed; and Colenso's exposure of the fictitious history, in Kuenen's hands, shed a broad light.

Every step had meant either resistance or disregard. Hupfeld in 1865 was delated to the Prussian Government as an irreverent critic;³ and, like many another pioneer, he has been disparaged by non-pioneers as lacking spiritual insight.⁴ Professor Eduard Reuss of Strassburg (1804-91) had as early as 1834 an "intuition" that the complete Law is posterior to the prophets, and the Psalms later than either; but he dared not publish his ideas, and thus "narrowly missed becoming a hero of Old Testament criticism."⁵ Almost all of the pioneers, in fact, had been churchly men, anxious to conciliate the old-fashioned believers, and cherishing what they could of their incised religious views. It was not till the doctrine of evolution had begun to permeate thought in general that the men of critical insight could move with real freedom. One of the illustrations is the work of Kalisch, before referred to.⁶

4. After Kuenen, the new scientific temper is seen powerfully at work in the articles published in 1876-77, in the 'Year-books for German Theology,' by Professor Julius Wellhausen, on 'The Composition of the Hexateuch.' In 1878 appeared his 'History of Israel,' vol. i. Partly translated in English in 1885, as 'Prolegomena to the History of Israel,'

¹ "Fear of failing in their examinations through knowing too much kept away many students from his [Vatke's] lectures." Dr. Cheyne, *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, 1893, p. 140.

² Dr. A. Duff, *Hist. of Old Testament Criticism*, R. P. A., 1910, pp. 125-9.

³ Dr. Cheyne, *Founders of O.T. Criticism*, p. 151.

⁴ *Id.* p. 154.

⁵ *Id.* p. 177. But cp. Wellhausen, *Introd. to History of Israel*, in *Prolegomena*, Eng. trans. p. 4.

⁶ Above, p. 265.



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with a preface by Professor W. Robertson Smith, it consummated, for English readers of its age, the rational criticism of Old Testament history. "Almost every younger scholar of mark," Smith could then write, "is on the side of Vatke and Reuss, Lagarde and Graf, Kuenen and Wellhausen." Smith, with his peculiar duality of mind, had no misgivings about the religious effect. The book, he felt, would appeal to any one who "has faith enough to see the hand of God *as* clearly in a long providential development *as* in a sudden miracle."¹ But for clear-headed students abreast of evolution the development of Hebraism was no more to be thought of as a providential development than that of any other religion, or of disbelief in all; and a God who evolved all religions impartially was not a hopeful recipient of prayer and worship.

Wellhausen shows none of the haltings between two opinions which had hampered the older generation and made hard their path. Theological predilections he does not discuss: he is a critical historian pure and simple. He sees the process of concentration at Jerusalem of an all-absorbing temple-cult which inevitably obliterated the other Yahwist shrines; and, without seeing the process as economically motivated—that key was still left to be systematically applied—he cites Luther as proposing in his day to exterminate the money-making "field chapels" which competed with the parochial churches.² Yahweh is finally the God of Jerusalem because there is his house, in which alone he "dwells." And of this anthropomorphic though imageless cult he traces the ethic in the same purely historical spirit. Hebrew ethic is seen to rise in sheer savagery like every other; and to have retained savage characters to the end.

There are indeed theistic pronouncements. "Ancient Israel," we are told, "was certainly not without God-given bases for the ordering of human life; only they were not fixed in writing."³ But it is not denied that all other ethical bases are equally "God-given": the formula is a professional tag. What is exactly meant by the further dictum⁴ that "God works *more* powerfully in the history of the nations than in Church history" it is hard to say: we must not look for a coherent philosopher in a theological professor. Nor is even the historical analysis definitive: the historicity of Moses is left ill-vouched; likewise the historicity of Elijah and Elisha: Wellhausen is not a mythologist. Further, he is full of *a priori* conceptions about Jesus; being indeed less of a scientific analyst than a powerful operator of one central principle. As he avows,⁵ his master idea is that of the centralization of the Jewish cult; and his influence came from that ordering conception and the terse vigour and clearness of his style.

But his achievement was sufficient to evoke a hostility proportionate

¹ Pref. cited, p. ix.

² *Prolegomena*, p. 27.

³ *Id.* p. 393.

⁴ *Enc. Brit.* art. 'Israel,' rep. in same vol. p. 513.

⁵ *Prolegomena*, p. 368. "My whole position is contained in my first chapter."

in stress to the breadth of the assent.¹ The old problem, How can such negative critics claim to remain Church dignitaries or professors of theology? came again to the front. Maurice had put the challenge to Colenso, who reminded him that the question had been raised against himself. It was indeed a hard dilemma. Is an enlightened churchman to admit that the Church is bound to exclude truth, making untruth its function? On the other hand, is he to go on conforming to a body of what he shows to be false pretensions about revealed religion? The heretics solved the problem by "sitting tight"; and the awakening lay intelligence drew its own practical conclusions.

5. German criticism has gone on since Wellhausen as before, working down the various Hebrew books to their roots, showing the Psalms to be all long posterior to David; dissecting the prophets; always making clearer the general worthlessness of the attributions of the Sacred Books. Hugo Winckler rounds the century with a *Geschichte Israels in Einzeldarstellungen* (1895-1900),² which has not been translated into English. This may be said to proceed partly on the inspiration of Ignaz Goldziher's 'Mythology among the Hebrews,' translated (with improvements) into English in 1877; a work which has been duly ignored by the theologians, who could indeed plead that the identification of a multitude of legendary figures with sun and moon and sky is a highly speculative undertaking. Nevertheless it is an inquiry that cannot be avoided if we are to try to reach bottom in the legendary history of the Hebrews as of other peoples. That the Samson-story is a sun-myth, twin with that of Herakles, is now widely recognized; though when Godfrey Higgins so put the case³ few listened, and many English clerics were still at the stage of believing, with a theorist of a hundred years before, that the Greeks had got the Herakles story from the Hebrew Bible.

For modern writers, the question as to Samson had been ably raised in 1862⁴ by Heymann Steinthal (1823-99), later to be distinguished for his studies on the origin of language. Goldziher (born 1850) had first produced his treatise in his native Hungarian, afterwards translating it into German (1876). Here the inquiry is carried far beyond the Samson-myth. Abraham, "the High Father," is declared to be an ancient deity, the Night Sky; and Isaac, "the Laughter," to be the Sun-God, while Sarah is "the Princess of Heaven"=the Moon. Jacob in turn is, as "the Follower," the Night or the Dark Sky; and Esau, "the hairy," is the Sun; to which category Moses is likewise attached. Joseph, again, is "the Rain," born of Rachel, "the Cloud." All this is obviously

¹ Duff, p. 139.

² Parts I and II of a series on *Völker und Staaten des alten Orients*.

³ Above, p. 89.

⁴ Also in 1862, W. Pleyte, in his interesting treatise, *La Religion des pré-Israélites : Recherches sur le dieu Seth* (Utrecht), had shown the Seth of Genesis to be a disestablished deity (p. 123).

difficult of reduction to proof;¹ and Winckler, who whole-heartedly adopts the myth-principle, exemplifies the difficulty by his different interpretations.

For him, Abraham is the Semitic Moon-God, and Sarah = Ishtar.² Jacob is also a Moon-God, his twelve sons being the months.³ Joseph in turn is a Sun-hero,⁴ and Ephraim and Manasseh are the two halves of the year; while Moses is traced as Tammuz-Yahweh, and the birth-legend and the death are mythically explained, as is fitting. But to decide whether the twelve sons of Jacob are, as in Goldziher, the moon and stars, or, as in Winckler, the twelve months, is a truly elastic problem; and a science in the light of which Joseph is either the Rain or a Sun-hero must be pronounced imperfectly constituted. We can but say (1) that the Samson-story alone serves to dismiss the strange dogma⁵ that the Hebrews were destitute of the faculty of myth-making; (2) that Babylonian mythology—recognized as such by all scholars—forces the recognition of Hebrew mythology; and (3) that the latter study must be proceeded with.

The partial discredit which overtook all the *à priori* mythology adopted by Goldziher, when anthropology revealed the real way of growth of savage belief, has doubtless retarded the study, which in any case does not commend itself even to the theologians who disintegrate the Bible Canon. But they will probably find that a species of discrimination which admits Joshua to be non-historical, yet certifies Moses, abandons Samson as myth but clings to Abraham and Isaac and Jacob and his sons, will yield no standing-ground for the critical spirit. It will be a task of the historian of twentieth-century freethought to trace the expiscation of Hebrew Mythology.

6. After the consensus of Kuenen and Wellhausen had broadly established the Higher Criticism of the Old Testament, the stress of battle necessarily shifted back to the study of the New. The lead of Pierson and Loman was not indeed followed either in Germany or in England; and the common predilection was to labour endlessly to prove the priority of Mark, with small thought of the outcome as regards belief in the historicity of a Jesus who in Mark is quite definitely a God. To study the myths of Joshua and Samson, admittedly reduced from Gods to heroes, was clearly not advisable in that connection. The portent of the recovered 'Teaching [*Didachê*] of the Twelve Apostles,' given to the world in 1883,⁶ quickly forced upon vigilant students the admission that

¹ Cheyne writes in 1893: "Goldziher, I am certain, would now abandon the greater part of his *Hebrew Mythology*" (*Founders*, p. 317, note). But, as Dr. F. A. Paley observes, in the preface to his valuable translation of *The Gospel of St. John* (1887), comment by editors of Christian classics on "the parallels, often extremely striking, in heathen mythology" is "forbidden ground" (p. vii).

² Work cited, Th. II, p. 23.

³ *Id.* pp. 57-63.

⁴ *Id.* pp. 70-7.

⁵ Discussed in *Christianity and Mythology*, 2nd ed. pp. 368-9.

⁶ Details in *The Jesus Problem*, pp. 126-35.

its earlier sections are purely Judaic.¹ Professor Adolf Harnack, who had not at first seen this, yielded to the demonstration. The plain inference was that a Jewish propaganda had been carried on by Twelve Apostles—who could only be those of the High Priest—before any Jesuine matter had been added to the document. It was probably an alarmed perception of such an inference that led Professor Harnack, sometime a disintegrator of tradition, to his celebrated pronouncement as to “the essential rightness of tradition, with a few important exceptions.”

But the tide could not be stayed by any such command. The work of Strauss could not be undone; and such a book as ‘The Gospel History and the Origin of Christianity, grounded on a Criticism of the Record of the Passion and the Resurrection of Jesus,’ by Dr. W. Brandt (1893), would have sufficed to re-open the debate if Strauss had been forgotten. The famous study of Professor Paul Schmiedel of Zürich on ‘The Gospels’ in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* (1901) was to open new flood-gates of debate; and the later labours of Abbé Loisy were to extend the deluge.

It was not only the gospels that crumbled under the searching tests of the new school of criticism. Before the gospels had come under the most stringent analysis applied to them, the Paulines, the Petrites, and the Apocalypse, were being as decisively dissected. Harnack has told how one of his students submitted to him an essay in which it was contended that the Apocalypse is visibly, in its basal elements, Judaic and not Christian; how he, the Professor, at first impatiently rejected the theory; and how he came later to perceive that it was true. His own experiences in the matter of the *Didachê* and the Apocalypse thus supply the most dramatic negation of his claim for “the essential rightness of tradition.” The whole problem of the Apocalypse, in the hands of students who grasp the bearing on it of Babylonian mythology, has been so elucidated that the old astrological theory of Dupuis has been newly vindicated. It remains to be seen whether theological scholars will be found in the future to develop such inquiries, which progressively reduce to mythology the bulk of the Christian legend.

§ 3. *The Movement in Britain and America*

It cannot be claimed that in the English-speaking world of the past century nearly so much was done for the “higher criticism” as in Germany and Holland. Geddes and Hennell in their day had been for the most part ignored or banned; Milman’s first scepticisms had been cannonaded, the later disregarded; and the great service of Colenso hardly went beyond the special demonstration as to Pentateuchal history which had been anti-

¹ Recognized first by Dr. C. Taylor, Master of St. John’s College, Cambridge, in his ed. of *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles*—two lectures delivered in 1885. Cambridge, 1886.

pated by Voltaire. The sheer scholarly labour expended in Germany alike on Old and New Testament matters was unapproached in England; no individual influence there compared with those of Baur and Strauss or even Renan; and the new activities of Robertson Smith and his British congeners were admittedly set up by those of Holland and Germany.

1. Nevertheless, the work of setting forth critical views on the problems of Biblical scholarship was always being furthered by English-speaking students. In America, Professor Andrews Norton of Harvard, whom we have seen so deeply perturbed by the doctrinal neologies of Theodore Parker, had early reached equally innovating views on the Old Testament.

"More than twenty years ago," writes Principal J. J. Tayler, of Manchester New College, in 1863, concerning Norton's views on the Pentateuch, "the learned and pious author had adopted and published conclusions respecting the age and authorship of the Pentateuch, substantially identical with those which the appearance of Bishop Colenso's book has recently made the subject of so much eager discussion and hostile criticism."

The retardation of such criticism was characteristic alike of Norton's temperament and the attitude of the age. Holding such opinions, Norton had first expounded them in a note to the second volume of his elaborate work 'On the Genuineness of the Gospels,' in which he defended his Unitarian views. Tayler's own preface tells how Moses' authorship of the Pentateuch had been denied in the sixteenth century, long before Hobbes and Spinoza, by the Protestant Carlstadt and the Catholic jurist Masius; and how in almost every generation since the judgment had been reiterated. The earnest common-sense reasonings of Norton, safeguarded by austere censures of the critical indecencies of Michaelis and the resulting lack of true piety in German criticism,² must have influenced clerical as well as lay readers, and were substantially endorsed by Tayler in his preface to the reprint of 1863.

2. Apart from the scholarly treatises of Colenso and Kalisch, already mentioned, critical work was done by such publicists as Edward Vansittart Neale (1810-92) and Thomas Lumisden Strange (1808-84). Neale, well known in his day as a cultured Christian Socialist and a zealous co-operator, contributed to the pamphlet series of Thomas Scott in 1869 a 'Genesis critically analysed and continuously arranged, with Introductory Remarks,' in which, after taking up a strictly scientific and naturalistic position as to the documents, there is offered a re-construction of the text in the light of recent scholarship, well worth study by experts and non-experts, and illuminative for the more open-minded clergy. When the author soon afterwards published in the same series a tract on 'The Mythical Element in Christianity,' the distance he had travelled from his

¹ *The Pentateuch and its Relation to the Jewish and Christian Dispensations*, by Andrews Norton. Edited by John James Tayler, 1863. Pref. p. iii.

² Vol. cited, p. 72, note.

Christian starting-point was made strikingly clear.¹ It is after claiming to have refuted the theory of the non-historicity of Jesus that he writes :—

When we attempt to pass beyond those [general] limits into the *details* of what are generally called the evidences of the Christian religion—the direct external proofs of supernatural action—we find ourselves in the domain of legend and myth ; and all certainty as to the supposed facts vanishes with the traditional, imaginative, and contradictory character of the testimony adduced for them (p. 59).

There will follow, he thinks, a more radical contest over the claims of Christianity, but with a result different from that thus far assumed by either the historical critics or those who oppose them. He appears to expect the emergence of Christian Theism, in which the Christian element will be subsidiary—something like the Neo-Unitarian position of the next decade. In 1870, this was stirring heresy.

3. Neale's tract is somewhat puzzling as a professed refutation, inasmuch as that to which he undertook to reply, an anonymous pamphlet entitled 'The Twelve Apostles' (1870), is not by him really examined. The gist of Neale's argument is a creditably temperate criticism of the positions of the much older *Diegesis* of Robert Taylor and the *Infidel's Text-Book* of Robert Cooper, whereas the challenged tract contends primarily and substantially for the non-historicity of the Twelve Apostles—a position which was to be unexpectedly justified by the publication of the long-lost *Didachê* in the next decade. In vindication of the historicity of the Twelve Neale has offered no arguments, save by implication those deducible from the Acts and Epistles. The anonymous pamphlet,² accordingly, may pass as the first broaching of the myth-theory on a historic basis, independently of Dupuis and Taylor.

4. A more widely appreciated polemic was embodied in the volume of John Robertson of Coupar-Angus entitled 'The Finding of the Book' (1870), also published by Thomas Scott. That treatise, sub-titled 'An Essay on the Origin of the Dogma of Infallibility,' and dedicated to Colenso, proceeds from a careful study of the origination of Deuteronomy to the general judgment that the "Notion of Scriptural infallibility or supreme authority is essentially *anti-christian*," thus appealing like most of the critical treatises of the time to a religious sentiment. It earned a special vogue, however, through the arraignment of its author, as a Kirk elder, for heresy, and his expulsion in despite of his profession to stand by the Bible on critical conditions. As a popularization of critical results in a clear form the book did good service.

5. Less attention probably was earned by the potentially more awakening volume entitled 'The Speaker's Commentary Reviewed' (1871),

¹ In 1875 he published in Scott's series a pamphlet on *Reason, Religion, and Revelation*, which also sums up for an emotional and imaginative theism. In the same year, another pamphlet in the series, bearing the title *Religious Ignorance*, with no author's name, in effect repels Neale's pleas.

² Dated, like some other anonymous pamphlets in Scott's series, from Kilferest.

by Thomas Lumisden Strange, "late a judge of the High Court of Madras, and author of 'The Bible: Is it the Word of God?'" Judge Strange, however, remains one of the more interesting polemicists of the time on the freethinking side.

"A highly religious man," writes J. M. Wheeler,¹ "and long an evangelical Christian, he joined the Plymouth Brethren, and ended in being a strong and then [a] weak Theist.....When judge, he sentenced a Brahmin to death, and sought to bring the prisoner 'to Jesus.'" The Brahmin "professed himself influenced, but at the gallows he proclaimed his trust to be in Rama and not in Christ. This set the judge thinking."

No one could have divined evangelical antecedents from 'The Speaker's Commentary Reviewed,' though it sets out with the then usual proclamation of confident theism. The unscholarly and uncandid compromises of the Commentary in question, which moved Kuenen to grave protest,² are by Strange assailed, exposed, and ridiculed with an irony which at times verges on the Voltairean. As a pungent and many-sided indictment of clerical chicane³ it leaves little to be desired save gravity, which is however attained in the closing chapters; and though it dealt with only the first instalment of the Commentary under review it probably had a monitory influence on the later contributors. Of Strange's later works, 'The Sources and Development of Christianity' (1875) was perhaps the most influential, but his book on 'The Bible' was a telling piece of propaganda.

6. The new (1872) edition of 'The English Life of Jesus,' by Thomas Scott, was probably the more acceptable because it at no point outwent the positions of previous inquirers, ignoring Bruno Bauer. Again and again it affirms the historicity of events and utterances⁴ which were in the next generation to be often called in question, while pointing out the insoluble discrepancies in the details of the Tragedy.⁵ The differences of critical attitude raise the question, which recurs later, as to whether Scott had at this stage had collaboration from Sir George William Cox.⁶ It is chiefly in regard to the fourth gospel that the criticism is notably advanced.⁷ And this position had already been taken up, albeit with anxious protestations of piety and reverence, by J. J. Tayler in his 'Attempt to ascertain the Character of the Fourth Gospel' (1867). Practically following Baur, Tayler reluctantly decides⁸ that the fourth

¹ Who penned the notice of Strange in *D.N.B.*

² See the pamphlet in Scott's series translating his articles.

³ There was current at that period a story (not investigated by the present writer) to the effect that in a leading Commentary the subject ARK was postponed with a "See DELUGE," which heading again was dismissed with "See FLOOD," which in turn was postponed with a "See NOAH."

⁴ Work cited, pp. 136, 139, 142, 345.

⁵ *Id.* pp. 271-2, 284-7.

⁶ Appointed in 1886 Bishop of Bloemfontein; later (1888) the biographer of Colenso.

⁷ *Id.* pp. 152-71.

⁸ He tells in his preface how he had long "clung tenaciously" to the canonicity of the book.

(1889), where (Introductory Lecture, Part II) we have the believer in miracles and the defender of all the orthodoxies oppugning Baur with a zeal that indicates the serious importance of his doctrine.

8. The strongest scholarly force in British Biblical criticism in his day was undoubtedly Professor W. Robertson Smith (1846-94), the special value of whose anthropological work we have already noted. Though his impetus came from Kuenen and the Germans, he exerted in this field the exceptional analytic faculty which he displays in others, and which in his youth had nearly made him a physicist. The fact that he, driven from his first ecclesiastical chair by prosecution for heresy, yet not only the ablest Biblical scholar in his own country but a recognized expert for the Germans, was a stubborn adherent of Christian dogma, and had been an earnestly religious theological teacher at Aberdeen—this repute won for his original and progressive ideas an amount of welcome from young clerical students which no air of freethinking could have earned. Apparently with little or no perception of his destructive influence on the inculcated religion which he professed, he led all scholarly study of the Old Testament in the English-speaking countries on a forward path. Whatever might be the shifts of the ever-compromising clergy, lay opinion was being emancipated.

9. Even among the Anglican clergy, the spirit of change is seen at work. Concerning Charles Gore, in the Oxford of the 'eighties, "it was common knowledge to his friends and pupils that he inclined towards some extremely modern methods of criticizing the Old Testament."¹ Yet Gore was one of the lights of Pusey House, where Canon Liddon sought to maintain a truly orthodox attitude towards Holy Writ. In 1889 the Canon confesses² that he should be happier "if some of our friends did not coquette with rationalism, as put out by the destructive school of Driver and Cheyne"; and in the same year he learned, "to his unspeakable dismay, that a book which was just coming out under the editorship of the Principal of the Pusey House [i.e. Gore] contained an essay by the editor which 'would make great concessions to the Germans.'"³

10. It is instructive to trace, in the life and work of Canon Thomas Kelly Cheyne (1841-1915), this mingling of the new spirit with the old. In 1893, already long obnoxious to Liddon, Cheyne is still partly redolent of the religious unction which in his youth was the "proper thing" in all Biblical investigation. He can still write⁴ [or reprint] that Kuenen "resembles Lagarde in little except in his love of truth and his want of sympathy with traditional forms of Christian theology"; and again that "Nothing but the most *fearless* criticism, combined with the most genuine spiritual faith in God, and in His Son, and in the Holy Spirit,

¹ G. W. E. Russell, *Dr. Liddon*, 1905, p. 108.

² *Id.* p. 110.

³ *Id.* p. 111. Cp. p. 119.

⁴ *Founders of Old Testament Criticism*, 1893, pp. 185-6.



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can be safe.”¹ The unanalysed and unpurified emotionalism still holds its own, unabashed, beside the truth-seeking temper and the rational critical method which is already felt to be the one real security for sane thinking. This curious persistence of sacerdotal hysteria, which can still be seen at work in any large conference of priests as in any gathering of fanatics, is the heritage of tradition, inculcation, convention, and irrational psychosis. The ancient, the sacred oil of unction still coats the thought of the scholarly inquirer. But Cheyne was to live to show how surely the traditive proclivity must yield in time to the action of sheer judgment.

For already, in 1893, he is nervously alive to the inadequacies and the timidities of Canon and Professor Samuel Rolles Driver (1846–1914), whose ‘Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament’ (1891) was for its decade to be the comparatively “safe” yet scholarly manual² of the students who were anxious to know what scholarship had found out about the Hebrew books, yet concerned to remain ecclesiastical. In Dr. Driver we have the due professional fusion of the trained scholar and the priest. In his preface he writes :—

It is impossible to doubt that the main conclusions of critics with reference to the authorship of the books of the Old Testament rest upon reasonings the cogency of which cannot be denied without denying the ordinary principles by which history is judged and evidence estimated. Nor can it be doubted that the same conclusions, upon any neutral field of investigation, would have been accepted without hesitation by all conversant with the subject ; they are only opposed in the present instance by some theologians, because they are supposed to conflict with the requirements of the Christian faith. But the history of astronomy, geology, and, more recently, of biology,³ supplies a warning that the conclusions which satisfy the common unbiassed and unsophisticated reason of mankind prevail in the end. The price at which alone the traditional view can be maintained is too high.

Here we have, in effect, the critical condemnation of the whole general effort of the Anglican Church through three generations to suppress truth and sanctify error. The priesthood and the believing laity are tacitly convicted of obstinate obscurantism. And then, on the next page, we have the obscurantist affirmation of the fundamental delusion pervading and sustaining the whole process :—

It is not the case that critical conclusions, such as those expressed in the present volume, are in conflict either with the Christian creeds or with the articles of the Christian faith. Those conclusions affect not the *fact* of revelation but only its *form*. They help to determine the stages through which it passed, the different phases which it assumed, and the process by which the record of it was built up. They do not touch either the authority or the inspiration of the Scriptures of the Old Testament. They imply no change in the Divine attributes revealed in the Old Testament ; *no change in the lessons of human duty to be derived from it* ; no change in the general position

¹ *Id.* p. 258.

² There are many later editions.

³ Dr. Driver refers for support to “the luminous and able treatment of this subject by the late lamented Aubrey L. Moore in *Science and the Faith* (1889).”

(apart from the interpretation of particular passages) that the Old Testament points forward prophetically to Christ. That both the religion of Israel itself, and the record of its history embodied in the Old Testament, are the work of men whose hearts have been touched, and minds illumined, in different degrees, by the Spirit of God, is manifest.....¹

Thus, in the act of enforcing it, is the "reason of mankind" sacerdotally flouted. Barbarism and iniquity, fraud and folly, cruelty and obscenity, are alike vouched as coming in their degrees from "the Spirit of God." All the religions, all the theisms and the atheisms, the polytheisms and the monisms, the sciences and the rationalisms, are in effect confessed to be alike "inspired in different degrees"—Feuerbach equally with Samuel. The iconoclast is as divine as the idolater. A ruined Bibliolatry is held to be salved by an absurd philosophy; and "inspiration" and "revelation" are once more reduced to verbiage, to the shame of religion and the priestly profession.

These things are of course not perceived by the Cheyne of 1893, still seeking "the combined point of view of a keen critic and a progressive evangelical theologian,"² and scornfully refusing to meet save with insolence "a view which is only worthy of some ill-instructed secular lecturer"³—the view, that is to say, that the laws in Deuteronomy are "the author's inventions." The sacrosanct must still be duly hedged about. Yet he would fain have Driver frankly avow that "the Book of Jonah is not merely not in all points, but not in any point, historical," seeing that honest students can as well be offended by prevarication as by irreverence.⁴ And still the author of the unhistorical book is to be revered "as one of those *inspired* men who could convert mythic and semi-mythic stories into vehicles of spiritual truth."⁵ Thus operates the instinct of unction.

The scholarly value of Dr. Cheyne's riper work on the Psalter and Isaiah, and his little examined theory of "Jerahmeel" in the Hebrew evolution, are matters for specialist inquiry. But it is important to note here that the scholarly critic who thus long lagged on the path of science ultimately rendered a very great service to Biblical and rational knowledge by his editing of the *Encyclopædia Biblica*; and that he who so long cherished the relics of evangelicalism was one day to realize that the story of Judas is myth, and the historicity of the Twelve Apostles and the Crucifixion unlikely.⁶ It is a memorable record of critical progression, and of courage to confess. Such developments are not to be looked for among theologians in large number in the future, any more than in the past. Exploratory genius such as that of Robertson Smith, even under the partial inhibition of dogma, courage such as Cheyne's, rectitude and

¹ Dr. Driver cites Riehm, who was sure that the "consciousness of God" seen in the Pentateuch "cannot be derived from flesh and blood."

² *Founders*, p. 254.

³ *Id.* p. 275.

⁴ *Id.* p. 316.

⁵ *Id.* p. 318.

⁶ See *Jesus and Judas*, pp. 9, 177.

vision such as those of Kuenen and Wellhausen, are not hopefully to be counted on, at least in Britain and America, so long as scholarly Biblical criticism is mainly in the hands of ordained priests. But Cheyne's progression is a reminder of the incalculable possibilities of advance.

11. As there are progressions, so, of course, there are retrogressions. Of the Rev. Dr. Archibald Henry Sayce there is some good criticism in Cheyne.¹ In his youth, Mr. Sayce was "not ashamed to be called a friend by the unpopular Bishop Colenso";² and in his Hibbert Lectures (1887) on the Religion of the Ancient Babylonians his knowledge of and services to non-Hebrew Semitic scholarship and mythology were as noteworthy as their naturalism and their corrosive effect on the old conception of a unique revelation to the Hebrews. But independent work of that kind could not earn the prizes of the Church; and in 1884 Professor Sayce had "found grace" in orthodox eyes by his 'Fresh Light from the Ancient Monuments,' which was much more widely read than the Hibbert Lectures. In 1893, accordingly, Cheyne heard of him "everywhere as a pillar of traditional views of the Bible," and as having helped to bring about "a complete turn of the tide against the views of the higher critics."³

When, in 1894, the Assyriologist produced, through the S. P. C. K., his volume on 'The "Higher Criticism" and the Verdict of the Monuments,' this reputation was eagerly extended, though in his prefaces the reverend author significantly insists that he is "an archæologist, not a theologian." Every reader of the Hibbert Lectures, indeed, knew that he gave small help to orthodox theology, and much hindrance. But the clerical and popular joy in believing that the Hebrew history embodied in the Bible was or seemed to be true at points where the "higher critics" had said it was not, was at once pathetic and revelatory. The S. P. C. K. audience represented orthodoxy in its latter-day forms. Meanwhile the higher criticism proceeded as before, especially in Germany; and much even of Sayce's rehabilitation of Hebrew tradition was invalidated, while the disintegration of "revelation" proceeded in virtue of the ethical reaction evoked by the paralogisms of Driver. The falsity of nearly all the ascriptions of the sacred books, the true causation and adaptation of their so-called monotheism, the fictitiousness of the "Mosaic" history, were made ever more clear. At the end of the decade, there were still fewer Bibliolaters, still fewer educated believers in the orthodox creed, than there had been at the beginning.

12. When we consider the cumulative effect of the entire critical movement on the general belief in Christianity, there is an almost tragic significance in the declaration with which James Martineau winds up his life's work and teaching on the central creed. Everything comes back

¹ *Founders*, pp. 231-41.

² *Id.* p. 233; Colenso, *Pentateuch*, Pt. VI, pref. p. xxxii. ³ *Id.* p. 232,

to the issue, Is Christianity True? ; and when Martineau, so widely acclaimed as the chief pillar of religion for educated men in the English-speaking world, sums up¹ the whole matter as to the instituted creed, it is in form a denunciation, and in effect a scathing epitaph :—

As I look back on the foregoing discussions, a conclusion is forced upon me on which I cannot dwell without pain and dismay ; viz., that Christianity, as defined or understood in all the Churches which formulate it, has been mainly evolved from that which is transient and perishable in its sources ; from what is unhistorical in its traditions, mythological in its preconceptions, and misapprehended in the oracles of its prophets. From the fable of Eden to the imagination of the last trumpet, the whole story of the Divine order of the world is dislocated and deformed.

These were the things which the fighting freethinkers had been saying for a hundred years. Said by the man who had variously resisted the disclosure in the past, they were held not to preclude for him an Oxford honorary degree. And no freethinker had ever framed the indictment in sterner terms. Thus it goes on :—

The blight of birth-sin with its involuntary perdition ; the scheme of expiatory redemption with its vicarious salvation ; the incarnation, with its low postulates of the relation between God and man, and the unworkable doctrine of two natures in one person.....the official transmission of grace the second coming.....all are the growth of a mythical literature, or Messianic dreams, or Pharisaic theology, or sacramental superstition, or popular apotheosis. And so nearly do those vain imaginations preoccupy the creeds that not a moral or spiritual element finds entrance there except “the forgiveness of sins” —

which, if it is sanely to be termed a moral or spiritual element at all, is a negation of morals and a quadrating of “the spiritual” with the practice of the lowest religions. And still the denunciation proceeds, in terms that Clifford never outwent in asperity :—

To consecrate and diffuse, under the name of “Christianity,” a theory of the world's economy thus made up of illusions from obsolete stages of civilization, immense resources, material and moral, are expended, with effect no less deplorable in the province of religion than would be, in that of science, hierarchies and missions for propagating the Ptolemaic astronomy, and inculcating the rules of necromancy and exorcism. The spreading alienation of the intellectual classes of European society from Christendom, and the detention of the rest in their spiritual culture at a level not much above that of the Salvation army, are social phenomena which ought to bring home a very solemn appeal to the consciences of ordinary Churches.....

What more destructive criticism, many a reader must have asked, had been passed by Martineau's sister and her colleague when he held them up alike to odium, forty years before? When we turn from the impeachment to the profession of revised faith which follows, our sense of their relative sanity becomes strong.

I am brought [writes the confessor] to a further conclusion in which

¹ At the close of *The Seat of Authority in Religion*, 1890, p. 649 sq.

I rest with peace and hope: viz., that Christianity, understood as the personal religion of Jesus Christ, stands clear of all the perishable elements, and realizes the true relation between man and God.....Religion is the right attitude of soul to the Infinite.....

He can never have realized the impression of tragic nullity that he then made upon readers who had noted what went before, and who knew something of the sifted facts as to the conglomerate of conflicting doctrines in the gospels. He does not appear ever to have sought to answer the cogent criticism of his friend Professor William Knight, who in 1871 exposed to him the insurmountableness of the fact that throughout the gospels Jesus talks as a God, and that if he were not such he was "unveracious, egotistic, domineering, vain toward his contemporaries, arrogant towards posterity. He is now unworthy of the *respect* of Christendom, if he is not worthy of its devotion."¹

Martineau, who hated sacerdotalism and dogma, was but repeating the pretence to find the light of truth and the lamp for the human path in the adapted proverbial lore of late Judaism. For instructed men alive to historical reality, his salvaged creed was but a plank from the acknowledged wreck. In this account of things the word religion loses all the content of its historic past, and becomes but a name for a hero-worship or a dissembled reversion to the ancient cult such as men had seen made by Shintô in Japan. Visibly, "the Christian religion" had become a poorer thing than the doctrinary lore of Confucius or Lao-Tsze, to say nothing of the philosophy subsumed and embodied in the teaching of the Buddhas.

But in coming to this conclusion on the religious upshot of Martineau's critical career, as we shall similarly conclude on his philosophic performance, we are not convicting him of an abnormal incapacity for true vision in the bulk of his activity. He was generally pressing forward, and the final confession, imperfect as it is, counts for much. The record of his slow disillusionment is but the record of the religious evolution of the century; and the notation of his fallacies commits us to such a notation in the process towards truth on the avowedly rationalistic side. What was special to Martineau was a high gift of speech and style, which was the main factor in his fame and influence; and this will probably be credited to him in a later survey, even after he has undergone his present occultation.²

¹ *Inter Amicos: Letters between James Martineau and William Knight*, 1901, p. 41.

² Noted in art., 'The Passing of the Rhapsode,' in *Literary Guide*, Feb., 1928.

CHAPTER XV

LATER PHILOSOPHY AND ETHICS

§ 1. *Britain and America*

FAILURE OF THE RELIGION OF AUTO-SUGGESTION

ALREADY on the advent of the doctrine of evolution we have seen Unitarian theologians in England spontaneously turning, as some of their school had done fifty years before, to the conception of a Deity "immanent" in the cosmic process. All such conceptions had often been condemned, alike by orthodox and by Unitarian publicists, as pantheistic and, as such, virtually "godless." Hegel's philosophy was so denounced, its God being for most men a theoretic abstraction, transcending alike prayer and praise. Mansel, following the rigorous philosophic argument which led to the postulate of an Absolute, necessarily transcending *all* relations, had devoutly proclaimed that, though there must be an Absolute if Deity was to be thought infinite, eternal, omniscient and omnipotent, the Absolute of the philosophers could not be the "true Absolute," since that *must* conform to revelation. Orthodox philosophy was thus logically bankrupt, and Spencer claimed to take possession.

1. The next theological step, accordingly, had to be the more specious formulation of an Absolute which *did* enter into the human relations that philosophy had recognized to be logically unthinkable. Theism must be kept somehow anthropomorphic while professedly taking into account the irresistible philosophic conclusion that an anthropomorphic God is a vain solution of an infinite and eternal universe. God, originally made in the image of man, and then philosophically shown to be in that form incredible, must be more subtly re-made in the image of man, to perform the old religious function under a re-written theorem. Inevitably the attempt had to be made on the ground of ethics. Only by expounding the evolutionary God of the scientific cosmos as still a God of Goodness could the concept be made to seem worth the acceptance of thinking minds.

2. The task was readily undertaken by many in England,¹ of whom

¹ One of the most interesting, if least noticed, was Dr. C. E. Appleton (1841-79). This remarkable writer seems to have rejected all historic religion, though a devout sacramentalist (*Life and Literary Relics*, 1881, pp. 92-7), and completely accepted Feuerbach's analysis of all theism as auto-suggestion (pp. 122, 140), yet held his Hegelian auto-suggestion to be conclusive.

T. H. Green and James Martineau may be regarded as the most widely accepted teachers of their day; and it was in the hands of Martineau that it was most confidently supposed to have been successfully done. The testimonial to Martineau in 1888, signed by six hundred and fifty men of standing, of many denominations, represented a more general consensus of approbation than could be claimed for any orthodox or any other theistic thinker. Whether his Oxford degree, conferred in 1888, would have been bestowed after his mordant indictment of historic Christianity in 1890 may be questioned, but his Dublin doctorate was bestowed in 1891, presumably for his philosophic work. When Martineau's ethical philosophy is strictly formulated, therefore, the theistic position of the time can be decisively weighed.

The summary having been made by official adherents of the school, who indicate the grounds on which they think it is open to revision, a concise statement is not difficult:—

It is a fundamental principle of Dr. Martineau's religious philosophy that all *essential* theological truth is capable of verification in the experience of *the wisest* and most spiritually minded persons; and the dogmas which do not admit of any such verification are *ipso facto* no part of God's eternal Gospel to Humanity.¹ Recognizing as merely poetic "that *quasi*-Pantheism, so often found in great writers and poets, which is simply the expression in a somewhat extreme form of those mystical moods when the Over-Soul so pervades and floods the inner life that the distinct consciousness of separate individuality seems for a time almost lost," he expressly rejected "that genuine Pantheism which deliberately violates the ethical consciousness and denies to the soul the possession of any such delegated independence and causality as shall enable it to freely choose between a self-seeking life and a life with God."² Let the thinker "try as he may to merge his own causality in the Divine, it is still he, *and not God*, that makes the sublime renunciation."

The words last cited are Martineau's own.³ Just above them, the interpreters have made the statement that the individual personality is "a free cause *other than* the divine, *yet homogeneous with it*." And previously⁴ they had posited, as the basal truth on which both philosophy and theology are founded, "the truth, namely, of the direct and immediate self-revelation of the Eternal in the consciousness of *Humanity*"—here with no restriction to "the wisest and most spiritually minded persons." Thus are the changes perpetually rung between a thesis of the homogeneity of God and man, the "self-revelation" of Omnipotence in human consciousness, and the claim that man has a "delegated (!) independence" which makes a "free" judgment. The upshot is sheer auto-suggestion. There is no reply to W. M. W. Call's 'Final Causes' (1891)—the answer to all supernaturalist polemic. There is no recognition that Feuerbach had declared all religion to be *necessarily* auto-suggestion,

¹ Drummond and Upton, *Life and Letters of James Martineau*, ii, 344.

² *Id.* pp. 456-7. ³ *A Study of Religion*, ii, 167. ⁴ *Life*, ii, 345.

and *therefore* incapable of revealing cosmic fact. We have a mere prophetic pretence that auto-suggestion is divinatory. And the logic is but a tissue of *non-sequitur*.

God, we are told, is "immanent" in physical nature, and "transcendent" in his "communion" with men.¹ Also, the ideas of the less wise are "*no part*" of God's monition or revelation to Humanity. Again, "God, in the infinite fulness of his being, *transcends his own actual manifestations* in the universe of finite physical and psychical entities which he has called into existence." And we have, of course, the familiar argument that Omnipotence must be *able* to relate himself anyhow, and that to deny this is to "detract from God's perfection." In Martineau's own words: "The modern scruples that are felt with regard to the personality of God appear to me to be not less intellectually weak than they are morally deplorable." At the same time, God (by implication) cannot have any relations with animals, which are not "persons" but only "living things."² Thus must we after all "detract from God's perfection"—to say nothing of our doing so when, calling "him" male, we yet deny him sexuality—auto-suggestion again.

All that remains to note in Martineau's system is the perpetual reiteration that we have no basis for our morals unless we believe that God instils them—the confessed belief of many who act quite wrongly. As always, the proposition utterly evades its corollary, that *all* moral judgments, *all* proclivities, *all* codes, must on the primary thesis be taken as instilled by God—the Utilitarian's equally with the Pope's. At times the statement is that simple humanist ethic has "no scope for more than the morality of expediency, or of *ungrounded* sentiment."³ Here "the murder is out." Dr. Martineau's ethical sentiment is "grounded" because he believes that God gave it to him: other people's moral sentiments are "ungrounded"—this after the exposition of a doctrine of Divine Immanence in *all* "personal" life. So much for auto-suggestion.

That these doctrines are no solution of the problem, no real re-conquest of the ground of theology, becomes the more readily clear when we briefly trace the series of ethically and logically equivalent positions from Pauline Christianity onwards.

a. "In [Him] we live and move and have our being" (Acts xvii, 28)—an explicit adoption of pagan pantheism, assigning *all* action to the Theos.

b. "Hath not the potter a right over the clay?" (Rom. ix, 21 *sq.*)—an annihilation of the human judgment by which, in effect, the goodness of deity is assumed to be recognized and certified.

c. "Not one [sparrow] shall fall on the ground without your Father" (Mt. x, 29)—an affirmation of the divine regulation of every event.

d. In the face of all such affirmations, constantly reiterated, Christian practical theology has no less constantly affirmed not merely the responsi-

¹ *Id.* ii, 458, citing the *Study*, ii, 179.

² *Study of Religion*, ii, 183. ³ Letter in *Life*, ii, 238.

bility to the Deity of all persons for all deeds held to be condemned by that Deity, but actually an eternity of future punishment alike for unrepentant sinners as such and unbelievers as such. This is the standing ethical dilemma of Christian theism.

e. Christian philosophy, at the hands of Descartes, reverting to a pagan lead, posits the conception of a Deity who starts his universe, imposing on it laws which thenceforth control it. That ostensible solution of the otherwise hopeless dilemma was the substantial appeal made to its age by Cartesianism. Adopted in England by Cudworth, it was denounced as virtual atheism. It was in effect a negation of the Christian theology of prayer and Providence, as well as of future punishments, and it left "revelation" standing as a wholly incongruous postulate.

f. Theology in the main subsisted on the orthodox lines; and in the eighteenth century we have Cowper proclaiming that tempests and pestilences are the punitive handiwork of Deity—despite the texts (Lk. xiii, 2-5) which set out by expressly denying such inferences, and then (in interpolations) endorse them. Even among men who had misgivings about such doctrine, normal as it was, there visibly subsisted the belief in their *individual* relation to Deity. "God's chastening [or guiding, or helping] hand" was a practically universal expression; and not only was there no theological rebuke for the man who, saved in a storm or a catastrophe in which many others perished, proclaimed himself the chosen recipient of divine favour, but such declarations were held to be peculiarly "godly," and the friends of the slain dared make no protest, much less cry "blasphemy!"

g. When Biblical criticism on the one hand and physical and moral science on the other had discredited for sincerely thinking men, lay or theologians, alike such a theory of things and the dogma of Scriptural inspiration which buttressed it, the theist proceeded to carry his "conviction" of "communion with God" to the ground of his "moral sense," here partly following the lead of Kant. Once more, "the true criticism of dogma is its history." For the new belief had absolutely the same illusory basis as the old, no more and no less—auto-suggestion calling itself knowledge.

His new pseud-ethical affirmation was simply a "polarized" re-statement of the fact of the ostensibly intuitional basis of moral feeling, recognized alike by Hume, Mill, and Spencer in the very act of tracing that long evolutionary process by which animal affections have been socially sublimated into deeply felt moral principles *for an indefinite number of persons*. The theist merely imposes "Theos" on the evolution, while unable to deny that there remain *many religious persons imperfectly moralized* (in terms of the generally accepted principle of reciprocity), in spite of the alleged "divine immanence" in the entire cosmic process.

The issue is thus simple. It may be dramatically put as arising among a group representing the Kantian, the Christian theist, the non-Christian theist, and the naturalist or rationalist. As thus:—

Kantian. "You must accept as absolute the conviction of duty. A good will is the one good thing in the world. Utilitarian morality is worthless."

Christian Theist. "Kant recognizes, nevertheless, that the good will is very rare. The average will must therefore be enlightened. We agree that utilitarian ethic is valueless: the enlightenment must come from above. We find it through Jesus; and, enlightened by Him, we are conscious of our moral communion with the Father."

Non-Christian Theist. "I recognize at points common ground, but no

abnormal enlightenment, in the gospels; and at those points they clash with Pauline theology, which is unethical. I am content to feel that the Divine is at work in me when I seek to realize my moral aspirations. I feel that they 'make for righteousness,' and that righteousness must be in the divine plan."¹

Rationalist. "I fully recognize that what you call a good moral sense constitutes a good bias, and that utilitarian tests will not easily sway a man to conquer a bad bias. The forms of bias are obviously analogous to the variations of life-forms. The law of reciprocity, ill-stated in the Golden Rule, so-called, is the guiding-star. Merely to fulminate the categorical imperative of Kant is very idle when you recognize, as you must, that it is either nugatory for most, or is embraced in justification of actions which the "best minds" declare to be crassly immoral. It functioned for the Massacre of St. Bartholomew's Day.

"When you say that the Cosmic Power makes for righteousness you are either denying that it controls action in general—in which case it is not a Cosmic Power—or affirming that it works through the recognition of cosmic evil as *evil* by the evolving moral sense. Then it is just our 'moral sense,' or science, that is to determine morality. Recognizing that the evolving moral sense is still largely a kaleidoscope of contradictions, and that our own impulses (like Kant's) can at times diverge from the accepted law of reciprocity, we seek for our *rectifying test* in Social Utility, which we see to be historically the main progressive factor.

"If you, the Theist, have an opinion on right action or social utility which clashes with mine, how do you vindicate it? By argument, which *subsumes the reciprocitarian-utilitarian tests*, or by affirming that you are sure that God is specially enlightening you? If the latter, you are outside of reasoned philosophy. If the former, what philosophic difference is there, finally, between your ethic and mine? Your Theos is a fifth wheel to your coach. Once you have given up Revelation, as you must, you vainly pose as a prophet, save for the religionist whose traditionary positions you have avowedly abandoned.

"To him my reply is that by his own test of social efficiency, *which*, as ignorantly applied by Christian sociology, *is the crudest form that utilitarian argument has ever taken*, his religion is a broken reed. It has never produced a decently good world. And his test is radically antinomian. I grant that my concern for truth is fitly to be termed intuitional. It is a primary bias, like my concern for justice. But these are precisely, for me, the highest forms that the moral sense has yet reached in its evolution. Certainly they are capable of inculcation, guidance, and betterment. The love of truth is refinable.

"The religionist, however, in effect argues that the intuitional love of truth and justice may usefully be either overridden by or subordinated to a tradition alleged to be popularly efficacious, of which the historical basis is demonstrably false and the dogmatic content largely unrighteous. That I describe as false utilitarianism and vicious ethic, because it ignores two chief Goods. It is, further, radically pessimistic. It accepts evil as irresistible in the act of professing to overcome it. And surely an ethic which partly overrides the claims of truth and palters with those of justice is profoundly 'unspiritual.'"

¹ Theism, of course, might be propounded *without* any ethical theorem. But non-moral theism is not a practical factor in the debate. Men want a Good God, or none,

In any case it has not the slightest prepotency for good conduct. It is professed by men who wilfully go to war with each other—a course which the mere ethic of expediency would bar for all who seriously face life. And the final verdict of reason on the theistic ethic is that it is not truly serious, inasmuch as it forever evades its own dilemmas, and really posits a God who cannot get his own way. The churchly theist expressly describes his God as “baffled” in his purposes by the perversity of the creatures in whom he is “immanent.”¹ No stress of rhetoric can win ultimate dignity for such self-stultifying thought. The doctrine of the moral immanence of Omnipotence in all human life involves the recognition of Thuggee (or Thàgi)—a religious phenomenon by every scientific test, a religion of murder ecstatically held and acted on till it was rooted out by the Indian police—as a manifestation of Divine Immanence. To the arrogant plea that “the wisest and most spiritually minded persons” are the trustees of the right ethic, the final answer is that its very arrogance is its own condemnation. It is fundamentally unethical. It has been the attribute in all ages of human-sacrificers, of inquisitors, of heretic-burners and witch-burners, of organizers of religious massacre and religious war. We had it in 1914 from the hierophants of German *Kultur*.

The rationalist has here been given the longest innings because he has to cover and dispose of all the preceding positions. It is for those who think they can logically outflank him to do so. That the argument comes finally to ethic is already a confirmation of the whole rationalistic polemic against religion, inasmuch as it is a confession that neither alleged revelation nor alleged spiritual insight can avail for rational persuasion without some semblance of proof that the moral sense necessarily presupposes an immanent God. The reply is that the very presupposition impeaches the God, inasmuch as the moral sense of so many is bad, and that the “instinct” for truth and righteousness, reduced by reason to logical form, is demonstrably the final court of appeal. Some religionists in fact, now as in past ages, claim to be rationalists. The answer is that they reason ill.

3. And if we apply the common religious test of vogue—that is, the test by which the Christian religion is commonly held to be certificated—we find that in an ever-increasing degree all questions of conduct, public and private, are by common consent brought to the bar not of dogma or theology but of moral reason, employing rational appeal. Only in the domestic disputes of the churches is “Scripture” allowed to be the court of appeal; and there the assumption yields small hope of concord. The authorities avowedly resort to the guidance of expediency. Religion now does but seek to follow up a secular lead.

When all is said, the claim to a self-certificated knowledge of God, whether avowedly ethical or more generally philosophical, must go the way of the claim to the knowledge of a revealed God, which when put by Maurice was dismissed by Martineau as an “unnatural and irrational rupture between philosophy and theology.”² No theist has ever rebutted

¹ *Lux Mundi*, ed. 1902, p. 395 (App. II, *end*).

² *Life*, ii, 345.

the simple criticism of Henry Sidgwick : " When an anchorite prays and is comforted by a vision of the Virgin or a saint, we are agreed, are we not, that the effect is purely subjective ? When he prays and afterwards feels a gain in moral strength, in life-giving hope, tranquillized selfish desires, he seems to me enviable ; but am I therefore to say that his experience is surer evidence of objective reality in this case than in the former ? I hardly think so."¹ That is the concretion of the abstract argument of Feuerbach, ignored and evaded by Martineau as by all the other theists—the argument that *every* " divine idea " is but the apotheosis of his own aspiration by man.

And when Mr. Stopford Brooke declaimed to a religious Conference in 1900 to the effect that " without the postulate of the soul in man akin to God and going to Him, science and ethic have no *secure* foundation," and that in virtue of Martineau's teaching " the battle is practically won against the forces of godless science and godless ethics,"² he was merely paying himself and his hearers with words. Let the records of science and the history of the nations tell how much of theism is left in either science or reasoned ethics. Mr. Brooke was only laurelling Neo-Unitarianism as he had formerly laurelled the Christism which he was definitely to abandon. Such a claim is a *brutum fulmen*.

Argument apart, the turning of the balance of thought from the religious to the rational standard in ethics is broadly demonstrated in the acceptance of the rationalist literature and teaching of the preceding age. An influence like Mill's, respectfully acknowledged by many who were on some points at variance with him,³ told of a recognition of the moral validity of his relation to life. Upon Mill's influence followed that of Spencer, arousing more controversy yet never failing to carry the character of a moralized presentment of all problems. Mill and Spencer, in fact, were seen to be raising the moral standards of the nation. And for large masses of the people, exactly such an influence was exercised by Bradlaugh, the thorough-going and outspoken atheist, and Holyoake, the passive one.

The old assumption that an " infidel " must be bad had dissolved under the light of publicity. It was not that the new doctrine could transform bad natures into good, as the old had been fabled to do. Bad atheists there might be, as there had been multitudes of odious Christians, moral goodness being primarily a fortunate variation, needing only right reasoning to yield right practice. But when it was made progressively plain that the new attitude to faith and morals not only did not involve or induce lack of moral rectitude but illuminated and actually uplifted those who embraced it, the religious appeal was outgone. In a time in which Darwin, Huxley, Mill, Spencer, Clifford, and Morley were eminent

¹ Letter to J. R. Mozley in *Henry Sidgwick : A Memoir*, by A. S. and E. M. S., 1906, pp. 366-7.

² *Life of Martineau*, ii, 471.

³ Cp. Judge Shaw's " Centenary " address, in *Occasional Papers*, 1910, p. 286.

figures, and George Eliot the most eminent novelist, ethical feeling ceased to be definable as a religious specialty.

4. James Martineau, in his sermon on 'The Godly Man' in the volume which he calls 'Hours of Thought,' is moved to confess¹ that "Even apart from its abuse in the religious dialect of a school, the word 'godly' has come to mean something vastly more limited, and less certainly significant of nobleness, than it once denoted." Stress of reflection had forced him to recognize the unreality or insincerity of much of that very religious rhetoric in which lay his own chief gift of appeal, however much he might excel his rivals alike in diction and in earnestness. Yet he is living in rhetoric when he takes for granted a past splendour of godliness, of which he does not seek to give any historic vision. We have read history for ourselves, and know that his report is but a litany.

And on the other hand [he confesses, in a mood of vision and magnanimity] there are secular forms of character, undeniably high and noble, which seem to have no sympathies on the spiritual side, and are unconscious of light from above. It would be a monstrous and a monkish rule to measure men in our time by their devotions; to admit to the *glory of godliness* every assured intimate of heaven, and *exclude from it* every one from whom the living presence of the Most High is hid.

The prophetic pose, the sibylline gesture, the inextinguishable presumption of the pretence to transcend the cosmos and "commune" with infinitude, cannot disguise the realization that "godliness" is a *façon de parler*, a stage property of the theistic drama, and that a vivid moral intelligence outweighs all theistic rhetoric.

5. One of the chief moral influences in general literature in her age was the fiction and poetry of George Eliot. She in fact vitiated her *art* as a novelist and dramatist by constantly stressing and commenting moral doctrine, subordinating her whole view of life to a conception of retribution as something perpetually operative, in disregard of the larger aspects the recognition of which by Hardy won him a later vogue when hers had declined. Always calling herself an artist, she never read the fiction of others, evidently feeling herself called to a special moral mission.² And, whatever the effect on her artistic achievement, she unquestionably attracted her audience largely in respect of the deep moral impression she generally made.

And yet her ethical philosophy was definitely non-theistic. Not only have we her grave allusion to Frederick Myers, on "the three words which have been used so often as the inspiring trumpet-call of men—the words God, Immortality, Duty," when she "pronounced with terrible earnestness how inconceivable was the first, how unbelievable the second,

¹ Work cited, 1876, p. 244.

² Trollope was pretty much in the same case, as to disregard of other people's novels. See Mr. Sadleir's *Trollope: A Commentary*, 1927, p. 340. (Letter of 1868.)

and yet how peremptory and absolute the third"¹—not only have we this oracle: there is the written one that

There is really no moral "sanction" but this inward [moral] impulse. The will of God is the same thing as the will of other men, compelling us to work and avoid what they have seen to be harmful to social existence. Disjoined from any perceived good, the divine will is simply so much as we have ascertained of the facts of existence which compel obedience at our peril. Any other notion comes from the supposition of arbitrary revelation.²

Some private utterances of George Eliot's have been exploited with the purpose of showing that she was "out of sympathy" with the rationalistic beliefs of her time, at least in her later years. Her friend Madame Bodichon having written (1862) begging her not to take away anybody's beliefs—as if she or any educated rationalist would be likely to obtrude anti-religious views on religionists who did not aggressively obtrude theirs—she replied:—

Pray don't ever ask me again not to rob a man of his religious belief, as if you thought my mind tended to such robbery. I have too profound a conviction of the efficacy that lies in all sincere faith, and the spiritual blight that comes with no faith, to have any negative propagandism in me. In fact, I have very little sympathy with Freethinkers as a class, and have lost all interest in mere antagonism to religious doctrines. I care only to know, if possible, the lasting meaning that lies in all religious doctrine from the beginning till now. (Cross's *Life*, p. 356. Cp. p. 238.)

This has been not unjustly represented as a disapproval of all "negative" criticism. The matter can be raised above the sentimental plane on which it was started only by scrutinizing the facts.

As we have already seen, George Eliot had a high-strung emotional nature doubled with a powerful critical faculty,³ and the emotion was apt to prime her critical reasoning. On the other hand, she readily repented of her "tempers," and on the rebound was apt to dissolve in soulful expressions of universal sympathy. She is recorded to have once "thrown up her arms" to enounce an ideal of universal benevolence which had been given out long before by Jeremy Bentham, almost in the same words. Yet, in point of fact, she had written much unmerciful criticism. No man of her day ever penned a more blistering indictment of a pietist than she did of Dr. Cumming, and her treatment of Young was hardly less acrid. She abounded, indeed, as much in temperamental antipathies as in sympathies.

On the other hand, when she had become the most famous

¹ Cited in O. Browning's *Life*, pp. 115-16. ² *Id.* p. 105; Cross's *Life*, p. 427.

³ "I was struck by the massiveness of the head as contrasted with the frailty of the body," writes one who saw her in 1877. (J. Jacobs, *Essays and Reviews*, 1891, p. xvi.) "Marian Evans," said Sara Hennell to Moncure Conway, "was in youth morbidly pious. She was melancholy by temperament and often in tears. She suffered from loneliness" (Conway, *Autobiography*, ii, 377).

English novelist of her day, it was out of the question that she should enter into polemics against the creeds of the majority of her readers. Lewes, we are told, urged her to do so—why, is not clear, seeing that he himself only posthumously did so over his name.¹ Oscar Browning recites² a conversation in which Lewes so urged, and she asked: "Why should she hurt the numbers who loved and trusted her through her writings?" The point was so obvious that it is astonishing that Lewes (an admirable husband, though a somewhat indelicate person³) should have missed it. A novelist who had largely won her audience by the sympathetic handling of religious feeling (*Adam Bede*, *Mill on the Floss*, *Romola*) could not plausibly resume rationalistic polemics. She had chosen her part—to become a moral preacher for a still inartistic nation, under the guise of an artist, and her emotion took the shape and colour of the kind of appeal she found most widely acceptable.⁴

This in turn is claimed by some as a considered outcome of careful thinking. We have only to note her own account of her attitude, in a disturbed but deliberated letter,⁵ to realize how fortuitous had been her procedure. Avowing her doubts and her final certitudes, she tells of "my yearning affection towards the great religions of the world which have reflected the struggles and needs of mankind, with a very different degree of completeness from the shifting compromise called 'philosophical theism.'" The assailed theists might well complain that their effort to purify barbaric religion should be singled out as a shifting compromise when all the religions in question had been just shifting compromises.

The modern world religions, commonly so-called, apart from Christianity, are Buddhism and Islam; the ancient polytheisms, which stood for the world of their day, were the Brahmanic, the Babylonian, the Egyptian, the Persian, the Greek, and the Roman; to which we may add the Mexican and Peruvian. All alike, barring Buddhism, were stained with blood and cruelty; all alike represented a systematic, sacerdotal, economic exploitation of the "needs" and appetites of ignorance, inculcating belief while exploiting it. To see in all this a field only for "yearning affection" is to cancel the writer's own test of "harm to social existence," as well as every test of truth. To call the procedure one of sentimentalism is not the least charitable summing-up. We are not here dealing with a

¹ In *The Study of Psychology*, 1879, pp. 40, 169, 172.

² *Life of George Eliot*, 1890, pp. 152-3. Cp. Mathilde Blind, *George Eliot*, p. 211.

³ See the pungent reminiscences of Mrs. E. Lynn Linton, *My Literary Life*, 1899, p. 18 sq.

⁴ As to her distresses from her legally unmarried position—on which her old friends were strangely conventional—see Conway, *Autobiography*, ii, 376-7.

⁵ In O. Browning's *Life*, pp. 118-9 Cp. Cross, p. 516.

thinker, but with an emotionalist. One of Lewes's impeachments of religion (*Study of Psychology*, p. 169) is a very definite description of the "terrible effects due to the idea of 'saving souls'"—to wit, the destruction of Grecian and Moorish culture.

To sum up. While George Eliot very naturally, after turning profitably to fiction, felt that all critical polemic was objectionable, or that it was somehow "mere" when it sought to discredit and displace the untested beliefs of her sympathetic readers, the fact remains that after her abandonment of evangelicalism in youth she remained without traditional belief. We have (1) her declaration that she stood on much higher moral ground when she became a rationalist (Cross, p. 56). (2) Her declaration to Myers is a negation of all the creeds. (3) Expressing in 1859 her estimate (a natural justification of her protracted youthful evangelicalism) of Christianity as the highest expression of the religious sentiment, and her profound interest in the inward life of all sincere Christians, she writes: "I have not returned to dogmatic Christianity" (Cross, p. 298). (4) In 1861 she declares her faith in "the working out of higher possibilities than the Catholic or any other Church has presented" (*id.* p. 330). Then too she insists that "the 'highest calling and election' is to *do without opium*." (5) In 1857, again, she had written: "I could more readily turn Christian, and worship Jesus again, than embrace a Theism which professes to explain the proceedings of God" (*id.* p. 231). And to the end she firmly repugned all the ethical forms of the God-idea (*id.* pp. 523, 532, 557). (6) Yet again, in 1869, she tells Mrs. Stowe: "I do not find my temple in Pantheism"—the pantheism of some years of her youth (*id.* p. 447). The ethical theism of auto-suggestion can make nothing of such a mind.

That she not only abstained, after 1857, from a thankless public polemic which she was really (save as a perfect translator) not well qualified to carry on, but spoke censoriously of all who did the work, is the measure at once of her uneasiness and of her extravagance in reaction. In her anti-polemic moods she cannot avoid being hotly polemical against polemicists, and she refuses to ask herself how on her principle of quietism there could ever have been any rational progress at all. On the principles she lays down in her heated letters, condemnation is to be passed alike on Hennell, on her husband, on Spencer, on Strauss and Feuerbach whom she translated, on her own work in translating them, on her friends Morley and Clifford and Stephen and Huxley—nay, on everybody who ever scientifically disturbed the inculcated beliefs of her female and other devotees.

The position was passionate and inconsistent, and amounts only to an untenable veto on critical activities from which she prudentially

(and profitably) abstained. Gifted with a really keen critical faculty as regards all serious propositions, doctrines, theories, and researches (witness her dismissal of Renan as a thinker after reading the *Vie de Jésus*; Cross, p. 371), she was nevertheless ill-fitted for the clarifying toil of criticism, becoming stringent and spasmodic (as in her essays) when she should have been judicial. Her alternative was "mere" emotion. Quite justly condemning most of the literary criticism of her time as crudely impressionist and worthless, she revealed, by her refusal to read dissenting criticism of her own work, her failure to reach intellectual security on her chosen course, or to realize that the ultimate test in all literature as in every other effort is just depth and rightness of mental realization, imagination and diction being the motive and means of all literary modes alike.

6. The counter-move of the theist is, as aforesaid, the paralogism that the moral ideal of each at any given moment is the personal revelation of the Deity in and to "us"—as if the ideals did not constantly clash; as if each teacher, each sect, each nation in war, did not claim the same source of revelation; as if Joanna Southcott were not on the same logical footing with the other mystics. The claim, put as universal, is primarily pantheistic—a declaration that "God" is immanent in all moral feeling. But in the same breath, in the usual pantheistic way, the claim becomes one of ethical solipsism: it is only the "best" or "highest" moral idea that is thus revealed; and we have either a doctrine of special revelation to self-certified seers or a mere presentment of a rhetorical trope as an ethico-philosophic theory of divine immanence. The unveracity of the reasoning on this issue is itself the proof that there is no ethical value in the theistic concept, which has dictated the prevarication through two millenniums.

What George Eliot anxiously strove to inculcate in ethics is now, by the majority of the higher practitioners of the novel as by the majority of reforming publicists, commonly taken for granted. Only in the field of the specific culture of the religious sentiment *for its own sake* is it sought to identify moral aspiration with theistic or Christian beliefs. Episcopal persons, indeed, latterly profess to be anxious for peace in the Church in order that "she" may wield a necessary influence over young persons who, listening unduly to the *intelligentsia*, have become unsettled about conduct. But that very claim involves the confession that conduct is to be reasoned over, and that the tests are those of social well-being. The Protestant *episcopi* are thus grown rationalists and utilitarians *ad hoc* in their own despite. And the fact that they yet ostensibly take for granted the rationality of prayer is visibly a stumbling-block to their prestige as practical thinkers. For prayer implicates all the self-contradictions of theism.

7. It is instructive to compare with the polemic of Martineau that of the Anglican contributors to the volume entitled *Lux Mundi* (1889),

edited by Bishop Gore. Here, in the article on 'The Christian Doctrine of God' by Canon Aubrey Moore, we have the same dilemma professedly faced in the name of Trinitarianism, with the aim of vindicating "theology" as against those who decry it in the name of "religion." That is to say, the creed of the Church, including the Resurrection, is to be newly defended, since "the fact that Christian Theology is now (!) openly challenged by reason is obvious enough."¹ To this end the doctrine of Divine Immanence is affirmed and acclaimed and reiterated with enthusiasm²; and Darwinism is declared to have "conferred upon philosophy and religion an inestimable benefit, by showing us that we must choose between two alternatives. Either God is everywhere present in nature or he is nowhere. He cannot be here and not there." On the other hand Martineau, not being a Trinitarian, must be repelled.

He has done little to show us how.....the personal God, which [*sic*] religion demands, is even an intelligible idea. He wavers between a view which logically developed must result in pantheism, and a view implying a distinction in the Divine nature, which carries him far in the Trinitarian direction. More often he contents himself with leaving the speculative question alone, or storming the rational position by the forces of religion and morals.³

The criticism is just. But how then does the Anglican make intelligible the idea of a Personal Trinity? He simply makes no attempt of the kind, surrendering to documentary dogma. After rightly barring the claim to infer God from the moral conscience, he merely stakes morality on Christ. "It is a mistake," he justly avows, "to suppose that we can take the untrained and undeveloped conscience, and argue direct from it to a righteous God."⁴ Martineau, of course, would as justly retort that he had founded not on the undeveloped but on the developed conscience, that of the "most spiritually minded persons." But both, to begin with, had thus alike stultified their vital premiss that God is immanent in the undeveloped as in the developed conscience; and the Canon in his turn merely evokes the retort that his Christian conscience is an ill-developed because an ill-reasoning conscience. We end in both cases with the old religious *petitio principii*. We are to hold to the belief in a Personal God, tying to it the Trinitarian belief in a Supernatural Christ, simply because, for the Anglican, it makes "the difference between a religion purified and a religion destroyed.....Religion has, before all things, to *guard the heritage of truth*, the moral revelation of God in Christ."⁵ The thing to be proved is taken for granted. The reader is to be browbeaten by the assurance that he *must* have a religion, and that the Christian is the best. There has been no veridical test of truth whatever.

¹ *Lux Mundi*, 12th ed. p. 71.

² *Id.* p. 72, note, citing *A Study of Religion*, ii, p. 145, compared with p. 192.

³ *Id.* p. 77.

⁴ *Id.* pp. 69, 73, 74.

⁵ *Id.* p. 80.

Lux Mundi thus takes its place in the line of manuals of paralogism for the defence of the faith—works as a rule quite “sincere” in that they are the products not of sophists but of men enamoured of their fallacy and incapable of transcending it. In point of the varying capacities of its contributors it ranks high above Drummond’s *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*—a polemic so foolish that we can well believe the report that its author finally saw the fact with shame—and Kidd’s *Social Evolution*, which is an automatic tissue of self-contradiction. The welcome given to such inept performances in the latter decades of the century was the proof of the general consciousness of the orthodox that their creed was being out-argued and that they must somehow find arguments on their own side. Anglicanism at least made a better parade than that of the freelances of irrationalism. Its rhapsodes were certainly inferior, *qua* rhapsodes, to Martineau; but they could use criticism against him, and they had the intelligence to make concessions to Biblical criticism and evolutionary science. When, however, the Trinitarian “immanence” was found to yield even flatter self-contradiction than the Unitarian—Bishop Gore describing Immanent Omnipotence as “baffled” in his intention—the more competent Anglican readers reverted with a sigh to Martineau, while the rationalists tranquilly dismissed both. The appeal to reason had been a fiasco.

Even the ostensibly philosophic vindications of religion in the period had a certain dissolvent quality. Prof. John Caird’s ‘Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion’ (1880)¹ can have given little comfort to Scottish pietists. Mr. Benn’s charge² of disingenuousness on Scottish thought, as represented by Caird, seems a hard saying; but though Scottish academic subservience to orthodoxy is only a matter of special degree, Caird’s prestidigitation in the name and against the interests of faith is undeniably exorbitant. He deludes the orthodox by professing to take Revelation for granted as necessary, thus implying the Bible, yet understands theistic revelation as necessarily progressive and continuous.³ He scouts the high doctrine, *Credo quia impossibile*, as one that “could never embody the conviction of any sane mind” save with reservations which cancel it,⁴ yet the philosophy which he declares necessary to make religion “adequate” rests on no reasoned ontology.

It is towards those who look to him for a logical basis that Caird is most unhelpful. In claiming to prove “the necessity of religion,”⁵ which is what they want demonstrated, he explains that he means it to be necessary to man in the sense in which we speak of the “necessity of morality or law or science or *philosophy*.” But this is satisfactory neither to the religionist without philosophy nor to the

¹ Croall Lectures for 1878-9.

² *Introduction*, ed. 1904, p. 60.

³ *Hist. of Eng. Rationalism*, ii, 410.

⁴ *Id.* p. 62. ⁵ *Id.* pp. 75, 150, 151.

thinker without religion, for he merely takes for granted the very matter in dispute. He does not pretend to show that men cannot be law-abiding or moral or scientific without theism; and he is significantly silent about salvation. On the pietistic side of things he insists that "religious knowledge" so called is "inadequate,"¹ and he unsparingly assails, as nugatory, the Schleiermacher creed of "feeling,"² his own guide being Hegel. He expressly rejects the argument from design.³ But his postulate of a personal Theos avowedly founds on a "secret logic," which can only be feeling; and it is to feeling that he points for the certification of Christianity.⁴ Nowhere, save by such machinery, is ordinary religion helped as religion is commonly understood.⁵

Professor Alfred William Momerie (1848-1900), who later (*Preaching and Hearing*, 1886, p. 117) extolled Caird as the inexpugnable vindicator of Hegelian theism for the age, was in his turn a heretic, and only as such had his period of notoriety. His brilliant discourses on *Church and Creed* (1890) and *The Corruption of the Church* (1891) made him for practical purposes an ally of the advance, while his à priori theism yielded no new support to the tradition. And he seems to have made no attempt to rebut the calm anti-theistic argument of W. M. W. Call in *Final Causes* (1891), which so effectively undoes what Caird sought to do. That indeed caused little or no reverberation, but its quietly moving account of the progress of a sincere mind from the status of Anglican curate to that of anti-supernaturalist is more deeply impressive than the dramatic spectacle of Momerie's career. Yet Momerie's expulsion (1891) from his posts as professor of logic and mental philosophy at King's College, and as preacher to the Foundling Hospital, was one of the significant events of the time for all who followed the British movement.

8. If we turn from the polemics of professed theologians to those of men who may be supposed to have a keener sense for the "needs of the time," we find no serious dialectical difference. Of all lay apologists for faith in latter-day England, Lord Balfour is indisputably the most distinguished. His main positions were taken up in his 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt' (1879) and his 'Foundations of Belief' (1895)—the former a philosophic parry to the scientific offensive in general, the latter a more popular vindication of the attitude of religious belief on the grounds given in the former. In sum, the 'Defence' is a reversion to the method of scepticism, partly popularized first by Montaigne in his 'Apology of Raimond Sebonde,' and systematically developed by Huet in the seventeenth century.

¹ Ch. vii.² Pp. 152, 161. Contrast p. 154.³ Pp. 135-7.⁴ *Id.* p. 170.⁵ Cp. the definitions, pp. 156, 159, 304, 306.

It is partly relied on in Butler's 'Analogy'; it had been destructively employed by Hume as against the partial and pro-religious scepticism of Berkeley; and it had been incidentally involved in Newman's 'Apologia'; but it had not latterly been found acceptable as a substantive defence of any religion. To Lord Balfour's mind it has evidently made a special appeal, as it is embodied in all his later works. The argument is, in sum, that all scientific beliefs so-called are primarily as "intuitive" as religious beliefs, and cannot therefore be employed to invalidate the latter. Belief being just the feeling of certitude, any feeling of certitude can claim to be as well founded as another. None can pretend to be specially "founded on reason," since all are but inferences drawn by reason from perceptions of phenomena. Lord Balfour in effect assumes that scientific men are apt to be under a hallucination as to how they come by their beliefs, and take for granted a difference of psychological basis which does not exist.

9. The man who might have been expected to face and answer this ingenious argument was Huxley. Faced by the 'Defence of Philosophic Doubt' he seems to have had no misgivings about the compliments he paid to the logical faculty of his political leader as against Gladstone. But when the 'Defence' was followed up by the 'Foundations,' political allegiance gave way; and, already near his end, the old gladiator sent to the *Nineteenth Century* the first part of an article of combat. To the editor, when returning the proofs, he wrote: "I grieve to say that my estimation of Balfour, as a thinker, sinks lower and lower the further I go. God help the people who think his book an important contribution to thought."¹ The second part of the article was never published, the aged fighter having laid down life and sword.²

And in the published part, which is largely given up to literary pre-luding, preliminaries, and reminiscences, we come to grips with the subject only at the close, where it is shown that Mr. Balfour has conceived of Naturalism as a philosophy embracing only the physical sciences, and taking no account of the mental. That is a telling criticism so far as it goes, Naturalism being obviously inclusive of the phenomena of thought; and Mr. Balfour might have been expected to acknowledge the criticism in his later editions. But inasmuch as the complementary destructive criticism of his own constructive case was not forthcoming, he has apparently been able to retain the conviction that he has placed a vital difficulty in the way of the rationalistic criticism of faith.

10. To this conviction, perhaps, he was assisted by the criticism of his 'Foundations' with which Martineau closely followed³ that of Huxley. Martineau, himself committed to intuitionism for his God-idea, was

¹ *Life and Letters*, ed. 1903, iii, 359.

² The reading of the proofs of the first part has been imperfect at points.

³ *Nineteenth Century*, April, 1895.

properly enjoy music unless they see joy as a divinely instilled receptivity and not as a result of evolution of sense.¹ Yet, in the introduction to his eighth edition² he avows as "truths that are now admitted as truths of anthropology" the derival (1) of the beginnings of morality from animal instincts: (2) the fact that "religion in its highest forms is a development of infantine and often brutal superstitions"; and (3) "that in the pedigree of the noblest and most subtle of our emotions are to be discovered primitive strains of coarsest quality." These are just the things he had been loftily denying. And thus vanishes the plea, false to the bottom, that we cannot take pure joy in emotions held to be so originated.

Further, he has claimed that anything describable as religious happiness is to be reached only by belief in a God who answers prayer, "takes sides," and has "preferences"³—presumably political, among others. Yet, while claiming that sustaining comfort is given by the belief that Christ suffered and atoned for us, and that the present world will be atoned for in a Future State for all, he has declared that no future betterment of humanity in this world "will make up for what it has suffered in the past."⁴ The phrasing is characteristically lax, the concept "make up for" being left unexamined. But, taken in the apparently intended sense, it leaves the intelligent reader wondering what estimate of Divine Beneficence is intended thus to be conveyed.

The friendly and prayer-hearing God is thus somewhat disastrously discounted for practical purposes. Lord Balfour has, in fact, no belief in the continuance of human progress,⁵ any more than had the first Christians. Yet further, after arguing that we cannot enjoy music save when it is conceived as proceeding from a divine plan, he expressly affirms⁶ that "materialism and spiritualism; theism, pantheism, and atheism.....religion and irreligion.....each and all have inspired, or helped to inspire, the creators of artistic beauty." Yet again, after all the polemic as to the uninspiring outlook of science, he has avowed that "the physical universe now supplies.....an object capable of absorbing the interest and *filling the imagination of the greatest among mankind*."⁷ The flag of "our deepest needs" seems thus to be in retreat.

12. For the rest, Lord Balfour's negative case is wholly irrelevant, inasmuch as it relies on disparagement of the naturalist view of cosmic causation as admitting the process to be "irrational," and one of "chance" and "accident." It is in fact a confession of entire indiscipline in logic thus to fasten on the cosmic process terms of human relation to conduct and

¹ *Foundations of Belief*, ed. 1901, p. 70.

² *Id.* p. xxiv.

³ Gifford Lectures on *Theism and Humanism*, 1915, p. 21.

⁴ Address to the Church Congress, 1888, in *Essays and Addresses*, p. 292.

⁵ Rectorial Address at Glasgow University, 1891—*A Fragment upon Progress*, vol. cited, pp. 243, 278, 281.

⁶ *Essays, Speculative and Political*, (1919?), p. 61.

⁷ *Theism and Thought*, 1923, pp. 6-7.

to *contretemps*. As the rationalist's first foundation is laid on the tracing of invariable causation in Nature, he expressly excludes "accident" and "chance" from his notion of the cosmic process. It is for him *sui generis*. The Biblical God, indeed, has avowed miscarriages. Nature does not suggest them to the sane observer. As little can the rationalist admit the concepts "rational" and "irrational" in his thought of the cosmos.

For him the cosmic process is no more rationally to be termed irrational than it is to be termed Liberal or Conservative or blue or green. As little is it to be termed "rational," that being a term applicable only to human or animal conduct, humanly contemplated. "Chance" and "accident," similarly, are terms connoting only human non-provision in human experience; and are no more sanely applicable to cosmic causation than would be the terms "spite," "anger," or "carelessness." Lord Balfour's metaphysic, in fact, belongs to the plane of animism. Only on that plane is an earthquake either an "accident" or the manifestation of a "blind" Power. For the Naturalist, Niagara is not "irrational." Is it for Lord Balfour rational? Ought it not to be?¹

When it is added that his sceptical vindication of theism is as such repudiated by other theists, its inadequacy even for popular purposes appears to be demonstrated. If there is any logical purport in the term "irrational" as applied to the naturalist view of the cosmic process, Lord Balfour is to be understood as insisting that the process must be thought of as rational. On that view he is committed to the customary Pantheism of the "Immanent God." At the same time he posits a very "personal" and extremely anthropomorphic God. He would thus seem to have combined all the dilemmas of theistic philosophy into a consummate body of paralogism—this while reminding us that he does not profess to offer a "system."

13. Fallacious reasoning, however, has not been confined to the orthodox camp. We have noted it in Spencer and Mill; and it has to be noted in Huxley. It was toward the end of his life, in his Romanes Lecture (1893) on 'Evolution and Ethics,' that he perplexed his hearers and readers by positing in set terms a conflict, a "combat," between the "cosmic process" and the "ethical process." This he avowedly did with his eyes open, declaring in the Prolegomena which he added to justify his address, as he had done often before, that all moral and intellectual life, no less than all animal life, "is, strictly speaking, part and parcel of the cosmic process," "as purely a product of the cosmic process as the humblest weed."² Yet he goes on to elaborate and stress his proposition that "*the two* are antagonistic."

¹ Hutchinson Stirling, similarly, protests that evolution cannot be due to "brainless chance" (*Life and Work*, p. 322). This appears to imply that Stirling ascribed "brain" to the Cosmos. The special folly lies in ascribing to evolutionists the conception of "chance" as a force.

² *Coll. Essays*, vol. ix, p. 11.


The whole argument is reduced to a non-scientific verbalism when it is realized that what is asserted is simply phenomenal counter-action between modes of the cosmic process, such as is constantly going on in every part of it. It is to such counter-action that the reasoner points by way of justifying his language. "Even in the state of nature itself, what is the struggle for existence but the antagonism of the *results* of the cosmic process in the region of life, one to another?"¹ So be it, if "results" is to mean any relatively enduring antagonism between variant forms or species. The tiger is antagonistic to the antelope, as is the antelope to the herbage on which he feeds. And so the human moral urge, the attempt to control egoism by social law and social appeal, is antagonistic to the egoistic impulses sought to be checked.

But there is no logic in calling only the egoistic impulses "the cosmic process" when it is granted—nay, insisted—that all alike are variations in the eternal way of the whole process. Why, in effect, call bad conduct cosmic and good conduct anti-cosmic? The moral or social impulse is just the impulse which, visibly beginning in parenthood, makes continuous animal and human and social survival possible. As well call the pressure of procreation on means of subsistence a "checking" (Huxley's term) of the cosmic process. New species arise out of the struggle for existence and old disappear. That is confessedly all in "the cosmic process." In the same fashion the good parents, the law-abiding tribes, reproduce themselves where their contraries perish. And that is equally in "the cosmic process."

Huxley's logical divagation would seem to have been his variant of the apprehension which caused the aged Spencer to predict "rebarbarization" as a result of the growing stress of militarism. Both knew, as evolutionists and as historians, that societies may so decivilize themselves, and that civilizations on a large scale may thus be blotted out. What they should have done was to cry aloud to their contemporaries: "Remember that evolution does not mean perpetual upward progress, as we understand progress. It is not a total law of betterment, as we understand betterment. Realize that human betterment operates *through our choices*. *Select*, then, the right course for yourselves, as the cave man perfected his weapons."

What Spencer did was to deliver a prediction which he had no right to make, in face of the known fluctuations of national and regional progress. What Huxley did was to confuse science by formulating a conflict, not between wrong and right, advantageous and disadvantageous social courses, and between individual proclivities, but an incogitable conflict between "the cosmic process" and one of its normal modes. Both evolutionists, on the view indicated, under stress of age and apprehension lapsed from the scientific into the unscientific temper and diction.

¹ *Id.* p. 13.



T. H. HUXLEY

From a photograph by Mayall, 1893. Reproduced (by permission)
from "Life and Letters of Thomas Henry Huxley," by Leonard
Huxley. (Macmillan.)

The special educational harm of Huxley's paralogism was that it played into the hands of the supernaturalists by obscuring the fact of *the social utility of morals*—the great intellectual security for the vindication of the moral bias, as well as the key to the process of social and moral betterment. Only as a fortunate variation, for instance, is the introduction of reciprocal law into the horde, with supersession of free incest and parricide by tabu, to be understood. Without those variations there would have been no civilization. The moral outcome of the variation is registered in the consequent moral law. And it all belongs to "the cosmic process."

The doctrinal end of the matter is that the evolutionist, who as such is a determinist, instead of resorting to the gross countersense of "free will"—invented to salve an internecine theology which at once affirmed and denied Divine Omnipotence—realizes that choices are inculcated by experience as well as by bias, and that the function of the mind convinced that it is making right choices is to communicate its conviction. Thus does he "pull his weight" in the cosmic process, getting in that way what is for him the best out of life—otherwise, "out of the cosmic process," of which he is part. That is how, for the rationalist, the cosmic process works, in ethics. And that is the upshot of rational ethics.

Huxley is the more necessarily to be criticized because he had never been sparing in his indictment of previous freethinkers. He professed to have only dubious regret as to his "savage" criticism of Chambers, though he very candidly tells how in his youth he had approached Faraday with a contraption for perpetual motion, and how on his first meeting with Darwin he confidently propounded the orthodox scientific beliefs which Darwin had abandoned and was going to overthrow.

Usually he was laudably careful to investigate quotations and references; and he usefully pointed out¹ the error of ascribing to Locke the phrase about nothing being in the intellect which was not previously in sense. But he wrote² that "when Cabanis said that thought was a function of the brain, in the same way as bile secretion is a function of the liver, he blundered philosophically." As a matter of fact, that is not what Cabanis wrote. Huxley nevertheless goes on to say: "But in the mathematical sense of the word function, thought may be a function of the brain. That is to say, it may arise only when certain physical particles take on a certain order." It is difficult to understand the proposition, which seems verbally quite astray as to the "mathematical" sense of function.

14. In noting the philosophical lapses of Huxley³ we are once more confronted with the general law that all progress in thought is collective,

¹ *Nineteenth Century*, March, 1895.

² *Life and Letters*, iii, 191.

³ On these see further the expert criticism of Prof. Thistleton-Dyer in *Encyc. Brit.*

no one mind compassing it to the full. This is a main part of our historic generalization as to freethought in the given century, as in those preceding. Truth is in part approximated to even on the side which we class as that of error; and from men committed to grave errors come some contributions to new truth. Equally, in what appears to be the vanguard of critical thought, we find demonstrable divagations, forcing the inference that tested truth is to be reached only by co-operative effort. It belongs to the situation that men trained in a quite thoughtless credulity, zealous for gross delusions, become, as partisans, rigorous critics of a rationalism which is in comparison sane and sincere.


As a matter of historic fact, it may be said that the flaws in the doctrine of most of the individual "front-benchers" of rationalism were commonly detected and avoided in the "back-bench" propaganda of the fighting freethinkers. Bradlaugh, for instance, would never have fallen into Huxley's paralogism as to the cosmic process; and in his journal the difficulties of Spencerism were competently criticized. The more competent, at least, of the men engaged in constant platform debate fought really more warily than those who figured in the reviews. It may be that, as the London watermen have been said to be better oarsmen than the university crews, having reached by praxis what, till recently, only one university seems to have reached by theory, the "working" freethinker became the better reasoner because he had to be.

However that may be, the total services of Huxley to evolutionary thought, like those of Darwin and Spencer, are massive beyond dispute. All three, like their philosophic predecessors and contemporaries of other schools, committed errors of reasoning. Darwin opposed Birth Control, which Huxley strongly supported. Spencer confused his metaphysic at his outset, and contradicted his own libertarian ethic by his prescriptions to Japan.¹ Huxley, at points correcting Darwin and Spencer, falls into some self-contradictions in his own metaphysic. The main upshot is that Rationalism can never be sectarian in the fashion of all religions, including the Comtist, which has been ankylosed by the attitude of religious prostration before the Founder. Freethought can have no Popes, any more than Mahatmas.

15. That the men "between camps," as well as those in the opposite camp, should derive satisfaction from such lapses, where the evolutionist draws the simple scientific inference of the fallibility of every individual mind, is all in the way of normal conflict. The late Professor Henry Sidgwick, so good an example of the mind conscious of errors in all schools that he was declared to be oftenest confident of the duty of having no opinion at all, put in his diary this judgment:—

Have been reading Comte and Spencer, with all my old admiration of their intellectual force and industry and more than my old amazement at

¹ See *Explorations*, pp. 127-32.



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E.M.S. (Macmillan)

their fatuous self-confidence. It does not seem to me that either of them knows what self-criticism means. I wonder if this is a defect inseparable from their excellences. Certainly I find my own self-criticism an obstacle to energetic and spirited work, but on the other hand I feel that whatever value my work has is due to it.¹

Had the placid diarist ever bethought him of bringing self-criticism to bear on his own unhappy generalization, in his lectures on 'The Development of European Thought,' that the French Revolution came of the frivolity wrought by Voltaire,² he might have realized his own share in the special infirmity which he detected only in others. No concrete historic generalization was ever made more unjudicially, or more inattentively, by a serious modern scholar not moved by malice. The fact raises the question of a possible psychological truth behind his guess about excellences involving fatuities. One of the conditions of effective thought is keen attention; and this *may* come easier to energetic than to calmly contemplative minds. But the scientific truth seems to be that excitation on one line of thought may cause inattention on others, thus yielding the same miscarriage as is reached by the less energetic mind in its own way.

Yet no candid student of Sidgwick will refuse to avow that his work as a whole, done in his own quasi-vacillating way, is a good discipline in right thinking. He did not and could not found a school; his name stands for no outstanding direction given to the thought of his time;³ it is even a pleasant by-word for non-direction. Nevertheless, he has taught or helped many to think carefully; and we must refuse to endorse his own blame of some of his writing: "It is poor stuff, this sterile criticism, and I am rather ashamed of it."⁴ No criticism is sterile which makes clearer for any that which was not clear.

The self-criticism here probably comes of the "sub-conscious" leaning (a personal equation) to an emotionalist as against a passionless view of a problem when the former seems to be in any way conducive to right action. In his ethics this is a frequent source of logical divagation, and it seems to have been the source of his grave blunder about Voltaire. He becomes positively fanatical over Spencer's distinction between moral feeling proper and the feeling that all law is obligatory. "Any language," he writes, "which *ignores* the general duty of obeying even bad laws—

¹ Henry Sidgwick, *A Memoir*, 1906, p. 421.

² See *Explorations*, pp. 1-27, for extracts and criticisms.

³ I once heard Sidgwick, at the Aristotelian Society, give a delightful account of his difficulties. A German student, who had undertaken a doctoral thesis on his philosophy, wrote asking him to be good enough to put on a postcard a statement of his *Welt-Anschauung* (world-philosophy or philosophic outlook). Sidgwick exerted himself to comply; but, he added, he "did not keep a copy of that pup-pup-postcard," and had never since been able to say what his *Welt-Anschauung* was. Only the fortunate possessors of the student's thesis can.

⁴ *Memoir*, p. 422.

when laid down by the constitutional authority for making laws—is *dangerously* revolutionary.”¹ The eclectic has forgotten to be eclectic.

Spencer had *not* ignored the alleged duty: he was but stating the fashion in which it was often cognized. And to assert blankly that any hesitation about obeying a bad law is “dangerously revolutionary” is merely to ignore wilfully the point of departure at which bad laws begin to be discredited. The simple fact that a law is much disobeyed is often the beginning of the effective recognition by the law-makers that it is bad. Thus to assert that it is dangerously revolutionary to smuggle a pair of scissors, in evasion of a foolish and iniquitous import duty, is a strange attainment of vehement conviction on the part of a thinker generally bent on avoiding such convictions. The inference is that with him as with other men conviction could at times be quite independent of self-critical investigation.

16. That conclusion may serve to introduce the summary that much of the debate over ethics in the last decades of the century was more a matter of variation in particular sentiment than of any real survival of supernaturalist ethical beliefs. Martineau, who had formerly battled nearly all his life for such doctrine, ended by avowing that “the true and the good” are alone “divine.”² The semblance of the survival in Green is lacking in Sidgwick. In his posthumously published lectures on ‘Philosophy: Its Scope and Relations’ (1902) he dispassionately handles the problem of epistemology, makes the usual academic assumption that “Materialism” or “materialists” or “materialistic philosophers” affirm the “sole existence of matter,” without citing one writer to that effect, and benevolently recognizes the necessity of Theism for “normal” human nature while tacitly indicating that it is not necessary for him.

The fact that this candid intelligence, with all its velleities towards faith, could never find the ground of agreement with Christianity which it sought, is not the least striking illustration of the ineluctable advance of reason in its conflict with creed. On one ground, he is particularly to be commemorated. “Though we kept our own fellowships without believing more than he did,” one of the university Fellows said to George Eliot, “we should have felt that Henry Sidgwick had fallen short if he had not renounced his.”³

17. In the last decade of the century an attempt was made by an English writer, W. Cave Thomas, F.S.S., in the treatise ‘Cosmic Ethics, or the Mathematical Theory of Evolution, Showing the full import of the Doctrine of the Mean, and containing the Principia of the Science of Proportion’ (1896), to build at once a rational ethic and a confirmation of Theism. The rational ethic leaves much to be desired, inasmuch as every doctrine of the mean has to subsume *moral* impulse and choice,

¹ *Lectures on the Ethics of T. H. Green*, etc., 1902, p. 224.

² Conway, *Autobiography*, ii, 369. ³ Cross's *Life of George Eliot*, p. 516.

and is therefore not, as it professes to be, impersonal ; but the attempt to superimpose a moral Deity turns out to be pure auto-suggestion of the usual intuitionist order. On the inference of a "Supreme Potentiality" in Nature are imposed the anthropomorphic modes of a *Logos*, a "principle or spirit of rightness in Nature," a "scientific conception of the incarnate manhood, and of the Messianic idea," and a "metaphorical" resurrection of mind and body by "moral re-formation."¹

These anthropomorphic modes are obviously hypostases, framed on traditionary bases, not of the total forces of the cosmos but of the moral aspirations of man ; and when the author meets the objection that "the existence of God cannot be proved"² with the retort that "Neither can the non-existence of God be proved," he delivers himself up. On his view, neither can the non-existence of Zeus or Aphrodite or Ormuzd and Ahriman or Isis and Osiris be proved, and all alike can challenge acceptance. If auto-suggestion is to override analysis and criticism, all auto-suggestion is on the same level. With the doctrine of evolution posited, the case is the same. That position is reached by tested inference ; and the phenomena of the cosmos not only repel anthropomorphic solutions of its course but exhibit constant potentialities of all the "forces" striven against by moral idealism. Man's moral ideals are not in the least secured or sanctified by ascribing them to a *Logos* which admittedly animates their contraries : they must rest for warrant on themselves and on the human endorsement of their total utilities.

No assertion of a cosmic progression on one planet towards the "ultimate at-mean-ment or at-one-ment of all things," and a "Christianity that shall be the salvation of the world,"³ is a scientific proposition at all : it is but an alogical imposition of outworn beliefs on new. Whether we believe in progress or not, all reasoned ethic must remain atheological.

18. The later attempts made by philosophically trained men to transmute, recompose, and re-state the traditional dogmas of the Christian creed fared no better. One of the most prestigious was the polemic of the first Gifford Lectures (1889) on 'Philosophy and Theology' (1890) by Dr. James Hutchison Stirling (1820-1909), author of 'The Secret of Hegel' (1865 ; rev. ed. 1898), and antagonist of Hamilton and of Darwinism. In old days it had been said of Stirling that if he had found the secret of Hegel he had contrived to keep it to himself. But he had wordily "revealed" in the book what is proffered in the 'Life and Work'⁴ as the secret in question : "In every act of self-consciousness, *particulars* meet *universals* in a *singular*.....Now, that is the Notion—that is the Secret of Hegel. *The vital act of self-consciousness is the notion.*"⁵ *Ergo*, the basis of the Universe is Thought.⁶ And as this—

¹ Work cited, p. 270.

² *Id.* p. 271.

³ Work cited, *end.*

⁴ *James Hutchison Stirling: His Life and Work.* By Amelia H. Stirling, M.A., 1912.

⁵ *Id.* p. 345.

⁶ *Id.* p. 341.

whether a true interpretation of Hegel or not¹—is a mere reduction of the Infinite Cosmos to a human=finite mode, the explanation avails nothing.

As Stirling sadly tells in a letter of 1897, his good (deceased) friend Professor Veitch of the Logic Chair at Glasgow "used to hitch up his gown when he came to my name, and would say, 'Dr. Stirling may tell you what he likes, but Hegel was nothing but an infidel.' Reproaches of that kind are practically fatal, however unjust."² Nevertheless the Hegelian, as the one Scottish philosopher of his day with any European status, was called upon to deliver the first Gifford Lectures. It was a perilous task. As Hegel had said "I am a Lutheran," so Stirling wrote: "Holding by philosophical Christianity from the Idealistic standpoint, I believe myself to belong to the orthodox evangelical party."³ Of course "the Dogmas" must cease to be literally taken, though Stirling was convinced that "we are purified by Christ's blood."⁴ What he could not endure was that a boy of seventeen should be able to make domestic trouble over the problem of Cain's wife.⁵ The faithful must be assured that all previous rationalism (*Aufklärung*) was "shallow," and that a new rationalism could translate all the stories and all the dogmas into Hegelian symbols, thus presenting a Christianity "properly philosophized"—no matter though such a procedure had never dawned on Paul or the Fathers, on Calvin or on Knox—leaving "philosophic Christianity" intact.⁶

Orthodox Edinburgh, lately thrilled by Drummond's 'Natural Law in the Spiritual World' (on which Stirling's private criticism must have been devastating), crowded to the Gifford Lectures, and was quite satisfied that its religion had been somehow inexpugnably philosophized, seeing that the lecturer always said his prayers to the Personal Absolute, and had flattered them by telling them that they knew all about "the distinction between understanding and reason."⁷ On the intelligence which had been for several decades more and more definitely turning away from the traditional creed, Stirling's lectures had not the slightest effect. Needless to say, he makes not a single attempt to answer Feuerbach; he does not even name him, but makes what he feels to be safe play with all explicit doctrine that does not recognize the Hegelian God.

Stirling was really a man of philosophic capacity. His 'Secret of Hegel,' with all its flaws of egotistic obtrusion and divagation, was the

¹ Needless to say, many students of Hegel decide that his God is *not* a Personality, though Stirling prayed nightly to the Hegelian God (p. 322). Cp. his own admissions as to Hegel's elusiveness, pp. 325, 344.

² *Id.* p. 318.

³ *Id.* p. 319.

⁴ *Id.* p. 320.

⁵ *Id.* p. 319.

⁶ Yet for Stirling Milton's *doctrine* is just "that intolerable bosh of Father and Son"; and Keble in turn is only unreadable "bosh." *Id.* pp. 306-7.

⁷ *Philosophy and Theology*, 1890, p. 14.

ablest book on the theme¹; and his essay in *Mind*, 'Kant has not answered Hume' (1884-5), was generally recognized as unanswerable. The fact was that Kant's failure to confute Hume had long been recognized by competent critics and readers, and merely ignored by the professional theologians who would not see. Vigorously and independently set forth by Stirling, who thought he was thereby establishing Hegelianism, the exposure was generally accepted. And still Hegelianism won no new ground, having no such value for the theologian as the quasi-Christianity of the Neo-Unitarian Martineau and of 'Lux Mundi,' which had very much the same illogical footing.

But no philosophic merit whatever attaches to Stirling's philosophic *réchauffé* of Christianity. His attitude on the "discrepancies" of the Bible is a mere brazening out of the theological bankruptcy. "What do the discrepancies matter?"² he defiantly asked, in effect, concerning a book that has been shown to be a mere congeries of discrepancies; and a thoughtless audience seems to have either applauded or soulfully assented, feeling that that was the way to dispose of all the "miserable flippancies of negation."³ His treatment of "the Higher Criticism," however, must have made some of the educated clerisy hang their heads. "To me," he wrote privately in 1898, "[there is] no idler thing under the sun than said Criticism.....I take Scripture wholly on the Testimony of the Spirit; and all that about dates and authors may go hang."⁴ The defence, in short, was the appeal of determined critical ignorance and impercipient to the fit audience.

Had Stirling been born and bred a Moslem, he would certainly have given the same temperamental allegiance to Islam as he actually gave to the dogmas of Christianity when he had "properly philosophized" them. As a Catholic born and bred he would have paid the same service to Papalism. The defence is a negation of reason under pretence of an appeal to it, a blind imposition of the seal of auto-suggestion on the new-clothed creed of tradition. Thus from the outset he gave that mortuary cast of special pleading to the Gifford Lectures which has accrued to them ever since—a thing certainly not chargeable on Lord Gifford, who, an honest and honourable man, expressly provided that at times a hearing should be given to the other side. His wish has never been fulfilled by his executors.

As for Stirling's notion, and the notion of his disciples, that he had confuted Darwinism in his febrile and prolix work on 'Darwinianism:

¹ The late Lord Haldane, in his preface to the *Life and Work*, spoke of Stirling as a "man of genius." This may stand in a sense which puts genius lower than mastery, making it a matter of explosive personality and (at its best) vivacious pregnancy. But Stirling, when all is said, was a man with a gift for philosophic debate without the philosophic temperament; and he began and ended in partisanship. Even on the literary side, his vaunted essay on Tennyson is now stale rhetoric, embodying an inept conception of Keats.

² *Id.* p. 317,

³ *Id.* p. 314,

⁴ *Id.* pp. 319-20,

Workmen and Work' (1894), it is but the crowning proof of his impercipience on the scientific side and his mere intuitionism on the philosophic. Never in the book, indeed, is the supposed issue reduced to clearness; but in the 'Life and Work' (p. 339) we have the simple and nugatory formula of "the incompetence of the Darwinian theory of evolution as an explanation of the order of the universe." Darwin never dreamt of such an explanation. He professed solely to *trace causation in two processes*—the origination of species and the rise of Man, even there offering no theory of variation. To a total conception of the cosmos science as such makes no claim; that is for intuitionist philosophy.

When, accordingly, Stirling reiterates (p. 334) that "the questions of the origin of species and the descent of man are emphatically philosophical and not natural-historical," he is really protesting that there should be no science at all. And to science he could make no contribution, as he could gain from it no light. All that philosophy apart from science has ever propounded concerning the universe is futile auto-suggestion, the imposition of human ignorance and human modes of tentative thought on an incomprehensible Infinite. And this is not more valueless for science than it is for philosophy. As already noted, the pretence that science posits "chance" as a *force*¹—such a verbalist conception being really customary for intuitionists—reveals only inability to distinguish between concrete problems of human experience and the concept of cosmos, which is *sui generis*. Chance is no more predicable of the cosmos than impatience or boredom.

19. The most important English philosophic work of the last part of the century is probably the 'Appearance and Reality' of Francis Herbert Bradley (1846–1924). As that able and vivid treatise explicitly concludes that there is no Reality apart from Appearance, and that all Appearance is part of Reality,² it can afford no standing-ground for theism, though Dr. Bradley is always harking back to an *à priori* notion of "genuine reality" and to illusory metaphors of other kinds, and is "so bold as to believe that we have a knowledge of the Absolute certain and real, though I am sure that our comprehension is miserably incomplete"³—an unexpected reinforcement for Spencer. At one point he puts it that "Certainly a man knows and experiences everywhere the ultimate Reality, and indeed is able to know and experience nothing else. But to know it or experience it fully and *as such* is a thing utterly impossible."⁴

This allows neither of the theism of auto-suggestion⁵ nor of traditional dogma; and though Dr. Bradley speculates much about "the

¹ Cp. *Darwinianism*, p. 243.

² "Appearance without reality would be impossible, for what then could appear? And reality without appearance would be nothing, for there certainly is nothing outside appearances" (work cited, ed. 1899, p. 487. Cp. 489).

³ *Id.* p. 3.

⁴ *Id.* p. 448.

⁵ "There is no calling or pursuit which is a private road to the deity." *Id.* p. 7.

soul" he reaches no semblance of orthodox ground ; while, as we have seen,¹ he effectively challenges the scientific convention of positing "parallelism" between body and mind and assuming thereby to evade the problem of causation. On the standing religious issues of God and Immortality the book grants religion virtually nothing :—

If you identify the Absolute with God, that is not the God of religion. If again you separate them, God becomes a finite factor in the whole. And the effort of religion is to put an end to, and break down, this relation—a relation which, none the less, it essentially presupposes. [The logical criticism of all the theisms.] Hence, short of the Absolute, God cannot rest, and, having reached that goal, he is lost and religion with him.²

Immortality, dispassionately and rather reluctantly discussed as a possibility, comes no better off, even after unconsidered concessions. The statement that "a bodiless soul is possible because it is not meaningless, or in any way known to be impossible,"³ is followed by the check : "But I fail to find any further and additional reason in its favour. And, next, would a bodiless soul be immortal?" Again, "The balance of hostile probability seems so large that the fraction on the other side seems to my mind not considerable."⁴ Equally, "the positive evidence" is dismissed "because for me it has really no value."⁵ On Spiritualism, on which Dr. Bradley had been supposed to be logically available, he is quite destructive : "It is the irrational conclusions of the spiritualist that I reject with disgust. They strike me as the expression of, and the excuse for, a discreditable superstition."⁶

Of this book, accordingly, no use has been found possible by the religious propagandists, who justly pronounce it "agnostic." Its merit, which is high, consists in its dominant purpose "to stimulate inquiry and doubt." "By scepticism," writes Dr. Bradley in his preface, "is not meant doubt about or disbelief in some tenet or tenets. I understand by it an attempt to become aware of and to doubt all preconceptions." If this ideal is not fully lived up to the reader is forewarned : "I offer him a set of opinions and ideas in part certainly wrong, but where and how much I am unable to tell him." In his notebook he had written : "Metaphysics is the finding of bad reasons for what we believe upon instinct, but to find those reasons is no less an instinct." And again, in the Introduction (p. 5) we have the just decision : "Metaphysics, even if it end in total scepticism, should be studied by a certain number of persons."

One of the unsuspected preconceptions is obtruded in the derisive account (p. 14) of the "simple" creed of materialism as affirming that "What is extended, together with its spatial relations, is substantive fact, and the rest is adjectival." This is an accepted gambit in the traditionary academic game. No writer is *ever* cited as having

¹ Above, p. 413.

⁴ *Id.* p. 505.

² *Id.* p. 447. Cp. p. 500.

⁵ *Id.* p. 506.

³ *Id.* p. 504.

⁶ *Id.* p. 507 n.

advanced the proposition. But the game, though still heedlessly played, cannot well go on much longer, and must be noted as distinctly discreditable to the universities. "Adjectival," which he thus uses more than once, appears to be Dr. Bradley's own word.

20. Of the not numerous British thinkers of the period who, whether or not systematic in their published work, were certainly competent students, we may select one more, Professor William Wallace (1843-97), in respect of his admitted influence, competence, weight of personality, and avowed interest in the religious and ethical sides of things.¹ Were he only the author of the little books on 'Epicureanism' (1880) and 'Schopenhauer' (1890), Professor Wallace's high capacity for a just and sympathetic presentment of philosophies to which he did not assent would be well proved, even if he fell below his standard in judging Bentham.² It is the more important to note that where he allowed himself to approach, however distantly, the criticism of current religious doctrine, he reveals a fundamental dissent.

A special inhibition, indeed, always affects such disclosure by official university teachers, especially when, as did Wallace, they deliver Gifford Lectures.³ These appear to be always composed with the aim of making critical thought sufficiently acceptable to the religious mind; and Wallace, by training and function, was amenable to the rule. He could even accept the false psychology which denied polytheism to be religious;⁴ and he could always elastically manipulate Plato, and even Hegel, to the skilled exposition of whom he was especially devoted. Yet when he is explaining away the "doctrine of the Incarnation"⁵ as meaning that all men are sons of God—a version of the early doctrine of Strauss and Hennell—he sufficiently indicates his heterodoxy. It is plain that he had small sympathy with the philosophy of Mr. Balfour;⁶ and when he comes to the separate treatment of Personality he very definitely decides that "personality can only belong to a member of a world.....Such a position cannot belong to the Absolute or Infinite. We cannot indeed say that the Absolute is impersonal, but we may at least say he is something more than personal."⁷

That a thinker thus radically divergent from the religious tradition should nevertheless concede "that the true test of the *truth* of a religion is its capacity to satisfy our ethical or moral *needs*"—this without a historic scrutiny of either the alleged needs or the religion—is significant of the potency of the religious institutions as affecting the academic teacher. Every criticism levelled by Wallace at Hedonism and Utilitarianism is here formally stultified. If another attitude is concealed by

¹ Professor Robert Adamson, of Glasgow University, ranked no lower in point of competence and range, but impinged less directly on our problems.

² *Lectures and Essays on Natural Theology and Ethics*, edited by E. Caird, 1898, p. 380.

³ Those of 1892, at Glasgow.

⁴ Vol. cited, p. 195.

⁵ *Id.* p. 91.

⁶ *Id.* pp. 84, 88, 89, 90.

⁷ *Id.* p. 278. Cp. p. 276.

the concession, he was particularly ill-justified in his construction of the "needs" of Bentham. In point of fact his comments on the concept of immortality show that he did not concur in that;¹ in which case the whole theorem of "needs" is a verbal compromise.

21. There have been no more distinguished philosophical writers in the United States, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, than Professor William James (1842-1910) and Professor Josiah Royce (born 1855), and of these the former had the larger audience, were it only because of his remarkable literary power.² He has much of the merit of Bradley as a challenger of preconceptions and as an independent pioneer in metaphysics, with an even happier gift of vivid expression. A love of independence for its own sake, indeed, seems to have inspired alike his ultra-materialistic and his poetico-theistic sallies. In his 'Principles of Psychology' (2 vols. 1890), for instance, he committed himself to the staggering proposition "that we feel sorry *because* we cry, angry *because* we strike, afraid *because* we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, because we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be."³

The question whether this is a paradox or a paralogism is one for serious psychology: the service done is to compel analytical thought. No so-called "materialist" ever put his case with such complete intransigence. On the other hand, no spiritist ever offered so headlong a challenge to logic and philosophy as James did in his treatise entitled 'The Will to Believe' (1897), or played so partisan a hand as he laid down later in his book (1902) on 'The Varieties of Religious Experience.'⁴ Our concern here lies mainly with the former, and with the booklet on 'Human Immortality' (1898), to which James's later doctrine of Pragmatism (1907) may be regarded as subsidiary or ancillary.

In 'The Will to Believe' we have the quite definite position that where the religious arguments from evidence seem to balance and leave us in doubt we shall do well to plump for our preference, taking for granted that "God" will be glad to have our allegiance.⁵ It is not a complete criticism of this theorem to say (a) that it still leaves the case unsolved, inasmuch as most thoughtful men would much rather *not*

¹ *Id.* pp. 205-6.

² Conceivably inherited from his father, the elder Henry James, author of *The Old and New Theology* (1861), who was master of an excellent style, and whose *Reminiscences of Thomas Carlyle* is the best document of its kind. The philosopher's brother, Henry James the Younger, was singularly inferior in literary lucidity to his father and brother. (W. James's son and biographer is a third Henry James.)

³ Work cited, ii, 450. (As if we could not be sorry or angry *without* crying or striking.)

⁴ The two books are separately analysed and criticized in the present writer's *Explorations*.

⁵ Assent can hardly be given to Professor Santayana's statement as to James (*Character and Opinion in the United States*, 1920, p. 75) that "his doctrine, if he may be said to have had one, was agnosticism." On the next page we have the highly qualifying statement that "the agnostic.....in him was never quite eclipsed."

believe in the arbitrary God of theology, here accepted ; or (b) that the notion of a God who wants assistance is ultimately valueless even to theologians, though proffered to them successively by Voltaire, Greg, Mill, Mr. Wells, and Mr. W. L. Courtney. The complete criticism is (1) that the position is so fantastic that James virtually abandoned it when he protested that he had been misunderstood ;¹ and (2) that he had taken it up in virtue of the sheer laxity of his logic and his philosophy.

There could really be no misunderstanding of his explicit formulations of an anthropomorphic Deity, of a choice to believe in disregard of the whole philosophic incoherence of the thesis, of the fitness of such a decision, of the doctrine that a "desire" for a fact can create it, as when a man tells a woman she "must" love him. It is true that, after thus employing the worst argument ever advanced by a trained thinker, James in his book virtually cancelled it, as he did with his absurd taunt that "fear" constrains non-theists to their view, while avowing that it is fear of being on the wrong side that dictates his own decision. But these cancelments, and the plea that he had been "misunderstood," left James's book to do its popular theistic work. It thus remains one of the more illaudable of the reactionary books of its time, though written with a literary skill never attained by its religious competitors.

A notation of the fact that many of his addresses were prepared for popular audiences, such as Young Men's Christian Associations and gatherings of Unitarian ministers, sufficiently justifies the criticism that James catered for public appreciation. As his son² shows, indeed, he largely wore himself out in responding to invitations which stood for anything but expert zeal in study. The Gifford Lectures on 'Varieties of Religious Experience' were thus overtly framed to propitiate Edinburgh orthodoxy, though the brilliant lecturer could not forgo disclosures of critical reaction against the pietism which in him was largely an affectional vindication of his heredities and his personal resentment of the heterodox criticism which struck at his father's passional theism. His most systematic and scholarlike work, the 'Principles of Psychology,' cannot fail to promote sincere psychological study in despite of its arbitrariness ; and there indeed are to be found scientific indications³ of the truths which he later manipulated unscientifically for popular purposes.

The lecture on 'Human Immortality,' which he delivered for the foundation of the orthodox Miss C. H. Ingersoll, is one of his popular productions. Avowing not only the dependence of mind on brain but even a phrenological view of the subject,⁴ he confesses to having no

¹ Cp. *Pragmatism*, 1908, p. 258.

² *Letters of William James*, 1920, ii, 2-6. It is painful to realize that, for sheer lack of adequate official salary, even with private means, James was simply compelled to spend his powers on popular lecturing, and thus to curtail his philosophic effort.

³ *Principles of Psychology*, i, 552.

⁴ *Human Immortality*, 1898, pp. 17-28, 89-91. Cp. Santayana, p. 81.

strong personal interest in the belief, but proceeds forensically to claim that there is no logical bar to gratification of the emotional craving, provided that the believer recognizes the fitness of conceding immortality to *all* personalities, savage and even animal.¹ As that is admittedly not the attitude of the ordinary believer, the negative verdict is thus, perhaps, less than popular. Contrasted with Bradley's pronouncement, it is a relatively unphilosophical handling of the philosophic problem, a kind of addendum to the 'Unseen Universe' of Balfour Stewart and Tait, which equally accepted the brain datum.²

James's position on Pragmatism, which claims to be scientifically philosophic, was formally taken up in the present century, and in view of his attempts to answer criticisms it may be reckoned an unfortunate effort to misapply a critical principle. All science may be counted "pragmatic" in the sense that it is a codification of truths found "to work." But the concept in question is always scientifically inseparable from the demand for tested truth. When, accordingly, it is sought to certificate doctrines in terms of a "Pragmatism" which so often really applies a superficial *social* and *personal* test, and is in practice content with that, the veridical content of the principle is gone.

What should be a definition and vindication of truth becomes a resort to social opportunism and an appeal to the prejudice of alleged "experience." James, strenuously seeking to vindicate the principle as veridical, shows in his replies to criticisms (*The Meaning of Truth: A Sequel to 'Pragmatism,'* 1909) the logical weakness of his case at best; and the use made of it for religious purposes is the only one practically in view. Indeed, his own resort to it is too palpably an effort to rehabilitate 'The Will to Believe,' seen to be nocent to reason. Yet his zest for "radical empiricism" will always lend value to his writing, despite "that incoherency of mind of which the majority of mankind happily enjoy the privilege" (*Human Immortality*, p. 25); and his personal and literary charm is persistent. It may be said of him, in the words of his curiously wrong estimate of Shakespeare (*Letters*, ii, 336), that his "rhetorical fluency.....made people take him for a more essentially serious human being than he was."³

22. Professor George Santayana, whose 'Character and Opinion in the United States' (1920) is the most competent criticism and estimate of recent American philosophy, appears to indicate that while William James had a wide and genial influence, especially after the return wave of his reputation from Europe, the repute of native philosophy after him lay rather with his colleague Professor Josiah Royce, who did much of his

¹ *Human Immortality*, pp. 64-87.

² *Id. note*, p. 98.

³ Cp. Santayana, p. 92: "He once said to me, 'What a curse philosophy would be if we couldn't forget all about it.'"

work in the present century. That able writer, however, had taken up his special position in 1897, in his 'Religious Aspect of Philosophy,' and in his Ingersoll Lecture on 'The Conception of Immortality' (1900). The former was a dialectically ingenious plea for theism to the effect that, while error is omnipresent, the fact implies, in terms of idealism, the existence of a "mind" which knows the truth. It is fairly obvious that, however such a theorem might satisfy or placate the demand for a God-idea, it could not any more than any other ethical hypostasis supply a criterion of truth, which must just be sought on the old logical and humanist lines.¹ And Royce added nothing to the hypothesis of a necessarily Good Mind, omniscient, infinite, absolute, yet self-revelatory,² as the basis of ethics.

Nor did he concur with James in his exposition of theism, though they were cordial and intimate friends.³ For James he was "rationalistic" in one of the senses in which James, seeking light in aspiration, thought the universe was not properly to be envisaged, even as James latterly reckoned Dr. James Ward to have exhausted his monotheistic method and to be ripe for the concept of "pluralism,"⁴ whatever that may be. Thus three typical philosophic expositors of theism for the average educated reader, at the end of the century, had no clear common ground. James and Royce, in particular, do not appear to be regarded as having done much for the vindication of Christianity, though both gave it their sympathy in advance.

Royce was in a sense "rationalistic" in that, like Caird, he looked to philosophic reasoning for truth, and not to verbal revelation, though he was "heir to the Calvinist tradition," and though "piety, to his mind, consisted in trusting divine providence and justice, and emphasizing the most terrifying truths about one's own depravity and the sinister holiness of God."⁵ Virtue consisted, he often said, "in holding evil by the throat."⁶ That could consist philosophically with rationalism, not with pantheism, and it left theism in its old quandary, with the old phantom of pessimism unlayed.⁷ His German training had given him no tolerance for German "frightfulness."

Royce's handling of the problem of immortality in his Ingersoll Lectures offers no intelligible support for the religious belief in that thesis in any of its concrete forms, being ruthlessly metaphysical and

¹ Cp. Santayana, p. 101.

² The present writer once suggested to Royce, in talk, that the history of the God-idea might usefully form part of any new attempt to expound it. Royce, however, would not admit that the history had any bearing on the validity of the re-statement.

³ Cp. the *Letters of James, passim*, and Santayana, p. 132.

⁴ *Letters*, ii, 314.

⁵ Santayana, p. 100.

⁶ *Id.* p. 416.

⁷ "There was a voluminous confusion in his thought" (Santayana, p. 127). That was the impression left by his lecturing. "His two thick volumes on *The World and the Individual* [with their explanatory supplement of over 100 pp.] leave their subject wrapped in utter obscurity" (*id.* p. 135).

only abstractly explorative. The question as to human immortality is hunted through the forms 'What is an Individual?' 'What is uniqueness?' 'What is a fact?' 'What is Reality?' 'What is the meaning?'—of everything in turn. The sole outcome is the verbal assurance that every item in the universe must be unique and as such a necessity of the whole, but that nevertheless we cannot realize what constitutes our own or any other individuality, which accordingly is realizable only in another existence. Immortality = an Individuality not even conceivable in the present life.

For this process and these results the lecturer refers us to his 'Religious Aspect of Philosophy' (1885), to his share in the 1897 volume on 'The Conception of God,' and to the first series of his Gifford Lectures, on 'Four Conceptions of Being' (1900). It must have been the verdict of many critical readers that a philosophic system which assumes Deity yields here neither any applicable doctrine of deity nor any cogitable concept of human immortality. The volubility of the lecture is in the ratio of its inconclusiveness. James at least sought more to come home to men's power of credence.

23. The century might be said to close, for English-speaking orthodoxy, with the Gifford Lectures of Professor James Ward on 'Naturalism and Agnosticism' (2 vols. 1899), which were warmly hailed as a truly satisfying attack on rationalism, duly alive with invective. The attack and the applause were thus the measure of the constriction of spirit on the religious side of things. Dr. Ward's main achievement, effected with much expenditure of temper,¹ was the detection of some of the dialectical inconsistencies in the writings of Spencer, Huxley, and others on the rationalist side. So much had been achieved, long before, by truth-seeking rationalist critics, of whose work Dr. Ward availed himself. The discreditable side of the procedure was the implicit assumption that such inconsistency was fatal to the rationalist case. In point of fact Dr. Ward was maintaining a thesis which is the vital negation of itself, being split by inconsistency from top to bottom; and he was implicitly accepted as vindicating a creed whose Sacred Books had been shown to be riddled beyond belief with contradictions, and whose dogma is their co-ordination. His doctrine of "intelligent" causation commits him to the causation of Agnosticism equally with Spiritism, of all evil as well as all good, of all unbelief as well as all belief; and his teleology is thus ethically nugatory.

Coming to the recognized issue, Dr. Ward makes the usual play with the assumption that Naturalism sees only "matter" (citing, as usual, no writer to that effect), and is unconscious of the actuality of "mind." Mind, in turn, he posited in the usual anthropomorphic fashion as being necessarily the mode of an Infinite Intelligence—a proposition analogous

¹ Among the epithets launched at Spencer are "ridiculous," "flimsy," "nonsense."

to saying that the Cosmos has an infinite digestion, an infinite brain, an infinite verbal faculty, and an infinite proclivity to rhetoric. To call mind "spirit" was assumed to be a vindication of religion in general. The vital issue is not once even perceived. Never does the spiritist grasp his nettle and say: "God produces bile, as He produces thought."

How little value for ethics remained with the spiritistic doctrine was demonstrated by the express contention that Laplace, who unanswerably declared to Napoleon that in astronomy he "had no need of that [God] hypothesis,"¹ was at once practically and ethically discredited as "hopelessly incompetent in the region of moral evidence"² by Napoleon's dismissal of him as an unsatisfactory official. All instructed men knew that as to his science Laplace's answer was irrefutably true, and that all science, as such, stands on his ground. But it was still only the students of history and morals who fully knew the profound falsity of the spiritist's implication that his creed is valid "in the region of moral evidence," and that its professors have there collectively exhibited virtue and efficacy. Some, conscious of the moral and intellectual nullity of the implication, wished for a moment that Clifford should return to smite the later professional spiritist as he had smitten those of his own decade. But a world which had to some extent read the history of Christendom, and was daily facing the iniquities of clerical ethic and the inanity of the moral thesis of 'Social Evolution,' was for practical purposes sufficiently informed to be adequately impervious to the pretence.

At that period the conviction that the pious Gladstone had been a pernicious official was held by myriads of his pious British antagonists. The temporary insanity of Newton, on the other hand, was by them no more admitted than were his divagations on prophecy to discredit him as a theist; neither was the temporary insanity of Comte admitted by his disciples or any one else to have disposed of him as a sociologist. That Jesus, Paul, and Mohammed had been by physiological experts indicated as "epileptics" was not mentioned by the spiritist, who appears to have been convinced that the Gospel Jesus or Paul would have satisfied Napoleon as a political administrator, and that all modern educated theists were similarly qualified. But neither did the professor discuss the competence of the freethinking Julius Cæsar.

The residual impression left by the work of Dr. Ward, as by that of Dr. Stirling, was that of the feverish animus of theistic philosophy at the end as at the beginning of the century. Martineau, indeed, had at times reached far higher levels, and Mr. Balfour, the amateur, had maintained amenity. It was the academic experts³—in Britain though not in America—who could not without the help of ill-feeling sustain the Godism

¹ Dr. Ward, citing W. W. R. Ball, gives the form "*any such hypothesis*" (work cited, i, 4). The familiar form is, "*Je n'ai aucun besoin de cette hypothèse*," and Dr. Ward's story that "Laplace drew himself up and answered bluntly" appears to be a modern fabrication. ² *Id.* pp. 43-44: ³ That is, some, not all.

of the earlier prime. And, writing for a troubled religious world which demanded reassurance and was visibly anxious to have it, they were quite naturally thus perturbed¹ and thus shrilly partisan.

Much play has been made, in the past generation, with the term Reality, as a covering for refashioned speculations about the "Power behind" the universe. It is used by writers who go on to speak of "Jehovah." In religious hands the term does vicarious duty with that other, "Values," which has served no less abundantly to substitute for the test of truth a really hedonist test of comfort for proclivities and prejudices, making men's inherited or inculcated presuppositions rank, untested, as the ultimate grounds of predication or assent. If we are to ask ourselves what "realities" and "values" are in the intellectual life of the majority, we shall be compelled to conclude that on the ecclesiastical as on some other sides of things they are logically false coin. One of the great realities of the common intellectual life, pre-eminently among the sacerdotal orders, is the dominion of purely passional leanings over all logical codes, and one of the greatest of current "values" is the emotional bias which repels the dry light of truth. Religious literature in general supplies most of the evidence. But philosophy furnishes its quota.

§ 2. *France*²

1. At the beginning of the century philosophy was as backward in France, under Napoleon, as in England. In the dearth of available scholars of philosophic training, the new "Faculté des Lettres de Paris," opened in 1809, was officered as best the Imperial Government could.³ The "witty and charming" La Romiguière handled philosophy in terms of psychology, proceeding upon but modifying Condillac; and Royer-Collard, the politician, a strong devotee of social order and authority, was appointed to a chair without any acquired qualification. He began his task, we are told, by picking up in a bookshop and reading a translation of the Scottish "Common Sense" philosopher Reid, upon which, with more energy than insight, he built up a theistic doctrine which he felt to be suited to the needs of French society.

2. It was from the lectures of those teachers that the young Victor Cousin (1792-1867) acquired his first philosophic notions. Already at twenty he was a lecturer in Greek; but philosophy at once excited his enthusiasm, and he eagerly assimilated the thought of his two masters. Later, he was enthusiastic for Kant, whom he first read in a Latin

¹ "In our large towns, in these days, in our capitals, in our villages, we are confronted by a vast mass of unbelief" (Stirling, *Philosophy and Theology*, p. 15).

² Philosophy in France has been shown in Chap. II, § 2, to have been already in part rationalistic even in the period of orthodox ascendancy. Its progress has therefore been here indicated, in conspectus, from the Napoleonic period to the end of the century, as a practically continuous progress to predominant rationalism.

³ Jules Simon, *Victor Cousin*, 1887, pp. 6, 11.

translation ; still later, when he had visited Germany, he was captured in turn by Jacobi, the critic of Kant, by Schelling, and by Hegel, whom he was one of the first to acclaim ; and, yet again, by Plotinus and Proclus, to whom the Germans led him. The result was a philosophy fused rather by rhetoric than by logic, an unsystematic system, as it were, constituted by rings of growth, like a tree. Avowedly an eclectic, and by mental turn a rhapsode, Cousin did but graft one philosophy on another, reaching no clear synthesis. He was, besides, finally constrained by his official position when he was restored to teaching functions.¹ After alarming the pietists² by his doctrine of the Absolute, he settled down, as an administrator of the University system, to enforcing on all professors, whatever their "system," the teaching of "the existence of God, Providence, the spirituality and immortality of the soul, freewill, and duty."³ Editing Abailard's *Sic et Non*, he could see that doubt is a "salutary exercise of the spirit." As an official teacher he would not see it.

It is in this aspect that he relates to the history of opinion in his age and country. His own prestige as a rhapsode was great, and he influenced many pupils, rather by reason of his powerful and assertive personality, early strengthened by his experience of life as a *gamin* in Paris, than by his thought, though his influence was heightened by his scholarly work as a translator of Plato and as editor of Proclus and Descartes and Abailard. He was indeed in many regards a scrupulous scholar ; and Taine's disparagement of his series of biographies of seventeenth-century Frenchwomen as pedantic is less than just. But he remains finally a representative rather of philosophic obscurantism and convention than of critical thought. His doctrine of the Absolute, suggested by Schelling (though contradictory to Schelling's), and his philosophy of experience, derived from Kant, have no logical coherence, and do but form a mosaic, framed in the interest of orthodox religion. Once officially influential, he set himself, like other semi-liberals of the Restoration, to the systematic employment of religion in schools and colleges as a means to moral order and political stability.⁴

3. Théodore Jouffroy (1796-1842), a gentler spirit whom the overbearing Cousin undervalued, counted more than he for sincere thinking. Cousin was "the most admirable tragedian of the time," a zealous and skilful declaimer, rehearsing his effects. Jouffroy was subdued, self-controlled, thus impressing the stronger brains where Cousin captivated the weaker.⁵ Of Swiss descent, with a Swiss seriousness, he found himself at seventeen, at the École Normale, stripped by his own criticism of his hereditary Catholic beliefs, yet avowing, "I was an unbeliever, but I detested unbelief." In the prevailing dearth of qualified men he

¹ As to the sensation made by Cousin's *Cours de Philosophie* in 1828, see Hamilton, *Discussions*, pp. 1-2. ² Simon, p. 8. ³ *Id.* p. 115. ⁴ *Id.* pp. 122-32.

⁵ Taine, *Les Philosophes classiques du XIX^e Siècle en France*, 3e édit. pp. 203-6.

became a teacher even earlier than Cousin, actually giving lessons in philosophy at nineteen; and it was only after some years of frequently shaken health and deep thinking that he compromised himself by attacking Christianity before his pupils, to the indignation of the masterful Royer-Collard.¹ Naturally, he lost his teaching posts, like Cousin, in the panic reaction of 1820-22. It was as a private teacher, standing aloof alike from the militant freethinkers and the sacerdotalists, that he developed his philosophy; though in the liberal reaction of 1828 he became again an official instructor at the *École Normale* and the *Sorbonne*.

Then came in 1832 the Young Catholic reaction against him, led in the schools by Ozanam,² which he quietly withstood. Dying at forty-six, he left behind him the pattern of a life of signal sincerity, and a body of teaching which to a considerable extent made for sound thinking in psychology and ethics, though he refused to take the vital step of connecting psychology with physiology. His advance consisted in treating psychology substantively without imposing on it any cosmic theories. This was really a circumspect return to the standpoints of Diderot and Condillac. On the other hand, his primary concern over the problem of progress, which in his youth made him recoil from the methods of ideology, led him to a kind of agnostic meliorism, in which his emotional theism played only a subsidiary part. Out of it all he left to the men of his day a much-needed gospel of resignation to an evolution which could not be hurried. It made its appeal, as we have seen, in America.

4. Over against the official philosophy and these non-concluding tentatives of Jouffroy stood out, in the middle decades of the century, the "Positive" system of Auguste Comte, which was in truth not so much a philosophy as a demand for the abandonment of all metaphysic, all attempts to solve or grapple with the problem of the infinite cosmos, all attempts, even, to carry back the scientific study of world-formation and the evolution of organisms, and, at the same time, the attempt to reach a philosophy of mind by introspection. By sympathetic students his chief contribution to philosophic thinking is held to be his "law of the three stages," to wit, a primary "theological stage" in human history, lasting from primary animism through polytheism and the theocracies into Christianity; a secondary "metaphysical stage," in which deities are replaced by philosophic abstractions of many kinds; and a final stage, the "positive," in which metaphysics are set aside by the scientific method which accepts only experientially demonstrable knowledge.

This analysis of a general mental process has admittedly great suggestiveness, provided it is taken as stating recurring sequences, and not a specific historical progression. It is, indeed, a socio-psychological

¹ Adam, p. 230.

² At that time joined by the young Jules Simon.

rather than a sociological analysis, and thus partakes of the nature of a philosophic generalization. Its originality, sometimes disputed, is of minor importance; but it should be compared with Benjamin Constant's thesis of *four* stages in ethico-religious evolution.¹ Constant puts as an obvious generalization the sequence: (1) A primitive stage of ignorance, in which physical forces are alone worshipped; (2) a stage of partial scientific knowledge, in which adoration "retires to the ground of the moral"; (3) the sequence of cause and effect in the moral world being discovered, religion restricts itself in metaphysic and "spirituality"; (4) later, "the subtleties of metaphysic being abandoned as incapable of explaining anything, it is in the sanctuary of our soul that religion happily finds its inexpugnable asylum."

Constant might be said to provide Comte, in the last "stage," with the formula of his Religion of Humanity, though Comte did not bethink him of extending his "law" to include the fourth stage. Between them, in any case, the formulas amount to a retrospective and prospective view of human life in which the past is to be consummated in a new "religion"; and as all practical religion-making is outside the concept of philosophy as a "Knowledge of Knowledges," they leave for progressive thinkers the task of reopening the whole inquiry in a scientific as against a hortatory temper. Comte and Constant alike seek to impose on their fellows their personal equation—the psychological state, still not uncommon, of men who feel that outgrown bodies of belief about the universe, inasmuch as they set up a common (never universal) state of feeling, must be followed up by a permanent hypostasis of the feeling in question, at any cost to logic and consistency. We shall meet with the idea in so good a mind as F. A. Lange. In France less than anywhere could such a dictation find acceptance among competent minds.

5. French philosophy thus stood divided, in the late 'fifties, like the philosophy of England and Germany, between (*a*) systems which sought to buttress the traditional religion and (*b*) a powerful and growing movement towards the dismissal of all theological conceptions of the universe, of the problems of conduct, and of the course of human affairs. Victor Cousin, in his volume *Du Vrai, du Beau, et du Bien* (1853; 5e édit. rev. 1856), regarded by him and others as the substance of his teaching, stood as the professed exponent of "spiritualism," that is, of an alliance between philosophy and religion, in which the former was recognized as appealing only to a very small minority,² while the latter was the necessary mental and moral support of the great majority. The function of philosophy was mainly to save religion from superstition, for which reason it must be left "free." As to the truth of the religion, there is simply no pretence of affirming it; religion is vindicated as "beautiful," and as necessary to the maintenance of "monarchy and liberty."³ In

¹ *De la Religion*, 1824, tom. i, liv. i, ch. vii, p. 107. ² Éd. 1856, p. 430. ³ *Id.* p. 431, *u.*

1860 we find Cousin joining hands with Dupanloup to denounce "the materialistic and atheistic philosophy," and to declare that "spiritualism is represented by Christianity," and that "thus the Holy Father is the representative of the whole spiritual and moral order."¹

6. Disinterested thinkers like Pierre Leroux were entitled to say that this was not a philosophy at all, but a patchwork of opportunism; and in 1856 there came forward a new combatant, keenly bent on clearing the ground of all such architecture. Henri Taine (1828-93; baptized Hippolyte Adolphe) had begun his brilliant career with an *Essai sur les fables de La Fontaine* (1853) which introduced into French criticism a virtually new style and method (though it hinted of Diderot), and, in the same year, with a prize essay on Livy, equally marked by individuality and force. In the *Philosophes classiques du XIX^e Siècle* the same analytic and expository powers are turned to the courteous but stringent dissection of the five outstanding French philosophers of the previous generation—La Romiguière, Royer-Collard, Maine de Biran, Cousin, and Jouffroy.

The method is one of alertly respectful approach, each writer in turn being acclaimed, even generously, for his best qualities and his literary powers. An exception is made in the case of Maine de Biran, who is first fallen upon, with amusing fury, by a quoted friend who finds in his style a turbidity that leaves all German competition far behind. On this follows an amicable explanation, by Taine, that the philosopher really knew what he meant, and that he can be made intelligible by translation into simple speech; whereupon the indignant assailant concedes that it must be a strong mind that is not reduced to imbecility by the use of such a diction. In the case of the other four thinkers there come, first, compliments on their powers of expression. Then follows the calm exposure of their fallacies of method, inference, and presupposition.

Cousin, the most prominent, comes off worst, after being most elaborately handled. For Jouffroy Taine had the respect which that teacher earned from most of his pupils. He was "thinker, not orator," the latter being the fit label of Cousin. But Jouffroy also incurs serious criticism as being vague and inexact in his psychology where precision and concreteness are essential to scientific work. The book as a whole is a criticism, disclaiming any production of a new system, but proceeding on strictly "positive" lines, with no allusion to "Positivism" as a system. Taine, we are told, did not "discover" Comte till 1860. Nonetheless, perhaps all the more, his treatise is a manifesto of positivist science, laying down in advance the lines on which, fourteen years later, he was to proceed in his treatise *On Intelligence* (1870), the most solidly scientific of his speculative works.

In his famous *History of English Literature*, certainly, Taine is not

¹ I. de Saint-Amand, *L'Apogée de Napoléon III*, pp. 42-43.

truly "positive." His formula of "the race, the *milieu*, the moment" (a theorem framed from hints in Hegel and in Montesquieu), taken as a scientific account of the causal conditions of any given literary production, never won acceptance save among his special school, and has not survived even there. It was in fact a premature reduction of a complex problem to a false simplicity, leaving out of account precisely the most important factor, that of individual gift. No English critic was ever satisfied by the result, as apart from the unquestioned brilliance of the criticism of individual works and men; and when Taine, after producing the *De l'Intelligence*, proceeded to bring his manifold powers to bear on a fresh task of sociological generalization, the study of the causation and action of the French Revolution, there was revealed the same infirmity in a number of summary statements. His power lay in the exercise which he prescribed, the exact study and statement of concrete fact; and it is for this, in the later stages of his narrative, that his massive work on the Revolution remains valuable.

But while he thus unwittingly revealed the arduousness of the scientific ideal, he was from the first a potent force in the direction of psychological study. It has even been claimed that experimental psychology derives from his lead; though he avowedly proceeded upon his English predecessors. On any view, he visibly stands at the parting of the ways in French philosophy after the Restoration period of official accommodations; and his master faculty of terse and vivid exposition gave him a width of influence such as was not compassed by Feuerbach. It made broadly for sanity of thought. As against the survivals of Saint-Simonism and Fourierism, wilful Utopisms which vainly professed to be philosophic, and as against the impossible and fundamentally reactionary "construction" of the later Comte, Taine's thought stood on the solid ground of critical realism. He was thus one of the chief intellectual forces of his time.


7. In 1865, Professor Paul Janet (1823-99), a pupil of Cousin, recognizes that there is a "crisis" in French philosophy, and proceeds to discuss it, beginning with Taine, whom he criticizes with much intelligence, ticking off his "inventions," among them the unlucky formula that a tested perception is a "true hallucination." He confesses, however,¹ that the "spiritual" philosophy of the first half of the century, generalized by Cousin, has in the past ten years suffered grave reverses, and is forced to a reconstruction, which has been variously undertaken by Émile Saisset,² Jules Simon,³ and Elme M. Caro.⁴ Janet is of their party, but does not appear to feel that they are triumphant.⁵ His own

¹ *La Crise philosophique*, 1865, p. 6. ² *Essai sur la philosophie religieuse*, 1859.

³ *La religion naturelle*, 1856.

⁴ *L'Idée de Dieu et ses nouveaux critiques*, 1864.

⁵ His weakest argument is the demand (p. 25) to know why, if the old Condillacian theories are right and those of Cousin wrong, the former "succumbed." All men knew that there had been merely an official substitution in the university teaching.



HIPPOLYTE ADOLPHE TAINE

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position is indicated in his final declaration that Taine's positivism is the negation not only of all metaphysic but of all ethic (*toute morale*)—a position destined to be the Waterloo of "spiritualism." Long before, religious men had realized that if morality cannot be understood as the evolution of a social need it is at the mercy of all fanaticism. Janet, as theist, could but see that his intuitionist theism and his ethic were on a similar footing, and like many English theists who followed him, he decided that the moral intuition must be made to seem the religious one.

In Janet's survey, Renan figures already as seeing in the world problem a mere perpetual flux of opinion, yielding no absolute truth, the beliefs of mankind varying with their conditions, and giving rise to contingent philosophies. Thus Renan is closely akin to Taine. The latter presents the philosophy of the fact, the former the philosophy of the phenomenon, two aspects of the same concept. Yet Taine seeks precision, while Renan regards precision as unattainable, and addresses himself to generalizations where Taine pursues the individual. Janet's account hardly chimes with the later developments; but it is noteworthy that, as viewed by him, already in 1865 Renan has no theism left, seeing in God only "an ideal without any reality." Confessedly, this is a distillation from the unsystematic thought of Renan's earlier essays and his book on 'Averroës and Averroïsme' (1852). But while Taine and Renan are thus presented as dismissing theistic systems without offering a system of their own, that is seen to belong to their position, which is a denial that any system explaining the universe can have any validity.

For himself, Janet fully avows that the spiritual system of the last generation is formally obsolete in that it takes no account of the ever-enlarging scientific view of the universe. He could do no less when two Catholic priests were accepting the new science. But he has only an *à priori* "must" to offer for his doctrine of a benevolent Providence, after he has insisted that the definition of the soul by Littré and Robin amounts to "pure materialism."¹ To declaim against "mutilating the human spirit" is no answer to the thesis that the entozoic soul is indemonstrable. The polemic against a science which denies metaphysic to be capable of real discoveries is eloquent, but no more.

When Janet comes to Vacherot, the cause of philosophic spiritualism is seen to be in worse case than ever. Vacherot, whom he politely terms in effect an atheist,² had indignantly repelled the charge, declaring himself as hostile to atheism as to pantheism, which last he almost found "criminal." Pantheism, declared Vacherot, by joining God to the world, saddles him with all its evils and agonies, which is intolerable. On the other hand, the God of Vacherot is a pure ideal, existing solely in the mind—the unreal God of Renan over again. Evidently spiritual

¹ *Id.* pp. 114–15.

² *Id.* p. 146.

philosophy had come to as grave a crisis in France as that reached in England, and it was for Janet to attempt a new solution.

8. This he at length undertook in his large work, *Les Causes Finales* (1876), which may be counted his main philosophic effort. It is scholar-like and in part workmanlike, inasmuch as it is critical of kindred undertakings. But it is foredoomed to frustration. Janet sets out to substitute for the concept of special creation, which he sees to be cancelled by evolutionary science, that of a Theos who is evolving things in terms of his archetypal ideas, these involving progressive change. Yet there is not even a pretence of conceiving the whole cosmic process in terms of purpose. Vast multitudes of phenomena, for M. Janet, are not to be thought of as each having a purpose: the innumerable frightful sequelæ of a volcanic explosion, for instance, are admittedly unmanageable in that way. Thus there is no general scientific concept. But, he insists, if there are in the universe a great number of phenomena which in no way suggest the idea of an aim (*un but*), on the other hand (*en revanche !*), there are others which, rightly or wrongly, "provoke this idea *imperiously and infallibly* : such are the organs of living beings, and above all of the higher animals."¹ This is the introduction to a work which claims² that the principle of Final Causes is not *à priori*, but an induction or inference.

Obviously the alleged "principle" is but a reaffirmation of the primary animist hypothesis, which takes itself to be an irresistible intuition, but which even in its primitive form was more consistent than M. Janet's, inasmuch as the early animist saw divine purpose in *all* the details and sequelæ of an eruption. The theist is but making the usual attempt to find a providential order in *life* and in the affairs of *man*—barring the awkward inferences from the destruction of Pompeii or the wrecking of Lisbon. We are only dealing once more with the poetic or emotional impulse to find a Father in Heaven, who does nothing "in vain," so far as we are concerned. And not only does M. Janet evade the problem of purpose in inorganic Nature: he contributes no coherent theory of the evolution of man in society.

The answer to his elaborate treatise is (1) that he merely transfers to theism the difficulties which he professes to find in a non-theistic view of things. His central argument is the nugatory one that without the hypothesis of a Final Cause, which is the Purpose of an Infinite Power infinitely good, Evolution is to him inexplicable.³ That is, he insists on a morally anthropomorphized cosmos, a cosmos reduced to the idea of plan, which is as strictly human and finite a concept as any. For rational thought the cosmos, being envisaged as infinite—that is, describable only in terms of a concept which can but negate limits—is necessarily "inexplicable" to any one. "Explanation," in the full sense, is a term applicable only to statements of human experience as such. So-called

¹ Work cited, pp. 9-10.

² *Id.* pp. 12-13, 21.

³ *Id.* p. 369 *sq.*

explanations of cosmic phenomena are but statements of observed invariable sequences: the sequence is just the "law," and only on experience of sequence do we rest the concept of universal "causation"; which becomes essential to all reasoned thought on phenomena.

No scientific man now professes to explain the Infinite. Janet can affect to do it only by alleging a "must" which will square with no phenomena, inasmuch as his antagonist, on his own theory, either "must" find it incogitable or is merely lying. There argument ends. The final logical answer to Janet is (2) that by imposing the essentially finite concept of purpose on an eternal process he is propounding a mere countersense, like "an infinite leap" or "an amiable iceberg." The practical answer is that "morality" is just the human effort to "moralize" a social life in which moral ideals and impulses are forever clashing; and that if there is divine purpose here the purpose must include all the frustrations. The attempt to reconcile the thesis with the facts is thus cumulatively repugnant to reason in the ratio of its formal elaboration.

9. Abundant and brilliant as the output of French philosophy has been in the last quarter of the century, it cannot be said that so far as theism is concerned there has been any logical advance on the performance of Paul Janet. Realizing some of his miscarriages, indeed, some have sought different modes for the restatement of the "spiritual" creed. Thus M. Jean Ravaisson-Mollien (1813-1900) argued from the datum of "mechanism" to a supreme mechanist,¹ and inasmuch as men of science have persisted in calling the cosmic process "mechanism" they pay the dialectic penalty. But the "mechanist" inference is only the old resort to the anthropomorphic fallacy of purpose. And when Ravaisson and others seek to make the fact of æsthetic joy, which is ostensibly non-utilitarian, an argument for a "personal" control of the cosmos, they have only added a new link to the chain of paralogism.

The emergence of æsthetic sensation commonly so called (as distinguished from direct physiological pleasure) is certainly a notable phenomenon in evolution. When men found that an Arab horse, or a tree, or a flower, stood out from other things in respect of giving them the delight which we say is born of beauty, they had advanced a step which cannot now be understood as a simple advantage in the struggle of species for survival. Before the philosophers, the æsthetes had been content to refer the problem back to the "creator." But that reference can no more satisfy the æsthetic than it can the moral investigator; and it involves the recurring fallacy of deciding, over each new "higher" problem, that the case was "simple" before the higher issues were faced. At no stage is it any simpler, logically considered, than at any other. And at all stages alike the anthropomorphic solution, "there

¹ Cited by Prof. J. A. Gunn, *Modern French Philosophy*, 1922. M. Ravaisson's outstanding work is his *Rapport sur la philosophie en France au xix^e siècle*, 1867.

must be a God like us," is but the inveterate reversion to unreasoned animism.

10. When, then, M. Jules Lachelier (1832-1918), following on Ravaisson, once more rearranges the cards by way of insisting that "only by seeing the variety of all phenomena in the light of an organic unity can we find *any meaning* in the term universe," or "any *rational basis* for the unity of phenomena and of experience,"¹ he is again only inserting an *à priori*. The men of science and the politicians alike, making no pretence to discover the meaning of the universe, do every day what he says they cannot, and this without any such verbalist unification of the data as he commands. The applause given to such newly worded vociferation, indeed, represents only the theological tradition in which so many academic philosophers and psychologists have been bred. There has been no new logical analysis whatever.

11. On the other hand, the "Personalism" which the learned and gifted Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) opposed to the abstraction of the Absolute is only the older substituted for the newer verbalism. Renouvier, in some respects the most accomplished specialist of his time, appears to have let his powerful temperament have the casting vote in all his problems. Justly did he argue, as against Comte, that the collocation of the sciences cannot yield a "philosophy" in the old sense of an "explanation" of an infinite cosmos; though Comte could have answered that he did not pretend to give *such* a philosophy. But when Renouvier deduces from the fact of men's certitude over the persistence of causation a personal presence behind, guaranteeing it, he is just repeating the primary anthropomorphic step; and he never answers the question, How comes it that so many other men now do not repeat it?

All these debates return to the issue of the basis of ethics; and upon that issue Renouvier remained fatally committed to a countersense. As a "personalist" he should logically have been a Calvinist, recognizing that his God had foreordained all actions; because if they were not so foreordained there was no sense in maintaining the "personal" guarantee of all causation. On the other hand, if they were so foreordained there was no sense in the attempt to find human reasons for a philosophy of morals. If the problem of the cosmos is to drive us back to a personal Theos, the personal Theos should drive us back to revelation, and to a treatment of *all* ethical phenomena as explicable only in terms of Divine Will. By insisting that men are morally self-determinant, and calling that phenomenon "free-will," the school of Renouvier contradict their own theism.

For it is plainly true that men as reasoning creatures are the only "masters of their fate" of whom they can have any testable notion; and it is equally true that as such thinkers they are determinate by their

¹ Gunn, as cited, p. 120.

capacities and incapacities, which are "explicable" solely as resulting from their structure and their *instruction*. For themselves they are, so to say, the "last word" in evolution. Yet they can rise only in respect of their footing. To call that rise an act of "free-will," as does Renouvier, is a mere abuse of language. Once more it must be pointed out that the term "free" is wholly anthropomorphic in its bearing, and can apply only to actions considered as checked or unchecked by other actions. The "will to" any course is just the balance of the motives for and against, and man's will differs from the tiger's only in respect of the variety and complexity of the motivation. The word "free" merely addles the problem; for no man thinks it worth while to say the tiger has free-will.

It was the sheer irrelevance of Calvinism (which is would-be consistent theology) to human *polity* that drove Calvinists on the one hand to the flat denial of their own principles (making evil independent of God's will), and Arminians on the other hand to the framing of a more inconsistent theology which by its greater laxity seemed to evade the countersense. And it is the sheer irrelevance of all theism to human polity—seen in all the theistic systems—that has driven men to the atheological position, at which they eliminate the countersense by confessing that in the cosmos they know only sequences, and cease to pretend to see the Infinite in terms of the anthropomorphisms of Will and Purpose.

The last hope of theistic philosophy in our historic period, accordingly, lay in certain aspects of the "new" philosophy of M. Henri Bergson,¹ particularly that in which M. Bergson declares that men are "free" inasmuch and insofar as they rise above deduction and frame new hypotheses not obviously describable as inductions. He, and some of his followers, seem to think that such ostensible leaps of thought transcend "intelligence" and causation.² But these phenomena of theoretic discovery are perfectly recognized, by evolutionists, as part of the process of evolution. They are analogous to the emergence of the perception of Beauty. They are even involved in the process of learning, no less than in that of discovering. They amount to new perceptions of Relation. And in the process of theoretic discovery the false hypotheses, which are so sadly abundant, are on the same emergent footing with the true. Yet M. Bergson's philosophy gives them as such no harbourage. He does not seem even to recognize them as simply unsuccessful variants. His concern seems to have been to suggest that evolutionists do not recognize the progressive motion of knowledge, and that to call it "creative" is somehow to get rid of the principle of sequent causation

¹ *Les Données immédiates de la conscience*, 1889 (Eng. trans. *Time and Free-Will*, 1910); *Matière et Mémoire*, 1896 (Eng. trans. 1911).

² M. Bergson's system as a whole is briefly discussed in the present writer's *Rationalism*, 1912, pp. 64-71.

and to reinstate the concept of a "free" will in man, though not in animals.

But this device of M. Bergson (which may be said to have been anticipated by Dr. Shadworth Hodgson when he argued that men were "unfree" only when under irresistible need or appetite) does not really evade the logical dilemma. What he calls "free" mental action or will is either part of the cosmic causation or it is not. If it *is*, and if the causation be stated in terms of "divine will," we are back to pantheism or Calvinism, and the ill-distribution of mental capacity remains part of the fatal ethical dilemma of theism. Only by noting the causation are we scientific or philosophic at all. Only by recognizing the facts of sequence as ground for philosophic tolerance, in a strife that must persist because of the divergence of wills, do we escape self-stultification as moralists.

To say, on the other hand, that the psychic process of choice and preference is cosmically "free" is only to stultify that term afresh. Strictly it has become as meaningless as would be "free gravitation." To attempt to make it work at one point as a negation of the concept of causation is finally to wreck (philosophically) the whole theistic system by cancelling the very concepts of providence, plan, purpose, and control for which theism contends. And so, at the century's end, in France and elsewhere, theism in philosophy remained non-suited, for M. Bergson had given it no logical help. His odd insistence on making "real time" mean only the passing instant—as if thinkers had not always realized the datum that "the present" is a poise "between two eternities"—raised only the verbal issue as to which is the best practical use of the term, and could in no way affect the fact that all reasoning as to belief and action must proceed on a study of the recorded or inferred past.

12. If there is any better modern French argument for theism than those above examined it has escaped the present reporter, who has necessarily confined his philosophic survey to that side of the cosmic problem. Theism gains nothing, for instance, from the brilliant essay of M. E. de Roberty on 'The Unknowable' (1889).¹ As he sums up, the problem of "The Unknowable" is quite distinct from that of the limits of human knowledge, and they must not be confused. The former resolves itself into a variant of the series of the Absolute and the Infinite and the Immanent, which work out as incogitable abstractions or negations of knowledge; just as the problem of the Infinite Person ends in notation of a countersense.

Thus Religion, insofar as it professes to face its logical or metaphysical difficulties at all, is in the position of employing verbalisms framed to confuse the recipient, by way of formally reconciling him to the machinery of prayer, ritual, and sacraments which constitute the

¹ *L'Inconnaissable: sa métaphysique—sa psychologie.*

economic means of all the instituted systems. The only practical alternative is a resort to a Christism which predicates a Personality to be taken on trust, with its (selected) message, since there can be no pretence of finding in the New Testament an intelligible statement of a credible faith.

§ 3. *Germany*

1. As against the forensically religious philosophy of Hegel, a certain increasing rationalistic influence was wielded by the powerful educationist, psychologist, and metaphysician Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776–1841), who has been more studied in later generations than in his own. Reacting against the pantheism and the “nature-philosophy” of Schelling and the dialectic of Hegel, he constituted a critical force of no little importance. “His criticisms,” writes one of another school, “are worth more than his constructions”¹—which means that the idealists felt his criticisms hard to answer, and found in him no clear-cut system which they could attack. Herbart’s relation to religious beliefs, however, was finally neutral and agnostic, though stated in conciliatory terms, on rather conventional lines, inasmuch as he admitted a “necessity” for religion while denying that anything could be known of God even in terms of a design argument. The result has been, according to Zeller, that in Herbart’s school there has appeared, alongside of his own predominant tendency to a cautious moral rationalism, a “crass wonder-worship.”² He thus remains significant chiefly as an educationist and æsthetician.

2. Alike from the religious and the professional point of view, the most prestigious name in German philosophy after the middle of the century is that of Rudolf Hermann Lotze (1817–81), whose special relation to critical freethought is to be gathered from his posthumously published lectures on the Philosophy of Religion.³ Coming after the break-up of the Hegelian school into a Right and a Left, Lotze set himself tentatively to recompose progressively a teleological philosophy in the light of ethics,⁴ as various Englishmen were to do after him; and his attitude to the Christian religion is philosophically conservative. His Lectures constitute a classic example of what may be impressively done for the formal salving of faith by a philosophic purpose and temper, as against the kind of emotional reconstruction attempted by Coleridge.

As Lotze’s main philosophy was approached by imposing *a priori* a teleological theism on a nature-philosophy which had been so scientifically mechanistic as to make many count him a thoroughgoing materialist, he was partly qualified to work an equivalent transformation on the body of

¹ Prof. James Ward in *Encyc. Brit.*

² *Geschichte der deutschen Philosophie seit Leibniz*, 1883, p. 865.

³ Eng. trans. edited by F. C. Conybeare, *Outlines of a Philosophy of Religion*, 1892.

⁴ *Microkosmos*, 1856–64 (Eng. trans. 1886); *Metaphysik* (1841, 1879).

Christian dogmas. In this case, however, the procedure is contrariwise. The cosmic philosophy bestows personality on the Absolute because there is no other way of making the Absolute count for anything. The outlined philosophy of religion seeks to make the Christian creed appear credible by dismissing alike most of its dogmas and its ethics, taking its historicity for granted, and pronouncing that Jesus may fitly be called the Son of God—especially as all religious persons feel themselves to be Children of God—because “we are *certainly* justified in holding that the relation in which He stood to God was not only different in degree to that in which we stand, but also *unique* in *kind*”;¹ and that, if we properly refrain from analysing our impressions, we “cannot but feel” that in Christ’s life work “an infinitely valuable and unique act of healing has been performed for mankind.”²

That is not merely the sum and substance but the whole body of Lotze’s special philosophy of Christianity; and the only question it raises is whether any one, in Germany or elsewhere, finds in it any significance, save as an ostensibly philosophic encouragement to believing Christians to “carry on somehow.” It is formally connected with dicta to the effect that, if and when we have decided to believe in a Personal-Relative-Absolute, we naturally want to give effect to our pre-supposed unity with God by forming a community with other men; and when we find an existing community professedly aiming, no matter how, at indicating a belief in such a unity, we ought to join them, and ought to be allowed to do so without being asked any teasing questions.

Lotze, it may be guessed, would tranquilly have admitted that his prescription would be equally valid for Jews or Moslems who do *not* believe that Jesus was *sui generis*, though he would hardly have proposed to them to join Christian Churches. The one condition he makes is that no Church should pretend to hold the only door to salvation. What salvation is, he confesses, he really does not know, save that it means comfort in the thought of probation for a future life, though he knows that it cannot be what evangelical Christianity says it is.³ In sum, Churches of any sort are good things, provided that they do not, like the Catholic, claim to be the only way to heaven. Thus is Protestantism “defecated to a pure transparency,” as nearly as may be, and Lotze for Germany plays the part of Cousin for France.

The utter naïveté of the procedure, when reduced to its outcome, belongs to Lotze’s benignly sibylline character and his capacity of thinking alternately, with no logical nexus, in terms of ultra-scientific physics and physiology and of the subjectivism which finds solace in an Absolute labelled Personal simply because it is otherwise clearly not of any use to ethics, however little use it may be when so anthropomorphized. His admirers, avowedly hard pressed to understand him, describe him as

¹ Trans. p. 172.

² *Id.* p. 173.

³ *Id.* pp. 173-5.



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sedative against scepticism ; and the sceptic may freely grant that he is even soporific, in that he indicates all the rebuttals to the theistic case save when he begs the question. The *Religionsphilosophie* in fact supplies the rebuttals so candidly and so explicitly that it has been regarded as a virtual contribution to the propaganda of rationalism.

It certainly had no effect either in increasing the scanty attendance at the Protestant churches in Germany or reducing the Catholic congregations, which continued, under Lotze's philosophic veto, to exhibit the natural action of unthinking belief. Theists conscious of unity with God and disunity with Christian dogma were able to bear up in their relatively philosophic view that the conceptual unity in question could have nothing to do with sectarian gregariousness. At the same time the historic investigation of Christianity, to which Lotze seems never to have paid the slightest attention, proceeded at the hands of the more learned Protestant clergy, none of whom seems to have retained the notion of a Jesus different "in kind" from his contemporaries. The total effect of Lotze's posthumous manifesto was thus to emphasize, for competent minds, the indigence of religious belief as a working philosophy of life.

3. Of a very different character was the *Geschichte des Materialismus* of Friedrich Albert Lange (1828-75), which may be pronounced to be on the whole the most useful contribution to philosophy by Germany in the second half-century. Published in 1865, it won rapid appreciation,¹ despite hostility to Lange's many democratic activities, by the breadth of sympathetic comprehension which it reveals in no less degree than breadth of scholarship ; and what its author had at first regarded as an impermanent polemic was by him recast for a second edition (1873-75) as a scholarlike treatise, at once historical, critical, and expository. Its outstanding defect is that it assumes "Materialism" to be an unmistakable name for a known, formulated, persistent body of doctrine, of which no definition is attempted. As that, however, is the practice of philosophic writers in general, he is hardly to be specially censured. The final task was indomitably carried out in the few years of broken and sinking health which had been left him by a selfless devotion to the multitude of public activities that had for him constituted the most pressing duty of life.

Humanitarian through and through, with a natural bias to poetics,² Lange emerges as a man of action. Successively or simultaneously political publicist, secretary to a Chamber of Commerce, newspaper editor, partner in a printing-house, popular educator, university educator, Professor of Philosophy, alternately in Switzerland and in Germany, he shared in the life of his time to an extent rare among German philo-

¹ Dr. Pfeiderer (*Development of Theology in Germany*, Eng. trans. p. 183) speaks of the book as having "enjoyed a brief celebrity." It reached in 1908 its eighth edition (revised by H. Cohen).

² His university thesis, at Bonn in 1851, was on *Quaestiones metricae*.

sophers.¹ Spiritually he belonged to the period of 1848, with its extravagant hopes of political and social reconstruction; and his *Arbeitsfrage* ('The Labour Question,' 1865, 5th ed. 1894) remains, with his *Geschichte*, a memorial of his devotion to the cause of popular progress. "The struggle against the struggle for existence" was for him the formula of social reform; and if his immediate social ideal remained partly under the direction of his youthful dream of a speedy World-Federation, it never affected the generous rectitude of his study and criticism of all phases of philosophic evolution. Mentally shaped before the advent of scientific evolutionism, his scientific outlook made him promptly recipient of its philosophic importance, though it never fully impregnated his prognostic thought.

In Lange's hands, as in Büchner's, the old sham-fight over Materialism is largely disposed of, even when the former talks of "surmounting materialism" and treats as inconsistent Büchner's repudiation of the conventional definition. Like Büchner, though less clearly, he reaches the recognition that so-called materialism is not ultimately an attempt to "explain" the infinite cosmos, but a reduction to veridical form of man's actual knowledge concerning it in all fields of survey. Yet he accompanied his historical and critical exposition with a constant declaration of the play of "idealism," in the non-technical and misleading sense of outreaching speculation, both social and philosophic, analytic and sympathetic; thus setting up a new illusory antithesis in place of the otherwise illusory one of the academics. Son of a good evangelical Professor of Theology, who had raised himself from the position of a poor labourer, Lange had never been really pietistic; while always retaining on his socialistic side a practical goodwill for the "Christian idealism" which had been expressed in the largely clerical movement of Christian Socialism in England. The outcome is a subjective ideal of a "future religion" which, like his "idealism," is rather socialistic than philosophic, and is really irrelevant to the problems of "materialism."

Obviously, there is no philosophic "surmounting" of materialism in advocacy of an idealism which expresses, not any new attempt to re-think the universe in terms of "mind," but a simple projection of hopes for the human future. Such hopes are cherished indifferently by religionists and rationalists. When Lange charges Büchner with having been moved by socio-political ideals, the criticism recoils on himself. Inasmuch as so-called materialism resolves itself into an unrestricted search into all causation, it cannot be surmounted by any faith which accepts and applies it. A man of science does not surmount his knowledge by cultivating music or poetry. The ideal of "the struggle against the struggle for existence" is a perfectly sequent plan for a society that

¹ Yet he could affirm that commercial egoism is a product of theoretic Materialism! In Germany as in England he must have known hard traders to be usually Christians.

realizes the nature of the past struggle; and if it be declared to be outside the scope of materialism to "explain" it, the statement can be understood only as a recognition that organized life is for ever progressively creative. That induction is in terms of science, not of a metaphysic which seeks to transcend the concept of a sequent causation embodied in organized life as such. The word "explain" is a fruitful source of confusion in philosophic debate. In one sense, no natural sequence can be "explained." In another, all scientific explanation consists simply in tracing sequence.¹

In his very lucid and comprehensive introduction to the reprint of the English translation of Lange's *History of Materialism* in one volume (1925), the Hon. Bertrand Russell writes (p. xii) that "The two dogmas that constitute the essence of materialism are: First, the sole reality of matter; secondly, the reign of law." No names or references are given for the first dogma; and we are conscious of the standing difficulty set up by the constant assumption that "materialism" is a body of doctrine well known to be systematized under that name, and widely propounded as Churches propound their creed. Yet there is no such body of doctrine. Büchner, who is presumably to be called a materialist if any one is, never denies "reality" to ideas as such, mind as such. On the contrary, he expressly (*Kraft und Stoff*, 16te Aufl. p. 71) recognizes reality as to be dually conceived, mind being one side of the duality; and he further denies that there exists any "Materialism.....which undertakes to explain all the phenomena of existence by matter alone." Moleschott held equivalent language.

"The reign of law," on the other hand, has doubtless been accepted as a fit formula by a number of ostensible materialists in common with "spiritists"; though, on the other hand, there are definite grounds for regarding some of the latter as denying the "reality" of matter. But it has frequently been pointed out that the term "law" is metaphorical and misleading, and that in any case (as Lotze saw) "law" is here a statement of a thought and not of the cosmic process in view. The scientific concept behind it is that of unbroken sequence of causation. It is only by impugning *that* conception as unwarranted that "materialism," as it really exists in scientific thought, can be said to be confuted. Such a confutation would certainly tend to re-establish the theological doctrine of a divine arbitrary Will operating incomprehensibly and incalculably throughout the cosmos.

In his analysis of the concept of "law" Mr. Russell remarks (p. xv) that it is "open to anybody to say that.....the actions of individual electrons have a certain range of caprice, within which

¹ Büchner puts the case in *Last Words on Materialism*.

there is no evidence for the reign of law," though "A man who maintained such a view dogmatically would be very rash, since to-morrow he might be refuted by some new discovery." Proceeding to biology and psychology, Mr. Russell, not asserting "that there is any positive evidence against the reign of law in this region," argues that the evidence in its favour is less strong, because there "prediction is as yet only possible within very narrow limits."

There need be no demur against leaving the case at that. Prediction as to earthquakes is possible only within very narrow limits, but even theologians now actually prefer to regard earthquakes as products of "material" causation, finding the older view ethically embarrassing. All that "materialists" appear to assert is that psychic phenomena, including all volitions, are parts of a process of sequent causation. If, then, it is warrantable to say, as does Mr. Russell (p. xvi), that "in the present condition of human knowledge.....either to assert or to deny the universal reign of law is a mark of prejudice; the rational man will regard the question as open," it would seem to follow that the assumption of universal sequent causation is in that predicament; in which case it will be difficult to be a rational man. Seeing, however, that Mr. Russell illustrates his position by noting the "perennial controversy" between determinism and the doctrine of Freewill, it may be suspected that there is a flaw in the reasoning. The dispute in question roots in a mere confusion of terms, set up to disguise a theological difficulty.

As the verbal theorem of Freewill has never given any difficulty to competent rationalists, so the hypothesis of *lacunæ* in causation may be dismissed as maintainable only by a theology which is no more "metaphysical" than the doctrine of Islam. When Mr. Russell concludes (p. xix) that "there is no good reason to suppose materialism metaphysically true," he is presumably to be understood in terms of his account of its *two* "dogmas." As the second is not known to be doctrinally maintained by anybody—though the late Dr. F. H. Bradley and Mr. Benn seemed to think it was a common position—the issue apparently falls.

A possible final point of issue with freethinkers as such is set up by Lange's final section on 'The Standpoint of the Ideal.' As the *eirenicon* of a dying humanitarian of noble character, it has a pathetic interest. It does not clearly consist with his definite pronouncement against the attempt to set up a Comtist or humanitarian cultus by way of replacing theological cults. Quite explicitly he writes in his table of contents: "Our cult of humanity has no need of religious forms"; and in the text he rejects Comte's "arbitrarily compiled Calendar of Saints,"¹ and the quasi-Comtist festivals proposed by Dr. Eduard Reich (a materialist) to

¹ *Geschichte des Materialismus*, 3te Aufl. 1877, p. 510.

be substituted for those of the Churches. Such schemes, he insists, have nothing in them of the nature of religion. Previously he had pointed to the dangers of tyranny involved in all systems of priesthood, including Comte's;¹ but even with those dangers eliminated he counts the cult non-religious.

Then he comes to his own prescription. "One thing is certain," he writes in his concluding section, "man needs a completion (*Ergänzung*)² of reality by an ideal world of his own making, and that the highest and noblest functions of his spirit (*Geist*) should in such creations coöperate."³ The application is that "free poetry may entirely leave the ground of the real and seize upon myth in order to lend words to the inexpressible. Here then we come to a completely satisfying solution of the question of the nearer and remoter future of religion."⁴

The upshot would appear to be that Germans may find what they want in Schiller's 'Realm of Shadows,' while Christians in general, after giving up their historic creed, may fruitfully continue to sing "Rock of Ages, cleft for me," that being a mythus open to no suspicion of reality. It may be left to Comtists to show whether or not they have myth enough in the 'Great Being' and the 'Great Fetish,' and to religionists to say what satisfaction they find in the prospect opened up for them. The sufficient reflection for the rationalist is that early associations and emotions very frequently thus reassert themselves on the bed of death; and that the valid evolutionist will not occupy himself in prescribing either æsthetic or religious recreations for a posterity which will certainly decide for itself in that as in more serious matters.

It would be interesting to know what Lange would have said had he known that Büchner and Moleschott were to the last as devoted to poetry as he. (He knew of Büchner's youthful poetic activities, and seems to reproach him with turning from poetry to seek truth.) Moleschott adored alike Homer and Goethe and Shakespeare and Dante. (*Für meine Freunde*, 1894, pp. 65, 299-305.) He was at least as enthusiastic about all manner of poetry as about the science which was his vocation; and his name for his conception of his task was "poetic reality" (p. 230). Büchner, in conversation, was rapturous in his adoration of Shakespeare. He in fact often regretted that he had not given himself like his now famous elder brother George and his brother Alexander, both political exiles, to a literary life; and among his literary remains is a long lyrico-dramatic composition entitled *The New Hamlet*, which his brother

¹ *Id.* pp. 506-7.

² Mr. E. C. Thomas not unjustifiably translates *Ergänzung* by "to supplement." But a "supplement to reality" would be a curious description of a procedure declared to be necessary, implying as it would an avowal that the supplemental thing is "unreal." I prefer to give Lange the benefit of the doubt at this point, though he loses it later.

³ *Id.* p. 545.

⁴ P. 546.

judicially disparaged (Memoir in *Last Words on Materialism*, p. xxv. Cp. pp. xiv, xxiii, as to Ludwig's poetic idealism), and three unfinished tragic pieces, *Cromwell*, *Rosamund*, and *Andrea Castagno*, as well as many other poetic fragments. When we recall how Shakespeare himself reveals his agnosticism and his indifference to the common creed, we are prepared to suspect that the common neo-theistic pose of relating poetically to the cosmos is a matter of self-certification by way of covering conscious lack of conviction. But there can be no question of pose about Lange, who was, like Büchner, a sincere and upright soul. His last mental activity consisted in dictating, on his deathbed, parts of his unfinished *Logik*.

Lange may find more agreement in his further declaration¹ that "One thing is certain"—he abounds finally in these prophetic certitudes—"if a New is to arise and an Old is to pass away, two great things must conjoin: a world-enflaming Ethical Idea and a Social Impulse powerful enough to raise the downtrodden masses by a high step." But this too is a reversion to the mood of 1848, the pre-evolutionary faith, conserved by Marxism, in a cataclysmic social change. The progressive change has been and is going on, and the ethical uplifting likewise, "without observation." Marxism, whose adherents in general and whose leaders in particular wanted to have nothing to do with religion, mythic or other, supplied after Lange's death a semblance of ethical idea and social impulse; and there came the World War, unhindered by the Marxists, and a republican Germany not very different from other republics.

It is enough to record, for the honour of Lange, that his cosmopolitan spirit never lent itself as did that of the aged Strauss to racial rancour. As he had discussed all materialist writers without a touch of the insolent arrogance of the usual philosophic historian on that head, so he treated the writers of all nations with an equal goodwill. Character in the aggregate is the last thing to be visibly elevated. Lange assuredly wrought to that end as best a man may, by a fine example.

4. A good deal of attention is given in the last chapter of Lange's *History of Materialism* to the case of Friedrich Ueberweg (1826-71), the translation of whose 'History of Philosophy' was for at least a generation a valued handbook in many English and American colleges.² It is noteworthy that Ueberweg, who was originally a theist, and quite conservative in his political tendencies, was latterly, in his discussions with his intimates, so much of a materialist that one of them, Henri Czolbe—a Materialist devoted to the Papacy!—emphatically described him as "Atheist and Materialist."³ Lange, on balance, finds this pronouncement unduly definite; but his own account of his many personal discussions with Ueberweg (of whom he wrote a memoir) makes it quite

¹ *Id.* p. 557.

² Eng. trans. with additions by Dr. Noah Porter of Yale, 2 vols. 1872. (Smith and Schaff's series of College Text-Books.)

³ Lange, i, 523.

clear that the latter had abandoned all theistic certitudes. Lange, who supposed himself to be philosophically opposed to Materialism in a sense which included all modes of thinking that rest on a materialistic method, finds Ueberweg finally a "Materialist," as a result of aversion from Kant.¹

It is unnecessary here to go into the metaphysical debate, which on Lange's part is a procedure of demanding how we can profess to know what we think we know about matter, when he has apparently no difficulty whatever in being sure that he has irreducible and irrefragable knowledge about the nature, needs, and destination of men in society. That attitude is the sufficient proof that metaphysical hare-coursing, avowed by Lange to be all "founded on illusion,"² can be carried on indefinitely without any bearing on belief as to life, fact, history, and conduct. The important thing is that Ueberweg had long privately renounced Christianity, even talking at times, in the German '48 manner, about the necessity of a thirty years' strife of blood for the "recognition of the Reformation"³—that is, for a procedure which should "reform it altogether." That he could still discuss with Lange the elusive conception of a "purified" religion is only another illustration of the atavistic survival of religious psychism in men who have rejected all details of creed.

But at every definite point in the debate Ueberweg was anti-religious, and Lange was convinced that had he lived much longer he would have published his matured views. From Lange's notions of retaining myth-mongering hymns he turned speechlessly away.⁴ Christian ethics had for him no attraction left; in his philosophy scientific ethic was to be grounded on a wholly naturalistic and anthropological basis,⁵ down to the last æsthetic ramifications. At his death, in short, the eminent philosophic historian, logician, and metaphysician stood substantially with Strauss in his complete rejection of the religious view of life, whether considered as Christian or as theistic. It would seem accurate to say that by 1870 theistic philosophy in Germany was left to the professional theologians, for whom "spiritism" was no longer a philosophic doctrine of the cosmos but a more or less emotional exposition of states of mind declared to be "spiritual" as distinct from others.

5. The modern German philosophy which incurs Lange's most vehement hostility is the strange hypothesis propounded in the 'Philosophy of the Unconscious' (1869) by Karl Robert Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906). That elaborate treatise—for which its author disowns the title of a system—seems to be a development of Schelling's doctrine that the Absolute is to be known not consciously but by a species of knowledge above consciousness. Hamilton had confidently pronounced that "Out of Laputa.....it would be idle to enter into an articulate refutation

¹ *Id.* p. 515.² *Id.* p. 283.³ *Id.* p. 525.⁴ *Id.* p. 528.⁵ *Id.* p. 529.

of a theory which founds philosophy on the annihilation of consciousness, and of the identification of the unconscious philosopher with God."¹ But Hartmann evoked much discussion by something of the kind, his Infinite or Absolute being figured as an "unconscious" Will which, after somehow suffering misery as such, calls up Reason for its ultimate redemption, conceived in prognosis.

For Hartmann is a devoted pessimist, differing only in detail from Schopenhauer as to the preponderating badness of the universe, and the need to end it. His construction, which he later confessed to be immature (he framed it at the age of twenty-five), was dealt with by Lange in its unrevised form; and the criticism was fitly destructive. Hartmann's conception of a general natural causation in which there entered from time to time an "intellectual" causation of another kind he pungently described as a simple addition to natural science of the Australian black-fellows' formula of "devil-devil," advanced by way of sufficient explanation of everything thought to be out of the natural run.²

Inasmuch as Hartmann professed to accept the sciences and their general concept of causation, yet superimposed a thesis of supra-causation which he professed to justify by an elaborate mathematical calculation of "probabilities," Lange was content to show that Hartmann did not understand the theory of probabilities at all, and to dismiss the book as standing in grosser contradiction to science than any previous system, and putting all the errors of Schelling and Hegel in a much cruder and more obvious form.

Nevertheless Hartmann's 'Philosophy of the Unconscious,' with its readjusted gospel of pessimism, found for a generation a vogue which had never been attained by Schopenhauer, and had in 1875 reached its seventh, and in 1890 its tenth edition. The naïveté which, with a real zest for serious thinking and reading, has always marked the modern German intellectual life, permitted of as much *Schwärmerei* for Hartmann as had ever been bestowed on Kant or Hegel, though there was also abundant opposition. Where Spencer in England had been content with the comparatively sober hypostasis of "The Unknowable," and Hegel had restricted himself to the hypostasis of "Spirit" without personality, Hartmann could find acceptance for a duplex hypostasis which by virtue of the term "Unconscious" seemed to elude the ordinary snares of anthropomorphism, while really concreting the Absolute in the quasi-human modes of Will and Reason. It was just anthropomorphism over again, but with an almost trinitarian plexus of terminology, in which "Unconscious" was clamped upon both Will and Spirit.

¹ *Discussions on Philosophy and Literature* (art. of 1829), p. 20.

² *Geschichte des Materialismus*, ii, 278. Hartmann retorted (1877) by calling Lange's treatise a "tendency-writing (*Tendenzschrift*) swelled by historical studies" (cited by E. C. Thomas at end of pref. to his translation). But this, if perhaps as just as Lange's account of Büchner, does not refute Lange's criticism.

Where a philosophic doctrine is incogitable, yet ostensibly founded on scientific data and a scientific calculus of "probabilities," its fortune is a matter of mood and mode. Hartmann had the benefit of a surprising title, a variety of surprising theses, a variegated parade of scientific detail knowledge and method, a forcible style, a discursive and free-spoken treatment of life, and a gospel of pessimism which had already been made fashionable by the posthumous vogue of Schopenhauer, and was indeed in keeping with much German sentiment. With science the system has properly nothing to do, as Lange declared, and the men of science mostly said so; and as a conception of the Cosmos it is but one more web of verbal speculation, acceptable only to minds congenitally capable of taking sheer verbal construction for representation of reality. Between the abundance of such minds and the disinterested German alacrity for metaphysical debate, the treatise found fame enough to modify in practice the pessimism of its complacent author, without having any demonstrable effect on European thought.

Its able English translator, Dr. W. C. Coupland,¹ in effect claimed value for it as a stimulus² to the unspeculative English mind to grapple with the problems of the universe. And indeed Hartmann, with his strenuous notation and criticism of previous thinking in his direction, is thus stimulative for all students of philosophy.³ But the analysis of his schema, as of that of Schopenhauer, ends in the blind alley of the concept of "Unconscious Will" upon which Reason unintelligibly supervenes; and the real problem of "the unconscious" is necessarily turned over to the scientific psychologist, at the point of the phenomena of dream, which have so far been rather unprofitably explored. Hartmann's attempt to make his philosophy function as a "new religion," in place of the Christianity which he recognized to be obsolete, remains the outstanding feature of his polemic; and his statement in the preface to his seventh edition that "even Theology has begun to prize me as a valuable ally" is historically memorable. Himself a "materialist" through one half of the chess-board of his thought, in which there is no logical synthesis of mind and matter, he sought acclamation by belittling "materialism" without argument.

In his treatise entitled 'The Self-Disintegration of Christianity and the Religion of the Future' (1874)⁴ Hartmann not only revealed his basis of self-will but contrived to figure as the most comprehensive

¹ Author of an able work on *The Spirit of Goethe's 'Faust'*, 1885.

² In his volume *The Gain of Life* (1890) Dr. Coupland (pp. 136-7) indicates serious dissents from Hartmann, while unexpectedly endorsing him.

³ His output of detached essays is large, though only that on 'The Self-Disintegration of Christianity' calls for attention here.

⁴ *Die Selbstersetzung des Christenthums und die Religion der Zukunft*, trans. (rather freely) in English under title *The Religion of the Future* by Ernest Dare, 1886.

"anti" of his time. He was bent on establishing a "pessimistic-pantheistic" religion, on the basis of his 'Philosophy of the Unconscious.' He was not hopeful of the speedy advent of the requisite religion; but was convinced that it was an absolutely necessary basis for morals as against the "brutality" of popular Socialism. Strauss, though in respect of his merits as a critic he would not attack him, was dismissed as at once "irreligious" and unphilosophic; orthodox Christianity was equally unacceptable by reason of its Christism; Catholicism was impossible as being the incarnation of anti-culture; and Liberal Protestantism had become a mere de-Christianizing of Christianity in respect of its virtual Unitarianism, which left it a weak re-statement of theism, with an undeified Christ whom it hoped to cause to function as the God-Christ had done. Pantheism *plus* Pessimism was accordingly the only possible religion of the future, inasmuch as it had a "religious" basis and yet was scientifically "philosophic."

The most philosophic feature of the polemic is the avowal of the unlikelihood of its speedy acceptance. After half a century it still remains a religion for persons not yet noticeably existent. Von Hartmann had never thought it necessary to offer a logical defence of his use of the term "pessimism," which in his hands remains, like "optimism" in others, irrelevant to the philosophic problem.¹ All that is clear is that he felt the existing universe to be "unworthy to exist," and that he found it a merit in Jesus to have taken a similar view.² On what grounds he expected men to develop a religious emotion towards the unthinkable Pantheos of a psychically worthless universe he makes no clearer than his reasons for seeking or hoping to moralize it. We have his word for it³ that the worshipful Pantheos, the "Allgeist" of his "religion," in whom all individuals are "immanent," is the Pan-monistic Unconscious of his philosophy; but the identification has been found incogitable by most of his readers. It was not unnatural that, as he tells us in the preface to his second edition, the Prince Archbishop of Vienna, Cardinal von Rauscher, greeted the appearance of the book by a speech in which the author was denounced as the leader of a band of "determined atheists" outgoing even the Liberal Protestants who had undeified Christ, and the Prussian Government which had patronized them in its warfare with the true Church. The attack had doubtless served to sell the first edition. The excitement has not subsisted.

Hartmann is likely, however, to retain historical interest as being, apart from Nietzsche, the last clear-cut representative of the pre-war aspect of German philosophy as a series of powerful assertions of "personal equation." Kant, the patriarch of the tribe, is indeed

¹ Cp. *Philosophie des Unbewussten*, 2te Aufl. p. 675. (Eng. tr. 2nd ed. iii, 134.)

² *Selbstsetzung*, 2te Aufl. p. 51; Eng. tr. p. 57.

³ Pref. to 2nd ed. p. iv; Eng. tr. p. 5.

not quite justly to be classed with it,¹ inasmuch as in him the philosophic effort is primarily critical; and he connects historically with the previous age of dispassionate critical inquiry, which for English readers calls up the names of Locke and Hume, and for French connects with those of Buffier and Condillac. After Kant come the self-assertive figures of Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and Schopenhauer, all charged with "intuitional" convictions, and all determinedly bent on self-expression, first and last.

Hartmann, following on these with an equal endowment of personal equation, an equally intuitional conviction, was constrained to a procedure of dispassionate argument in regard to his predecessors and the ratiocination by which he sought to vindicate his structural hypothesis, which is as truly "shot out of a pistol" as Hegel declared Schelling's to be. There his philosophic process ends, with no real facing of his own problems. His pessimism is temperamental, and therefore does not contemplate itself as an intuition like another; and for divergent personal equations he has nothing but arrogant intuitional contempt. Lange, with his exceptional fair-mindedness, visibly reacts against Hartmann's intellectual egotism, as William James did against Hegel's. Mr. Santayana, in his little book on *Egotism in German Philosophy*, does not discuss that element in the philosophies of Lotze and Hartmann, which he might usefully have done.

6. In the way of religious philosophy, the most conspicuous phenomenon in Germany in the last quarter of the century was, by common consent, the vogue of Ritschlianism. Albrecht Ritschl (1822-89) was one of the numerous line of thinkers who in Germany have set up schools rather in virtue of their personal magnetism than of their philosophic consistency, achieving by unction and rhapsodic gift what the greater thinkers sought to do by a serried reasoning which was only in part touched with emotional rhetoric. Beginning as a pupil of Baur, concerned with scholarly investigation, he reacted towards a more emotional creed, to which in turn he sought to give a philosophic basis. Ritschl was thus on the one hand a theologian who, in a study of 'Justification and Atonement',² sought, as so many Christians before him had done in England and elsewhere, to put a tolerable aspect on the ill-disguised fundamental barbarism of the historic Christian dogma; and on the other hand a philosopher who met his theological antagonists with the declaration that they could not confute his religion save by confuting his philosophy.

¹ Though he is so classed by Mr. Santayana, *Egotism in German Philosophy* (n.d.), ch. v. It should be noted that the phenomenon in question is not to be reckoned "racial." We have it in Comte. It is but specially prominent in Germany by reason of culture-conditions.

² *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, 3 Bde. 1870-74; 4th ed. 1896, and minor works.

Such confutation was in due course undertaken by Leonhard Stählin of Bayreuth, whose *Kant, Lotze, und Ritschl* (1888) found competent translation at the hands of a Scottish theologian. As Stählin shows, Ritschl is a neo-Kantian who stands, with Lotze and Lange, on Kant's main "sceptical" positions as to the reality of knowledge, and proceeds to commit Kant's contradictions in regard to 'Things in Themselves.' The contradictions are fully exposed;¹ and the only addendum worth making is that the contradictions were inevitable for all Kantians alike, being implicit in Kant's psychological dualism. Ritschl had been assailed by a whole platoon of theologians² who found his religion indigestible; and the analysis of his philosophy served to show that if that was to be the safeguard of the other the new religion was in no better case than the old. But it had really needed little analysis to show that Ritschlian religion is but one more attempt to prove that when a religious belief calls itself an intuition it certifies itself.

The interesting historic fact is that the most philosophically formulated religion in Europe now turned out to be a mere variant of that of the non-Christian deists of the eighteenth century, the chief difference being that whereas the deists were perfectly confident that no one could doubt the existence of God, the hostile revelationist theologians of the past had been at pains to show that there could be no certainty on the matter apart from revelation; and now that revelation was substantially discredited, their successors had to readjust the position to the Kantian form that man needs a God-idea for his moral and other purposes. Ritschl had simply developed Schleiermacher, presenting the believing world with a God-idea which, as Stählin pointed out, was avowedly based upon the impossibility of knowledge of the supersensual. Thus Ritschl was merely saying in one way what Spencer had said in another, and what Mansel, following Hamilton, had said before them.

For Ritschl, of course, there remained the "revelation of Christ," with which the non-metaphysical Christian had been carrying on his organization. But the old evangelical faith was no longer presentable as objective revealed doctrine, in the name of philosophic theology: the revised Christology is in the terms of the revised theism; and Jesus is the revelation of the God of Love—that being a "judgment of value" to life. "Ritschl's Christology renounces all attempts to make us understand *how* Jesus came to take possession of the mystery of the Kingdom of God."³ That is to say, he avoided the historical problem, which the historical students were meantime forcing more and more to the front. Miracles are discreetly treated as things to be spiritually viewed, an event being natural or supernatural just as you care to see it in terms of your philosophy. Ritschlianism, in short, is a philosophy of accommo-

¹ Cp. Pfeiderer, *Development of German Theology*, p. 185, as to Ritschl's philosophic change of front.

² List in Lichtenberger, p. 577 note.

³ Lichtenberger, p. 592.

dition, adapted to the needs of clerics who feel the threadbareness of orthodoxy, and are comforted by a delicately woven—albeit thin—cloak of metaphysic.

The chief comfort open to the Ritschlians was that their theological antagonists could not produce anything more satisfying. They claimed that if official Christianity was still to be founded on the Bible, the Bible must somehow be shown to be true in terms of the theology or philosophy so founded. The Scottish translator of Stählin is satisfied, with his author, that "the noumenon really is given, or gives itself to us, in the phenomena, the thing-in-itself in its appearance"—"though the *modus operandi* is a secret."¹ Then the Bible must be God's truth—part of the "giving." "This," says the theologian, "seems to me a fundamental Biblical truth, which has never yet found more than a very partial recognition even within the Christian Church; and the ignoring of which must necessarily render Christianity *à priori* unintelligible and incredible." Concerning Ritschlianism, accordingly, he "can only say, Heaven deliver the Christian faith from such help."

But the defender of the faith presents finally only a variant of the condemned philosophy. He postulates a "sensitivity through which the invisible sphere, especially God, finds access to the mind" as does the visible world. He is "essentially" at one with Jacobi in deciding that man thus knows God as he knows the universe. The critical objections to this pure subjectivism are duly ignored; and Feuerbach is never named. But whereas Jacobi declares that there can be no "science of God," the Scottish professor "herein parts company with him." He cherishes a "hope" that one day "a science will arise" which will meet the case.² Sad to say, however, the hope disappears within two pages: "there can be no science."³ Thus the contradictions of Ritschl are outgone by the contradictions of the anti-Ritschlian; and the non-theological scrutineer is superfluously convinced that theology is the most elaborate of all evasions of the canons of consistency. The historical comment is that so long as religious institutions can find economic maintenance, theologies will be forthcoming as required, for and against any possible doctrinal position. Bossuet's *Histoire des Variations des églises Protestantes* is seen to be but the first part of the story of a fatal evolution, especially notable in Germany in the nineteenth as in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

The Ritschlian theosophy may as well stand as any other.⁴ Ritschl seems to be the proximate father of the tribe who claim to certificate their religious and philosophic doctrines by "judgments of value"—a not very subtle innovation on the manipulation of the term "feeling."

¹ *Kant, Lotse, and Ritschl: A Critical Examination*, by Leonhard Stählin, trans. by Dr. D. W. Simon, Professor of Theology in the Congregational Theological Hall, Edinburgh, 1889, p. xv.

² *Id.* p. xviii.

³ *Id.* p. xx.

⁴ The third volume of Ritschl's chief work appeared in English in 1900.

"Value" being strictly subjective, veridical truth-seeking cannot impair it. For Pfeleiderer, the Ritschlian doctrine that "the thought of God must be treated in Christian theology solely as a judgment of value, or as a conception valuable for the attainment of goods," is exactly the same theorem as that of Feuerbach—that the God-idea *can* only be an expression of wishes.¹ And such is the fact. The modern theist is on the one hand the spiritual successor of the *a priori* deist of the eighteenth century, and on the other hand takes his stand—of course without acknowledgments—on the very formula provided by the nineteenth century atheist to explain him. Dr. Pfeleiderer had no sense of humour with which to meet the situation; but Voltaire would have appreciated it. It is the broad vindication of his prophecy that in a century Christians would have come round to his way of thinking.

7. Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche (1844–1900), who is strictly an ethical prophet speaking in contrary moods and with dissonant voices, is not properly to be reckoned a philosopher at all; and it is only because he was the most resounding modern name in the German intellectual world at the close of the century that he is considered in this section.² Certainly he is a militant freethinker, and no less clearly he is a man of genius, "alone among the Germans the master of the sentence," as he claimed for himself. His genius is expressed alike in his vivid and lucid diction³ and in his swift critical insight where he is grasping a truth. Yet his gift for reaching truth is chronically overpowered by his passion of mood, his reaction against his own mounting sense of physical weakness;⁴ and what should have been a continuous dispassionate analysis becomes in his hands a zigzag of doctrinary sallies, expressive of his surges of emotion, moral and anti-moral. Philosophy consists in the reduction of all beliefs to logic, which is reciprocity in reason; and ethics consists in the reduction of all codes of action to reciprocity in matters social. He chronically defies both tests in his later predication.

Nietzsche stands forth ultimately as the singularly stimulating preacher of the code of individual self-assertion, ostensibly basing that code on the scrutiny of past life as revealing the dangers of decadence, alternately but unconsciously considered as physiological, or intellectual, or political, or all three. Thus his historic criticism of Christianity in 'The Anti-Christ,'⁵ despite its vivid flashes of truth on documentary issues, is historically and scientifically invalid, inasmuch as he subsumes physio-

¹ *Development of Theology in Germany since Kant*, p. 185.

² His ethical criticism of Christianity and his ultimate doctrine of anti-ethical self-assertion are discussed in the paper on 'Nietzsche's Sociology' (1897) in the author's *Essays in Sociology*, vol. ii.

³ Cp. the testimonies cited in M. A. Mügge's *Friedrich Nietzsche, His Life and Work*, 1908 etc., p. 325.

⁴ The doctors, apparently, will not admit that Nietzsche's "mind" was shaken so long as he could write vividly and powerfully. Thus they do not diagnose his mental decline.

⁵ *Werke*, Bd. viii, 1895. Eng. trans. 1896.

logical decadence where it cannot possibly be proved to exist, and does not even realize the differing determinance of political, mental, and social decadence. Where his argument implies determinant physiological decadence, he charges Christianity with causing *that* by bad intellection, and the sociological causation is lost.

The true philosophic criticism of all religion must lie in showing it to proceed on wrong thinking. Thus Christianity, arising in socio-political decadence, is not logically to be charged with originating that, but is to be shown as flourishing upon and promoting it. Nietzsche, caught by conflicting emotions, charges it with creating decadence by cultivating sympathy, when the true charge is that it immeasurably fostered anti-pathies. The test of right thinking is here ejected by the surge of passion for dominance, for "the will to power."

There is hardly one of Nietzsche's unsound and immoral doctrines that is not crushingly negated by right doctrines from his own pen, enumerated previously or in the same book. His worst maxims are cancelled by his best. His moral merit lay in driving philosophy towards fundamentals; and no one has better expressed right principles than he does at times in 'Thus Spake Zarathustra' (1883-4) and even in 'Beyond Good and Evil' (1886). But when we come to 'The Twilight of the Idols' (*Gotzendämmerung*, 1888) all ethical reason is subverted by the gospel of animalistic self-assertion. He had called upon philosophers to take up a position "beyond good and evil," in respect of entire scientific impartiality. That would mean either reducing all ethic to reciprocitarian and social tests, or the complete rejection of ethic as such. His own final course is the rejection; and he thus ends as a distraught prophet, not an ethical thinker.

Deep as has been his disservice to freethought by associating it with will-worship and doctrinary immoralism, Nietzsche remains, even for opponents, fitly an object of compassion. His downward doctrinal course, from 1884 onwards, goes step for step with the cerebral malady¹ against which he desperately reacted and which in 1889 became a hopeless insanity, lasting, with partially lucid intervals, till his death. Insofar as he helped to create the temper which moved Germany to precipitate the World War he has evoked the due rebuttal. But he must have left his age potentially more awake to moral realities than he found it; and in the strict criticism of his doctrines will be found all necessary antidotes.

The large output of German philosophy up to the ninth decade, which includes systems better worth examination on philosophic grounds, though not on grounds of width of influence, than that of Nietzsche, may be traced in Dr. Moritz Brasch's *Die Philosophie der*

¹ This appears to have been hereditary, but aggravated by drugs. Mügge, pp. 92-94; D. Halévy, *La Vie de Frédéric Nietzsche*, p. 217. The use of chloral began in 1882.

Gegenwart, 1888, which has earned a just repute for impartiality. There will be found noted (p. 717) the affinities of C. C. Planck (1819-80) with Ueberweg and Heinze, and the reasons for surmising with Trendelenburg (p. 731) that all philosophy is fated to vary between certain defined forms, which cover all the speculative ground. No later German philosophic thought within the century stood for any novel influence on opinion.

§ 4. *Italy*

1. The crowded history of Italian philosophy in the century is noteworthy rather as revealing independently the main lines of proclivity in all such thought than as exhibiting any special influence on European opinion. Italian belief and unbelief in theism seem to have subsisted with little change all along. Always, for centuries past, there had been an abundant philosophic literature; and at the Revolution stage it was more alive than that of either France or Britain. In the eighteenth century the experiential method was greatly reinforced first by Locke and later by Condillac; and at the outset of the new century the latter school may be said to have been in the ascendant; the *Elementi di Filosofia* (1818) of Melchiorre Gioja being a prominent manual.

This school, which quickly assimilated the practical bent of that of Bentham, was powerfully represented by the great jurist and sociologist Gian Domenico Romagnosi (1761-1835), who in turn gave basis and direction to the thought and work of Carlo Cattaneo (1801-69), who always recognized Romagnosi as his master and leader.¹ It has thus remained a constant force in Italian thought, always counting for "positivism" in the proper sense of the term, and always broadly scientific in its study of the formation of opinions, religious and other; and however it may at times have been associated with Utopism in action, it is essentially evolutionary in its outlook, even when Romagnosi infers in the human mind a specific sense, the "logical." It is perhaps in keeping with that relic of apriorism that Pasquale Galluppi (1770-1846), whose output was largely contemporary with Romagnosi's, reverted on theistic lines to the doctrine of the entozoic soul, maintaining "the unity, the simplicity, the indivisibility, and the immortality of the human soul, which he considers as a spiritual force."²

2. This position, which is not logically Kantian, was by Galluppi connected with Kant's *a priori* ethic, as well as with his own theism. It was inevitable that the deism which was so predominant in Europe in the eighteenth century should thus be developed in Italy as elsewhere;

¹ Prof. Gaetano Salvemini, *Le più belle pagine di Carlo Cattaneo*, 1922, p. ii sq. As to the merits of Cattaneo's work see extracts at end of vol.

² Dr. Vincenzo Botta, in App. II to vol. ii of Eng. trans. of Ueberweg's *History of Philosophy*, 1874, p. 487.

and Galluppi's doctrine is at best a semi-agnostic theism, avowing, as Voltaire had done, the difficulty of reconciling the theologically assumed "infinite goodness of God" with the existence of evil. The religious upshot with Galluppi, however, was that "God is incomprehensible, creation is a mystery, miracles are a *possibility*, and revealed religion is an important aid to our education."¹

Even this, of course, was a poor support to the Church; and in the remarkably extensive Italian philosophic and sociological literature of the first three or four decades of the century the orthodox view of things had small furtherance.² Nor was the essentially pantheistic philosophy of Antonio Rosmini (1797-1855) any more agreeable to the Church, which in 1848 in the person of Pio IX, unable to hold out against his reactionaries, dismissed Rosmini's mediation on behalf of King Charles Albert.³ Rosmini is pronounced by De Sanctis "the leading thinker of his time in Italy," though Vincenzo Gioberti (1801-52) compared with him in prestige. Rosmini was a typical theist, finding his God-idea ostensibly by auto-suggestion, yet much concerned to employ the Church as its instrument. That meant that the Church should be reformed, not in a Lutheran but in an unworldly idealist sense; and that was not to be.

3. Gioberti was a theist with a difference. For him the avowed method of auto-suggestion, termed "psychological," was as destructive of theism as Lutheranism had been of the unity of the Church; and he aspired, on a Hegelian basis, to create a theistic philosophy in terms of an avowed recognition of the reality of the cosmos, which however is formulated in the verbalism: "Being creates existences." For Gioberti the given intellectual potentiality of the human mind requires for its development the stimulus of language; and this is to be reckoned "a first divine revelation."⁴ Science is then to be divided into two branches, one the Rational and the other the Super-rational—a procedure which places Gioberti in the same boat with Rosmini.

Like his contemporary, Gioberti was a liberal eager for collaboration with the Church; like him he looked to Pio Nono for support, returning from exile to Italy in hope of triumph; and like him he found himself baffled, retiring as Rosmini did to spend his latter years on philosophy. Gioberti in particular had been a great stimulator of the "Resurrection"; and his high-sounding proclamation of the "moral and civil primacy of the Italians"⁵ was declared by Cesare Balbo,⁶ the Piedmontese statesman and historian, to be "not a book, but an action."⁷ The ultimate quality of the action may be said to have been reflected on the philosophy, which like that of Rosmini owed its Italian prestige more to the literary or

¹ Botta, p. 488.

² List by Botta; *id.* pp. 488-9.

³ *Id.* p. 490; L. Collison-Morley, *Modern Italian Literature*, 1911, p. 299.

⁴ Botta, as cited, p. 498.

⁵ *Primato morale e civile degli Italiani*, Brussels, 1843.

⁶ Author of the *Vita di Dante*.

⁷ Collison-Morley, p. 300.

rhapsodic gift of the writer than to any original potency of reasoning. France had in effect had the same kind of doctrine from Cousin.¹

4. It is significant that in his last years Gioberti, in the fragmentary writings which appeared posthumously (1856-7), was distinctly leaning to more rationalistic ideas. Language has now become for him "a natural product," and "revelation" is obliquely so regarded. And whereas the special authority of the Church had by him, as a Papalist, been previously taken for granted, religion being thus placed above philosophy, the positions are now recast; and religion figures as but a form of philosophy, naturally evolved. The old Hegelianism subsists in the thesis that Christianity is "the complement of all religious forms"; but as Christ is thus only "the Man-Idea," and not a God, Catholicism is flouted. And in a book published by him a year before his death, *Il Rinnovamento Civile d'Italia* (1851), "the papacy no longer appears as the natural support of Italian regeneration, but its greatest obstacle."² Thus was even theistic philosophy evolving away from institutional religion. Even Terenzio Mamiani (1799-1885), who may be reckoned one of the last representatives of the traditionary Platonic spiritism in Italian thought, could finally, in his *Rinascimento Cattolico* (1862), contemplate only as a possibility the reform of the Catholic Church.³

5. Alongside of the theisms, progressive or otherwise, the rationalistic and naturalistic philosophy was not only energetic but, as to status, quasi-official. Giuseppe Ferrari (1811-76), whom we have noted as one of the freethought leaders, entered the Italian Parliament in 1859, after having had to resign his professorship at Strasbourg on the score of his radicalism; and in the three chairs of philosophy at Turin, Milan, and Florence successively he propounded his strictly independent naturalistic philosophy, which he applied, like most of his contemporaries, to socio-political problems.⁴ Before Spencer, he set forth a philosophy of things largely in accord with his. And Bonavino ("Ausonio Franchi"), above mentioned as another active freethought propagandist, had in 1852 combated and rejected, in *La filosofia delle scuole Italiane*, the philosophies of Rosmini, Gioberti, and Mamiani, rejecting all as but variants of old Scholasticism. Constructively, in *La religione del secolo 19°* (1853) and *Il razionalismo del popolo* (1856), he had compiled a manual of its kind as good as any to be found elsewhere, drawing on Feuerbach no less than on Comte.

6. Of the transmutation thus wrought we have an adequate acknow-

¹ All of the Italian philosophers thus far cited were fecund writers, and all savour of the diffuseness which came upon Italian literature in the age after Machiavelli.

² Botta, p. 504.

³ *Id.* p. 509.

⁴ Ferrari, like his corrivals, was an active writer, producing *La Mente di G. D. Romagnosi*, 1835; *La Mente di G. B. Vico*, 1837; *Vico e l'Italia*, 1839; essays on the politics of Plato and Aristotle and on the philosophy of history, in French; a *Filosofia della Rivoluzione*, 1851, etc.

ledgment in the treatise 'On the Renovation of the Positive Philosophy in Italy' published in 1871 by Professor Pietro Siciliani of Bologna, a competent representative of the academic metaphysic which in Italy carried on the Platonic, Aristotelian, and scholastic-theistic tradition. For Professor Siciliani, who claims to be independent of all schools and sects, "philosophy is science, but it is also a religion," to which the sciences cannot attain.¹ The science-plus-religion in question is not in the least Catholicism, but the alternately nebulous and spectral concept of the Infinite Absolute as Person, irreverently described by Haeckel as that of "a gaseous vertebrate," felt by the true theist to be essential to his necessary thesis of "divine" control of the cosmos. Quite explicitly, despite his allegiance to the apostolic succession of Galluppi, Rosmini, and Gioberti, the professor admits "the contradictions of Rosmini, the countersenses of Gioberti, the incongruities of the Neo-Platonism of Mamiani."² What is claimed is that the positivism or rationalism so long persistent in Italian thought must now, like the idealism, be renovated, in view of the refusal of Darwin to pretend to "explain" the total process of the cosmos.³ But the critic admits that the "positivism" of his day is rather that of Littré than that of Comte,⁴ and he sees under that general rubric the succession of *Hamilton*, James Mill, J. S. Mill, Spencer, Bain, and Buckle, as in Germany the left-wing Hegelians.⁵

A certain basis for a concordat appears to be seen in the illustrious Vico, to whose venerable name all Italians had been rallied in the period of Resurrection by undisguised motives of patriotic pride. For Romagnosi and Giuseppe Ferrari and Cattaneo had all taken part in the enthusiastic apotheosis of the great innovator, alternately claimed as loyal Catholic and conformist freethinker.⁶ But, as the professor rightly confesses, prediction in philosophy is impossible; and he rather insists on his own traditional theism, adapted as he supposes to the new needs, than claims to see any "positivist" movement in his direction. The chief value of his copious exposition (usefully condensed at the close) is the notation of the culminant movement away from the teleology of the past.

7. We are thus prepared to accept the duly guarded survey in the recent lecture of Professor Giovanni Gentile, *Il Pensiero Italiano del secolo XIX* (1928), in which Italian thought is shown as broadly determined, from the days of Manzoni onwards, by the large pressures seen at work elsewhere. Mazzini, "in truth the most religious spirit of the century,"⁷ is grouped with Rosmini and Gioberti, of whom the former had produced "one of the books which, to speak like the Germans, made an epoch,"⁸

¹ *Sul rinnovamento della filosofia positiva in Italia*, 1871, p. 21.

² *Id.* p. 532. He admits that Gioberti lacked, and was bound to lack, the true notion of dialectic. P. 452 n.

³ *Id.* pp. 453-513.

⁴ *Id.* p. 3.

⁵ *Id.* pp. 514-15.

⁶ See the remarkable list of books dealing with Vico, from 1722 to 1870, given by Siciliani in his appendix.

⁷ Lecture cited, p. 36.

⁸ *Id.* p. 41.

while Gioberti's name is in Italy given by his school to the age.¹ And still the irresistible sciences were compulsive, and "a cold wind of rationalism and of criticism breathed on the enthusiasms and the faith which had stirred the age of preparation."² Roberto Ardigò (born 1828)—who had turned away from the Church at his outset—led the more courageous to avow their "positivism"; while the more learned if less courageous called themselves neo-Kantians, "of a more refined agnosticism." Rosmini and Gioberti being forgotten, the modern philosophy broadly carried the day.³

Thus, while Professor Gentile speculates in the present Italian taste on a revised idealism of the future, the historic fact remains that Italy is seen to have developed a philosophy that was, first, outside the religion of the Church, and next was anti-clerical and anti-ecclesiastical, and has yielded neither countenance nor sustenance to intuitional or institutional religion. Everywhere the record is cumulatively the same. Beliefs held on non-metaphysical tenure, dislodged by the pressures of sheer evidence and reason, are nowhere to be saved or buttressed by any metaphysic.

¹ *Id.* p. 45.

² *Id.* pp. 50-51.

³ *Id.* pp. 51-57.

CHAPTER XVI

OUTLYING FIELDS :

MODERN JUDAISM : THE ORIENTAL AND AMERICAN CIVILIZATIONS : BRITISH DOMINIONS

THE universality of the impulse of freethought is not fully realized until we note its operation in other fields as in that of Christendom. A brief account of the latter-day movement of things in the intellectual life of modern Judaism, and in the manifold world of the East, may therefore form part of our historic survey, with a bird's-eye view of Latin America and the English-speaking lands.

§ 1. *Judaism*

In the culture-life of the dispersed Jews, in the modern period, there is probably as much variety of credence in regard to religion as occurs in the life of Christendom so called. Such names as those of Spinoza, Jacobi, Moses Mendelssohn, Heine, and Kalisch tell sufficiently of Jewish service to freethought ; and each one of these must have had many disciples of his own race. Deism among the educated Jews of Germany in the eighteenth century was probably common.¹ The famous Rabbi Elijah of Wilna (d. 1797), entitled the Gaon, "the great one," set up a movement of relatively rationalistic pietism that led to the establishment in 1803 of a Rabbinical college at Valosin, which has flourished ever since, and had in 1888 no fewer than 400 students, among whose successors there goes on a certain amount of independent study.² In the freer world outside, critical thought has asserted itself within the pale of orthodox Judaism ; witness such a writer as Nachman Krochmal (1785-1840), whose posthumous *Guide to the Perplexed of the Time*³ (1851), though not a scientific work, is ethically and philosophically in advance of the orthodox Judaism of its age. Of Krochmal it has been said that he "was inspired in his work by the study of Hegel, just as Maimonides had been by the study of Aristotle."⁴ The result is only a liberalizing of Jewish orthodoxy in the light of historic study,⁵ such as went on among Christians in the same period ; but it is thus a stepping-stone to further science.

¹ Cp. Schechter, *Studies in Judaism*, 1896, pp. 59, 71. Schechter writes with a marked Judaic prejudice. ² *Id.* pp. 117-18.

³ This title imitates that of the famous *More Nebuchim* of Maimonides.

⁴ Zunz, cited by Schechter, p. 79.

⁵ Whence Krochmal is termed the Father of Jewish science. *Id.* p. 81.

While orthodox Judaism offers no such general menace to intellectual freedom in the modern world as is represented by orthodox Catholicism, it is natural that the latter should emotionally and doctrinally detest the former. Formally, they are the two chief rival irrationalisms. Each claims a divine monopoly, which is a negation alike of human ethic and of ethical theism ; and each protests (officially) that mankind does not recognize the divine scheme. The fact that each orthodoxy cancels logically the basis of the other ought in theory to promote vital reconsideration on both sides ; but orthodoxies are as such not permeable to logical thought. Inasmuch as both are economic institutions, resting on the religious taxability of two given populations, they seem likely to subsist indefinitely, the racial and the ecclesiastical *animus manendi* being amenable, in matters of creed, only to economic pressures set up by intellectual changes. Given the enduring differences in numbers, the critical inertia on the two sides is much the same.

On the other hand the service of "emancipated" Jews to modern freethought is probably as extensive as that which they have rendered in other fields of study. No modern scholar has done more important critical and archæological work in the field of hierology than M. Salomon Reinach, whose *Cultes, mythes, et religions*¹ is the harvest of a whole generation of scholarly inquiry. But such service, like that of many other freethinkers of Jewish descent, has no more special relation to Judaism than to any other religion, being strictly scientific. It tells simply that scholarship and intelligence, in men of Jewish race, turn away from traditionary religion as in men of other races. Thus J. H. Levy, one of the ablest contributors to the *National Reformer*, was of Jewish stock ; and Mr. Chapman Cohen, the able editor of the *Freethinker* since the death of G. W. Foote, is so likewise. Again, the justly esteemed commentary of Dr. C. G. Montefiore on the Synoptic Gospels (1909 and 1927) represents another order of service to religious scholarship by an exceptionally liberal Jew.

At the end of the century we find educated Jewry divided in somewhat the same proportions as Christendom into absolute rationalists and liberal or fanatical believers ; and representatives of all three types, of different social grades, were to be found among the Zionists, whose movement for the acquisition of a new racial home had attracted much attention and sympathy before the World War, which has secured its fruition. Whether or not the new Palestine should speedily reveal the play of the modern forces, Judaism clearly cannot escape the solvent influences which affect all European opinion. As in the case of the Christian church, the synagogue in the centres of culture keeps the formal adherence of many who no longer think on its plane ; but while successful attempts have been made to set up more liberal institutions for Jews

¹ 3 tom. 1905-1908.

with the modern bias,¹ the general tendency is to a division between devotees of the old forms and those who have decided to live by reason.

Among Jews, however, there is probably more of humorous outlook on their familial creed than among men of any other religion. A sense of humour certainly *ought* to be developed in a race which finds itself traditionally committed to the claim of being The Chosen People while constantly complaining of being The Victim People. And humour lends itself to the familial duty of professing a creed not seriously believed in. The penalty is felt to be the equation of the claim; and Jews jest freely against their race. This too is a dissolvent force. A creed felt to be familial and racial is something less than a philosophy. Familial and racial loyalty can maintain externals only, in Jewry as in Christendom.

The Eastern civilizations, naturally, exhibit mental progress in the ratio of their effective contact with the Western, and their capacity for organized education. Elements of philosophic rationalism deriving from the remote past in Persia and China and India affect, doubtless, the educated classes in a considerable degree; but there too the impact of modern science is a more potent factor. In India, naturally, the literature of English freethought has been to a large extent assimilated by educated natives, for whom it serves to discount alike Christian and native traditional belief. And that process is progressive, though the immense preponderance of ignorance in Indian life precludes any but the slowest permeation. But sociology, while recognizing the vast obstacles to the higher life presented by conditions which with a fatal facility multiply the lower, can set no limit to the possibilities of upward evolution.

§ 2. *Japan*

The case of Japan is a sufficient rebuke to the thoughtless iterators of the formula of the "unprogressiveness of the East." Latterly, indeed, that formula has passed into disuse in face of the emergence of Japan as a World Power, with modern organization and armaments. While a cheerfully superstitious religion is there still normal among the mass, the transformation of the political ideals and practice of the nation under the influence of European example has been so swift and so great as to be unparalleled in human history; and it has inevitably involved the substitution of rationalism for supernaturalism among the great majority of the educated younger generation. The late Yukichi Fukuzawa, who did more than any other man to prepare the Japanese mind for the great transformation effected in his time, was spontaneously a freethinker from his childhood;² and through a long life of devoted teaching he trained

¹ Thus there is in London to-day a "liberal" Jewish synagogue in which men and women sit together, and the restraints of the Sabbath tradition are disregarded.

² *A Life of Mr. Yukichi Fukuzawa*, by Asatarō Miyamori, revised by Prof. E. H. Vickers, Tokyo, 1902, pp. 9-10.

thousands to a naturalist way of thought. That they should revert to Christian or native orthodoxy seems as impossible as such an evolution is seen to be in educated Hindostan, where the higher orders of intelligence are probably not relatively more common than among the Japanese. The final question, there as everywhere, is one of social reconstruction and organization; and in the enormous population of China the problem, though very different in degree of imminence, is the same in kind. Perhaps the most hopeful consideration of all is that of the ever-increasing inter-communication which makes European and American progress tend in every succeeding generation to tell more and more on Asiatic life.

Mr. Okakura-Yoshishaburo, in his remarkably well-written and interesting work on *The Japanese Spirit* (1905, with introd. by George Meredith), while somewhat swayed by racial and nationalistic motive, gives an instructive conspectus of Japanese religion, in which all the phases are ethically unified by the concept that the great social duty is to face death bravely. In this presentment, whether professedly polytheistic or not, and however much formally influenced from India and China, Japanese religion has been fundamentally humanist, collectively utilitarian, employing ancestor worship and the belief in immortality to beautify as well as to stabilize the familial and social relations. Broadly, it has the aspect of a higher total efficiency than has been seen in Christendom.

At the same time the author reveals the higher intelligence of Japan as latterly rationalistic, though "Even in the mind of the modern Japanese, with its extremely agnostic tendencies, there is still one corner sacred to this inherited feeling"—for the familial cult. "Ask a modern Japanese of ordinary education, in the broad daylight of life, if he believes in a God in the Christian sense; or in Buddha as the creator; or in the Shinto deities; or else in any other personal agency or agencies, as originating and presiding over the universe; and you would immediately get an answer in the negative in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred."¹

This authoritative statement is well corroborated. Professor B. H. Chamberlain in the last generation pronounced that the Japanese "now bow down before the shrine of Herbert Spencer,"² proceeding in another connection (p. 352) to describe them as *essentially* an undevotional people. The latter judgment would be hard to sustain. The Japanese people in the past have exhibited the amount of superstition normal in their culture stage,³ and in our own day they differ from Western peoples on this side merely in respect of their greater general serenity of temperament. There were in Japan

¹ Work cited, p. 93.

² *Things Japanese*, 3rd ed. 1898, p. 321. Cp. *Religious Systems of the World*, 3rd ed. p. 103.

³ Cp. the *Voyages de C. P. Thunberg au Japon*, French. tr. 1796, iii, 206.

in 1894 no fewer than 71,831 Buddhist temples, and 190,803 Shintô temples and shrines; and the largest temple of all, costing "several million dollars," was built in the last dozen years of the nineteenth century. To the larger shrines there were habitual pilgrimages, the numbers annually visiting one leading Buddhist shrine reaching from 200,000 to 250,000, while at the Shintô shrine of Kômpira the pilgrims were said to number about 900,000 each year.¹

There had indeed been instances of sporadic freethought in past Japanese life as elsewhere. A curious example occurs in a pamphlet published towards the end of the eighteenth century. In 1771 a writer named Motoôri began a propaganda in favour of Shintôism with the publication of a tract entitled *Spirit of Straightening*. This tract emphatically asserted the divinity of the Mikado, and elicited a reply from another writer named Ichikawa, who wrote: "The Japanese word *kami* (God) was simply a title of honour; but in consequence of its having been used to translate the Chinese character *shin* (*shên*) a meaning has come to be attached to it which it did not originally possess. The ancestors of the Mikados were not Gods, but men, and were no doubt worthy to be revered for their virtues; but their acts were not miraculous nor supernatural. If the ancestors of living men were not human beings, they are more likely to have been birds or beasts than Gods."² But such propaganda could make no headway against the religious habit in an uneducated population in Asia or anywhere else; and the fixed facts of the frequency of earthquakes, and the presence of fifty volcanoes, meant a standing lead to superstition.

Professor Chamberlain appears to have construed "devotional" in the light of a special conception of true devotion. Yet a Christian observer testifies of the revivalist sect of Nichirenites, "the Ranters of Buddhism," that "the wildest excesses that seek the mantle of religion in other lands are by them equalled if not excelled"³; and Professor Chamberlain admits that "the religion of the family binds them [the Japanese in general, including the 'most materialistic'] down in truly sacred bonds"; while another writer, who thinks Christianity desirable for Japan, though he apparently ranks Japanese morals above Christian, declares that in his travels he was much reassured by the superstition of the innkeepers, feeling thankful that his hosts were "not Agnostics or Secularists," but devout believers in future punishments.⁴

A third authority with Japanese experience, Professor W. G. Dixon,

¹ See *The Evolution of the Japanese*, 1903, by L. Gulick, an American missionary organizer.

² Art. "The Revival of Pure Shinto," by Sir E. N. Satow, in *Trans. Asiatic Society of Japan*.

³ Griffis, *The Mikado's Empire*, 1876, p. 163.

⁴ Tracy, *Rambles Through Japan without a Guide*, 1892, pp. 131, 276, etc.

while noting a generation ago that "among certain classes in Japan not only religious earnestness but fanaticism and superstition still prevail," decides that "at the same time it remains true that the Japanese are not in the main a very religious people, and that at the present day religion is in lower repute than probably it has ever been in the country's history. Religious indifference is one of the prominent features of new Japan."¹ The reconciliation of these estimates lies in the recognition of the fact that the Japanese populace is religious in very much the same way as those of Italy and Ireland, while the more educated classes are rationalistic, not because of any "essential" incapacity for "devotion," but because of enlightenment and lack of countervailing social pressure. To the eye of the devotional Protestant the Catholics of Italy, with their regard to externals, seem "essentially" irreligious; and *vice versâ*.

Such formulas miss science. Two hundred years ago the French ecclesiastic Charron, following previous schematists, made a classification in which northerners figured as strong, active, stupid, warlike, little given to religion, cruel, and inhumane; the southerners as slight, abstinent, obstinate, unwarlike, and superstitious, but also cruel; and the "middle" peoples as between the two. To this he adds another table in which the northerners are made out to have common-sense and power of labour; the "middles" to be given to reason and justice, oratory and good government; and the southerners to have understanding, subtlety, and a propension to love and theology, and so on.² The cognate formulas of to-day are hardly more trustworthy. Buddhism triumphed over Shintôism in Japan both in ancient and modern times precisely because its lore and ritual make so much more appeal to the devotional sense.³ But the æsthetically charming cult of the family, with its poetic recognition of ancestral spirits,⁴ seems to hold its ground as well as any.

So universal is sociological like other law that we find in Japan, among some freethinkers, the same disposition as among some in Europe to decide that religion is necessary for the people. Professor Chamberlain (p. 352) cites Fukuzawa, "Japan's most representative thinker and educationist," as openly declaring:

It goes without saying that the maintenance of peace and security in society requires a religion. For this purpose any religion will do. I lack a religious nature, and have never believed in any religion. I am thus open to the charge that I am advising others to be religious while I am not so. Yet my conscience does not permit me to clothe myself with religion when I have it not at heart.....Of religions there are several kinds—Buddhism, Christianity, and what not. From my standpoint there is no more difference

¹ *The Land of the Morning*, 1882, p. 517.

² *La Sagesse*, liv. i, ch. 42.

³ Cp. Chamberlain, pp. 358-62; Dixon, ch. x; *Religious Systems of the World*, pp. 103, 111; Griffis, p. 166.

⁴ As to which see Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation*, 1904.

between those than between green tea and black.....See that the stock is well selected and the prices cheap.....¹

To this view, however, Fukuzawa did not finally adhere. The Rev. Isaac Dooman, a missionary in Japan who knew him well, testifies to a change that was taking place in his views in later life regarding the value of religion. In an unpublished letter to Mr. Robert Young, of Kobe, Mr. Dooman says that on one occasion, when conversing on the subject of Christianity, Fukuzawa remarked: "There was a time when I advocated its adoption as a means to elevate our lower classes; but, after finding out that all Christian countries have their own lower classes just as bad, if not worse than ours, I changed my mind."

Further reflection, marked by equal candour, may lead the pupils of Fukuzawa to see that nations cannot be led to adore any form of "tea" by the mere assurance of its indispensableness from leaders who confess they never take any. His view is doubtless shared by those priests concerning whom "it may be questioned whether in their fundamental beliefs the more scholarly of the Shinshū priests differ very widely from the materialistic agnostics of Europe."² In this state of things the Christian thinks he sees his special opportunity. Professor Dixon writes (p. 518), in the manner of the missionary, that "decaying shrines and broken gods are to be seen everywhere. Not only is there indifference, but there is a rapidly-growing scepticism.....The masses too are becoming affected by it.....Shintōism and.....Buddhism are doomed. What is to take their place?.....It must be either Christianity or Atheism. We have the brightest hopes that the former will triumph in the near future....." Few educated Japanese share the hope.

The American missionary before cited, Mr. Gulick, argues alternately that the educated Japanese are religious and that they are not, meaning that they have "religious instincts" while rejecting current creeds. The so-called religious instinct is in fact simply the spirit of moral and intellectual seriousness. Mr. Gulick's summing-up, as distinct from his theory and forecast, is as follows: "For about three hundred years the intelligence of the nation has been dominated by Confucian thought, which rejects active belief in supra-human beings.....The tendency of all persons trained in Confucian classics was towards thoroughgoing scepticism as to divine beings and their relation to this world. For this reason, beyond doubt, has Western agnosticism found so easy an entrance into Japan.....*Complete indifference to religion is characteristic of the educated classes of to-day.* Japanese and foreigners, Christians and non-Christians alike, unite in this opinion. The impression usually conveyed by this statement, however, is that agnosticism is a new thing in Japan. In point of fact, the old agnosticism is merely

¹ *Japan Herald*, September 9, 1897.

² Dixon, p. 516.

reinforced by.....the agnosticism of the West.”¹ This may be taken as broadly accurate. Cp. the author's paper on “Freethought in Japan” in the *Agnostic Annual* for 1906. Professor E. H. Parker notes² that “the Japanese in translating Western books are beginning, to the dismay of our missionaries, to leave out all the Christianity that is in them.”

But a grave danger to the intellectual and moral life of Japan has been latterly set up by a new application of Shintôism, on the lines of the emperor-worship of ancient Rome. A pamphlet by Professor Chamberlain, entitled *The Invention of a New Religion*,³ incidentally shows that the Japanese temperament is so far from being “essentially” devoid of devotion as to be capable of building up a fresh cultus to order. It appears that since the so-called Restoration of 1868, when the Imperial House, after more than two centuries of seclusion in Kyoto, was brought from its retirement and the Emperor publicly installed as ruler by right of his divine origin, the sentiment of religious devotion to the Imperial House has been steadily inculcated, reaching its height during the Russo-Japanese War, when the messages of victorious generals and admirals piously ascribed their successes over the enemy to the “virtues of the Imperial Ancestors.” In every school throughout the Empire there hung, at the close of the century, a portrait of the Emperor, which was regarded and treated as is a sacred image in Russia and in Catholic countries. The curators of schools have been known on occasion of fire and earthquake to save the imperial portrait before wife or child; and their action has elicited popular acclamation. On the imperial birthday teachers and pupils assemble, and, passing singly before the portrait, bow in solemn adoration.

The divine origin of the Imperial House and the grossly mythical history of the early emperors were being taught as articles of faith in Japanese schools precisely as the cosmogony of Genesis has been taught for ages in the schools of Christendom. A number of years ago a professor who exposed the absurdity of the chronology upon which the religion is based was removed from his post, and a teacher who declined to bow before a casket containing an imperial rescript was dismissed. His life was, in fact, for some time in danger from the fury of the populace. So dominant has Mikado-worship become that some Japanese Christian pastors have endeavoured to reconcile it with Christianity, and to be Mikado-worshippers and Christ-worshippers at the same time.⁴ All creeds are nominally tolerated in Japan, but avowed heresy as to the divine origin of the Imperial House is a bar to public employment, and exposes the heretic to suspicion of treason. The new religion, which is merely old Shintôism revised, had been invented as a political expedient,

¹ *The Evolution of the Japanese*, pp. 286-87.

² R. P. A., 1912.

³ *China and Religion*, 1905, p. 263.

⁴ Pamphlet cited, p. 16.

and may possibly not long survive. The emperor Mutsu Hito, who continued throughout his reign to live in comparative seclusion, was succeeded by a young prince educated on European lines. But the cult had obtained a strong hold upon the people; and by reason of social pressure received the conventional support of educated men exactly as Christianity does in England, America, Germany, and Spain.

Thus there is not "plain sailing" for freethought in Japan. In such a political atmosphere neither moral nor scientific thought has a specially good prognosis; and if it be not changed for the better much of the Japanese advance may be lost. Rationalism on any large scale is always a product of culture; and culture for the mass of the people of Japan has only recently begun. Down till the middle of the nineteenth century nothing more than sporadic freethought existed. Some famous captains were irreverent as to the omens; and in a seventeenth-century manual of the principles of government, ascribed to the great founder of modern feudalism, Iyeyasu, the sacrifices of vassals at the graves of their lords are denounced, and Confucius is even cited as ridiculing the burial of effigies in substitution.¹ But, as elsewhere under similar conditions, such displays of originality were confined to the ruling caste.² I have seen, indeed, a delightful popular satire, apparently a product of mother-wit, on the methods of popular Buddhist shrine-making; but, supposing it to be genuine and vernacular, it can stand only for that measure of freethought which is never absent from any society not pithed by a long process of religious tyranny. Old Japan, with its intense feudal discipline and its indurated etiquette, exhibited the social order, the grace, the moral charm, and the intellectual vacuity of a hive of bees. The higher mental life was hardly in evidence; and the ethical literature of native inspiration was of no importance.³ At the close of the century the educated Chinese, though lacking in Japanese "efficiency" and devotion to drill of all kinds, were perhaps the more freely intellectual in their habits of mind. The Japanese feudal system, indeed, was so immitigably ironbound, so incomparably destructive of individuality in word, thought, and deed, that only in the uncodified life of art and handicraft was any free play of faculty possible.⁴ What has happened of late is the rapid and docile assimilation of Western science. Another and a necessarily longer step is the independent development of the speculative and critical intelligence; and in the East, as in the West, this is subject to economic conditions.

¹ Lafcadio Hearn, *Japan: An Attempt at Interpretation*, 1904, p. 313; cp. p. 46.

² Thus the third emperor of the Ming dynasty in China (1425-35), referring to the belief in a future life, makes the avowal: "I am fain to sigh with despair when I see that in our own day men are just as superstitious as ever" (Prof. E. H. Parker, *China and Religion*, 1905, p. 99).

³ See Hearn, as cited, *passim*.

⁴ As to the lack of philosophic effort in the Japanese past, see Okakura-Yoshishaburo, as cited, p. 43 sq.

§ 3. *India*

A similar generalization holds good as to the other Oriental civilizations. Developments analogous to those seen in the latter-day Mohammedan world, and equally marked by fluctuation, have been noted in the mental life alike of the non-Mohammedan and the Mohammedan peoples of India; and at the end of the century the thought of the relatively small educated class was undoubtedly much affected by the changes going on in that of Europe, and especially of England. Educated Hindus are certainly now more frequently rationalistic than Christian or orthodox in Hinduism. The vast Indian masses, however, are far from anything in the nature of critical culture; and though some system of education for them is probably on the way to establishment,¹ their life must long remain quasi-primitive, mentally as well as physically. Buddhism is theoretically more capable of adaptation to a rationalist view of life than is Christianity; but its intellectual activities latterly seemed to tend more towards an "esoteric" credulity than towards a rational or scientific adjustment to life.

In the manifold complex of primitive and esoteric religious thought which is broadly labelled Hinduism or Brahmanism there have always been possibilities of vaguely rational speculation. Hinduism, in the words of Sir M. Monier-Williams, "is at once vaguely pantheistic, severely monotheistic, grossly polytheistic, and coldly atheistic."² Quite early in the nineteenth century English and other European influences were probably conducive to the reaction led by Rammohun Roy (1774–1833), a member of a Brahman family of Vishnuists, against idolatry and polytheism in general. As to his sincerity and love of learning there has been no dispute among scholars; and though his motive was religio-philosophic rather than scientific, he has been recognized by Monier-Williams no less than by his own followers as the first serious student of comparative theology.

His group of followers, first called the Atmīya Sabhā (Spiritual Society), using a liturgy of Vedic texts and selections from the Upanishads, became known later as the Brahma Sabhā or Brahmo Somāj (the Society of God), and figured promisingly as an agency of religious reform. Coming to England on behalf of the Grand Mogul, he made a marked impression among liberal religionists there,³ and might have returned to

¹ Cp. Sir F. S. P. Lely, *Suggestions for the Better Governing of India*, 1906, p. 59; and *Allan Octavian Hume, C.B., 1829 to 1912*, by Sir W. Wedderburn, 1913, pp. 17–19, as to the fatal check put on native education by the Anglo-Indian authorities after the Mutiny.

² *Indian Wisdom*, 1875, introd.

³ The Unitarian Society published in 1824 in one vol. a collected edition of his pro-Christian books, beginning with *The Precepts of Jesus the Guide to Peace and Happiness* (Calcutta, 1820)—a series of extracts from the Gospels. The favour won by the author's opposition to all idolatry was balanced by his Unitarian attitude to the supernaturalist Christian claims, and it was mainly the Unitarians who supported him.

extend his influence but for his premature death at Bristol. Other personalities carried on the native movement of innovation in India, the Tativa Bodhini Sabhâ (Society for the Search of Truth), founded by Debendra Nâth Tagore, being incorporated with the Brahmo Somâj in 1843. The movement in general was friendly to all religions as such, but recognized all "founders," Christian or Moslem or Jew, as simply gifted men, and appears long to have adhered to the Vedas as its Sacred Books.

Naturally trouble arose over that amorphous mass of documents; and when at length exact research clearly established their content as a compound of primeval superstition and diverse theistic speculation the Brahmo Somâj decided to dismiss them and to form a purely theistic church, which Keshub Chunder Sen (1838-84) in turn wrought to develop into a working syncretic religion, called "New Dispensation." The subsequent dissensions of sections belong to the history of religion rather than to that of freethought, the movement being always one of worship, while excluding all idolatry, sacrifice, or bibliolatry, and at the same time all disparagement of the books, creeds, deities, or practices of any other religion.¹ It acted powerfully in stimulating ideas of social and marriage reform. In that regard, and in its influence as a proselytizing movement against idolatry, lies its significance as a stage of transition for educated Hindus from the old faiths towards more critical thought. The process is inevitably slow. The later activities of Keshub were all in the nature of a propaganda of emotional syncretic religion, in which all the great cults and founders were acclaimed, while the cult-leader claimed a continuous revelation from God. One of his many experiments was a proclamation of the "Motherhood of God."²

Of the nature of the influence of Buddhism in Burmah, where it has prospered, a vivid and thoughtful account is given in the work of H. Fielding, *The Soul of a People*, 1898. At its best the cult there deifies the Buddha; elsewhere, it is interwoven with aboriginal polytheism and superstition (Davids, *Buddhism*, pp. 207-11; Max Müller, *Anthro. Rel.* p. 132).

Within Brahmanism, again, there have been at different times attempts to set up partly naturalistic reforms in religious thought—e.g., that of Chaitanya in the sixteenth century; but these have never been pronouncedly freethinking, and Chaitanya preached a "surrender of all to Krishna," very much in the manner of evangelical Christianity. Finally he has been deified by his followers. (Müller, *Nat. Rel.* p. 100; *Phys. Rel.* p. 356.)

More definitely freethinking was the monotheistic cult set up among the Sikhs in the fifteenth century, as the history runs, by Nanak, who had been influenced both by Parsees and by Moham-

¹ Declaration cited by Goblet d'Alviella, Eng. trans. pp. 247-8.

² *Id.* pp. 273-6.

medans, and whose ethical system repudiated caste. But though Nanak objected to any adoration of himself, he and all his descendants have been virtually deified by his devotees, despite their profession of a theoretically pantheistic creed. (Cp. De la Saussaye, *Manual of the Science of Religion*, Eng. tr. pp. 659-62; Müller, *Phys. Rel.* p. 355.) Trumpp (*Die Religion der Sikhs*, 1881, p. 123) tells of other Sikh sects, including one of a markedly atheistic character belonging to the nineteenth century; but all alike seem to gravitate towards Hinduism. Similarly among the Jainas, who compare with the Buddhists in their nominal atheism as in their tenderness to animals and in some other respects, there has been decline and compromise; and their numbers appear steadily to dwindle, though in India they survived while Buddhism disappeared. Cp. De la Saussaye, *Manual*, pp. 557-63; Rev. J. Robson, *Hinduism*, 1874, pp. 80-6; Tiele, *Outlines*, p. 141. But the recent work of Champat Rai Jain, Barrister-at-law, *The Key of Knowledge* (Calcutta, 1915; 3rd ed. enlarged, 1928), offers a vindication of Jainism in connection with a survey of modern scientific hierology. The author, an à priori (but anti-anthropomorphic) theist, professing to expound a religion of happiness, presents Jainism (3rd ed. p. 762) as "the only important creed which claims for its Scripture the authority of omniscient *men*," that is (p. 767), "the *Tirthamkaras*, who saw, by their power of Omniscience, the things as they actually exist in the universe, and whose statements are verified by the most searching conclusions of reason." The position is thus primitively authoritarian, the author's professed recognition of science being illusory, though he has read freely. The legend of the Jainist Founder, and the subsequent seers, is uncritically accepted.

Finally the Brahmo-Somâj movement of the nineteenth century appears to have come to little in the way of rationalism (Mitchell, *Hinduism*, pp. 224-46; De la Saussaye, pp. 669-71; Tiele, p. 160; D. N. Chowdhuri, *In Search of Jesus Christ*, Calcutta, 1927, pref.). But see the last-cited writer's dedication, and pp. 8, 14, etc., for the commemoration of Râjarshi Râmmohun Roy, the founder of the movement, as "father and founder of the science of comparative religion." And see Prof. W. Knight's *Inter Amicos*, 1901, as to James Martineau's high opinion of the intellectual gifts of Keshub Chunder Sen, who visited England in 1870. Similar applause was bestowed in the British press at his death. For native criticisms, see Goblet d'Alviella, pp. 381, 384.

§ 4. Turkey

The principle of the interdependence of the external and the internal life applies, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of Turkey. The notion that Turkish civilization in Europe was unimprovable, though partly coun-

tenanced by despondent thinkers even among enlightened Turks at the century's end,¹ had no justification in social science, though bad politics may ruin the Turkish, like other Moslem States. The discussions on the subject in Nassau Senior's 'Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece' (1858) are in terms of the pre-evolutionary attitude. Buckle at that stage declared, justly enough, that he could write the history of Turkish civilization "on the back of his hand."² It was essentially parasitic, and kept so by a barbaric fiscal system which might have been schemed to strangle all enterprise. But liberated Greece was in no very different state, save as regarded her elements of progressive ferment. The problem, in both cases, was one of fiscal misrule and corruption.³

Half a century more exhibited mainly the confused and convulsive movements determined by the racial and political situation. The special fatality in Turkey was the alien and hostile relation to Christendom without and within, curable only by a wisdom which Turkish life could not yield. Theological fatalism was a standing force of inertia. What Turkish freethinking there was in the second half of the century had not in general passed the theistic stage,⁴ and this without the reinforcement of science. Its spread was grievously hindered at once by lack of education and by the national religiosity,⁵ which the age-long hostility of the Christian States so much tended to intensify. Yet a gradual improvement in the educational and political conditions would suffice to evolve it, according to the observed laws of all civilization. Indeed the cataclysmic changes which have been wrought since the World War and are at work at the time of this writing seem to tell of an exceptional pliability in the case of Turkish religious feeling, perhaps the result of a fatalistic way of thought in the past.

This being so, the prognosis in Egypt is not greatly different. At the end of the last century, between French and English culture, the literate Egyptian youth and the professional classes were much stirred by rationalism, and much in need of a reasoned ethical culture, the mass in

¹ See article on "The Future of Turkey" in the *Contemporary Review*, April, 1899, by "A Turkish Official." This was the attitude of intelligent foreigners fifty years before. See Nassau Senior's *Journal Kept in Turkey and Greece*, 1858, pp. 224-8.

² *Reminiscences of H. T. Buckle* [by Ch. Hale] in the *Atlantic Monthly*, April, 1863—cited in App. to 3rd ed. of Stuart-Glennie's *Pilgrim Memories*, p. 495.

³ Senior's *Journal* shows little difference as to administrative methods. Both countries were substantially without roads. Greek education was still confined chiefly to males. (Work cited, pp. 325, 331.)

⁴ Yet, as early as the date of the Crimean War, it was noted by an observer that "young Turkey makes profession of atheism." Ubicini, *La Turquie actuelle*, 1855, p. 361. Cp. Sir G. Campbell, *A Very Recent View of Turkey*, 2nd ed. 1878, p. 65. Vambéry makes light somewhat of such tendencies (*Der Islam im 19ten Jahrhundert*, 1875, pp. 185, 187); but admits cases of atheism even among mollahs, as a result of European culture (p. 101).

⁵ Ubicini (p. 344), with Vambéry and most other observers, pronounced the Turks the most religious people in Europe.

town and country remaining illiterate. That situation changes but slowly. It may be that a result of the rationalistic evolution in the other European States will ultimately be to make educated Egyptians intelligently friendly to such a change.

§ 5. *Greece*

In any case, it cannot seriously be pretended that the mental life of Christian Greece in modern times has yielded, apart from large services to scholarship, a much better result to the world at large than has that of Turkey. The usual reactions in individual cases of course take place. An American traveller writing in 1856 notes how illiterate Greek priests glory in their ignorance, "asserting that a more liberal education has the effect of making atheists of the youth." He adds that he has "known several deacons and others in the University [of Athens] that were sceptics even as to the truth of religion," and would gladly have become laymen if they could have secured a livelihood.¹ But there was then and later in the century no measurable movement of a rationalistic kind. Edmond About in 1852 found in Greece "neither philosophers nor freethinkers"; everybody believed in his religion and went to church.² At the time of the emancipation the Greek priesthood was "in general at once the most ignorant and the most vicious portion of the community";³ and it remained socially predominant and reactionary. "Whatever progress has been made in Greece has received but little assistance from them."⁴ Liberal-minded professors in the theological school were mutinied against by bigoted students,⁵ a type much in evidence at Athens later; and the liberal thinker Theophilus Kaïres, charged with teaching "atheistic doctrines," and found guilty with three of his followers, died of jail fever while his appeal to the Areopagus was pending.⁶

Thus far Christian orthodoxy seems to have held its own in what once was Hellas. On the surface, Greece at the end of the century showed little trace of instructed freethought; while in Bulgaria, by Greek testimony, school teachers, early in the present century, openly proclaimed their rationalism, and called for the exclusion of religious teaching from the schools.⁷ Despite the political freedom of the Christian State, there had thus far occurred in Greece no such general fertilization by the culture of the rest of Europe as is needed to produce a new intellectual evolution of any importance. The mere geographical isolation of modern Greece from the main currents of European thought and commerce is probably the most retardative of her conditions; and only slowly can it be overcome. But, given either a renaissance of Mohammedan civilization or a great political reconstruction such as is latterly on foot, the whole

¹ H. M. Baird, *Modern Greece*, New York, 1856, pp. 123-4.

² *La Grèce contemporaine*, ed. 1860, p. 344.

³ *Id.* p. 320.

⁴ *Id.* p. 339.

⁵ *Id.* p. 86.

⁶ *Id.* p. 340.

⁷ Prof. Neocles Karasis, *Greeks and Bulgarians in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries*, London, 1907, pp. 15-17, citing a Bulgarian journal.

life of the nearer East may take a new departure ; and in such an evolution Greece would be certain to share. Being the most educated of the near-eastern lands, indeed, she may well be the leader.¹

§ 6. *Latin America*

Throughout Central and South America, in the latter half of the century, the conflict between democratic liberalism and the Catholic Church has visibly made for freethinking. Protestantism being absent or negligible, the hostility of the progressives towards the anti-democratic sway of the Church naturally involves rejection of its creed. Thus the freethinking literature of Catholic Europe permeates the populations ; and alike in the Spanish- and Portuguese-speaking countries there is rather more freethinking than in the motherlands. As long ago as 1856 the American diplomatist and archæologist Squier wrote that, "Although the people of Honduras, in common with those of Central America in general, are nominally Catholics, yet, among those capable of reflection or possessed of education, there are more who are destitute of any fixed creed—Rationalists or, as they are sometimes called, Freethinkers—than adherents of any form of religion."² This appears to be true, latterly, of all the States in Central and South America alike. In 1857, Mexico attained the separation of Church and State.

The case of Brazil is notable. Under the liberal Emperor Pedro II³ (1825–91) Comtism was so exceptionally cultivated in Brazil that its adherents were regarded as specially influential in bringing about the Emperor's abdication (1889). Under the Republic, however, there has been no sequent popularization of Comtism as a cult, and the "conflict between science and religion" there takes on the usual aspects of free-thinking anti-clericalism *versus* Catholicism, seen in the other South American countries. The immigrant elements from Europe generally strengthen the anti-clerical camp ; the Freemasonic Societies, as in Catholic Europe, constituting the freethought centres. Other organizations have arisen in due course ; and in Peru, about the beginning of the century, there was a Freethought League, with a weekly organ.

Thus the fortunes of religion in Latin America follow more closely than in North America the course of opinion in Europe. Catholicism has no prospect of regaining a grasp on the educated sections of the Latin States ; and as education progresses its hold on the masses becomes more and more limited to the indigenes. It is more prosperous in the United States, where its main stronghold is among the descendants of Irish and other Catholic immigrants, and in Catholic Canada. As the

¹ As to the pervading influence of Greeks in Turkey, see L. Sergeant, *Greece in the Nineteenth Century*, 1897, pp. 351, 359.

² Squier, *Notes on Central America*, 1856, p. 227.

³ This monarch was perhaps intellectually the most advanced ruler of his time. He was greatly devoted to the philosophic teaching of Coleridge.

Latin States advance in culture, further, they tend more and more to produce enlightening literature of all kinds for themselves; and this the more freely because their Catholic elements have less power of control of publication than is wielded by the Catholic organization in the United States, where all publishers issuing anti-Catholic works are systematically boycotted in the Catholic world. The struggle still proceeding in Mexico appears to be of historic importance; and the facts have been much garbled in the Catholic interest for European readers.

§ 7. *English-speaking Lands*

"Christendom" has thus become for Latin America as for Europe a signal misnomer. The historic faith is everywhere on the decline—the only partial exception being the United States, where democracy, untroubled by ecclesiastical interference, has been on the whole more favourable to religion than elsewhere. It is plainly improbable, however, that that explicable exception will subsist. Where science advances, the hold of religion necessarily dwindles; and the progress of rationalism in the United States may be taken to be only a question of time. The most socially advanced of the American lands cannot permanently remain in large part at the most uncritical standpoint in regard to the problem of the cosmos.

It has been latterly noted, indeed, that the factor of social conformity—which has been particularly powerful in the States—tends to eliminate even such phenomena as ethical societies, and to establish churchism as a necessary propriety. A new movement of freer thinking would appear to be contingent on an independent lead. That, however, seems (1929) to be already forthcoming; and in the nature of things new departures¹ may be reckoned probable. It is not to be supposed that in the land of Parker and Emerson, Whitman and Ingersoll, the twentieth century will lag behind the nineteenth.

If in the present connection the self-governing British Dominions are considered as outlying fields—though always in touch with the culture-life of the mother country—the prognosis for them will be similar. Canada is largely weighted by Catholicism in respect of its French section; and the general population is so largely recruited from the orthodox plane in the mother country that a prosecution for "blasphemy" is still a likely thing. In Australia, again, Catholicism has been largely recruited from Ireland, and the Protestant Churches are still energetic in their own cause.

But the intellectual forces likewise are always being recruited from the mother country; and in New Zealand the status of freethought has been signally vindicated in the past generation by such eminent personages

¹ E.g. the pronouncement of Dr. H. E. Barnes, head of Smith College, declaring the Bible to be untenable as a revelation of God, and proclaiming the necessary humanism of ethics. This outgoes the position of Bishop Barnes in England.

as the Hon. John Ballance (1839-93), who in 1891 became Premier, after having held various ministries with distinction, and the Hon. Sir Robert Stout (b. 1844), who after a brilliant legal and political career became in 1899 Chief Justice. A much-esteemed member of the Rationalist Press Association, he is still a force of light and leading in the land of his adoption. In British South Africa, meanwhile, rationalism thrives as one of the culture-forces, in virtue of the British connection. The Dominion has still no more distinguished literary name than that of Olive Schreiner.

§ 8. *Africa*

Even in the Bible-loving Boer Republic of South Africa (Transvaal), in its time one of the most orthodox of the civilized communities of the world, there was seen in the past century the phenomenon of an agnostic ex-clergyman's election to the post of president, in the person of T. F. Burgers, who succeeded Pretorius in 1871. His election was of course on political and not on religious grounds; and panic fear on the score of his heresy, besides driving some fanatics to emigrate, is said to have disorganized a Boer expedition under his command;¹ but his views were known when he was elected. In the years 1899-1902 the terrible experience of the last Boer War, in South Africa as in Britain, perhaps did more to turn critical minds against supernaturalism than was accomplished by almost any other agency in the same period. In Britain the overturn was by way of the revolt of many ethically-minded Christians against the attitude of the orthodox churches, which were so generally and so unscrupulously belligerent as to astonish many even of their freethinking opponents.² As regards the Boers and the Cape Dutch the resultant unbelief was among the younger men, who harassed their elders with challenges as to the justice or the activity of a God who permitted the liberties of his most devoted worshippers to be wantonly destroyed. Among the more educated burghers in the Orange Free State commandos unbelief asserted itself with increasing force and frequency.³ An ethical rationalism thus motivated is not likely to be displaced; and the Christian Churches of Britain had thus the sobering knowledge that the war which they so vociferously glorified⁴ had wrought to the discredit of their creed alike in their own country and among the vanquished.

¹ G. M. Theal, *South Africa* ('Story of the Nations' series), pp. 340, 345. Mr. Theal's view of the mental processes of the Boers is somewhat à priori, and his explanation seems in part inconsistent with his own narrative.

² An English acquaintance of my own at Cape Town, who before the war not only was an orthodox believer, but found his chief weekly pleasure in attending church, was so astounded by the general attitude of the clergy on the war that he severed his connection, once for all. Thousands did the same in England.

³ I write on the strength of personal testimonies spontaneously given to me in South Africa in 1900, some of them by clergymen of the Dutch Reformed Church.

⁴ See the evidence collected in the pamphlet *The Churches and the War*, by Alfred Marks. New Age Office, 1905.

The history of freethought in the twentieth century will probably have to reckon with the phenomenon of rationalism among the coloured races of Africa. It had already emerged in the past century, notably in the case of the Hon. J. Edmestone Barnes (b. West Indies, 1857). Educated at Kingston University School and at Leipzig University, and further trained as a land surveyor and civil engineer, Mr. Barnes was for a time a minister of the African Methodist Church. Finding himself after a time forced to abandon Christian beliefs, he returned to his profession, and, after further study in Europe, was appointed Surveyor General to the Republic of Liberia. Again after a time he returned to Europe for further study, and later extended his experience as a mining engineer in South Africa, till he became Director of Public Works in Liberia. Yet again he travelled in America, where for a time he devoted himself to the furtherance of Afro-American education. The outcome of his experience is set forth in his book, 'The Economy of Life.' Christianity has thus far dealt with coloured Christians by restricting them to separate churches. Mr. Barnes has been a member of the Rationalist Press Association, which recognizes no colour bar.

When such a man attains high recognition and esteem among his own race, it begins to seem not unlikely that instead of the indigenous races of Africa being destined merely to partition between Islam, which accepts them on a footing of equality, and Christianity, which does not, they may be destined to proceed, however slowly in mass, through the evolution which is apparently eliminating traditional religion from Christendom. Certainly the scattered masses of the African indigenes are still, and will long remain, on the footing of primitive religion, battenning on its crudest forms; but among them also there will be a slow evolution; and there is no certainty that it will be by way of acceptance of Christian dogma in the face of Christian exclusiveness. When we remember that it was a Zulu who enlightened Colenso, and through him the theologians of Europe, on a vital question of religious history, the forecast of another development seems in no way extravagant.

CHAPTER XVII

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

It would obviously be unfitting that the history of freethought in the first quarter of the twentieth century should be undertaken by the present writer, who has been one of the skirmishers in the warfare.¹ Such an undertaking would for him mean dealing with living friends and foes, the fortunes of theses still keenly debated which he has maintained in person, and the personal tactics of opponents; a procedure not properly to be described as historiography. It must be left to men of a later generation to write the culture history even of the first quarter of the present century.

But the survey of the nineteenth may fitly be rounded by a general view of the intellectual and social situation which we see resulting from the evolution thus far recorded. All history of freethought may be generalized, in terms of evolutionary science, as a statement of the circumstances under which the species freethinker—rudimentarily visible even in the period of "pre-history," and never absent in the historic period—emerges, multiplies, or dwindles. The student may contemplate the evolutionary process either in terms of pure Darwinism, noting the variation and the conditions of survival, or—very fitly, in regard to a process of conscious will in the varying personality—as a Neo-Lamarckian; since here, if anywhere, evolution is to be conceived as "creative." The determining circumstances are plainly (1) cultural, (2) socio-economic, (3) political. A conspectus of the existing situation, as a stage in the continuous process before described, is a natural addendum to the record.

Moncure Conway, whose Autobiography is so fascinating and so valuable a record of the actual personal and historic process of freethought in his lifetime,² has a passage in which, noting the unconquerable optimism of Büchner, he asks: "Why may not the future destroy freethought as Athenian civilization was destroyed? Because freethought is a religion; and men like Büchner, Haeckel, Bradlaugh, its prophets."³ To this, as a rational challenge, there are two answers. Freethought is really not a religion, save in terms of that lax and nugatory use of the word which

¹ Incidentally, and in the inserted notes, some aspects of the warfare have been touched upon. This was hardly avoidable.

² An edition with notes correcting the occasional errors would be useful.

³ Work cited, ii, 364.

makes all religion mean only an earnest proclivity. The freethinker is indeed such in virtue of a bias, a fixed love of tested truth. But as such he is really a man of science, with all science to found upon.

As historian, he cannot fail to note the reverses to civilization, the throwback occurring from time to time through social and political cataclysm, the vast retardation of rational thought in ancient China and India. He knows that the belief in miracles, still prescribed by demi-semi-scientific bishops, was adequately assailed in England two hundred years ago. But he also knows that in the past the factor of science, the chief security for veridical thought, was never nearly so great, so widely rooted, so variously potent as in the time now passing. The elderly freethinker¹ is naturally more static, more dubious of prognostic, than the younger; but both alike must ultimately come, if they forecast at all, to the tests of circumspect calculation. It is on the historic evidence that we must proceed.

We have seen, in the course of a century, a religion which had confidently founded on Revelation (involving Biblical inspiration, miracles, dogmas of salvation by faith in a blood sacrifice, and anathemas against all unbelief) transmuted, for comparatively instructed people, in this and other countries, into a religion stripped of these foundations and formulas. For the concept of a scripturally revealed God we have seen gradually substituted a theism of auto-suggestion, popularly presented as a claim that one's "experience" of a belief as comforting gives it the status of a truth. For the dogma of a Saviour-God we have seen a progressive substitution, among scholars, of the concept of a Moral Superman (the doctrine of the Jainas and the Buddhists); and for a sacrosanct history of his life and teaching, his unquestioned words and deeds, we are given a dubious selection of what appear to be probably or possibly authentic utterances, and a deepening debate on his actuality, his personality, and his purposes. Multitudes of churchmen to-day are thus substantially of the religion of Voltaire, who believed in a Good Deity, and represented Jesus as a perfectly good moral teacher, misunderstood.² They also stand with Voltaire in being very doubtful about a future life, and with Spinoza or Renan as to Jesus.

That this is no mere partisan summary is sufficiently attested by the avowal of one of the most distinguished contemporary theological scholars in England that

the old orthodoxy, regarded as a fixed system, exists no longer. It is not merely that breaches have been made in the wall, or that projections which stood in the way of modern thought have been cleared away: the whole

¹ "Broken by personal bereavement" is Conway's description of himself in his last period. *Id.* ii, 398.

² *Dictionnaire Philosophique*, art. RELIGION. Voltaire was thus not far out in his prediction of what would happen within a century, though he was over-optimistic as to the general survival of theism.

building has collapsed. Where Gibbon saw an effete and old-fashioned building we are confronted with a heap of ruins. There are few stones one upon another that have not been thrown down; but the heap remains—what are we to make of it?¹

That describes the result of the process that went on throughout the nineteenth century and is since being visibly consummated. It holds substantially good for the year 1900; and to-day we have bishops declaring in the pulpit the necessity of accepting Darwinism and evolution, which had in fact been privately and even publicly accepted by many clerics long ago. What holds true for the Church of England is largely true for the Church of Scotland, and for Nonconformist Churches in general. The late Mr. Spurgeon found even in the Baptist Church a doctrinal "downgrade movement" which he strove to arrest; and that Church, like the Wesleyan, has recently avowed decline in numbers of adult and juvenile adherents. In the Church of Rome, where the habit of belief finds its chief refuge, the work of disintegration has latterly been carried far by the Abbé Loisy. In Germany the labours of disintegrating criticism have been unceasing, and popular secularism is more pronounced than ever. The process has been universal; and in the Catholic countries the bulk of the more educated laity have long been notoriously sceptical.

Yet the Churches subsist. The English make continuous avowals that church-going falls away; yet we find the Anglican body convulsed over details in its Prayer Book which involve strained relations between the growing Anglo-Catholic section and the main body. The Modernist section unhopelessly fights its battle, gaining little ground because the natural course of things is for laymen and laywomen of modernist tendencies to pass outside of the Church. The general outcome is a state of things in which Protestant Churches are only formally Christian.

In Britain the Churches have in the mass settled down into social organizations, striving to retain congregations for "divine service" by doing modest human service among the classes which require it. They are essentially Social Clubs, whether or not they also supply, as "religion" proper, an ancient machinery of ritual. The average cleric, it is avowed, is neither an intellectual nor a typically religious man. He is a "social organizer," a manager of gatherings and "collections," often a diligent visitor of the poor and the sick, but at the same time a promoter of whist drives. A generation ago a general recognition of the decay of religious habits among the lower middle and working classes led to the efflorescence of a movement for "Pleasant Sunday Afternoons," by which it was hoped to attract to the churches persons otherwise likely to attend Secularist lectures or listen to other more stimulating appeals than those of religious duty. The need thus avowed is more and more systematically recognized in other ways.

¹ Prof. F. C. Burkitt, *Christian Beginnings*, 1924, p. 8.

Active "religion" is indeed represented in England by the numerically flourishing school of Ritualism, which vigorously appeals to the more primitive instincts underlying sacraments and other religious ordinances. Here religion is inculcated as a compound of mummery and the ecstasy it is alleged to superinduce. Where the semblance of intellectual appeal fails to retain intellectual people, the substitution of crude emotionalism has once more succeeded in capturing for organized religion many temperaments of the unintellectual order. In the eighteenth century such a movement, led by Whitfield and Wesley on definitely evangelical lines, had created a revival of which Wesleyanism was the outstanding result. Modern Ritualism has wrought among the middle and upper classes somewhat as Wesleyanism did among the workers.

But there is a difference. Wesleyanism wrought on the old demotic fear of hell, the sense of sin, the hope of heaven, the yearning for salvation by blood sacrifice. Ritualism is specifically æsthetic and sacramentarian; *its* religious hysteria is a more sophisticated thing, feeding on music and incense and vestments and all the pageant of sacerdotal tradition. Wesleyanism was and is Bibliolatrous; Ritualism, definitely staking itself on sacrament and litany, is comparatively little affected by the scientific disintegration of the Old Testament, which some of its leaders now ostensibly accept, with no concern for any logical solution of the central problem. Both forms of organized emotionalism are essentially anti-rationalist; but the Ritualistic, with its gravitation towards Rome, is fundamentally the more mindless of the two. Yet both conform in general to the need for a policy of "social" catering for adherents.

By the end of the century the extensive transformation of the Church of England into a combination of business management and neo-sacramentalism was avowed among its members. An aristocratic Liberal, the friend of Gladstone, a skilled penman, and an æsthetically emotional pietist of the ritualist type, published a series of clerical sketches in which the new order is visualized. First we meet the latter-day curate, no longer the Reverend Lazarus Quiverful, but a bachelor, an athlete, a "social worker," who plays good cricket and runs Mothers' Meetings, leading, whether in town or country, "a free, jovial, and independent life"—mentally a negligible quantity.

"Will my athletic young friends permit me," writes the sympathetic Anglican aristocrat, "to suggest that very few of their number are entitled to the praise of learning, and that not many of them have even that smattering acquaintance with books and culture which used to be thought inseparable from a University training? The learned men who take Holy Orders generally find their way into academical or quasi-academical positions. They get Clerical Fellowships, or they become lecturers at Theological Colleges or assistants at the Pusey House.....They do not become curates. The Curate—and of course I am speaking of the type, not of the individual—the Curate knows nothing.....He is steeped in the tradi-

tions of W. G. Grace, and says his prayers before a photograph of C. B. Fry. But there his general knowledge ends; and as to his special and professional knowledge, it would be impertinent for a layman to inquire too closely."¹

This from an Anglican pietist and man of the world, at home in both spheres. His picture of the Curate is thus completed:—

The modern Curate is not married. He is by no means a vowed celibate; he is sustained amid the arduous labours of Confirmation-classes and school-excursions, choir-practices and parochial gatherings, by the proud ambition of some day having a parish of his own, a wife, and £250 a year. On this modest income he eventually marries, and the result is that melancholy poverty of the Established Clergy which is the chief blot on the scutcheon of the Church of England.

The data consist. The income offered was not calculated to secure educated men, and it did not. As is avowed, it enlisted ill-educated men. For half a century the scholarly quality of the recruits of the Church had been sinking; it had now become stationary at the lowest level of modern times—the level of a body of men either trained at the Church's own clerical colleges or ranking as "the dregs of the universities." The authority just cited proceeds to describe a "Country Parson" who has a great deal less than £250 a year, and a town parson no better paid, save for institutional lodgings in the slums or increments from rich parishioners in west-end districts. This financial situation was ready for the new century, in which the problem has become admittedly so acute as to call for new action.

Ostensibly, there is no learned clerisy left, apart from the higher clergy and the academic theologians. The best scholars appear to receive little encouragement. To the late Edwin Hatch, for his valuable and singularly independent researches in the history of the early Church, no ecclesiastical preferment seems to have been awarded. There would appear to be as many scholarly and thoughtful clerics in some of the Nonconformist Churches as in the Anglican. And these Churches too feel the financial pinch. Thus the economic basis which is the "bed rock" of institutional religion, sustaining *that* against all winds of mere criticism,² appears to be slowly crumbling; and the function of the good churchman is to see to underpinnings, while the work of the clerisy goes on as before, on the humble lines of social organization for the classes without clubs. Between the established Church and the dissenting bodies there is only a difference of social status. Intellectual standards decline in all alike, by reason of the economic difficulty. English Nonconformist pulpits are latterly recruited in an increasing degree from Wales, which produces candidates with the national gift of eloquence, ready to accept the stipend which is insufficient to attract

¹ G. W. E. Russell, *Social Silhouettes*, 1906, pp. 52–53.

² The topic is developed in the author's *Dynamics of Religion*. (R. P. A.)

Englishmen educated enough to be schoolmasters. At the same time, it is to be admitted, the press conforms in the main to the religious appetites believed to flourish in the unstudious majority, giving anxious attention to all expressions of emotional orthodoxy, and maintaining so far as possible the attitude of ignorance in regard to the scholarly and scientific disintegration of the creeds.

Yet even a conformist Sunday newspaper makes a signal confession:—

As it exists to-day, institutional religion has in the opinion of many lost much of its hold on the mind and imagination of the people, particularly those of the younger generation, many of whom do not find in its teachings an adequate answer to the questionings of a restless and inquiring age. What is the reason for its failure? "Religion," said Professor Barry at the Church Congress, "has become the temperamental hobby of the few, and the Church's life has been too much narrowed down to the purely devotional acts and attitudes, widely sundered from the actual stress of work and aspiration in the outside world." Here he laid his finger on the core of the trouble.—*The Sunday Times* (Nov. 1926).

About the same time, a cleric writes to the *Christian World*:—

The Sunday schools are emptying. A minister said to me a little while ago, "My school is dying." He was in despair about it, and was leaving his church because of it. But his experience is not an isolated one. The Sunday schools all over England and of every Protestant denomination are on the wane. I was speaking to the sister of a superintendent associated with a large Yorkshire church, and she told me that her brother's school had lost 600 young men, whom no efforts could induce to return. Do we realize that for years there has been a steady decline in Sunday schools, so that in spite of a greatly increased population the Congregational schools alone have lost 119,000 scholars in the last eighteen years? The decline has not been spasmodic or erratic. It has been so steady and spread over such a number of years that we can afford no longer to ignore it or treat it lightly. Something is radically wrong.

It will not be pretended that the religious situation in Protestant Germany is in any way more promising from the clerical point of view. Early in the year 1922 the *Christian World*, quoting from Prussian religious journals detailed statements as to shortage of pastors and dwindling congregations, thus summarizes:—

Deep concern is also expressed at an extraordinary decline in the number of marriages and burials at which a pastor is asked to officiate. In a large Berlin cemetery during the three months ending December 31 only one funeral out of every fourteen had a religious service at the grave. It is becoming rare, especially among the working classes, to call in a pastor to minister to the dying; and the case of one woman is cited, the wife of a departing Socialist, who told a visiting pastor that she did not want her husband's mind unhinged by "nonsense fables." It is with the utmost difficulty that pastors succeed in gathering in children for confirmation classes, and children are being constantly reproved for asking questions "bordering on blasphemy," the outcome, as one report states, of conversations heard in their homes. Sunday-school teachers cannot be found in anything like sufficient numbers, and a rough census made in a number of

Prussian districts informs us that for every hundred children attending Sunday school in 1914 not more than twenty attend now.

As we have seen in our survey, the decline in German church attendance is not a post-war product, but had been obvious fifty years before, after an ostensible revival from the indifferentism of the first generation of the nineteenth century; and the decline had been plainly progressive before the war.

The movement of Biblical and other criticism in Germany has had a significant effect on the supply of students for the theological profession. The numbers of Protestant and Catholic theological students in all Germany have varied as follows:—*Protestant*: 1831, 4,147; 1851, 1,631; 1860, 2,520; 1876, 1,539; 1882–83, 3,168. *Catholic*: 1831, 1,801; 1840, 866; 1850, 1,393; 1860, 1,209; 1880, 619.¹ Thus, under the reign of reaction which set in after 1848 there was a prolonged recovery; and again after 1876 the figures rise for Protestantism through financial stimulus. When, however, we take population into account, the main movement is clear. In an increasing proportion, the theological students come from the rural districts (69.4 in 1861–70), the towns furnishing ever fewer;² so that the conservative measures did but outwardly and formally affect the course of thought; the clergy themselves showing less and less inclination to make clergymen of their sons.³ Even among the Catholic population, though that had increased from ten millions in 1830 to sixteen millions in 1880, the number of theological students had fallen from eleven to four per 100,000 inhabitants.⁴ Thus, after many "reactions" and much Bismarckism, the *Zeit-Geist* in Germany was pronouncedly sceptical in all classes in 1881,⁵ when the church accommodation in Berlin provided for only two per cent of the population, and even that provision outwent the demand.⁶ In February, 1914, on a given Sunday, out of a Protestant population of over two millions, only 35,000 persons attended church in Berlin.⁷

In the United States the economic situation is somewhat different. There the general standard of clerical culture has never been high, though there have always been many scholarly clerics; and the theological chairs at the chief universities have latterly been as competently filled as anywhere. On the other hand, the average income of preachers in the large towns is relatively high. But whereas until lately there were numerous "liberal" preachers, these seem in the recent period of "fundamentalism" to come under new disabilities. The tendency is, there as elsewhere, for the Modernist to lose his converts, who lapse

¹ Conrad, *The German Universities for the Last Fifty Years*, Eng. tr. 1885, p. 74. See p. 100 as to the financial measures taken; and p. 105 as to the essentially financial nature of the "reaction."

² *Id.* p. 103.

³ *Id.* p. 104.

⁴ *Id.* p. 112. See pp. 118–19 as to Austria.

⁵ *Id.* pp. 97–8.

⁶ White, *Warfare*, i, 239.

⁷ Art. on "Creeds, Heresy-Hunting, and Secession in German Protestantism To-day," in *Hibbert Journal* for July, 1914, p. 722.

from church-going precisely in the ratio of their Modernism. When they cease to regard the addressing of prayer and praise to the Infinite as a rational procedure, they tend to seek their rational culture in books, and the liberal preacher is left facing a congregation of the type which desires not rational culture but participation in "divine service." Thus the American pulpit latterly tends even more than the British to remain at low intellectual levels.

As against all intellectualism, on the other hand, the Church of Rome officially stands, as it always did, on the adhesion of an unintellectual mass in which the impulses of faith, ritual, and "divine service" are strong, and over whom the Pope, as Vicar of God on earth, wields the ancient spell. That was the simple secret of his past position as "the prisoner of the Vatican." Should he accept the position of being a real part of the Italian State, his mystic hold on Catholics throughout the world would be gone, and with it the bulk of his revenue. And inasmuch as the percentage of the "unintellectual religious," who care more for the solacement of their religious feelings than for knowledge, or science, or logic, or sheer thinking of any kind, is still great, and likely for long to remain so, the Papacy is likely in future to remain strong in inertia, in despite of all Modernist stirrings. It does not seek a "reconciliation with science," or a cultured clerisy, though it has a certain number of cultured clerics. Eminent men of science, and some eminent scholars, remain within its fold; but they are alike held to silence on questions vitally concerning faith. The scholar who pursues Biblical criticism on modern lines has short shrift. M. Loisy is one of a number of instances. In the words of Newman, "the wild, living intellect of man" is to be barred outside the field of faith; the barring being in part wrought by unbelieving cardinals.

But there is a *per contra*. In the Catholic countries so-called, the Papacy pays the price of its policy in the general hostility, tacit or overt, of the educated classes. In France, in Spain, in Italy, in the Central and South American States, the "liberal" spirit, which craves popular education and its fruits, has been anti-clerical throughout the past century, and visibly tends to remain so. Thus Catholicism may be said to be in a sense stronger in most of the so-called Protestant countries, in Britain, in Holland, in Germany, in the United States, than in the Catholic countries. In Spain the universities grow markedly anti-clerical. As Catholicism was strong in Ireland in the past against Protestant ascendancy, so it is relatively strong as against Protestantism elsewhere, keeping the larger and more devout congregations.

It has thus long been natural for freethinkers in Britain to see in "Rome" the ultimate enemy. Protestantism they can see to be a decaying force, by reason of the unceasing play of critical thought. Catholicism, being relatively immune to critical thought, careful to exclude it when it appears, and confident of a following that cares for other things, is

conceivably an engine for the future employment of new compulsions against freethought. And yet there are reasons for abstinence from any prediction on the subject. The Papacy is as it were a pyramid poised on its apex ; and any attempt at active socio-political concentration on its part throughout the world might so react upon it in Italy that its centralization might collapse. Meantime, it figures as a force operating injuriously through democracy in the United States to stifle criticism and the free play of education. The problem seems not unlikely to be brought to a head there, should Protestant obscurantism be effectively reduced by educative propaganda.

And inasmuch as an effective socio-political supremacy of Romanism would mean the virtual subjugation of democracy, it is only on a pessimistic view of human destinies that such a consummation can be forecasted in the name of social science. On the melioristic view, Romanism would seem likely to be the flag under which, in future generations, the religious type of man and woman will be aggregated, in contrast with the rationalistic. But that generalization in turn is not a complete induction from the data. Alongside of the phenomena of extending rationalism and weakening credulity within the pale of historic religion, we have the phenomena of the extension of non-philosophic Spiritualism, the spontaneous and self-developing belief in "communication with the other world," which in America and Britain in particular yields a growing revenue to a multitude of exploiters. That cult, and the Bibliolatrous cult of "Christian Science," supply the proof that the appeal of Romanism to the non-intellectual is no monopoly even in its special field.

The late Mark Twain, himself a divided spirit, predicted about the end of the last or the beginning of the present century that within thirty years "Christian Science" would be the reigning religion of the United States. That cult is notable as the only one thus far successfully founded by a woman,¹ and by women it has been largely embraced.² It appears to make a special appeal to the uncultured rich by a blend of hygienic and emotional promise ; and, like mediumistic Spiritualism, it visibly gains ground while the Protestant Churches are losing ground. The historic phenomenon of Mormonism in the past is a reminder to the devotees of blind faith that their lever and their fulcrum are capable of

¹ It cannot be said that any such success was attained by the equally Bibliolatrous and much more fanatical and illiterate movement started in 1792 by Joanna Southcott (1750-1814), who called herself "the Lamb's wife," and proposed to "seal" 144,000 of "the faithful" in terms of her prophecies. Her chief sensation, at the close of her career, was the proclamation (1802-13) that she should be the mother of a supernatural "Shiloh." She produced much doggerel verse, which, like her prose, is on a still lower literary level than the writings of Mrs. Baker Eddy. Yet two minor sects, founded by John Ward and John Wroe, sprang from her movement, of which there have been reverberations even in 1928.

² There appears to be no modern resort to goddess worship, apart from Keshub Chunder Sen's doctrine of the "Motherhood of God."

entirely new employment. We have to face, in short, the biological and sociological fact that the human race embodies large survivals of the "pre-logical man" of the prime, functioning in the mental life for "alogical" belief as in the active life for war, social and international, and for all manner of inefficiencies.

Once more we may contemplate the issue as one between "Culture and Anarchy," with the recognition that the "culture" of mankind is an enormously more arduous, more complex, more elusive ideal than it was for Arnold, so confident—in his prose mood—of the efficacy of a belletrist preparation, so unalert to the impotence of undisciplined thought. The lesson of our culture-history, as briefly scanned in the foregoing chapters, is that even the stricter disciplines remain but imperfect trainers of the complete mind of man as thus far evolved; that every pioneer in turn is seen to have gone somewhere astray either in his inductions or in his deductions, when they are scrutinized by a strict logic; and that the synthesis of their results is forever a new problem. There are few more sinister phenomena than the inaptitude of men in mass for anything like a strict concept of doctrinal veracity. The slow gain consists in the cumulative superiority of the logical over the alogical. And if we are to draw any prognostic conclusion from our creed of evolution it would seem to be this, that the alogical, which cannot conceivably be an advantage to the organism in general, whatever it may be to those who exploit it, will gradually yield to the logical—barring cataclysm.

It may be left to pessimistic romance to picture the human future as a differentiation of species yielding on the one hand degraded and on the other etiolated types, alike degenerate, alike receding from civilization.¹

Before the uncompassable problem of the cosmos, still solved by some with formulas of Divine Purpose—thus positing a finite Infinite and a relative Absolute—the activities of romance are seen to be part of the æsthetic life, whatever their simulation of science and ethic, and the exercise of prediction to be a field of conflict between science and sciolism, analogous to that of therapeutics. History, which is part of the effort to grasp Reality, dictates circumspection, and nourishes sanity, despite the systematic effort to write it in the interest of preconceptions. Our survey begins with a study of reversal by social cataclysm. Our own day presents another social cataclysm, that of Russia, which to some seems to compromise the spirit of progress anew. The student who scans at once the social and the intellectual problem is not likely thus to infer that evil will forever frustrate reason by brutally exploiting ignorance and blind egoism. He will rather reinforce his conviction that the task of reason is perpetual; and that his own work must be forever better done. The Russian cataclysm took place in a field of the

¹ Two brilliant examples are the *Here and Hereafter* of the late Barry Pain and the *Time Machine* of Mr. H. G. Wells, who has latterly cultivated optimistic forecasts, for a time theistic, then non-theistic,

most widespread ignorance, long maintained by religious machinery. It is no augury for more civilized lands.

Nor will he even see it as a perpetual battle between perpetual opposites, sheep and goats of reason and unreason, creatures predestinately classed by their types in conflicting armies. It remains true, indeed, that of all the approaches to the hundred-gated city of truth the darkest, the most devious and dangerous, the most malarious and precarious, is that of traditionary religion, with its vain short-cut of auto-suggestion. But the history reveals that light has sometimes been flashed from the army ostensibly vowed to the extinction of new light ; that the love of truth emerges within the pale of the Guardians of Untruth, and is always invading it ; and above all, that the truth-seeker is in his turn fallible, forever subject to revision by himself or by his kind. And if he is always open to the missiles of the mercenaries of opportunism, his is yet a trifling trial compared with that endured in their warfare by the men who broke his path for him. Cheap publicity, he knows, remains predominantly available for cheap thought. The more reason to perfect the weapons of higher thought. Rationalism is still obviously at a disadvantage in the English press, where the *Times*¹ maintains, for its Catholic *clientèle*, the miraculous character of the career of Jeanne Darc. Thus, after a century-and-a-half of fluctuating progress, the forward-looking student is recalled to the simple maxim of the great freethinker who, with all his miscarriages, was so much better alike in head and heart than his enemies, *Il faut cultiver notre jardin*.

The task of freethought in the twentieth century, then, is to improve on the freethought of the nineteenth. It will include, it is to be hoped, a re-writing and a better writing of the history thereof. For the survey has taught us, if anything, that history, like science, is a perpetual reconstruction, and that what may rationally be regarded as a true summary at any period is the outcome of the whole intellectual effort of the age.

And it is well to face, in that temper, the possibilities of declination. In the carnage of the World War, every country actively involved may be held to have lost ten per cent of the best brains of a selection of its most vigorous youth. For Britain, the special loss may be put at a hundred thousand. What that means in the total efficiency of the mental movement is not to be calculated ; but it suffices to account for phases of apparent resurgence of the creeds of ignorance. Alongside of the mournful avowals of good clerics as to the decline of faith appear vulgar pretences that rationalism is gone "out of fashion." That is bought advocacy. Once more, the true advance is to be measured only on a large retrospect.

Churchmen who have seen their bishops capitulating to Darwinism, and their commentators accepting the results of Biblical criticism while

¹ May 15, 1928,

feebly claiming an allomorphic "inspiration" for discredited books and clinging to New Testament miracles while abandoning others, can hardly suppose themselves to be in possession of a lasting body of historic or ethical reality, whatever may be their concern to maintain their economic basis. Rationalists, indeed, who have seen their pioneers commit error and fallacy, can as little pretend to frame a final conspectus that, in detail, will resist all criticism. But they are the pioneers. Theirs forever is the function of advance, though they do but effect a perpetual rectification, knowing that, in the grave words of the great ancient commonplace, they are as runners successively carrying forward the ever new-kindled torches of the life of the mind.

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